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Abstract 
Risk and uncertainty have a vital impact on any business, but are par-
ticvilarly influential in the shipping industry. Although risk and uncertainty 
constitute the hfe-blood that courses through the veins of business, decision 
makers typically attempt to reduce the risks to which their decisions are 
subject. This is because there inevitably exists a level of risk which the 
decision maker is unwilling to accept. 
In May 1985 a new method of risk reduction in shipping became avail-
able through the introduction of B I F F E X — the Baltic International Freight 
Futures Exchange. Participants in shipping can now hedge against their 
risks in the physical market by taking a position on the new futures mar-
ket. This adds a new dimension to the situation as it existed before the 
introduction of B I F F E X , when the hedging of market risk was undertaken 
solely by holding alternative forms of physical contract. 
Typically, decision makers in shipping have formulated hedging strate-
gies on the basis of ad hoc, inconsistent and subjectively judgemental cri-
teria. This work is concerned with the optimization of the risk reduction 
process by integrating the different forms of market investment in a port-
foho context. 
T h e methodology used is bzised on Modern Portfoho Theory ( M P T ) . 
This provides a formal structure for the deduction of a subjectively optimal 
portfoho, in the sense that it yields the 'best' r isk/return trade-off in Hne 
with a decision maker's own attitude to risk. Previously. M P T has been 
apphed solely to the determination of optimum portfolios of stocks and 
shares. The theory is, therefore, refined in accordance with the require-
ments of shipping. Similajly, the theory has previously only been appHed 
to investors who are *risk averse'. In this work, it is expanded to include 
those investors who are 'risk prone' or 'risk neutral'. The objective of the 
thesis is thus the successful implementation of M P T to allow the deduction 
of a subjectively optimal portfoho of shipping market investments. 
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Chapter 1 
In t roduct ion 
1.1 Defining the Scope of the Analysis 
According to the Oxfo rd English Dict ionary, the verb ' to hedge' is a colloquial 
te rm meaning ' to secure oneself against a loss on a bet by be t t ing on the 
other side'. In a business context, the term has a parallel meaning which 
can be derived by subst i tu t ing the terms 'an investment ' and ' invest ing ' for 
'a bet' and ' be t t ing ' in the above def in i t ion . The losses which a commercial 
hedger seeks to mit igate are invariably the direct result of adverse price 
fluctuations through t ime. The 'prices' referred to may relate to those which 
are paid, and are therefore relevant to the costs of a commercial enterprise, 
or equally, to those that are charged and which, therefore, affect revenue. In 
both instances, such losses are never manifest in the company accounts since 
they are measured solely on the basis of the oppor tun i ty cost incurred in 
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aol taking advantage of some available al ternative. Thus, a company which 
actually made Si mi l l ion prof i t out of a part icular deal would be deemed as 
having incurred a Si mi l l ion loss if , had they adopted an a l ternat ive strategy, 
they would have made S2 mil l ion prof i t . 
[n a shipping context, a shipowner suffers losses ( in the sense of opportu-
ni ty cost) if, for example, he is locked in to a lengthy t ime charter while the 
returns which could be earned on the voyage charter market have increased 
to a greater level than those pertaining in the t ime charter market . Simi-
larly, a shipowner who has arranged a forward voyage contract for some t ime 
in the fu ture at a certain freight rate wi l l be exposed to the risk of a rise 
in the freight rate for such a voyage dur ing the in t e r im period. The same 
examples but w i th opposite price movements i l lustrate the potent ia l losses 
or oppor tun i ty cost accrued to the charterer. 
I t is the potent ia l i ty for such losses tha t is inherent in the t e rm risk'. 
However, when working w i t h i n the confines of a capitalist economy ( in a 
global sense), i t is imperative that such risk exists. I t is due to the existence of 
risk, that there is potential for prof i t . A t the same t ime, ind iv idua l enterprises 
endeavour to l i m i t , at least to some extent , their exposure to this risk. It is 
this a im to which the practice of hedging directs itself. 
Gray (1987) points to the fact that the commercial risk which shipping 
companies have to face can be broadly classified in to four categories: 
1. Interest rate risk 
2. Exchange rate risk 
3. Bunker price risk 
4. Market risk 
The original intent ion of this work was to assess how members of the 
shipping communi ty decide on the need to hedge their costs and revenues 
and to then determine which methods they should use in order to best f u l f i l 
their requirements. I t is clear that the fundamenta l raison d'etre for hedging 
is the existence of risk. The available methods of hedging depend upon the 
fo rm of that risk. Thus, i f an unrestricted analysis of hedging in shipping is 
undertaken then i t also needs to be classified in to the four categories outl ined 
above. Apar t f r om the potent ial ly Herculean nature of this task, there are 
several other just i f icat ions for l i m i t i n g the area of interest. 
Interest rate risk and exchange rate risk are not peculiar to the shipping 
industry. Many companies in a plethora of different industries are faced wi th 
the same problems. Because of this feature, methods which may be employed 
for hedging against such risks are well documented. Brown (1979) and Hey-
wood (1984), for example, have suggested a variety of methods for hedging 
currency or exchange rate risk when dealing in different in ternat ional com-
modities. Similarly, Rebell, Gordon &c P la twick (L984) discuss the way that 
an interest rate hedging strategy needs to be incorporated into investment 
decisions. The conclusions drawn in their work are supported by, for exam-
ple, those of Beenstock & Brasse (L984) and Figlewski (1986). In add i t ion to 
the vast array of work on currency and interest rate risk, the possible meth-
ods of hedging against these two risks have not altered dramat ical ly over the 
last decade. 
Bunkers can be looked at as a specific product submarket of the oi l in-
dustry. O i l companies, amongst many others, are forever hedging against 
adverse movements in the price of o i l . Because of the influence exerted by oi l 
on the state of the world economy, the methods that are used are again well 
publicized. These methods are directly analogous to those used for hedging 
bunker price risk in the shipping industry, [n general, there are no peculiar 
options available solely to shipping companies. Clubley (1986) describes var-
ious strategies for hedging against adverse oi l price changes and, therefore, 
risk. 
Al though bunkers are specifically associated w i t h the shipping industry, i t 
is theoretically possible that certain large and, therefore, impor tan t members 
of the shipping communi ty may never need to become involved in the hedging 
of bunker prices merely because they never have to buy bunkers. This is true 
of charterers who adopt a policy of h i r ing ships purely on a voyage basis. 
Bunker price movements are more than likely incorporated in the freight 
rates that they pay, but the bunker price risk which they face then becomes 
veiled by the shroud of market risk. 
[t is, in fact, the type of market risk faced by members of the shipping 
communi ty that is the only t ru ly generic fo rm of risk which pertains solely, 
wholly and exclusively to that shipping communi ty . In this context, of course, 
the shipping communi ty can be regarded as consisting only of the pr imary 
dealers in the market vis a vis the shipowners and the charterers. A fur ther 
interesting aspect of analysing the hedging of market risk is the fact that on 
May L^' 1985, a new mechanism for potent ia l hedgers was introduced in the 
form of the Bal t ic . In te rna t iona l Freight Futures Exchange ( B I F F E X ) . This 
makes its analysis especially t imely. Further support is provided by Gray 
(I987p5) who writes: 
"Market risk is the Rrst, and arguably the most impor tan t , of 
the risks a successful owner must learn to manage and control ." 
W i t h these just i f icat ions in mind, i t was decided to concentrate solely on 
the hedging of market risk in the shipping industry . Market risk refers to the 
potent ia l i ty of adverse freight rate movements. Obviously, what constitutes 
an adverse movement depends upon what side of a part icular shipping con-
tract one considers. A n adverse freight rate movement for a charterer wi l l be 
a beneficial movement for the shipowner and vice versa. Thus, i t could be 
inferred that an op t ima l hedging strategy for a charterer wi l l be the analogue 
of that of a shipowner. In order to assess the val idi ty of such an inference, i t 
is necessary to consider what exactly constitutes a hedge of market risk. 
It is widely accepted that when freight rates are generally high, but are 
expected to decrease in the near future , shipowners w i l l , where possible, ne-
gotiate long-term t ime charters in order to lock in those high rates. I t is clear 
then that a t ime charter constitutes a physical hedge against generally de-
clining market rates and, therefore, against the rate per ta ining under voyage 
charter. A t the other end of the market, a shipowner w i t h , for example, two 
ships* and who is locked into a t ime charter at a relatively low freight rate 
wi l l seek to employ his other ship on voyage charters i f the freight market is 
expected to rise. Thus , a voyage charter may const i tute a hedge against the 
market risk incurred by a t ime charier. 
These are just two, somewhat simplistic, situations f rom a welter of pos-
sibilities. However, they do i l lustrate tha i what constitutes a hedge under 
one incumbent s i tuat ion may not under another. The part icular hedging 
strategy that is adopted, i f i t is to be proved beneficial, depends upon a 
relatively clear and accurate view of the fu ture . As in the theoretical exam-
ples quoted above, the existence of such a view would, however, i rnp l ic i i ly 
remove the risk and allow the decision maker to achieve an o p t i m a l hedging 
strategy very easily as his accurate view of the fu tu re changes through t ime. 
.Assuming, very realistically, that the fu ture cannot be accurately predicted 
then the shipowner is left in a position where he has to hedge against all 
possible future situations given his current one. Consequently, the problem 
the shipowner faces becomes not one of hedging against par t icular future 
circumstances, but one of holding a par t icular mix of physical contracts such 
that, whatever fu ture s i tuat ion arises, he has hedged his market risk to the 
extent that he wishes. 
The recent addi t ion of freight futures has provided yet another tool for 
hedging market risk. This new addi t ion also needs to be blended w i t h the 
available physical contracts in order to achieve a mix which the ind iv idua l 
shipowner regards as op t imal . This statement alludes to the concept of 
subjective op t imal i ty . This is an impor tan t idea. Since the potent ial for 
profit (and loss) is dependent on the existence of risk, the greater the level of 
risk acceptance, the greater the potent ia l for prof i t and for loss. The amount 
of risk the shipowner is prepared to take in search of prof i t is dependent 
upon his indiv idual circumstances, values and at t i tudes. Thus , there exists 
no object ively op t ima l mix of shipping contracts. 
If the commitment of resources in general, and costs in part icular , are 
allocated to the physical contracts available to the shipowner and to the 
freight futures contracts, then i t is possible to consider t ime charters, voyage 
charters, freight futures contracts etc. as ' investments' . Thus , in determining 
a shipowner's op t imal 'hedging' strategy, one can consider the problem as 
being the ident i f icat ion of a shipowner's subjectively op t ima l por t fo l io of 
market investments. 
Returning now to the question raised earlier as to whether a charterer's 
op t ima l por t fo l io of investments wi l l s imply be the analogue of the shipowner's 
As has been shown, i t is the mix or por t fo l io of available shipping invest-
ments which is important in a t t empt ing to reduce risk to the level required. 
The charterer, however, is dealing not only in shipping markets, but also in 
the market of the commodi ty for which he seeks a ship for t ranspor ta t ion 
purposes. Indeed, his risk exposure is usually far greater in the commodi ty 
market than i t is in the shipping market . Th i s is purely and s imply a funct ion 
of where his overall cost and, therefore, investment is allocated. 
In order to subjectively optimize a charterer's por t fo l io of investment, the 
decisions made wi th regard to shipping must be integrated w i t h those made 
in , for example, the commodi ty markets. The resultant opt imized portfolios 
wi l l differ , therefore, depending upon whether the charterer is moving steel, 
coal, grain, bauxite, etc, etc. 
In order to constrain the breadth of this analysis and also to concentrate 
only on the hedging of risk in shipping, i t is necessary to l i m i t the s tudy to the 
subjective opt imizat ion solely of the shipowner's por t fo l io . It is in tu i t ive ly 
obvious that the market risk faced by a shipowner affects only his revenue, 
thus i t is the hedging of shipowning revenue which forms the core of the 
analysis. Hemming (1986) supports this impl ied view that , in the mar i t ime 
industries, the most impor tant uncertainties affect revenues rather than costs. 
By analogy wi th the comments made w i t h regard to the charterer, i t 
could be construed that an investment por t fo l io approach to the analysis 
is only relevant to those companies who have shipping as their only com-
mercial interest. Such a conclusion is. theoretically correct. However, many 
t rad i t iona l shipowning companies, par t icu lar ly the larger ones, have diversi-
fied away f rom shipping. For example, P & 0 have vast property interests 
and Chr is t ian Salveson are now a majo r road haulage firm. I t is clear tha t 
for a po r t fo l io based methodology to be properly applied, all possible market 
investments must be treated as an integrated whole. iVevertheless, i t could 
be argued that for those companies who have maintained a major interest in 
shipowning, the approach is s t i l l valid since by op t imiz ing their irivestments 
in the shipping markets they stand a better chance of achieving overall op t i -
mal i ty or very close to i t . 
Thus far, jus t i f ica t ion has been given for l i m i t i n g the analysis contained 
wi th in this work to the subjective op t imiza t ion of the market investments of 
shipowners. There remains one fur ther theoretical constraint to explain. The 
fact that B I F F E X has provided an innovative and novel al ternative market 
investment, in the form of freight futures, has already been alluded to. These 
contracts, however, were designed expressly for the dry bulk sector. The use 
of freight futures, i n their current f o r m , as a hedging mechanism for tanker 
operators, for example, is extremely i l l-advised. As a consequence, i t lias been 
found necessary to fur ther l im i t the analysis to the investments available in 
the dry bulk sector. 
There are a number of methodologies available wi th in the sphere of fi-
nancial economics which theoretically cater for the subjective op t imiza t ion 
of investment portfolios. Arguably the most impor tan t , and certainly the 
most widely used, methodology for undertaking this task is Modern Port-
folio Theory as a t t r ibu ted to Markowi tz (1952). In its broadest sense, this 
methodology involves the measurement of returns, risk and risk a t t i t ude in 
order to derive an op t ima l por t fol io which meets the requirements of indi-
vidual decision makers. From this methodology, two other mainstream alter-
native approaches have been developed. Arb i t rage Pricing Theory (see Ross 
(1976)) and the Opt ion Pricing Model, as expounded by Bookstaber (1950) 
and Black, Fisher & Scholes (1973), have both been suggested as viable alter-
natives to-Modern Por t fol io Theory in explaining and/or prescribing investor 
behaviour. However, all three of these methodologies have nearly always been 
applied to the area of pure investment relating to stocks and shares. The i r 
application to the markets of particular industries are few and far between. 
Because both Arbi t rage Pricing Theory and the Opt ion Pricing Model 
can merely be regarded as refinements of the original Modern Por t fol io The-
ory, it was decided to a t tempt to apply the original methodology to the study 
contained wi th in this work. This decision is supported by ihe fact that the 
two alternatives were originally devised in order to overcome the computa-
tional diff icult ies inherent in applying Modern Por t fol io Theory. In these 
times of sophisticated computerized technology, such diff icult ies are more 
easily surmounted. 
10 
1.2 Setting the Objectives 
Having established the precise area of study, i t is now necessary to describe 
the objectives which the ensuing analysis seeks to meet. The analysis at-
tempts to determine the op t ima l por t fo l io of market investments in the dry 
bulk shipping sector under certain market conditions and for shipowners of 
a certain risk a t t i tude . However, such specific results are inevi tably open 
to cr i t ic ism by vir tue of the assumptions that have been made in achieving 
those results. The inaccessibihty of privileged in fo rma t ion also detracts f rom 
the results achieved. By virtue of these potent ial shortcomings, the pr imary 
purpose of this work is not to discover the def ini t ive op t ima l por t fo l io thai a 
dry bulk shipowner should hold, however interesting and relevant the results 
might be, but rather to assess whether Modern Por t fo l io Theory provides a 
practical methodology for such a company to deduce a por t fo l io which satis-
fies their own subjective cri teria for op t imal i ty . In a wider sense, therefore, 
the study constitutes a macroeconomic assessment of what is fundamental ly 
a microeconomic methodology. 
The or ig inal i ty of this work is derived f rom a number of features. .As 
has already been alluded to, the application of the Modern Por t fo l io Theory 
methodology to the market investments of a par t icular indus t ry is extremely 
rare. As far as this author is aware, i t has never been done, in any for-
mal sense, for the market investments of shipowners. Indeed, even i f there 
I I 
were a previous appl icat ion, this would now be redundant w i t h the recent 
development and in t roduc t ion o f B I F F E X . 
Inevitably, the original Markowi tz (1952) exposit ion of the theory wi l l 
have to be adapted to faci l i tate an applicat ion to shipowning. Cer ta in adap-
tations may not be absolutely v i t a l to the successful implementa t ion of the 
theory to a practical appl icat ion, but may s imply be preferred because they 
improve the analytical t rac tab i l i ty of the procedures invoked to obtain the 
required results. Since the u l t imate a im of this research is to provide a work-
able technique which can be practical ly applied by shipowners to aid in their 
market investment decision making, the min imiza t ion of the time and effort 
required to instigate the methodology fur ther just if ies such adaptations. The 
specification of these various adaptations and their successful incorporat ion 
into the original theory constitutes more evidence to support the or iginal i ty 
of this work. 
The question now arises as to why it is impor tan t that shipowners do opt i -
mize their market investment por t fo l io . Remembering that the opt imiza t ion 
process espoused by Modern Por t fol io Theory takes in to account the sub-
jective risk a t t i tude of the company, any deviat ion away f rom the o p t i m u m 
portfol io holding wi l l mean either: 
o that the company in question is allocating resources to the market in 
too conservative a manner, so that they are overcompensaiing for risk. 
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Thus, they are not generating as high a prof i t as they might i f they 
took greater risks. 
- or 
• that the company in question is exposing itself to risks that are defi-
nitely unwanted and perhaps even dangerous to its continued survival 
should circumstances prove disadvantageous. 
Both of these situations have wider implications for the indus t ry and, 
indeed, for society as a whole. The probabi l i ty of shipping bankruptcy is 
greatly increased i f i nd iv idua l companies are not operat ing at the o p t i m u m 
level. This is impor tan t for a number of varying reasons. Employment is obvi-
ously affected, but so are national income through foreign currency earnings, 
trade itself and even defence. The development of t h i r d world coiintries is 
of ten pinned on the success of its shipping industry. Where the companies 
that compose that indust ry are not operat ing at the o p t i m u m level, the na-
tion's development may be hindered. There are potent ial ly numerous other 
mul t ip l ie r affects caused by an unhealthy shipping indust ry which are even 
more di f f icul t to assess. The importance of its role is suggested by Slopford 
( I988p2) when he writes: 
•'The progression f rom a wor ld of isolated communit ies to to-
day's integrated global communi ty was made possible by shipping 
and sea trade." 
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The risks that this study is p r imar i l y concerned w i t h are those pertaining 
to specific potent ial contractual transactions which are available as invest-
ment choices to decision makers in the shipping arena. As such, they are 
strategic in nature and as a consequence are of major impor t to the survival 
and well-being of any enterprise involved in the shipping industry. I f the 
methodology assessed herein could lead to an improvement in the efficiency 
and effectiveness of shipping companies then i t should be applauded, valued 
and adopted for the benefit of a l l . As Zannetos (1972) so pragmatical ly puts 
i t : 
' 'What I plead is for better analyt ical models and better data 
to support managerial decisions, [ n t u i t i o n is great, but i n tu i t i ve 
solutions must be tested for val idi tv!" 
The major objectives of this study can thus be enumerated as follows: 
1. To determine whether Modern Por t fo l io Theory provides a practical 
and useful methodology for the analysis and selection of market port-
folio holdings for shipowners in the dry bulk sector. 
2. T o determine the changes to the original methodology that are neces-
sary to facihtate its successful appLcation to shipping. 
3. To assess the potent ia l usefulness of the methodology in other sectors 
and for other types of market investor. 
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4. To find the theoretically prescribed portfolios of dry bulk market in-
vestments for investing companies w i t h di f fer ing risk profiles. 
In a t t empt ing to achieve these objectives, there a number of impor tan t 
questions that need to be answered which have interesting implicat ions in 
their own right . These include the fol lowing: 
• How can att i tudes towards risk be ascertained and measured*' 
• How can risk be measured and, i f so, what is the best measure? 
• Are there any differences between the risk at t i tudes of different types 
of shipowning company, different countries etc? 
• Is BIFF-EX a viable hedging tool and, i f so, who is using i t as such? 
• Is the Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model (see Plarrington (1983)) a useful 
tool for the measurement of risk in shipping? 
The number of possible questions which could be posed dur ing an analysis 
of this type is enormous, but these few represent some of tlie questions that 
this work, dur ing the course of seeking to achieve its p r imary object ive , has 
sought to answer. 
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1.3 C h a p t e r D e v e l o p m e n t 
A n i n t r o d u c t i o n to the concepts o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y is p r o v i d e d i n C h a p -
ter 2. [ n o rde r t o a l l e v i a t e some o f t h e p r o b l e m s o f d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h are 
appa ren t i n o t h e r w o r k s i n the same field, i t p r o v i d e s an o u t l i n e o f t h e t e r m i -
no logy w h i c h has been a d o p t e d for the purposes o f t h i s w o r k . T h i s i n c l u d e s a 
d e f i n i t i o n o f t he t y p e o f i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t y w i t h w h i c h t he e n s u i n g ana l -
ysis concerns i t se l f . C e r t a i n p s y c h o l o g i c a l aspects o f r i sk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y are 
discussed, mos t n o t a b l y t he i m p o r t a n c e o f t h e dec i s ion maker ' s a t t i t u d e to-
wards r i sk . T h e c h a p t e r concludes w i t h some gene ra l b a c k g r o u n d t o t he 
u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y o f r isk r e d u c t i o n a n d stresses t he need f o r a f o r m a l 
s t r u c t u r e w i t h i n w h i c h r isk assessment can be u n d e r t a k e n . 
C h a p t e r 3 seeks to p r o v i d e some i n s i g h t , fo r t he r e l a t i v e l y u n i n i t i a t e d , 
i n t o the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y as a w h o l e a n d t o e x p l a i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f 
the e n v i r o n m e n t o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h s u r r o u n d s i t . In o r d e r t o 
place th i s s t u d y i n t o c o n t e x t and t o set t he scene, a d e t a i l e d o u t l i n e o f h o w 
d r y b u l k s h i p p i n g has deve loped ove r t he past t w e n t y years is g i v e n . T h e 
f r a g m e n t e d n a t u r e o f d r y b u l k s h i p p i n g is d e s c r i b e d in t e r m s o f sh ips , cargoes 
and t rades a n d the i n t e r a c t i o n o f s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d i n d e t e r m i n i n g f r e i g h t 
rates is e x p l a i n e d . T h e f o r m u l a t i o n o f e x p e c t a t i o n s o n the basis o f forecasts 
is discussed as is the d i f f i c u l t y i n d e r i v i n g such forecasts f r o m a n ana lys i s 
o f the d e t e r m i n a n t s o f s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d . T h e a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e task o f 
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d e v e l o p i n g accu ra t e f r e i g h t rate forecasts r e in fo rces t he prevalence o f r isk a n d 
u n c e r t a i n t y i n s h i p p i n g and aga in j u s t i f i e s t he need fo r a m e t h o d o l o g y w h i c h 
a d e q u a t e l y deals w i t h i t s exis tence. 
T h e i n a d e q u a c y o f j u d g i n g i n v e s t m e n t s o n the basis o f E x p e c t e d M o n e -
t a r y V a l u e ( E M V ) is p r o v e d i n C h a p t e r 4. I m p l i c i t l y , t h i s decries t he value o f 
p r o f i t m a x i m i z a t i o n as a c o r p o r a t e o b j e c t i v e . T h e i m p o r t a n c e o f i n c o r p o r a t -
i n g r isk a t t i t u d e i n t o dec is ion m a k i n g is s tressed a n d the concep t o f u t i l i t y , 
as a n a t u r a l p r e r equ i s i t e to t he a p p l i c a t i o n o f M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y , is 
i n t r o d u c e d . R i sk ave r s ion , r isk proneness a n d r i sk n e u t r a l i t y are d e f i n e d i n 
t e rms o f t he concep t o f m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y a n d the process for m e a s u r i n g u t i l -
i t y is e x p o u n d e d . T h i s chap t e r concludes b y e s t a b l i s h i n g t h a t u t i l i t y ana lys i s 
w i l l f o r m the basis o f m e a s u r i n g the p r e v a l e n t a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s r i sk a m o n g s t 
sh ipowners . These measu remen t s w i l l t h e n c o n t r i b u t e t o the final ana lys i s o f 
i n v e s t m e n t cho ice as descr ibed by M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o t heo ry . 
C h a p t e r 5 begins by i l l u s t r a t i n g t he t e c h n i q u e used fo r u n d e r t a k i n g a 
u t i l i t y ana lys i s o f sh ipowner s , [ t relates t he t h e o r y t h a t has been discussed i n 
C h a p t e r 4 . to t he p r a c t i c e o f d e r i v i n g precise u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s for s h i p o w n e r s . 
T h e necessary d a t a is co l l ec ted f r o m a s u r v e y a n d a gene ra l m e t h o d o l o g y o f 
the s u r v e y p r o c e d u r e is p r o v i d e d t oge the r w i t h s t a t i s t i c s w h i c l i re la te to 
response ra te etc . T h e d a t a co l l ec ted v i a t h e s u r v e y is t h e n ana lysed a n d 
the resul ts o f t h a t ana lys i s , i n t h e f o r m o f t h e a p p r o p r i a t e m o d e l l e d u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n s , are p resen ted . 
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H o w u t i l i t y analys is f i t s i n t o t he o v e r a l l M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y m e t h o d -
o logy can be seen i n C h a p t e r 6, where the t r a d i t i o n a l f o r m o f the t h e o r y is 
presented . A d e t a i l e d g u i d e t o how the m e t h o d o l o g y is t h e o r e t i c a l l y i m -
p l e m e n t e d a n d the reasons w h y i t w o r k s are also p resen t . P a r t i c u l a r l y i m -
p o r t a n t is t he i n t e r a c t i o n o f the necessary i n p u t s t o t h e M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o 
T h e o r y m o d e l . These i n p u t s are u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s a n d measures o f b o t h r isk 
and r e t u r n . T h e a s s u m p t i o n s t h a t u n d e r l i e t he t h e o r y are discussed a n d 
the changes or a l t e r a t i o n s t o these a s s u m p t i o n s , w h i c h are necessary t o an 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n fo r sh ipowner s , are i t e m i z e d . 
I n o rde r to i m p l e m e n t M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y , i t is necessary t o o b t a i n 
measures o f r i sk and r e t u r n fo r a l l the p o r t f o l i o s t h a t m i g h t be c o n s t r u c t e d . 
Said p o r t f o l i o s can be c o m p o s e d o f a n u m b e r o f i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t s i n 
d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n s . C h a p t e r 7 del ineates t he i n d i v i d u a l m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t s 
t h a t are ava i l ab l e to a s h i p o w n e r . I n so d o i n g , i t becomes e v i d e n t t h a t 
c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t s d i f f e r f r o m o the r s so le ly o n legal or o p e r a t i o n a l 
g r o u n d s . A c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t s p u r e l y on 
the basis o f financial aspects, leads to the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t c e r t a i n o f the 
t r a d i t i o n a l s h i p p i n g m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t s m a y be o m i t t e d f r o m t h e ensu ing 
analys is . M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , t h i s c h a p t e r p rov ide s a d e t a i l e d i n t r o d u c t i o n t o 
f r e i g h t f u t u r e s and h o w t h e y w o r k . T h e f a c t t h a t B I F F E X c o n s t i t u t e s a 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y new a n d i n n o v a t i v e p o t e n t i a l m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t makes th i s 
e x p o s i t i o n especia l ly r e levan t . C h a p t e r 7 conc ludes w i t h an exac t j u s t i f i e d 
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s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f the u n i v e r s a l set o f possible m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t s av a i l ab l e to 
a s h i p o w n e r w h i c h w i l l be ana lysed us ing the genera l p r i n c i p l e s o f M o d e r n 
P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y . 
C h a p t e r 8 establ ishes the rules w h i c h g o v e r n t he c a l c u l a t i o n o f r e tu rns 
i n d r y b u l k s h i p p i n g f r o m d i f f e r e n t m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t s . I t is s h o w n t h a t 
a b u i l d i n g b lock a p p r o a c h t o m o d e l l i n g t he p e r t i n e n t r e t u r n s is the best 
m e t h o d ava i l ab le fo r t h i s sor t o f a p p l i c a t i o n . De ta i l s o f these m o d e l l e d re-
t u r n s fo r each m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t are p resen ted a n d the i m p l i c a t i o n s fo r the 
i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f the t h e o r y are discussed. 
I t can be seen i n C h a p t e r 9 t h a t , i n o r d e r to e s t i m a t e the risks associ-
a ted w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t , i t is a b s o l u t e l y [lecessary t o have 
es t imates o f r e t u r n a t h a n d . I t is s h o w n t h a t the re are n u m e r o u s ava i l ab l e 
m e t h o d s o f q u a n t i t a t i v e r isk e s t i m a t i o n . T h i s ana lys i s e m p l o y s j u s t f o u r , 
however , and the r isk e s t ima tes of each i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t are presented 
and discussed. P a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t i n t h i s respect is l i i e i r cons i s tency 
and l o g i c a l i t y . T h e p r o b l e m s associated w i t h r isk e s t i m a t i o n for p o r t f o l i o s 
are e n u m e r a t e d a n d a genera l c o m p a r i s o n o f t he adequacy o f eacli r isk mea-
sure i n a c h i e v i n g th i s a i m is u n d e r t a k e n . 
C h a p t e r 10 k n i t s t oge the r t he var ious c o m p o n e n t i n p u t s t o t he M o d e r n 
P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y m e t h o d o l o g y a n d g r a p h i c a l l y i l l u s t r a t e s a nove l means o f 
f i n d i n g a s o l u t i o n to t he s u b j e c t i v e l y o p t i m a l p o r t f o l i o . T h e fac t t h a t the 
results d i f f e r w h e n d i f f e r e n t measures o f r i sk are e m p l o y e d is h i g h l i g h t e d and 
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the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h i s fo r a p r a c t i c a l i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o 
T h e o r y to the s h i p o w n i n g i n d u s t r y are a l l u d e d t o . A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h i s chap t e r 
i l l u s t r a t e s the p r a c t i c a l p r o b l e m s w h i c h are not i m m e d i a t e l y a p p a r e n t w h e n 
d iscuss ing the u n d e r l y i n g t h e o r y as i n C h a p t e r 6 a n d prec i se ly e x p l a i n s how 
each pa r t o f the t h e o r y can be p r a c t i c a l l y a p p l i e d in a t t e m p t i n g t o achieve 
a s o l u t i o n . 
T h e final pa r t o f the work.. C h a p t e r I I , s t a r t s w i t h a p r a g m a t i c a l l y o r i e n -
t a t e d d iscuss ion o f t he resul ts ach ieved f r o m the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n o f the 
theory . C o m m e n t s are m a d e w i t h respect t o t he v i a b i l i t y o f M o d e r n P o r t f o -
l io T h e o r y as a m a n a g e m e n t t o o l i n the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y . T h e i m p l i c a t i o n s 
of a d o p t i n g such an a p p r o a c h are discussed and the advan tages a n d disad-
vantages o f the m e t h o d o l o g y are p o i n t e d o u t . T h e c h a p t e r conc ludes w i t h a 
genera l o v e r v i e w o f the f u r t h e r research poss ib i l i t i e s w h i c h are i n d i c a t e d by 
the analys is u n d e r t a k e n w i t h i n t h i s w o r k . 
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Chapter 2 
The Concepts of Risk and 
Uncertainty 
2.1 T h e N a t u r e of Dec i s ions , R i s k a n d U n -
certa inty 
Decis ions are made i n a l l aspects o f l i f e and in a v a r i e t y o f d i f f e r e n t c ir-
cums tances . T h i s w o r k , however , is conce rned p r i m a r i l y w i t h those decisions 
made w i t h i n a business e n v i r o n m e n t , a n d m o r e s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h those rel-
evant to t he h igher eschelons o f m a n a g e m e n t whe re h i g h c a p i t a l , h igh risk 
decisions are n o r m a l l y t a k e n . T h e r e l a t i v e i m p o r t a n c e o f a n y p a r t i c u l a r de-
c i s ion i n such an e n v i r o n m e n t m a y range f r o m the ' l i f e or d e a t h ' dec i s ion to 
the e x t r e m e l y m u n d a n e . However , t h e c o m m o n s t r i n g w h i c h t ics a l l types 
and levels o f dec is ion toge the r is t he ex is tence o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y , [ i 
is f r e q u e n t l y s t a t ed t h a t ' t h e o n l y c e r t a i n t y i n l i f e is d e a t h . ' T h e o b v i o u s 
c o r o l l a r y o f t h i s t r u i s m is t h a t t h e v e r y process o f m a k i n g a dec i s ion necessi-
tates t a k i n g a r isk . Indeed , r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y , t a k e n t oge the r , c a n c l ea r ly 
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be seen as an a l l -pervas ive i n f l u e n c e . K n i g h t ( 1921 ) even goes so f a r as to 
suggest t h a t h u m a n consciousness i t s e l f w o u l d d i sappear i n t h e i r absence. 
O n e m a j o r d i f f i c u l t y i n d i scuss ing a t o p i c such as r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y i n 
r e l a t i o n t o business dec is ion m a k i n g is t he lack o f a u n i f o r m t e r m i n o l o g y . Par-
t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t i n th is respect is t he v a r i e t y o f difi*erent d e f i n i t i o n s w h i c h 
have been a t t r i b u t e d to the t w o t e r m s . Some a u t h o r s i n the area s e e m i n g l y 
make no b e t t e r j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the d e f i n i t i o n s w h i c h t h e y a d o p t t h a n does 
Lewis C a r r o l l ' s charac te r o f H u m p t y D u m p t y i n ' A l i c e i n W o n d e r l a n d ' ; 
" ' W h e n I use a word* , H u m p t y D u m p t y said in a r a t h e r scorn-
f u l tone , ' i t means j u s t w h a t I choose i t t o m e a n - n e i t h e r m o r e 
nor less'." 
P rev ious w o r k i n the field shows t h a t a p a r a d o x exis ts , i n t h a t w h i l e cer-
t a i n a u t h o r i t i e s stress the d i f fe rences b e t w e e n r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y , o t h e r s use 
the t e rms in t e r changeab ly . W i t h i n t he conf ines o f t h i s w o r k , t he d e f i n i t i o n s 
o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l as f a r as poss ib le f o l l o w the f o r m e r p h i l o s o p h y . 
T h u s , a d i s t i n c t i o n w i l l be d r a w n b e t w e e n the t w o t e rms . H o w e v e r , prece-
den t suggests t h a t t he f r e e d o m exis ts t o precisely ' t a i l o r ' d e f i n i t i o n s to the 
m e t h o d o l o g i c a l needs o f the ana lys i s . 
R o w e ( 1 9 7 7 p l 7 ) states t h a t : 
" U n c e r t a i n t y exists i n the absence o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t pas t , 
present o r f u t u r e events , values o r c o n d i t i o n s . A l t h o u g h t h e r e 
are var ious degrees o f u n c e r t a i n t y , the basis o f the c o n c e p t o f 
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u n c e r t a i n t y is t he absence o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t pa r t s o f a s y s t e m 
unde r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " 
I m p l i c i t i n t h i s s t a t e m e n t is the f a c t t h a t u n c e r t a i n t y necessi tates the 
c o m p l e t e 'absence o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t pa r t s o f a sys t em u n d e r cons ider -
a t i o n . ' T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f u n c e r t a i n t y w i l l be r e f i n e d t o i n c o r p o r a t e those 
instances whe re the re is mere ly a p a r t i a l absence o f i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t pa r t s 
o f the dec is ion m a k i n g sys t em. T h e t e r m 'genera l u n c e r t a i n t y ' w i l l thus be 
used h e n c e f o r t h t o descr ibe the ex is tence o f p a r t i a l or t o t a l absence, i n c o m -
pleteness o r i m p r e c i s i o n o f i n f o r m a t i o n w i t h respect to the area o f dec i s ion 
m a k i n g . 
A g a i n a c c o r d i n g to Rowe (1977 ) , t he re are bas ica l ly t w o t y p e s o f i n f o r -
m a t i o n w h i c h need t o be deduced in o r d e r t o accu ra t e ly d e f i n e a n y sys t em 
under s t udy . These can be s u m m a r i z e d as fo l l ows ; 
D e s c r i p t i v e I n f o r m a t i o n T h i s relates t o t he i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e var iab les 
t h a t e x p l i c i t l y de f ine a s y s t e m . 
M e a s u r e m e n t I n f o r m a t i o n T h i s relates t o the s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f a va lue to 
be ass igned t o each v a r i a b l e ( a l r e a d y i d e n t i f i e d as d e s c r i p t i v e i n f o r m a -
t i o n ) w i t h i n a sys t em. 
[ t is f r o m th i s e x p o s i t i o n o f the c o m p o s i t e e lements o f i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t the 
d e f i n i t i o n s o f r i s k a n d u n c e r t a i n t y t o be used w i t h i n t h i s thesis w i l l be f u r t h e r 
d e r i v e d . I n r e l a t i o n to th i s aspect , i t can be said t ha t genera l u n c e r t a i n t y 
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occurs where there is a t o t a l or p a r t i a l s h o r t f a l l i n e i t he r o r b o t h o f t he 
t w o c o m p o s i t e e lements o f i n f o r m a t i o n , i .e. d e s c r i p t i v e a n d / o r m e a s u r e m e n t 
i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e t e r m 'genera l u n c e r t a i n t y ' can , t he r e fo re , be r ega rded as 
an a l l - encompass ing concep t w h i c h can o n l y no t be a p p l i e d t o those ( f e w ) 
occasions w h e n b o t h d e s c r i p t i v e and m e a s u r e m e n t i n f o r m a t i o n are k n o w n 
w i t h abso lu t e and d e f i n i t e c e r t a i n t y . 
Gene ra l fac to rs w h i c h on an i n d i v i d u a l basis, a n d t h r o u g h i n t e r a c t i o n , 
c o n t r i b u t e to the exis tence o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y i n c l u d e ; h u m a n , n a t u r a l 
a n d r a n d o m events , w h i c h a l l occur t o some degree i n mos t sys tems o f i n t e re s t 
b u t are especia l ly p e r t i n e n t to the area o f business dec is ion m a k i n g . 
. I t is clear f r o m the p rev ious d i scuss ion t h a t , i n a n y g i v e n dec i s ion m a k i n g 
s i t u a t i o n , the re m a y exis t e i the r d e s c r i p t i v e a n d / o r m e a s u r e m e n t u n c e r t a i n t y . 
T h e t e r m "general u n c e r t a i n t y ' has been d e f i n e d t o cover eve ry c o m b i n a t i o n o f 
these t w o e lements . Risk can be de f i ned as b e i n g t h a t p a n o f gene ra l uncer-
t a i n t y w h i c h is capab le o f b e i n g e n u m e r a t e d a n d e v a l u a t e d i n some m a n n e r . 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , r isk can be regarded as t h a t p a r t o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h 
has the p o t e n t i a l for f o r m a l i z a t i o n ar id m e a s u r e m e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y , t he r isk 
e l emen t o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y m u s t e n t a i l no d e s c r i p t i v e u n c e r t a i n t y and the 
measu remen t u n c e r t a i n t y m u s t be capab le o f some degree o f f o r m a l i z a t i o n . 
T o s u m m a r i z e the d e f i n i t i o n , r isk relates t o those c i r c u m s t a n c e s where t he 
possible o u t c o m e s o f a dec i s ion can be i d e n t i f i e d w i t h c e r t a i n t y b u t whe re 
the re exis ts a possible p o t e n t i a l u n w a n t e d consequence or loss. F u r t h e r , the 
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u n c e r t a i n t y in t he occur rence o f the p o t e n t i a l o u t c o m e s m u s t be capab le o f 
be ing expressed i n t he f o r m o f a p r o b a b i l i t y o f occu r r ence . 
T h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f risk raises t w o i m p o r t a n t issues w h i c h need t o be c lar-
i f i ed before p roceed ing any f u r t h e r . 
1. A l t h o u g h i n abso lu t e t e r m s , t h e r e e x i s t c e r t a i n ins tances w h e r e t he 
possible a l t e r n a t i v e o u t c o m e s o f a g i v e n dec i s ion m a y a l l be o f b e n e f i t to 
the business in q u e s t i o n , w h e n l o o k e d a t r e l a t i v e l y t h e n c e r t a i n o f t h e m 
become u n w a n t e d consequences i n t h e sense t h a t t h e y are less p r e f e r r e d . 
Hence, g i v e n a t least t w o a l t e r n a t i v e o u t c o m e s where a p re fe rence can 
be expressed, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f r i sk c a n be a p p l i e d . 
2. Once a l l p o t e n t i a l o u t c o m e s have been i d e n t i f i e d , i.e. t he re exis ts no 
d e s c r i p t i v e u n c e r t a i n t y , i t is a l w a y s possible t o a t t a c h p r o b a b i l i t i e s o f 
occu r r ence to the a l t e r n a t i v e s . T h i s m a y be done o n an e x t r e m e l y 
i n a c c u r a t e and ad hoc basis, b u t i m p o r t a n t l y i t can a l w a y s be done 
in some f o r m or a n o i h e r . I f t h i s were t he case, i t w o u l d s i m p l y mean 
t h a t the o u t c o m e o f a p a r t i c u l a r dec i s ion is m o r e u n c e r t a i n t h a n w o u l d 
o t h e r w i s e be t he case. 
T h e p o l i c y o f d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g be tween r i sk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y i n the m a n n e r ex-
p o u n d e d thus fa r i n the d iscuss ion is s u p p o r t e d e i t he r i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y 
by a u t h o r s sush as VVil le t t ( 1 9 0 1 p 6 ) a n d K n i g h t ( I 9 2 1 p 4 ) w h o r e spec t i ve ly 
de f ine r isk as be ing : 
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" T h e o b j e c t i f i e d u n c e r t a i n t y r e g a r d i n g the occu r r ence o f an 
undes i r ab l e even t " 
a n d 
" M e a s u r a b l e u n c e r t a i n t y . " 
J u s t i f i c a t i o n , t he re fo re , exists for a d e f i n i t i o n w h i c h regards r i s k as con-
s t i t u t i n g t he measu rab le subset o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y . 
As has been seen, where there ex is t s d e s c r i p t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , measure-
men t i n f o r m a t i o n can a lways be d e t e r m i n e d no m a t t e r how i n a c c u r a t e l y . 
Converse ly , whe re the re is no d e s c r i p t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n , t he re c a n n o t ex i s t any 
measuremen t u n c e r t a i n t y , since the re exis ts no i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t can be mea-
sured. T h i s ca t egory o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y is , t he r e fo re , a t o t a l l y r a n d o m 
p h e n o m e n o n w h e r e as M c L a n e y (1986) pu t s i t : 
". . . t he possible ou tcomes c a n n o t be even i d e n t i f i e d let a lone 
t h e i r l i k e l i h o o d assessed." 
T h e c o r o l l a r y o f such an a r g u m e n t is t h a t there are o n l y t w o c i r c u m -
stances w h i c h arise i n the p rac t ice o f business dec i s ion m a k i n g . T a k e n to-
gether , t he r e fo re , t h e y c o n s t i t u t e o v e r a l l genera l u n c e r t a i n t y w i t h t h e f o r m e r 
p r o v i d i n g a d e f i n i t i o n f o r t h e t e r m ' r i s k ' . I f t h a t p a r t o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y 
w h i c h c a n n o t be c lass i f ied as r isk is n o w d e f i n e d as ' r e s i d u a l u n c e r t a i n t y ' , i t 
is clear t h a t : 
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General ifncertainty = Risk -r Residual Uncertainty 
T h e o b v i o u s i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n the level o f r i sk a n d t h e level o f res idua l 
u n c e r t a i n t y is a v i t a l one. T h e leve l o f res idua l u n c e r t a i n t y is a c t u a l l y deter-
m i n e d by h o w fa r the dec is ion m a k e r can d e t e r m i n e t h e level o f r i sk present 
w i t h i n a g i v e n dec is ion choice; i.e. by how w e l l the dec i s ion m a k e r can co l -
lect and c o l l a t e d e s c r i p t i v e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d h o w e x h a u s t i v e and accu ra t e is 
the associated m e a s u r e m e n t i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e m o r e i n a c c u r a t e the dec is ion 
maker ' s e s t imates o f r i sk m e a s u r e m e n t , t h e n the g r ea t e r w i l l be the level to 
w h i c h r e s idua l u n c e r t a i n t y i m p i n g e s u p o n t h e r isk e v a l u a t i o n process and the 
final dec is ion choice. T h u s , the s i t u a t i o n can be f u l l y desc r ibed , w i t h regard 
to the t e r m i n o l o g y e m p l o y e d w i t h i n t h i s thesis , by t he schemat i c s h o w n i n 
F i g u r e 2 . 1 . 
T h e r e are a n u m b e r o f i m p o r t a n t reasons w h y r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y have 
been d i s t i n g u i s h e d in the w a y p r e v i o u s l y o u t l i n e d . F i r s t l y , by t r e a t i n g r isk as 
a speci f ic subset o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y , i t is n o w feas ib le to discuss t he level o f 
genera l u n c e r t a i n t y f a c i n g a dec is ion m a k e r i n such a w a y t h a l ' i t i n c o r p o r a t e s 
t he level o f risk t h a t is faced . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , i t also a l lows specif ic i n d e p e n d e n t 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f the level o f r i sk a n d the l eve l o f r e s idua l u n c e r t a i n t y faced 
by a dec i s ion m a k e r . 
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F i g u r e 2 . 1 : C o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n o f R i sk a n d U n c e r t a i n t y T e r m i n o l o g y 
Gene ra l U n c e r t a i n t y 
^ ^ ^ i s ^ Res idua l U n c e r t a i n t y 
A n o t h e r a d v a n t a g e i n the use o f such t e r m i n o l o g y lies w i t h the f ac t t h a t 
i t p rov ides l i m i t s w i t h i n w h i c h an ana lys i s o f r i sk r e d u c t i o n i n the s h i p p i n g 
i n d u s t r y m a y be u n d e r t a k e n . Since a dec i s ion m a k e r s h o u l d a lways seek 
to e n u m e r a t e as m u c h genera l u n c e r t a i n t y as is feas ib le , t h u s e n a b l i n g i t s 
e s t i m a t i o n as r i sk , the level o f res idua l u n c e r t a i n t y is ipso f a c t o reduced 
to as l ow a l eve l as is possible . F r o m t h a t p o i n t o n , t he t o t a l l y r a n d o m 
n a t u r e o f res idua l u n c e r t a i n t y belies a t t e m p t s t o a v o i d o r reduce i t f u r t h e r . 
Consequen t ly , w h i l e decis ion makers can go no f u r t h e r i n m i n i m i z i n g res idua l 
u n c e r t a i n t y , t h e y do have the o p t i o n o f i m p l e m e n t i n g pol ic ies w h i c h a t t e m p t 
to reduce the effects o f r i sk . I t is t o t h i s aspect t h a t t he rest o f t h i s w o r k w i l l 
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address i t se l f . 
2.2 R i s k , U n c e r t a i n t y a n d I n v e s t m e n t 
As has been s t a t ed i n t he f o r e g o i n g d iscuss ion , t h i s w o r k is p r i m a r i l y con-
cerned w i t h the r e d u c t i o n o f r i sk , since i t is r isk t h a t the dec i s ion m a k e r can 
t ake conscious a c t i o n to a v o i d or reduce. S p e c i f i c a l l y , t h i s w o r k concen t ra t e s 
on t h a t t e c h n i q u e o f r isk r e d u c t i o n k n o w n as ' h e d g i n g ' . T h i s t e r m relates 
to the t a k i n g o f a p a r t i c u l a r course o f a c t i o n w h i c h seeks t o t a l l y ' o r p a r t i a l l y 
to offset the a c t u a l effects or consequences o f a p o t e n t i a l u n w a n t e d o u t c o m e 
t h a t has a r isk associated w i t h i t . 
W i t h i n th i s b r o a d c o n t e x t , i t is business i n v e s t m e n t t h a t is o f p a r t i c u l a r 
in te res t . T h i s aga in raises a q u e s t i o n o f d e f i n i t i o n . W h a t e x a c t l y is mean t 
by the t e r m ' i n v e s t m e n t ' ? T h i s r e q u i r e m e n t is o f v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e i n t h a t 
i t b o t h defines the scope o f the ensu ing ana lys i s a n d y e t , at t he same t i m e , 
cons t ra ins the area o f in te res t . Spec i f i ca l ly , a d e f i n i t i o n o f i n v e s t m e n t pro-
v ided by B i e r m a n & S m i d t ( l 9 8 4 p ^ ) w i l l be used as t he basis f o r f u r t h e r 
d iscuss ion . T h e v use the t e r m t o refer to : 
". . . c o m m i t t m e n t o f resources made i n t he hope o f r e a l i z i n g 
benef i t s t h a t are expec t ed to occur over a r easonab ly l o n g p e r i o d 
o f t i m e i n t he f u t u r e . " 
As w i l l be discussed i n grea te r d e t a i l a t a l a t e r s tage, f o r the purposes 
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of t h i s thesis , the phrase " c o m m i t t m e n t o f resources* w i l l be he ld t o re la te 
spec i f i ca l ly to the c o m m i t t m e n t o f financial resources to p a r t i c u l a r s h i p p i n g 
con t r ac t s . T y p i c a l l y , the measure o f the net l eve l o f financial c o m m i t t m e n t 
to a p a r t i c u l a r c o n t r a c t is made on the basis o f o p p o r t u n i t y cost . F i n a n c i a l 
c o m m i t t m e n t , t he re fo re , takes i n t o a c c o u n t p o t e n t i a l costs or bene f i t s w h i c h 
c o u l d have acc rued had no t a l t e r n a t i v e courses o f a c t i o n been foregone . A l -
t h o u g h no t the p rac t i ce i n i n d u s t r y , f r o m the p o i n t o f v i ew o f t h i s w o r k , a 
g o o d i n v e s t m e n t , t he r e fo re , is l o o k e d u p o n as b e i n g one t h a t increases the 
w e a l t h o f the owners o f the c o m p a n y ' s secur i t ies ove r a n d a b o v e the increased 
w e a l t h t h a t w o u l d have accrued had the nex t best a l t e r n a t i v e been o p t e d for . 
Reekie (1975 ) describes i n v e s t m e n t as: 
. . the o u t l a y o f f u n d s t o d a y i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f a r e t u r n a t 
some la te r po in t s i n t i m e . T h e i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ion can be l ooked 
at i n the genera l a n d i n the p a r t i c u l a r . A t i t s b roades t level the 
m a n a g e r is faced w i t h t he dec is ion of w h e t h e r or not t o inves t , 
a n d i f so, w h a t q u a n t i t y o f f u n d s s h o u l d be c o m m i t t e d . " 
I t is the c o n t e n t i o n o f t h i s w o r k t h a t w h e n c o n s i d e r i n g the q u e s t i o n o f 
w h a t q u a n t i t y o f f u n d s s h o u l d be c o m m i t t e d , i t is i m p o r t a n t t o recognize and 
eva lua te the o p p o r t u n i t y cost o f m a k i n g the p a r t i c u l a r i n v e s t m e n t choice . Po-
t e n t i a l monies foregone , i n a d d i t i o n t o t he p r o s p e c t i v e cash o u t l a y , are w h a t 
rea l ly c o n s t i t u t e the t r u e financial c o m m i t t m e n t . T h e need to a c c u r a t e l y 
assess th i s c o m m i t t m e n t is espec ia l ly re levan t t o t h e s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y . T h i s 
is s u p p o r t e d by the v iew o f H e m m i n g ( 1 9 8 6 p l ) t h a t : 
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" T h e dec is ion w h e t h e r o r n o t t o inves t i n a p a r t i c u l a r v e n t u r e 
is o f f u n d a m e n t a l i m p o r t a n c e t o t he success o f a n y e n t e r p r i s e . 
I n a h i g h l y c a p i t a l i n t ens ive i n d u s t r y w i t h v e r y u n s t a b l e m a r -
ket c o n d i t i o n s l i k e s h i p p i n g , the i m p o r t a n c e a n d t i m i n g o f t he 
i n v e s t m e n t dec is ion is even more p a r a m o u n t . " 
G i v e n a speci f ic a v a i l a b i l i t y o f i n v e s t m e n t f u n d s , G i t m a n , J o e h n k & Pinches 
( I 9 8 5 p 2 0 9 ) argue t h a t : 
" Inves to r s , because o f t h e i r p re fe rence f o r h i g h e r r a t h e r t h a n 
lower r e t u r n s a n d lower r a the r t h a n h ighe r r isks seek i n v e s t m e n t 
o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f e r i n g t he h ighes t r e t u r n fo r t he least r i s k . " 
A l t h o u g h a u t h o r s such as L o r a n g e Sc N o r m a n ( 1 9 7 0 ) a n d D e v a n n e y (L971) 
have b r o u g h t i n t o q u e s t i o n the v a l i d i t y o f t h i s s t a t e m e n t as regards the sh ip-
p i n g i n d u s t r y , i t does serve t o h i g h l i g h t the f a c t t h a t r i sk a n d r e t u r n are the 
t w o o v e r r i d i n g c r i t e r i a u p o n w h i c h i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t i e s m a y be j u d g e d . 
T h i s j u s t i f i e s the use o f M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y as an i n v e s t m e n t m e t h o d o l -
ogy since i t bases i t s e v a l u a t i o n o f a l t e r n a t i v e p o r t f o l i o s o n these t w o c r i t e r i a . 
For every i n v e s t m e n t o p p o r t u n i t y , the dec i s ion m a k e r m a y hope for a 
p a r t i c u l a r level o f r e t u r n , b u t c a n n o t be c e r t a i n ahead o f t i m e as t o i t s 
a c t u a l value. T h e degree-of possible d e v i a t i o n a w a y f r o m the e x p e c t e d level 
o f r e t u r n is e m b o d i e d i n t he leve l o f genera l u n c e r t a i n t y a f f e c t i n g the dec i s ion . 
As B i e r m a n ^ S m i d t ( 1 9 8 4 p l 8 9 ) p u t i t : 
" T h e d i f f i c u l t y o f s p e c i f y i n g u n i q u e cash flows der ives f r o m the 
fact t h a t t he re are f u t u r e events t h a t w i l l e f fec t the cash f l o w s . 
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But we do not know in advance which of these events wi l l occur. 
For each possible event, we have to make a somewhat different 
forecast of the cash flows f rom the investment. The uncer ta inty 
arises because we do not know w i t h certainty which of the possible 
events w i l l occur, and thus cannot be sure which cash flow w i l l 
actually occur." 
The general uncertainty about fu ture cash flows associated w i t h a partic-
ular investment decision derives f rom uncertainty about some other events; 
usually related in some way to general business condit ions. Because the fu-
ture state of these general business conditions cannot accurately be forecast, 
the outcome of the investment cannot be precisely predicted. 
Al though at tempts can be made to predict, say, general business condi-
tions which can then be incorporated into the investment appraisal as risk, 
the omnipresent residual uncertainty inevi tably materializes as inaccuracies 
in the forecasting process. 
2.3 Psychological Aspects of Risk and Un-
certainty 
Once general uncertainty has been enumerated as risk, the emphasis is 
then placed upon the decision maker to react to that risk. Th i s feature 
brings into consideration one fur ther impor tan t aspect of decision making 
under conditions of risk and uncertainty; the values and at t i tudes of the 
decision maker. 
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As Singleton &: Hoveden (1987) suggest, changing technologies or envi-
ronments are always altering the frame of reference for risk. Plow-ever, one 
constantly dominat ing factor exists in the part played by human nature and 
human behaviour. In support of this precept, Ar row (197L) points out that 
uncertainty is a phenomenon that exists in the mind of the decision maker 
opt ing for a choice amongst alternatives. He part ly qualifies this view by sug-
gesting that such subjective uncertainty or risk may well stem f rom actual 
object ive physical observations, but reiterates that the fine tun ing is a task 
undertaken by the perceptive senses. This does not s imply mean that a deci-
sion maker's perception of risk should be of interest since, as Brehmer (1987) 
points out, this implies the actual physical existence of an object called risk. 
Rather, i t implies that various features of decision problems are perceived 
and i t is these that then lead to feelings of risk: A subtle, but i m p o r l a n l , 
difference in interpretat ion. 
I t is impor tant to recognize that the risk perception o f an ind iv idua l 
decision maker inevi tably depends upon the existence and combinat ion of 
several different factors such as: 
o V^icarious experience. 
o In tu i t i ve theory. 
o Direct personal experience. 
I t seems clear, therefore, that the process of risk es t imat ion is context 
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dependent and that inevitably, there are many other influences besides the 
three outl ined. 
A t this point, it must be reiterated that the psychological perspective 
outl ined thus far and the consequent importance attached to subject ive risk 
estimation, does not negate the requirement for collecting in fo rma t ion related 
to objective risk. As Singleton & Hoveden (1987) point out : 
"The place of facts in a world of ethical values should be set 
by the values, but facts cannot be changed by values." 
W i t h i n the confines of the decision making process, the influence o f human 
nature, values and at t i tudes goes beyond merely its influence over how risk 
is. regarded. The very practices of investment and decision making exist 
because of human nature. This point is most eloquently i l lustrated by Keynes 
(1936pl50) who writes: 
"Business men play a mixed game of skil l and chance, the 
average results of which to the players are not known by those 
that take a hand. I f human nature felt no tempta t ion to take a 
chance, no satisfaction (prof i t apart) in construct ing a factory., a 
railway, a mine or a f a rm, there might not be much investment 
merelv as result of cold calculat ion." 
The situation is, however, perhaps more realistically summed up by Rowe 
( I 9 7 7 p l ) who states: 
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'"Although every act iv i ty involves some risk, there are some 
kinds of risk and some levels of risk that members of society are 
unwi l l ing to assume." 
The question as to whether a part icular type or level of risk is acceptable 
to a specific ind iv idua l depends upon that person's perception of and a t t i tude 
towards the risk. Rowe (1977p23) goes on to describe this risk assessment 
process as follows: 
"Risk agents often wi l l ingly expose themselves to risks to ob-
tain some possible gain, when in their ind iv idua l del iberat ion, 
the possible gains outweigh the possible losses. I f one substitutes 
•probable' for 'possible' in the foregoing statement, quant i ta t ive 
balancing of probable gains and losses is possible w i t h i n l imi ta -
tions of meaurement uncertainty. This arises f rom the ab i l i ty to 
express probabilities on cardinal scales between zero and uni ty ." 
The corollary of this view is that human behaviour is typ ica l ly risk averse. 
While risks are sometimes taken to obta in desired gains, s imilar ly action 
taken to reduce a risk can be considered a gain in the sense that possible loss 
is reduced. It is w i t h this latter action that the strategy of hedging is most 
closely aligned. 
The technique which decision analysis employs so as to systematically 
incorporate the values and att i tudes of the decision maker is known as u t i l i t y 
analysis. This procedure, which wil l be dealt w i t h in some detai l in Chapters 
4 and 5, leads to a decision that is theoretically consistent w i t h the feelings 
of the decision maker about the likelihood of the possible outcomes and the 
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effect of the various potential outcomes on the investor's f inancial posit ion. 
A lot of work has been done on the applicat ion of decision theory to 
investment decisions. A di f ferent ia t ion has tended to be made between de-
cisions involving risk (where probabihties of al l alternatives are known and 
given) and those involv ing , what herein has been termed, residual uncer-
tainty (probabili t ies not known) . These decision theory approaches are fun-
damentally statistical in nature and are well documented by authors such as 
Schlaiffer (L969) and Luce Sz Raiffa (1971). They invariably depend upon 
subjective probabil i ty functions in the f o r m of expected value or expected 
u t i l i ty of various outcomes. As Rowe (1977p6) points out: 
' 'The process, once u t i l i t y values are assigned to outcomes, is 
mechanistic." 
The question as to how much importance should be attached to either 
objective or subjective probabi l i ty is, however, a matter of great controversy. 
While one school asserts that probabili t ies are pr imar i ly reflections of the 
actual frequency of occurrence of events (probabil i t ies are, therefore, objec-
t ive) , another school asserts that the assignment of probabili t ies pr imar i ly 
reflects the assigner's belief or confidence that the event in question wi l l oc-
cur. In the arena of practical decision theory applications, the seminal work 
of Bayes (1763), developed and applied at a later date by authors such as 
Jeffreys (L93l )and Lindley (1965), has led to popular usage fal l ing on the 
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side of the latter philosophy. 
This controversy between object ive and subjective probabi l i ty seems, at 
first sight, to be merely a methodological argument. However, Lee ( I 9 7 6 p l 3 9 ) 
goes so far as to suggest that : 
"The long-running dispute over the in terpre ta t ion of proba-
bi l i ty measures is of central , i f unacknowledged importance for 
the def in i t ion of risk."' 
A problem arises in that the subjective view, i f adopted, does blur the dif-
ference between risk and the actual danger of failure. Conceptually, therefore, 
probabil i ty and judgement become in te r twined and cannot be separated. 
Despite the philosophical argument between those who advocate the use 
of subjective probabilities and those who advocate the use of objec t ive proba-
bilities, there is general agreement that the decision maker's a t t i tude towards 
risk should be incorporated in to the decision analysis at some point . It is 
widely accepted that this is an impor tan t factor that must be taken into 
account when considering any investment opportuni t ies that are subject to 
general uncertainty. As Bierman ^ Smidt ( I 9 8 4 p 2 l 5 ) suggest: 
" L nder conditions of uncertainty, subjective at t i tudes towards 
risk bearing should play an impor tan t part in investment policy." 
The necessity for doing this is i l lustrated by Hemming ( I986p61) who 
writes: 
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"The risk preference of an ind iv idua l should be taken in to 
account w i th other cr i t ical evaluation factors when investment 
appraisals are being made. The variat ion of ind iv idua l risk pref-
erence leads to the s i tuat ion that the 'best* decision for one man-
ager may not be the same for another." 
One f inal jus t i f i ca t ion for emphasizing the importance of subject ive a t t i -
tudes towards risk (which can be, and of ten are, summarized as subjective 
probabi l i ty) is purely a pragmatic one. This s imply lies w i t h the fact that in 
the case of business investment, similar decisions under similar circumstances 
are not made enough times in order to assess object ive probabi l i ty . 
2.4 A Background to Risk Reduction 
Although the discussion thus far intimates the necessity for business to re-
duce the influence of risk, a paradox exists insofar as the decision maker does 
not wish to eradicate i t completely. Indeed, risk is a fundamental prerequi-
site of capitalism in that the act of taking a risk is indefat igably linked to 
making a prof i t . Many authors, including .Arrow (L971), agree that many 
contemporary inst i tut ions are shaped by the existence of risk. Indeed, some 
directly a t t r ibu te the growth of the free enterprise system to the e.xistence 
of general uncertainty. However, as Ar row (1971) points out , since the phe-
nomenon of general uncertainty must certainly have preceded the capitalist 
era. the difference between the present and the past which brought about 
this particular social organization has yet to be explained, 
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The maxim 'you need to speculate to accumulate ' implies tha t a risk 
is accepted in return for the potent ia l of making a p rof i t . Consequently, 
the really important aspect of good decision making is, first of a l l , to be as 
aware as possible of the risk associated wi th different decision alternatives 
and then, once the decision has been taken, to l im i t the risk associated w i t h 
that alternative in order to increase the likelihood of a successful outcome. 
It is in this latter sphere that the strategy of hedging has t rad i t iona l ly had 
a part to play. 
As has already been alluded to, in order to accomplish this object ive, no 
matter what a decision maker's a t t i tude to risk, it is v i t a l that i t be taken 
into account in making or analysing a business decision. As McLaney (L986) 
points out , this should be done in as formal a way as possible. 
In relation to the terminology employed wi th in this work, this means 
that the decision maker must a t tempt to ident i fy the risk involved in a given 
decision by the collection, collation and processing of i n fo rma t ion so that 
as much general uncertainty as possible can be enumerated as risk, thereby 
reducing to as low a level as is feasible the influence of residual uncertainty. 
However, as Rowe (L9T7p22) points out: 
"Reduction of uncer ta inty does not in itself reduce risk. Re-
sulting informat ion can be used to direct action to control risk, 
which is the object ive sought. The value of i n f o r m a t i o n can be 
measured only by the degree of control of risk gained by separate 
subsequent action." 
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In fact, the increasing concern wi th risk and risk systems is aimed primar-
i ly at its control . This is a relatively new concept in the his tory of humani ty 
and has developed concurrently w i t h the scientific revolut ion. 
As can be inferred f rom the discussion so far, risk implies something un-
wanted or to be avoided by vi r tue of the fact that the existence o f risk is 
associated w i t h potential consequences that involve losses to the person tak-
ing the risk. On a general level, Rowe (I977p24) provides a succint def in i t ion 
that: 
"Risk is the potential for realization of unwanted, negative 
consequences of an event." 
Risk aversion, therefore, constitutes action to control risk. In this sense, 
the action to reduce the potential effects of risk may be mot ivated either 
through deliberate, formal efforts for the reduction of uncertainty, or alter-
natively, by the in tu i t ive perception of the risk taker. 
In order to a t tempt to reduce the influence of risk over any investment 
decision, i t is impor tant to have a structure w i th in which the decision maker 
may work to that end. Both Otway (1973) and Kates (1976), working inde-
pendently, have developed a three stage process which composes what they 
te rm 'risk assessment'. This process includes; 
R i s k I d e n t i f i c a t i o n which reduces descriptive uncertainty. 
R i s k E s t i m a t i o n which reduces measurement uncertainty. 
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R i s k E v a l u a t i o n which involves the ant ic ipat ion of the par t icular subjec-
tive response to estimated risk. In other words, a de terminat ion of the 
specific risk aversive action that should be taken. 
The part icular risk aversive action can obviously be in the f o r m of risk 
reduction or simply in the form of risk acceptance or denial. A schematic 
which illustrates this conceptualization can be seen in Figure 2.2 below. 
Figure 2.2: The Elements of Risk Assessment 
Risk Ident i f icat ion X Risk Est imat ion 
Risk Evaluation 
Rowe (1977) provides a fur ther refinement of these elements as follows: 
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Risk Risk Risk 
Ident i f icat ion Est imat ion Evaluat ion 
Reduction of Reduction of Risk-aversive action 
descriptive uncertainty, measurement uncertainty. Aversive. 
Research. Revelation. Balances. 
Screening. I n t u i t i o n . Benefit-risk. 
Diagnosis. Ext rapola t ion . Cost-benefit . 
42 
Chapter 3 
D r y Bulk Shipping 
3.1 General Background 
This part of the work seeks to put into perspective some of the points raised 
in the previous discussion of risk and uncertainty. The shipping indus t ry is 
not unique in being prone to risk and uncertainty since these phenomena 
materialize whenever any decision is made. However, i t could be argued that 
there are a number of special factors relating to the industry which make 
it an interesting, almost unique, environment for the analysis of risk and 
uncertainty. 
Behind the o i l industry, shipping is the second most capital intensive 
industry in the wor ld . This is reflected in the fact that one estimate of the 
total outstanding commercial debt has been put at S85 bi l l ion and that this 
amount is expected to grow to SlOO bi l l ion by 1992. 
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Shipping markets have t rad i t ional ly been regarded as cyclical w i t h volatile 
movements present w i th in the general cyclical t rend. Al though the degree 
of fluctuation in the shipping market makes the industry very prone to risk, 
the si tuat ion has not been helped by the fact that the capital intensi ty of the 
industry has, in the past, promoted the availabil i ty of finance. Because ship-
ping companies are typica l ly searching for investment opportunit ies involv ing 
the purchase of ships, their loan applications to banks have consequently in-
creased and so the level of debt exposure to banks has increased concurrently. 
Similarly, at a somewhat simplistic level but relevant nevertheless, because 
banks like the idea of receiving quite substantial interest payments while 
maintaining security in the form of the shipping company's assets, they are 
quite wi l l ing to make such loan funds available. 
The internationalism of the marketplace in terms of shipownership, trade, 
manning, shipbuilding etc. means that the environment is typ ica l ly uncer-
tain. This is evidenced by the fact that random disasters are generally good 
for shipping. The relationship between world "disasters" and peak shipping 
markets can be seen clearly in Figure 3.L. This figure also serves to i l lustrate 
the cyclical and volatile nature of shipping markets. 
Every year, shipowners seem to wait w i t h baited breath for a Soviet grain 
failure. This internat ional aspect has, in the past, promoted a free market 
for shipping. However, in the past two decades this laissez-faire s i tuat ion has 
gradually become eroded as capital has become more d i f f i cu l t to raise (thus 
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const i tut ing a barrier to en t ry ) , and as the influence of poli t ics, bi lateral ism, 
flags of convenience etc. have become more acutely felt . 
The diversity of the general shipping market and the various submarkets 
wi th in i t adds to the degree of risk and uncertainty to which i t is prone. 
Shipping companies may vary between mul t ina t iona l conglomerates such as 
Hapag-Lloyd and owner-operators w i t h jus t a single ship at their disposal. 
The industry is s imilar ly diverse w i t h respect to the type of ports being used, 
the cargoes being carried, the routes, the types of ships employed etc. 
Further support for the argument that shipping faces an almost unpar-
alleled level of risk and uncertainty is provided by Abrahamsson (1980) who 
comments: 
"The huge capital needs of modern ships makes it very d i f f i -
cult , i f not impossible, for most operators to continue to rely on 
retained earnings. Moving to external financing, they rely on a 
worldwide market affected by government support programs for 
both shipping and shipbui lding in the fo rm of investment grants, 
low interest loans, tax relief, accelerated depreciation, and other 
subsidies, all of which must be evaluated in the l ight of d i f ferent ia l 
rates of inf la t ion in a system of floating exchange rates." 
Despite these various con t r ibu t ing factors to the level of risk and uncer-
ta inty w i t h i n the shipping industry, by far the most i m p o r t a n t influence is 
the fact that shipping is merely a service industry. It is dependent upon 
the level of trade for its survival and prosperity. Because shipping merely 
adds value to goods by providing a t ranspor ta t ion service, i t is subject to the 
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whims of the world's manufactur ing, processing and consumption industries. 
As suggested by Heaver (1976), the upshot of this feature is that the de-
mand for shipping services is purely a derived demand. Consequently, there 
is an automatic impl ica t ion that the level of general uncer ta inty which the 
shipping industry faces is greater than would be the case in the non-service 
sector because of the fact that i t seems not to have any control over its own 
destiny. 
Despite this, members of the shipping communi ty do a t tempt to mit igate 
against the potential adverse eflfects of this derived demand. For example, 
from a microeconomic point of view, successful market ing on one company's 
behalf may have the effect of accruing a larger slice of the available demand 
at the expense of its competitors. On a more macro level, a t tempts by 
shipowners to corner a part icular submarket of the shipping indus t ry has led 
to the development and employment of highly specialized vessels. This has 
had the effect of even fur ther emphasizing the different submarkets which 
together comprise the shipping industry. Many companies in shipping have 
sought to reduce the risk to which they are exposed by fol lowing in the 
footsteps of the major shipping companies. As Hardy ( I 9 7 9 p 6 l ) puts i t : 
"To most business men, oppor tun i ty is how to make money, 
and risks are quite s imply al l about how to lose i t . In the shipping 
industry we have in the past been accused of act ing ' l emming ' 
fashion in much of our decision making, each one of us follow-
ing hard on the heels of a part icular entrepreneur, of whatever 
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nationality, whose words and deeds are in vogue at the t ime." 
One fur ther strategy which may be instigated is that of hedging against 
potential adverse movements in either costs or revenues which inevi tably 
occur as the result of quirks in the derived demand. As has already been 
mentioned, this type of strategy provides the main impetus for the analysis 
wi th in this work. U has been found necessary to concentrate on one part icular 
sector of the shipping indust ry in order to faci l i ta te such an analysis. To this 
end, the t ramp dry bulk shipping market has been chosen. As Abrahamsson 
(1980) points out: 
"Ocean shipping is divided into the carriage of l iquid and d ry 
cargoes. This is reflected in most mar i t ime trade journals , which 
provide separate analyses and report ing of the tanker and d ry 
cargo markets and the liner and t ramp markets. For analyt ical 
purposes i t is impor tan t to bear in mind that the first category 
of markets refers to the general kinds of cargo carried, while the 
latter refers to the types of service contracts and the terms on 
which the cargo is carried." 
One major influencing factor in choosing the t r amp bulk market as the 
focus for the analysis held wi th in this work is that , as Marlow & Gardner 
(1980) point out, i t approximates very closely to an unrestricted compet i t ive 
si tuat ion where freight rates (prices) and quanti t ies demanded and supplied 
are largely determined by the interaction of market forces. Such a proposit ion 
does have its opponents, however, for example Dabrowski (198lp35) states: 
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"The present depression in the world shipping market dis-
closed weaknesses in the market mechanism developed by the 
capitalist system dur ing the past century and its inab i l i ty to 
quickly restore the balance between the demand and supply fac-
tors. There also came into play new elements which cont r ibu ted 
significantly to this s i tuat ion." 
Taking a balanced view, i t would seem that this freely compet i t ive market 
s i tuat ion is certainly not as true today as once was the case, par t icular ly in 
the light of the increased influence of world politics on trade and the trans-
por ta t ion process. However, even insofar as the freely compet i t ive s i tuat ion 
does or does not persist today, focussing solely on the theoretically market 
determined t ramp market may prove to be beneficial in fac i l i t a t ing the anal-
ysis of hedging methods w i t h i n the industry. Certainly more so than would 
be the case i f the liner trades were considered in that these are def ini t ively 
not held as examples of the laissez-faire ethos, but rather are monopolis-
tic in nature and consequently that much more d i f f i cu l t to analyse using an 
economics-based methodology. 
h has already been stated that another impor tan t mot iva t ing factor be-
hind choosing to concentrate on the t ramp dry bulk market is that on May 
1st 1985. a new freight futures market came into being in London, known as 
B I F F E X , which seeks to provide a novel and viable al ternat ive to t radi t ional 
hedging methods. This market is aimed specifically at the t ramp drv bulk 
sector, especially insofar as the index upon which i t is based is composed of 
the 12 major dry bulk trades. 
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The bulk carrier market , which services the dry bulk trades, has developed 
over the last century. As Rinman Linden (1978) attest, the modern ocean 
going bulk carrier, however, dates f rom the mid-50's when the first ones 
were buil t for Swedish shipping companies by the Kockums and Gotaverken 
shipyards. As Alder ton (1984p37) points out: 
"Al though there have been colliers for centuries carrying bulk 
coal, the modern concept of bulk cargo being loaded and dis-
charged quickly in to single deck dry cargo ships f r o m modern 
automated terminals dates only f rom about 1957. Like container 
ships they were born of economic necessity. T r a m p freight rates 
were very depressed in L957 so a cheaper means of carrying bulk 
cargoes had to be found." 
The dry bulk cargo market is nowadays purely a generic t i t l e a t t r ibu ted 
to a set of separate markets different iated by both specific ship type and 
specific commodity. These markets have been produced over the years by 
the concurrent expansion of both routes and cargoes. Indeed, the expansion 
of the dry bulk cargo market in the past 30 years has been considerable. 
According to Croxson (1985). in 1960 only 7.03% of dry bulkable cargo was 
transported in bulk carriers, whereas the equivalent figure in 1980 was 29%. 
In terms of ton miles, which represents a better picture of to ta l trade, this 
amounted to a g rowth of 3147% dur ing this period. 
This phenomenal g rowth in the relative importance of the bulk carrier in 
the faci l i ta t ion of trade is l inked inextr icably to a g rowth in the average size 
of the bulk carrier. This increase in the average size has been brought about 
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as the result of various technological innovations both at sea and in ports 
and as the result of the increasing economic v iab i l i ty of such ships associated 
wi th economies of scale. According to Goss & Jones (1971), these economies 
of scale are brought about by the volume and value of cargo carried and the 
distance between load and discharge ports and materialize in terms of a per 
ton carrying cost. However, the overall dry bulk market is most usefully split 
in terms of ship size as shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Ship Categories and Sizes 
Ship Type Size Range j 
(DVVT.) 1 
Handy-sized 25-35,000 I 
Handymax 40,000 i 
P ana max 55-65,000 ! 
Large 65-120,000 i 
Suezmax 120-150,000 1 
Cape-sized 150,000-f ; 
Ships less than 25,000 Dwt . are known as minibulkers, but this type of 
ship contributes l i t t l e to the overall market s i tuat ion. As well as a market 
division based on size of ship, another division may be made in terms of 
cargo and respective trade routes. The most impor tant dry bulk cargoes are 
ranked in Table 3.2. 
Today, the principal bulk cargoes such as iron ore, grain, coal, bauxite, 
manganese ore, a lumina and phosphates are usually carried in Panamax or 
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Table 3.2: Impor t an t Dry Bulk Cargoes 
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larger ships, while the smaller handy-sized bulkers now lend to carry the 
less prevalent bulk cargoes. However, a large handy-sized trade in grain to 
developing countries does st i l l exist. 
Despite the increase in the average size of bulk carriers over the years, 
the most important trend in recent times in the dry bulk sector has been the 
increased reliance upon specialized ships. .As Yolland (L978p21) puts i t : 
"Post-war years have seen a growth of technological ac t iv i -
ties via national research associations, shipping and shipbui ld ing 
companies, governments, academic inst i tut ions and consul t ing or-
ganizations. This has cont r ibuted to the development of highly 
specialized ships. These have been demanded in the search by 
shippers and shipowners alike for more efficient transport opera-
tions." 
The bulk carrier is sometimes fondlv known as the "workhorse of the 
seas". As the trade journal iOOAl ( I986p3) eloquently points out: 
"The workhorse of the seas is a bit like Cleopatra in its i n f in i t e 
variety. In order to maximize cargo carrying capacity in as many 
trades as possible all sorts of hybr id or versatile bulk carriers have 
evolved." 
Al though there are now many types of specialized bulk carriers such as 
the conbulker, which carries containers or bulk cargo, the bulk /vehic le carrier 
and the pure car carrier, by far the most impor tan t type of ship in the dry 
bulk market is the combinat ion carrier. Its importance is derived f rom its 
flexibility in that it can switch between dry and wet cargoes depending on 
which yields the most advantageous freight rate. This has massive implica-
tions for the supply of tonnage in a par t icular market, and as a consequence, 
u l t imate ly on the prevailing freight rate of that market . 
Basically, the combinat ion carrier can be described as a ship which can 
carry either oil or dry cargo in bulk. However, i t does take many forms. 
For example, the ore /o i l carrier (the 0 / 0 ) . the o r e / b u l k / o i l carrier (the 
O B O ) , the o re / s lu r ry /o i l carrier (the OSO) and the highly innovative prod-
uc t s /o r e /bu lk /o i l carrier (the P R O B O ) . The combinat ion carrier was in i t i a l ly 
designed as the solution to the problem of a long ballast leg or back haul. 
However, because many of the impor t areas for iron ore, coal and grain are 
also the majo r impor t areas for o i l , the fu l l o i l and dry cargo carrying poten-
t ial of a shipowner's combined fleet is not always ut i l ized. Therefore, since 
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there are very few natural combinat ion trades or natural balances o f freight 
values between one leg of a voyage and another, the real value of the com-
bined carrier lies in the switching of capacity f rom dry to l iqu id cargoes and 
back again as freight rates dictate. As a consequence, combinat ion carriers 
have confused the whole issue of iden t i fy ing a dry bulk carrier for the purpose 
of examining world tonnages, and therefore the supply, of the various types 
of ships. Their role wi l l be looked at in more detail at a later point in this 
chapter. 
3.2 Freight Rates 
The costs of a shipper and the revenues of a shipowner are determined primar-
ily by the freight rate payable by the shipper or charterer to the shipowner. 
Consequently, the object ive of the shipowner in providing a vessel for the 
carriage of goods is to obtain a freight rate that is sufficient to ensure his 
continued operation and perhaps even to be able to make a p ro f i t . The 
shipowner, therefore, seeks the highest possible rate. The shipper or char-
terer, on the other hand, seeks to agree on the lowest rate compat ible w i th the 
safe arrival of its cargo at its destination in good and merchantable condi t ion . 
.\s is the case wi th all markets in any industry, i t is i n tu i t i ve ly clear f rom 
the above that the actual level of the freight rate depends on the services 
being offered and those demanded. Thus , the forces of supply and demand 
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are the relevant determining factors. A picture of the movement of the voyage 
freight rates in each of the three general dry bulk markets which shall be 
analysed in this work is provided in Figure 3.2. 
Figure 3.2: Freight Rate Movements of the Three Trades Analysed in this 
Work (1985-1988) 
$/ton U S G C - J A P H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
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Source: Lloyd's Shipping Economist 
From this diagram, Penfold (1982) is obviously correct in proclaiming 
that: 
"No one can deny that the bulk market is notoriously volati le 
and part icular ly unpredictable over the short- term. ' ' 
Even though such movements are inevi tably a func t ion of the demand 
and supply features of the part icular ind iv idua l dry bulk sector of the overall 
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market, in general de Borger Sc Noanema[\ ( I 9 8 l p l 5 6 ) point out that 
" I n the shipping market short- term variations of freight rates 
are due more to shifts in the demand curve than to shifts in 
the supply curve. For example, dur ing 1979 the coefficient of 
variation of monthly supplied capacity for dry bulk was 2.4%, 
but the coefficient of variation of month ly capacity demanded 
was twice as high at 5 .1%." 
This implies that the shipping markets are more sensitive, and therefore 
more prone to risk and uncertainty, on the demand side. This is impor-
tant because, as has already been mentioned, this is the one area which is 
singularly out of the control of the members of the shipping f ra te rn i ty . 
Freight rates in the t ramp market, w i t h which this work is p r imar i ly con-
cerned, are agreed rates between the parties to the contract of carriage. ..-\s 
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such there are no classifications or tar iffs for this type of service. Conse-
quently, the t ramp market has generally been held to be freely compet i t ive 
wi th rates set by market forces. I f one accepts this view as being correct, 
then the importance of the demand and supply side functions is emphasized. 
Fluctuations in the prevailing freight rate for a part icular submarket 
wi th in the shipping industry are due to a variety of reasons. First ly, as 
previously expounded, freight rates may be liable to sporadic fluctuations 
merely as a result of the demand and supply functions moving towards new 
equil ibria. Also, however, shipping markets are prone to movement as a re-
sult of seasonal and cyclical fluctuations. Seasonal fluctuations are caused 
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pr imar i ly by cl imatic conditions which effect harvest and ice-bound ports for 
example, while cyclical fluctuations relate to the general business cycle which 
is a feature of Western Capital is t economies. 
Apar t f rom the pure risk of adverse freight rate movement to which an 
individual shipowner or charterer is exposed, there is also another aligned 
risk which is very impor tan t . Because in the vast m a j o r i t y of cases, freight 
or hire is paid in U.S. Dollars, the ind iv idua l shipowner or charterer may 
be faced wi th an exchange rate risk which could, depending on the relative 
strength of the host company's accounting currency against the dollar, serve 
to either exaggerate or cushion the risk which is faced w i t h regard to freight 
rates. Because this work is concerned merely w i th the hedging of freight 
rate risk, foreign exchange risk wi l l only be referred to when relevant to the 
pr imary discussion and wi l l not be dealt w i t h in any analyt ical manner. 
There follows a discussion of the factors which compose the supply and 
demand for shipping services, where hopeful ly i t wi l l become apparent that 
as Branch (1982) puts i t : 
. . the pricing of a cargo ship's services is dependent on the 
forces of supply and demand, but the factors underlying them 
are perhaps more complicated than is the case wi th most other 
industries." 
3.3 The Demand for Shipping 
As has already been made perhaps pa infu l ly obvious in the foregoing discus-
sion, the demand for shipping services is almost direct ly related to the level of 
general economic ac t iv i ty in the wor ld . Because of its service role, shipping 
is dependent for its very existence on internat ional trade. .As O 'Loughf in 
(I967p41) has described i t ; 
"The demand for carriage of goods is a derived demand in 
that shippers are pr imar i ly demanding the goods themselves and 
demanding the transport services as a means to get the goods. 
Nobody would desire space in a ship's hold for its own sake and 
wi thout the demand for the goods carried, there would be no 
demand for the space. I t has also been held that t ranspor ta t ion 
is essentially a part of product ion." 
The development of shipping is very much aligned to the g rowth of the 
world economy. This is evident in Table 3.3 which shows the g rowth of world 
seaborne trade since 1937. 
These figures, however, provide an insight in to the expansion of world 
seaborne trade merely.in terms of volume. The most useful measurement of 
world trade to the shipping enterprise is that of ton miles since this provides 
a more accurate assessment of the state of the demand for shipping functions. 
It is not only increases in the volume of wor ld trade that determine demand 
but also the pattern of that trade. For example, the requirement to move 100 
tons of cargo over 2,000 miles rather than over 1,000 miles means that there 
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is a net increase in the demand for shipping. However, demand statistics in 
the form of ton miles are somewhat harder to collect and collate than they 
are merely in terms of volume. 
Since the demand for shipping is dependent upon wor ld trade, i t may be 
advantageous to determine what world trade depends upon. The g rowth in 
internat ional trade is a funct ion of the growth in the Gross National Product 
of the countries that are par t ic ipat ing in internat ional trade. Because of the 
nature of the world economies, what this really boils down to is that ship-
ping demand is really dependent on the relative success of the world 's major 
economies such as the U.S.A.. Japan and the E.E.C. A l though the inf lu-
ence of the U.S.S.R. and China have short- term effects on shipping demand, 
especially where the L'.S.S.R. is seeking to supplement inadequate grain har-
vests, they wi l l not have a significant effect on overall shipping demand un t i l 
they participate permanently in the wor ld trade arena. The aforementioned 
relationship between shipping demand and world trade is imp l i c i t in the 
mathematically derived demand funct ion developed by Mar low ic Gardner 
(L980) and given by the expression: 
Qd = -6603.68 - 2.24F, - 3.28C/VP ^ 3 9 . 8 4 £ ' F F 
Where: 
Qd = Demand for Shipping 
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Ft = V^oyage charter freight rate index deflated by an index of wholesale 
prices and wi th 1963 =: 100. 
GNP = Gross national product of O E C D countries in SUS billions at 1963 
prices. 
EF F - .\n index to reflect the efficiency of O E C D countries in converting 
raw materials into a given tonne of ou tpu t (1963 = 100). This index 
was derived f rom the annual steel statistics published by the Iron and 
Steel Statistics Board and measures the ab i l i ty to convert raw materials 
into pig i ron. 
As we have seen, net shipping demand is dependent on the volume of cargo 
that is moved and also on the distance that it moves. These two features 
do. however, have a significant effect on how that demand materializes. For 
instance, increases only in the volume of wor ld trade would result in demand 
for more ships. On the other hand, changes in the pat tern of trade which 
result in cargos moving greater distances, or which result in greater volumes 
and distances, means that larger ships wi l l be in greater demand. 
T w o commodities which have an overbearing influence on the level of 
demand for shipping are oi l and steel. Al though they may have a direct 
influence on demand through the necessity of t ransport ing them, by far their 
most impor tant influence lies in the realms of macroeconomic dependancy. 
First of a l l , growth in indust r ia l product ion necessitates increased energy 
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requirements which has not only an obvious direct effect on the o i l , gas 
and coal trades, but also the relative prices of say o i l and coal determines 
the relative levels of demand in the separate tanker and dry bulk sectors 
individual ly . Similarly, this has influence over which trades the combinat ion 
carriers are uti l ized w i th in . Steel product ion requires coal and iron ore and 
the level of that product ion, therefore, determines the level of the coal and 
iron ore shipping sectors. The interrelationships between and the potent ia l 
net effects of all these aspects are too numerous to quant i fy . 
I t is apparent that whatever the s i tuat ion w i t h regard to the d i f fe r ing 
factors that eventually lead to a demand for shipping services, once they 
fi l ter through the system they w i l l have dif ferent ia l effects upon different 
submarkets wi th in the shipping sector. For example, w i th in the d ry bulk 
market, the demand for handy-sized vessels is so diffuse, in terms of the 
trades that they service, that the market for these part icular ships typica l ly 
does not show the same massive fluctuations that can and often do occur 
in the markets of larger vessels. The amount of this diffusion w i t h i n the 
handy-sized market is i l lustrated by the fact that apart f rom grain, no single 
commodi ty accounts for more than 10% of demand and most add up to l i t t l e 
more than 1%, or at best 2%. 
A different ia l effect can be seen when this s i tuat ion is compared to that 
of the large, or Cape-sized bulk carrier, which is almost solely dependent 
upon the fortunes of the steel industry. This is due to the inordinate effect 
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that this industry has on the carriage of coal and i ron ore. 70% of the 
seaborne coal trade is in coking coal used in steel product ion rather than 
in steam qual i ty for heating. The same is true of Panamax ships but to a 
lesser extent in that only half of this sector's demand is l inked to steel. A n 
addi t ional influencing factor over the market for large bulk carriers is the 
state of the o i l cargo market since when i t begins to suffer relative to the 
dry cargo markets, combination carriers are a t t racted by higher freight rates 
into the dry cargo sector, thus having a knock-on effect throughout al l the 
dry cargo markets but part icular ly in the Cape-sized sector. The influence 
of part icular cargo trades over ind iv idua l sectors of the bulk market can be 
implied f rom Figure 3.3. 
W i t h reference to the dry cargo markets, the s i tuat ion is summed up by 
Ratcliffe (1979) who writes: 
"For the very big ships, there are, therefore, only two giant 
industries of interest, steel and o i l , whilst for Panamax, steel and 
grain. Handy sizes, on the other hand, are dependent on every 
conceivable business involved in dry bulk commodit ies ." 
On the demand side, i t is impor t an t to remember the overt relationship 
between the level of trade and the requirement for shipping services. How-
ever, i t is equally impor tant to emphasize the two-way relationship between 
shipping and trade. As Chrzanowski, Krzyzanowski & Luks (1979) put i t : 
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Figure 3.3: The Influence of Particular Cargo Trades Over Individual Sectors 
of the Dry Bulk Market 
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"International trade is closely linked to developments in ship-
ping. The prosperity or depression in sea transport reflects, like 
a barometer, the international economic sitiiation." 
The very existence of shipping and its markets has provided the political 
economies of the world with a medium for the facilitation of trade equally 
as important, if not more so, than the foreign exchange markets. It could 
undoubtedly be argued that the existence of efficient and effective shipping 
services have actually been the raison d'etre for a large part of contemporary 
trade. The dependance of trade upon the shipping industry is illustrated by 
the fact that ships carry some 95% of international trade in volume terms 
and almost 80% in value terms. It is this ultimate dependance of trading 
nations on shipping as well as the relatively small contribution of sea trans-
portation to industrial cost that has resulted in various research, such as that 
by Marlow & Gardner (1980), proving that shipping has a relatively inelastic 
price elasticity of demand. This provides more evidence to justify the con-
centration of this analysis on the hedging of shipowners' revenue rather than 
charterers' costs. 
3.4 The Supply of Shipping 
In determining the level of supply in shipping, there are a number of aspects 
which need to be looked at. The issue is complicated by the fact that these 
aspects tend to interrelate, not only between themselves, but also with the 
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level of demand. The most obvious feature of the supply of shipping is 
the determination of the number and total tonnage of ships of each type. 
Transportation of dry bulk cargoes ie. raw materials, farm produce and 
certain industrial intermediates such as forest products, accounts for a rapidly 
growing proportion of world shipping. The rapid growth in the size of the 
world dry bulk carrier fleet (excluding combination carriers) is shown in Table 
3.4. 
Table 3.4: The Growth of the World Dry Bulk Carrier Fleet 





i L972 70 m 
' L97S I30m 
! L982 I62m 
i 1986 I84m 
i 1988 L84m 
Source: Shipping Statistics Yearbook 
It can be seen from the table that the increase between 1982 and 1988 has 
not been as dramatic as previous years. Indeed, there has been no growth at 
all over the last two years. However, this must be looked at in the light of 
the fact that there has been a net fall in the size of the total merchant Heet 
for each of the years 1983 to 1988. It is interesting to note that over the last 
ten years or so the fleet of general bulk carriers has remained fairly steady, 
but the provision of specialized ore carriers has expanded at a rate second 
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only to container ships. The flags under which the pure bulk carrier and the 
combination carrier fleets operate can be seen in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. 
Table 3.5: Dry Bulk Carriers by Country Groups as of Jan 1988 
Country Number 
of ships 
D.VVT Percentage of 
total (DVVT.) 
OECD 1038 53m 28.9 
of which 
-EC 679 28 m 15.4 
CMEA 403 l l m 6.2 
OPEN REG. ; 1681 6 l m 33.0 
THIRD WORLD i L050 47m 25.6 
OTHERS i 358 I2m 6.4 
TOTAL 4530 L84m 100.0 
Source: Shipping Statistics Yearbook (l988) 
Table 3.6; Combined Carriers by Country Groups as of Jan 1988 
Country Number | DVVT. 1 Percentage of 
of ships ; 1 total (DWT. ) 
OECD 75 1 10m 1 24.9 
of which i 1 
-EC 44 ! 5m 1 13.7 
CMEA 52 j Im 1 3.8 
OPEN REG. 187 1 I5m \ 48.7 
THIRD WORLD 
''^ ; 
8m j 21.6 
OTHERS 3 i a .4m 1.0 
TOTAL 359 ; 38 m 100.0 
Source: Shipping Statistics Yearbook (1988) 
The overwhelming feature of the shipping markets over the last fifteen 
years or so has been the level of overcapacity, ie. the excess of supply over 
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demand, within those markets. In relation to the dry bulk sector, the current 
estimated levels of overcapacity, according to Lloyd's Shipping Economist 
(April 1989), are 8.5m Dwt. in the Handy-sized market, 4.2m Dwt. in the 
Panamax market and 7.1m Dwt. in the Cape-sized market. Although high, 
these values are much smaller than they have been in the not too distant 
past. 
If merely knowing the total number and tonnage of ships were all lliat 
was needed in order to determine the supply of shipping, there would be no 
problem in assessing that level of supply. However, the issue is complicated by 
the fact that supply of shipping really relates to the level of active tonnage. 
When the freight rate within a particular market is depressed, there is a 
tendency towards the laying-up of uneconomic ships, where even variable 
costs cannot be covered, and towards slow steaming on trade routes. 
Given a certain freight rate, laying-up and slow steaming are both mea-
sures which save on the expenses incurred in running and operating a ship. 
As a consequence of these two features, when there is an improvement in 
the freight rate pertinent to a particular trade, due to say increased demand, 
after improving space utilization the first step that owners will take is to in-
crease the speeds of their ships. This has the effect of increasing the supply of 
shipping services in terms of ton miles. In order for ships to be brought out of 
lay-up, the relevant freight rate needs to rise above a certain level where not 
only increased speeds of already active tonnage does not completely soak up 
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the short-term excess demand, but also where it becomes economically fea-
sible for shipowners or operators to incur the extra expense involved. Thus, 
with respect to these aspects of supply, Chryzanowski (1985) describes the 
situation as follows: 
"In the short-term, there are only limited possibilities of in-
creasing supply. Only ships operating in other trades or laid-up 
can quickly be added to the existing supply if demand for tonnage 
increases. In the long-term, it is possible to increase supply by 
constructing new tonnage or repairing and converting older ships. 
The elasticity of supply in the long run is greater since owners 
tend to place new orders with shipyards when the rates shoxv an 
increase. However, there is always a lapse of time between the 
intended and actual increase of supply in the long term, since it 
takes time to build a new ship." 
If freight rates continue rising due to continued expansion in demand, the 
situation may be reached whereby the level of active tonnage is equal to the 
total stock of ships. Thus, there is no slow steaming and no ships in lay-up for 
a particular trade. As a result of the existence of an excess demand, the stock 
of ships then needs to be built up. The three factors which actually effect the 
stock of ships directly are; the level of newbuilding, the level of scrapping 
and casualties at sea. Obviously, the latter is, in most cases, totally beyond 
the control of the shipowner or operator and is, therefore, not a matter of 
policy. However, newbuildings are often ordered during times of improving 
freight rates. A problem arises in that this does not constitute an immediate 
response to the prevaihng excess demand in the market because of the time 
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lag involved between ordering and receiving new ships, usually between nine 
and eighteen months. If the excess demand in the market has not survived 
the period of this time lag, which is typically the case, again the situation 
becomes one of drastic oversupply and even lower freight rates than would 
have been the result of a straight fall in demand. This is one feature which 
has served to exaggerate the cyclical nature of the shipping industry. 
A further complication arises in that newbuilding prices are inevitably 
linked to the level of the freight rate. Consequently, increased levels of new-
building, in line with the theory of supply and demand, invariably occur at 
times of high newbuilding prices. Similarly, demolition prices are also linked 
to freight rates. So when a reduction in the stock of ships would be benehcial 
to the shipping industry, ie. where there are high levels of oversupply and 
consequent low freight rates, there does not exist the motivation, in terms of 
prices, for scrapping ships. The one saving grace with respect to demolition 
prices is that these do also depend upon the level of demand for scrap in the 
steel and associated industries. However, given low freight rates, a low level 
of general economic demand is implied and so it is unlikely that demolition 
prices will be bolstered by such demand in times of depression. 
One alternative, open to the individual owners/operators, to ordering 
newbuildings when freight rates are rising is to buy secondhand ships. How-
ever, this is merely a policy which is relevant at the microeconomic level since 
it does not, on its own, increase the stock of ships to meet excess demand. It 
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may be an appropriate move for some companies, given such a situation, but 
secondhand prices too are aligned to the freight rates. Consequently, careful 
consideration must be given to the choice between a newbuilding and an old 
ship. 
One further complication must be added to this list of factors affecting 
the supply of shipping and that relates to the connection that each submarket 
of the industry has with others. In the dry bulk market, the most obvious 
influence of this type is that of the role of the combination carrier. This type 
of ship can trade in either oil or in dry bulk. They are typically large and 
technologically sophisticated. Consequently, when freight rates are high in 
dry bulk relative to oil, they will be attracted into the dry bulk market to 
compete in the Cape-sized sector. Because of their technological advantages, 
they will displace the traditional large bulk carriers who will then attempt 
to seek part cargoes in the Panamax sector. There is an inevitable domino 
effect through the whole of the dry bulk market. 
Whether or not dry bulk provides greater revenue to the combination 
carrier than does the tanker market depends to a large extent on the price 
of oil. When the price of oil is low. freight rates rise in the tanker market 
because of an increased propensity to import oil on the part of the industrial-
ized nations. Consequently, combination carriers are more likely to trade in 
oil. However, low oil prices means reduced bunker prices which has a conse-
quent effect on the level of laid-up tonnage and slowsteaming in all shipping 
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markets. Thus there is a tendency towards oversupply in the dry bulk sec-
tor. Conversely, when oil prices are high, trade is quelled and combination 
carriers may be attracted into the dry bulk market even where freight rates 
are not particularly high. Even where capacity is at a minimum in the dry 
bulk sector through laying-up and slowsteaming, their entry even further ex-
acerbates the problem of excess capacity. Thus, the very existence of the 
combination carrier has a dampening effect on the dry bulk [narket in the 
sense that when rates are improving, they will enter the market, further in-
creasing the supply which then has a consequent constraining influence over 
how high the rates rise. 
The final influence over the level of supply of shipping is certainly the 
most nebulous and probably the most important of all the aspects that have 
thus far been discussed. The expectations of the shipping community have a 
major influence over market behaviour. The translation of expectations into 
actual behaviour on the part of individual shipowners, operators or charterers 
may have either adverse or beneficial effects on the markets as reflected in 
freight rates. Because this aspect is of such central importance i t will be 
discussed in much greater detail at a later stage in the chapter. The time 
lag between expectations embodied in concurrent behaviour and its actual 
eff^ ect upon the market is again illustrated mathematically by the equation 
which was developed by Marlow & Gardner (1980) to represent the supply 
function: 
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Q, = -79.87 + l.67Ft - 0.83Fi_3 + O.boQt-i + 0.69Qi.3 
Where: 
Qs = The supply of shipping. 
Ft = Voyage charter freight rate index deflated by an index of wholesale 
prices and with 1963 = 100 
Ft_3 = Fi lagged by three years. 
Qt — Total shipments of the five major dry bulk cargoes per annum measured 
in thousand million ton-miles. 
Qt-\ = Qt lagged by one year. 
0 ( - 3 = Qt lagged by three years. 
3.5 Future Prospects 
The relative importance of dry bulk shipping as compared to other sectors of 
the industry has grown tremendously over the last decade. Indeed, Ratcliffe 
(1979) suggests that: 
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"By the year 2000, the dry bulk carrier could have displaced 
the tanker as the single most important ship type on the high 
seas." 
The biggest problem which faces dry bulk shipping, as it does every other 
sector in the shipping market, is that of overcapacity. Newbuildings ordered 
during periods of high expectations are now accentuating this problem as 
their delivery come onstream. This massive overcapacity exerts supply side 
pressure on freight rates keeping them at very low levels. It is with this in 
mind that Richardson (1986) has warned: 
"With a certain amount of slack surplus still existing in the 
world fleet and despite some current upturns in the spot demand 
for tonnage, owners should hesitate to order ships and continue 
to scrap over-age units while the present imbalance between cost 
and earnings potential remains so extreme. Only a cautious ap-
proach to this issue will ensure the eventual return of the shipping 
industry to a healthy condition." 
This problem of overcapacity is widely recognized as being the chief cause 
of the recent shipping malaise which is exemplified by the fact that mid-1986 
saw the lowest ever freight rate levels in the dry bulk sector. Certain industry 
specialists, notably Molenaar (1987), have suggested that the responsibility 
for finding a solution to this problem should be taken out of the hands of 
individual companies in the shipping community. He suggests that the only 
feasible method for restoring the balance between supply and demand in the 
bulk markets is to introduce an internationally coordinated, enforced capacity 
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planning system. Objections could be levelled at this proposal on the grounds 
that such a policy would involve interfering with a relatively free market. 
However, Molenaar (1987) preempts such complaints by arguing that so many 
interference factors currently already e.xist within the market, as shown in 
Figure 3.4, that it can no longer be regarded as being freely competitive. 
Indeed, he further suggests that the placing of faith in the theoretically free 
and self-correcting markets of shipping is extremely misplaced. 
Figure 3.4: Interference Factors in Shipping 
c 
Stiuaufdi «no to OP 
Source; A/o/enaar (1987) 
Whether the centralization of shipping is regarded as beneficial or not, 
the amount of international cooperation required, as well as the logistics 
involved, must surely mitigate against the introduction of such a concept. 
It is because of overlonnaging that the shipping industry has not really 
been able to take advantage of the greatly reduced price of oil in recent years, 
[n fact, lower bunker prices have merely served to worsen the situation in 
the dry bulk trades as ships are able to speed up and come out of lay-up. 
However, the situation has improved over the past two years and is reflected 
in the GCBS combined tramp trip charter index which is shown in Figure 
3.5. 
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Source; Lloyd's Shipping Economist 
76 
It is important to recognize that the problem of overtonnaging has meant 
that the potential benefits which the bulk market could have derived from 
lower oil prices providing a stimulus to world trade through lower production 
costs have been muted. 
The strain which the general shipping market finds itself under is exem-
plified by the financial difficulties which a lot of companies find themselves 
in. Hong Kong based groups CH Tung and Wah Kwong consistently made 
the headlines with the rescue packages that they were seeking to make with 
their creditors before finally going to the wall. Japan had already-seen the 
fall of Sanko in 1985, but has now witnessed the withdrawal from shipping 
of the Nissho-Iwai trading house writing-off S320m of oustanding shipping 
loans. Similarly, Nakamura has filed for bankruptcy leaving its parent com-
pany, Sankyu Inc., to write off another S320m of shipping debt. The financial 
collapses are not limited to the Far East, the whole shipping world is being 
rocked with the demise of several notable companies. Lyle shipping and US 
Lines are just two of the many examples from the western world. 
Despite all the gloom and despondancy that has recently pervaded the 
shipping community, there are some glimmers of hope, particularly for the 
future of the dry bulk market. The first sign of such a recovery in the bulk 
trades was a massive involvement of Greek shipowners in the secondhand 
purchase market towards the end of 1986 and start of 1987. 
In the third quarter of 1986 alone. Greek shipowners invested SlOOm in 
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buying 33 modern secondhand bulkers, including 6 panamax and 2 Cape-
sized vessels. All 33 were less than fifteen years old and the majority less 
than ten. At the same time, the Greeks despatched 38 pre-19T0 bulkers to 
the scrap yard. Even after the inevitable firming of prices in the secondhand 
market, the Greeks continued on their buying spree, taking delivery of 47 
more bulkers in the final quarter of 1986, mostly at the expense of insolvent 
or bankrupt Far East owners such as Sanko, Tung and Wall Kwong. 
Further evidence of an improvement, hopefully a long term one, has been 
seen in the recent rise in freight rates. However, what is even more important 
to the long-term prospects of the market is that the supply and demand 
fundamentals, from which long-term freight rate trends are derived, seem to 
be taking on a more favourable disposition. For instance, Clarkson Research 
Studies (1987) have estimated the dry bulk surplus as being 20% in January 
1987 as compared to a tanker surplus of 28^ o^. Even more hopeful is the fact 
that this surplus is predicted to be down to just 9% by 1990 as compared 
to a figure of 16% for the tanker sector. The one fly in the ointment is 
that of the current 19.8m Dwt. surplus in the dry bulk market, only ^1% is 
laid-up as compared to 8.8% in the tanker market. This has the effect that 
any prolonged improvement in the bulk trades will be a slow and tortuous 
process since required tonnage will come in the short-run from the potential 
19.1m Dwt. currently slow steaming. 
Other factors which may have a positive influence over a potential recov-
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ery of the bulk market are: 
• The dry bulk orderbook of 11.Im Dwt. represents only 4.9% of existing 
tonnage. 
• The recent very high level of scrapping, shown in Figure 3.6, which ap-
proached record levels in L986 during the period when shipping was suf-
fering a major depression, provides further justification for optimism. 
Figure 3.6: Scrapping Levels in the Dry Bulk Market 
Dwt (millions). 
1978 1980 1983 1985 1986 1987 
Source: Feamleys, World Bulk Fleet 
• The dry bulk fleet is relatively young with A9.S% of the fleet under 
10 years old (Shipping Statistics Yearbook (1988)), thus negating the 
absolute requirement for replacement tonnage. 
• T h e age c o m p o s i t i o n o f t he fleet \n t e r m s o f size ca tegor ies , as shown 
i n F i g u r e 3.7, is f a v o u r a b l e in t he sense t h a t the lack o f s c r a p p i n g in 
P a n a m a x a n d Handy- s i zed ships has no t had as d e t r i m e n t a l a n e f fec t 
on s u p p l y as one m i g h t have i m a g i n e d . 
F i g u r e 3.7: T h e .-Vge C o m p o s i t i o n o f the D r y B u l k Flee t 
Owt (millions). 
0-4 5-9 10-14 15-19 20-24 25+ 
Source: Feamleys, World Bulk Fleet 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , a l t h o u g h the s u p p l y side looks r e l a t i v e l y b r i g h t for the 
f u t u r e , the d e m a n d side is nowhe re near so rosy. A p a r t f r o m the g r a i n t rades , 
the m o o d is gene ra l l y bear ish . M o s t depress ing is the p r o s p e c t i v e o u t l o o k 
for the w o r l d steel i ndus t r i e s w h i c h , as has a l r e a d y been p o i n t e d . j u t . have 
a m a j o r i m p a c t on the ca r r i age o f i r o n ore and coa l , the t w o biggest d r y 
b u l k c o m m o d i t i e s , c o m p r i s i n g 3 7 % a n d 3 2 % respec t ive ly o f t he m a j o r " b u l k 
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t rades . T h e recent f r e i g h t ra te recovery has gene ra l l y been rega rded as b e i n g 
g r a i n l ed , t h o u g h t h i s s t r e n g t h i n g r a i n d e m a n d is accepted as b e i n g m e r e l y 
s h o r t - t e r m . A m o n g the m i n o r b u l k c o m m o d i t i e s , f o r t unes e b b a n d flow, 
t h o u g h t h e i r i m p a c t h a r d l y seems l i k e l y t o lead to a s w i n g i n t he f o r t u n e s o f 
the d e m a n d / s u p p l y balance. O v e r a l l , the s i t u a t i o n is s u m m e d u p b y Oakes 
(1986) as be ing : 
" I n s h o r t , t h o u g h the p i c t u r e is h a r d l y d r a m a t i c , m a n y w o u l d 
a rgue t h a t the d r y b u l k m a r k e t c o u l d have q u i t e a lo t g o i n g f o r 
i t over the nex t few years. A n d c u r i o u s l y e n o u g h , as l o n g - t e r m 
c o n t r a c t s dec l ine , i t c o u l d we l l be t he t r a d i t i o n a l t r a m p o p e r a t o r 
- some t imes w r i t t e n o f f as a t h i n g o f the past - w h o has m o s t to 
g a i n . Perhaps t h a t ' s w h y the Greeks , s t i l l t r a m p o p e r a t o r s par 
excel lence, seem to have spent less t i m e s w a n n i n g a b o u t t a n k e r s 
r e c e n t l y t h a n c o u r t i n g last year 's u g l y d u c k l i n g . " ' 
T h i s v i ew o f the p o t e n t i a l t r e n d i n t h e d r y b u l k m a r k e t s is s u p p o r t e d 
by the la tes t forecast f r o m the J a p a n M a r i t i m e Research I n s t i t u t e ( 1988) 
w h o p r ed i c t t h a t the c u r r e n t i m b a l a n c e i n d e m a n d and s u p p l y w i l l r e m a i n 
f a i r l y cons t an t d u r i n g the I990 ' s as t h i s sector goes t h r o u g h a p e r i o d o f 
a d j u s t m e n t , b u t t h a t there w i l l be a v e r y g r a d u a l u p s w i n g i n t h e m a r k e t 
d u r i n g th i s p e r i o d . 
H a v i n g p r o v i d e d an ins igh t i n t o t he n a t u r e o f the d r y b u l k m a r k e t , es-
pec ia l ly w i t h respect to the degree o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h i t faces, 
i t is now necessary t o place these aspects w i t h i n the m o r e g l o b a l l y a p p l i c a -
ble sphere o f r isk r e d u c t i o n . T o th i s e n d , t he f o l l o w i n g sec t ion a t t e m p t s t o 
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h i g h l i g h t c e r t a i n genera l approaches to the r e d u c t i o n o f r i sk i n s h i p p i n g . 
3.6 A General Perspective on the Reduction 
of Risk and Uncertainty in the Shipping 
Industry 
T h e spec i f ic purpose o f t h i s w o r k lies w i t h t he ana lys i s o f h o w s h i p o w n i n g 
compan ie s can and s h o u l d a t t e m p t t o reduce the r isk and u n c e r t a i n t y w h i c h 
arises as the resul t o f adverse f r e i g h t ra te m o v e m e n t s . T h e r e are" a n u m b e r 
o f speci f ic m e t h o d s w h i c h m a y be e m p l o y e d by the s h i p p i n g c o m m u n i t y i n 
o rde r t o reduce the p o t e n t i a l i m p a c t o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y on t h e i r decis ions . 
H o w e v e r , as C h r z a n o w s k i , K r z y z a n o w s k i Luks (1979 ) p o i n t o u t : 
' "Sh ipp ing is pa r t o f t h a t sector o f t he e c o n o m y w h i c h is char-
ac t e r i zed by a large degree o f r isk a n d u n c e r t a i n t y . I n recent t imes 
the degree o f r i sk c o n n e c t e d w i t h new i n v e s t m e n t s has been i n -
creas ing and thus , i n t u r n , has lessened the s t a b i l i t y o f s h i p p i n g 
compan ie s . " 
T h e reason w h y the level o f r i sk p e r t a i n i n g to new i n v e s t m e n t s i n t he ship-
p i n g i n d u s t r y has been i n c r e a s i n g i n recent years is p r o b a b l y best e x p l a i n e d 
by S t o p f o r d ( L 9 8 8 p 7 6 ) w h o w r i t e s : 
" I n economic t e r m s , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t d u r i n g the p o s t w a r pe-
r i o d la rger a n d m o r e e f f i c i e n t ships have p rogress ive ly pushed 
t h e i r way i n t o the m a r k e t and depressed rates for sma l l e r sizes. 
I t is also clear t h a t i n v e s t m e n t f o r s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , as i n the case o f 
car ca r r ie r s , a n d fo r l a t e r a l m o b i l i t y p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n 
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the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the fleet d u r i n g t h i s p e r i o d . T h a t these t w o 
are a p p a r e n t l y c o n f l i c t i n g o b j e c t i v e s serves t o emphas i ze the c o m -
p l e x i t y o f the i n v e s t m e n t decis ions f a c i n g t he m o d e r n s h i p o w n e r . " 
In a t t e m p t i n g t o o f f se t some o f the r i sk w h i c h t h e y face, some s h i p p i n g 
compan ies have en te red i n t o j o i n t service ag reements . T h e i n i t i a t i v e i n th i s 
m a t t e r was l a rge ly t aken by the S c a n d i n a v i a n s in the I960 ' s . T h e effect 
o f such a p o l i c y is to reduce costs so t h a t the risk t o w h i c h a c o m p a n y is 
exposed is lessened. Such pol ic ies are p a r t i c u l a r l y n o t a b l e i n t h e c o n t a i n e r 
t rades where , fo r e x a m p l e , A C L a n d H a p a g - L l o y d have such an a g r e e m e n t as 
do T F L a n d N 'ed l loyd . Such agreements are b e c o m i n g i r \ c reas ing ly p o p u l a r 
i n the b u l k t rades as w e l l . S i m i l a r l y , t h r o u g h o u t t he w o r l d t he t r e n d o f 
flagging-out con t inues as does t he t r e n d t o d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n i n t o n o n - m a r i t i m e 
sectors. These too have p r o v e d t o be e f f e c t i v e m e t h o d s o f m i n i m i z i n g the 
adverse effects o f the recent s h i p p i n g recession. 
Those m e t h o d s o u t l i n e d above are genera l one -o f f pol ic ies w h i c h have 
been i m p l e m e n t e d by s h i p p i n g c o m p a n i e s i n o rde r t o c u t costs . T h e r e are 
a n u m b e r o f o t h e r s i m i l a r example s f r o m s h i p p i n g p r a c t i c e . H o w e v e r , t h i s 
w o r k is p r i m a r i l y concerned w i t h h e d g i n g s t ra tegies w h i c h t e n d to be m u c h 
more o p e r a t i o n a l , t a c t i c a l and r e p e t i t i v e i n n a t u r e . T h e s ing le f a c t o r w h i c h 
is c o m m o n to such s t r a t eg ic pol ic ies as those o u t l i n e d a b o v e a n d to pure 
hedg ing s t ra tegies is t ha t t h e y are a l l based o n some e x p e c t a t i o n o f f u t u r e 
events . T h e process by w h i c h such e x p e c t a t i o n s become e n g e n d e r e d m a y 
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be e i t he r f o r m a l or i n f o r m a l . Since t he l a t t e r is i m p o s s i b l e t o ana lyse , i t is 
the science o f f o r m a l dec i s ion m a k i n g w h i c h w i l l r e m a i n o f p r i m a r y concern 
t o th i s w o r k , a l t h o u g h th i s does not negate t he va lue o f i n f o r m a l ana lys i s 
i n p r a c t i c a l dec is ion m a k i n g . T h e f o r m a l process u p o n w h i c h e x p e c t a t i o n s 
are mos t u s u a l l y based is t h a t o f f o r e c a s t i n g . Fo recas t ing i t s e l f is one o f the 
e lements w i t h i n a w i d e r process w h i c h H a r d y ( 1 9 7 9 ) def ines as t he " R i s k 
M a n a g e m e n t Process". He describes i t as f o l l o w s : 
1. I d e n t i f y t he r isk exists at a l l - a none t o o easy task in some areas 
suscep t ib le to change. 
2. Q u a n t i f y the e x t e n t a n d cost o f the r i sk , t he e x p e c t e d r e t u r n o n t a k i n g 
the r isk a n d the p r o b a b i l i t y of success or f a i l u r e . 
3. Assess t he possible a c t i o n t o m i n i m i z e t he r isk e l emen t . 
4. Dec ide w h a t r i sk to t ake , a n d dec ide w h e n i f possible to t ake a v o i d i n g 
a c t i o n a l t oge the r . 
Forecas t ing is e m b o d i e d i n steps 2 a n d 3 o f t h i s process. T h i s resume 
does, however , serve t o disguise t he d i f f i c u l t y i n v o l v e d in f o r e c a s t i n g . As the 
J a p a n M a r i t i m e Research I n s t i t u t e ( 1 9 S 3 p I ) so s u c c i n t l y p o i n t o u t : 
" E s s e n t i a l l y l o n g - t e r m f o r e c a s t i n g is u n d e r s t o o d t o be far f r o m 
easy not o n l y c o n c e r n i n g the s h i p p i n g m a r k e t , b u t also a l l o t h e r 
spheres o f a c t i v i t y . " 
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As has a l r eady been ear l ie r s t a t ed , t he costs o f a c h a r t e r e r a n d t h e rev-
enues o f a s h i p o w n e r are u n a v o i d a b l y l i n k e d t o t he f r e i g h t ra te . I t is t he r isk 
i n h e r e n t i n possible adverse m o v e m e n t s o f t he f r e i g h t ra te t h a t is o f t he up-
mos t i m p o r t a n c e to each o f these par t ies t o t he s h i p p i n g c o n t r a c t w h a t e v e r 
f o r m i t m a y take . T h i s r isk can , however , be r educed t h r o u g h accu ra t e fore-
c a s t i n g . T h u s , fo recas t ing i t s e l f takes on a new i m p o r t a n c e for as .-Mderton 
(1980 ) suggests: 
" U l t i m a t e l y nea r ly a l l i m p o r t a n t decis ions in sea t r a n s p o r t 
o p e r a t i o n s depends o n the a b i l i t y to j u d g e the f u t u r e t r e n d i n t he 
f r e i g h t rates." 
A l t h o u g h n o t o r i o u s l y d i f f i c u l t , a n u m b e r o f academics have a t t e m p t e d 
to d e r i v e aggregate forecasts o f s h i p p i n g t r e n d s . Since t h e y seek t o forecast 
f r e i g h t rates, t hey have a l m o s t a l l t ended t o c o n c e n t r a t e on an ana lys i s o f 
the d e t e r m i n a n t s o f s u p p l y and d e m a n d . W'e rge land ( L 9 7 9 ) , fo r e x a m p l e , has 
d e r i v e d a ve ry aggregate m o d e l w h i c h a i m s a t e v a l u a t i n g m e d i u m a n d l ong -
t e r m t rends in the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y in gene ra l . I t also a t t e m p t s to assess the 
r e l a t i ve i m p o r t a n c e o f d i f f e r e n t s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d f a c t o r s . O n e weakness o f 
the m o d e l is the fac t t h a t i t assumes t h a t d r y b u l k t rades are a homogeneous 
m a r k e t where any b u l k ca r r i e r can c a r r y a n y b u l k c o m m o d i t y to a n y p o r t . 
."Xnother weakness lies i n the f ac t t h a t c e r t a i n o f t h e r e l a t i onsh ips e m p l o y e d 
w i t h i n i t are based o n l i m i t e d e m p i r i c a l k n o w l e d g e . Howeve r , one suggested 
a d v a n t a g e o f the m o d e l is t h a t i t p o r t e n d s t o forecas t the q u a l i t a t i v e t r e n d o f 
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the m a r k e t w i t h a fa i r degree o f accuracy . As VVergeland ( I 9 7 9 p 9 1 ) h i m s e l f 
contests : 
" . . . t h e m o d e l p rov ides a use fu l basis fo r e m p i r i c a l research 
w i t h i n an area where k n o w l e d g e is f a r f r o m impres s ive : T h e eco-
n o m i c d e t e r m i n a n t s o f b u l k s h i p p i n g s u p p l y a n d d e m a n d . " 
T h e d i f f i c u l t y o f f o r ecas t i ng fo r the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y is we l l d o c u m e n t e d 
i n the w o r k o f Y o l l a n d (1981) w h o po in t s t o several hu rd l e s w h i c h need to be 
ove rcome i f a forecast is to be b o t h a c c u r a t e a n d . t h e r e f o r e , u se fu l . O n the 
s u p p l y side, he po in t s to the c o m p l e x i t i e s i n v o l v e d i n e v a l u a t i n g the s u p p l y 
o f t on mi les , n o t a b l y the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f an a l l o w a n c e for f u e l , t l i e p r o b l e m 
o f e v a l u a t i n g sh ip speed a n d the p r o b l e m o f c a l c u l a t i n g t he t y p i c a l n u m b e r o f 
days i n service fo r any g iven year . S i m i l a r l y , on the d e m a n d side, the i n f l u e n c e 
o f t e c h n o l o g i c a l , p o l i t i c a l , financial and soc ia l f ac to r s are h i g h l i g h t e d t oge the r 
w*ith the p r o b l e m o f c o l l e c t i n g accu ra t e i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t r a d i r i g na t ions 
o the r t h a n those i n the O E C D . T h e biggest p r a c t i c a l c o m p l e x i t y on the 
d e m a n d side m u s t , however , be the re l iance o f the i n d u s t r i a l n a t i o n s I 'm 
value r a the r t h a n v o l u m e figures fo r the r e p o r t i n g o f t h e i r t r ade . E v e n where 
such v o l u m e figures can be d e t e r m i n e d , as R a t c l i f f e ( 1 9 7 9 ) pu t s i t : 
" T h e fo r t unes o f s h i p p i n g are i n e x t r i x a b l y l i n k e d to the bus i 
ness cyc le . " 
As a consequence, a t t e m p t s at f o r e c a s t i n g the prospects for s h i p p i n g mar-
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kets necessari ly en ta i l s a forecast o f w o r l d i n d u s t r i a l p r o d u c t i o n a n d economic 
g r o w t h . O b v i o u s l y , th i s is no s i m p l e task. I n p r a c t i c e , i t has o f t e n been f o u n d 
m u c h m o r e u s e f u l to concen t r a t e on t he f o r e c a s t i n g o f a ve ry spec i f ic sub-
m a r k e t , whe re the level o f d e t a i l a t t a i n a b l e i m p r o v e s t he accu racy o f such 
a t t e m p t s . H o w e v e r , perhaps the best s u m m a r i z i n g c o m m e n t t h a t c o u l d be 
made w i t h r ega rd t o any forecasts t ha t are p r e p a r e d for the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y 
is t h a t p r o v i d e d by V o l l a n d (1979) : 
" U n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f economic u n c e r t a i n t y , severe o v e r - t o n n a g i n g . 
g l o b a l s h i p b u i l d i n g crises a n d inc reas ing p o l i t i c a l i n t e r f e r ence , a l l 
t h i n g s are possible , however e x t r e m e t h e i r n a t u r e . " 
T h i s c h a p t e r has h i g h l i g h t e d t he risks t h a i p e r t a i n in the s h i p p i n g indus-
t r y and has also p o i n t e d t o some genera l m e t h o d s o f r e d u c i n g those r isks. 
However , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f w h a t o b j e c t i v e r isks e.xist i n a n y i n d u s t r y , i t is the 
s u b j e c t i v e p e r c e p t i o n o f those risks t h a t is v i t a l i n e x p l a i n i n g the u l t i m a t e 
decis ion t h a t is t a k e n . T h e f o l l o w i n g c h a p t e r seeks to p r o v i d e a f o u n d a t i o n 




Ut iHty Theory 
4.1 General Introduction and the Rejection 
of the Expected Monetary Value Crite-
rion for Investment Appraisal 
C o p e l a n d & W e s t o n ( I 9 8 0 p 6 4 ) de f ine E c o n o m i c s as f o l l o w s : 
' ' Economics is t he s t u d y of how people a n d societ ies choose t o 
a l loca te scarce resources a n d d i s t r i b u t e w e a l t h a m o n g one a n o t h e r 
and over t i m e . " 
W i t h i n the conf ines set by th i s d e f i n i t i o n , t he s t u d y o f i n v e s t m e n t be-
h a v i o u r c o u l d be v i e w e d as the purest m a t e r i a l i z a t i o n o f the p r i n c i p l e s o f 
economics . E l e m e n t a r y financial economic t h e o r y suggests t h a t the c o m p a r -
a t i v e assessment o f a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t choices s h o u l d be made o n the ba-
sis o f expec ted p r o f i t ( s o m e t i m e s re fe r red t o as e x p e c t e d r e t u r n or expec t ed 
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m o n e t a r y va lue ) . T h i s e v a l u a t i o n p rocedure is i l l u s t r a t e d i n t he f o l l o w i n g 
e x a m p l e : 
O p t i o n A : T h i s i n v e s t m e n t p o s s i b i l i t y has a 5 0 % p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g 
SoO p r o f i t a n d a 5 0 % p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g SLO p r o f i t . T h e E x p e c t e d 
M o n e t a r y V^alue ( E M V ) o f the i n v e s t m e n t is t hus S30. i.e. 
(0 .5 :< S50) -r (0.5 X- SIO) = S25 -h S5 = S30 
O p t i o n B : T h i s i n v e s t m e n t p o s s i b i l i t y has a 2 5 % p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g 
SlOO p r o f i t and a 75% p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g SlO p r o f i t . T h e E M V o f 
th is i n v e s t m e n t is t hus S32.50. i.e. 
(0.25 X SlOO) - (0.75 X S lO) = S25 -H ST.50 = S32.50 
O n the basis o f an E M V assessment. O p t i o n B w o u l d be the p r e f e r r e d 
i n v e s t m e n t since i t y i e ld s a g rea te r o v e r a l l expec t ed p r o f i t ( E . \ [ V ) t h a n does 
O p t i o n A. However , i f an analys is is u n d e r t a k e n o f the ab so lu t e i n d i v i d -
ual p r o b a b i l i s t i c poss ib i l i t i e s , i t can be seen t h a t O p t i o n .-\ c o n t a i n s a 5 0 % 
chance o f e a r n i n g o n l y SlO, w h i l e O p t i o n B c o n t a i n s a c o t n p a r a t i v e l y h i g h 
75% chance o f e a r n i n g o n l y SlO. A g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l l o o k i n g a t the t w o 
choices m a y we l l o p t fo r O p t i o n A r a the r t h a n O p t i o n B because o f the 
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grea te r a t t a c h e d p r o b a b i l i t y o f e a r n i n g a h ighe r r a t he r t h a n l o w e r r e t u r n . I f 
the p r o b a b i l i t i e s w h i c h are a t t a c h e d t o t he possible o u t c o m e s w i t h i n each i n -
v e s t m e n t p o s s i b i l i t y can be regarded as measures o f r i sk , t h e n i t w o u l d seem 
clear t h a t people 's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i sk have an eff 'ect, no t o n l y u p o n the 
decis ion t h a t t h e y m a k e b u t also, u p o n the c r i t e r i o n w h i c h is used t o a r r i v e 
a t t h a t dec i s ion . E m p h a s i z i n g t h i s p o i n t i n a d i f f e r e n t way , C o u g h k H i l l 
( I 9 7 9 p 2 8 ) use the f o l l o w i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
" . . . suppose someone o f f e r e d y o u , fo r j u s t S i , a l o t t e r y t i c k e t 
w i t h a 5 0 / 5 0 chance o f w i n n i n g SLO. V o u w o u l d t h e n p r o b a b l y 
t h i n k i n t e rms o f e x p e c t e d p r o f i t a n d m a k e the bet as t he e x p e c t e d 
r e t u r n SlO ;< 0.5 = So is g rea te r t h a n the cost. E v e n i f y o u los t , 
the loss o f S i w o u l d no t e f fec t y o u s i g n i f i c a n t l y . 
Suppose t h e n someone else o f f e r e d y o u the same chance o f 
w i n n i n g S 10.000 for a cost o f 31,000. T h e n the e x p e c t e d va lue o f 
the g a m b l e is s t i l l g rea te r t h a n the cost , b u t y o u w o u l d have to 
t h i n k v e r y c a r e f u l l y a b o u t i t , because t o y o u the loss o f S 1,000 
w o u l d be so p a i n f u l as t o be u n a c c e p t a b l e as a n o u t c o m e . S i . 0 0 0 
m a y be too m u c h t o lose, desp i t e the chance o f w i n n i n g S 10,000." 
.-\s a consequence o f t he t w o p r ev ious i l l u s t r a t i o n s , i t seems c lear t h a t the 
results o f an i n v e s t m e n t a p p r a i s a l made on the liasis o f E x p e c t e d M o n e t a r y 
Va lue m a y be a l t e r ed by the i n f l u e n c e o f a t least t w o f ac to r s p o t e n t i a l l y 
i n c o r p o r a t e d w i t h i n the a i i a lys i s : 
1. T h e abso lu t e level o f p r o b a b i l i t y a t t a c h e d t o u n w a n t e d poss ib i l i t i e s 
w i t h i n the i n v e s t m e n t choice . 
2. T h e abso lu t e size o f t he p o t e n t i a l u n w a n t e d p o s s i b i l i t y w i t h i n the i n -
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v e s t m e n t choice . 
T h e r e is, however , a t h i r d f a c t o r w h i c h m a y d i v e r t an i n v e s t m e n t dec is ion 
a w a y f r o m a j u d g e m e n t based on E M V and th i s relates t o t he p o t e n t i a l 
d e v i a t i o n o f r e t u r n s . T h i s i n f l u e n c e is aga in best s h o w n w i t h t he he lp o f a 
t h e o r e t i c a l i l l u s t r a t i o n . 
O p t i o n A : T h i s i n v e s t m e n t p o s s i b i l i t y has a 100% c e r t a i n t y o f y i e l d i n g S50 
p r o f i t . T h e E x p e c t e d M o n e t a r y V a l u e ( E M V ) o f the i n v e s t m e n t is thus 
SoO. i.e. 
( I x S 5 0 ) = S50 
O p t i o n B : T h i s i n v e s t m e n t p o s s i b i l i t y has a 50% p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g 
3100 p r o f i t and a 5 0 % p r o b a b i l i t y o f y i e l d i n g SO p r o f i t . T h e E M V o f 
t h i s i n v e s t m e n t is t hus 350. i.e. 
(0.5 SlOO) ~ (0 .5 :< SO) = SoO -r SO = S50 
T h e r e is no d i f f e r ence be tween the t w o i n v e s t m e n t s on t he basis o f E M V b u t 
i t is clear t h a t O p t i o n .-V w o u l d be p r e f e r r e d by the vast m a j o r i t y o f inves tors 
since the re is no d e v i a t i o n away f r o m the c e r t a i n t y o f a S50 p r o f i t . 
These th ree i n f l u e n c i n g f a c t o r s , i l l u s t r a t e d above , w h i c h resu l t i n the 
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r e j e c t i o n o f E M V as a va l i d p r o c e d u r e for assessing a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t 
poss ib i l i t i e s have been and can be a t t r i b u t e d t o t he o v e r a l l i n f l u e n c e e x e r t e d 
by risk on the i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ion . C o n s e q u e n t l y , the E M V m e t h o d o l o g y can 
o n l y be sens ib ly a p p l i e d i n s i t u a t i o n s w h e r e the i nves to r is t o t a l l y i m m u n e 
to the p o t e n t i a l i n f luence o f r isk . Such an i nves to r is said to be r i sk n e u t r a l . 
I n most p r a c t i c a l i n v e s t m e n t decis ions , however , i t is c lear t h a t t he p o t e n t i a l 
i nves to r does, i n f ac t , exJ i ib i t a n o n - n e u t r a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s r i sk . T h i s 
is ev idenced i n the w o r k o f F r i e d m a n L Savage ( L 9 4 8 ) w h o p o i n t to the 
exis tence o f insurance and g a m b l i n g as e x t r e m e examples ( a t b o t h ends o f 
the scale) o f diH"ering pos i t i ve a t t i t u d e s t o r i sk . I n the f o r m e r , the i n s u r e d 
chooses c e r t a i n t y to u n c e r t a i n t y , however i m p r o b a b l e the r isk o f loss, w h i l e 
the g a m b l e r prefers u n c e r t a i n t y t o c e r t a i n t y . M c G u i g a n Sz M o y e r ( I 9 3 3 p 3 7 ) 
p r o v i d e f u r t h e r s u p p o r t fo r th i s p o i n t : 
" O t h e r more c o m m o n l y obse rved examples o f b e h a v i o u r , such 
as i n v e s t m e n t p o r t f o h o d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n a n d the s i m u l t a n e o u s pur -
chase o f l o t t e r y t i cke t s ( t h a t is, g a m b l i n g ) and in su rance also l e n d 
s u p p o r t t o the observed fac t t h a t t he m a x i m i z a t i o n o f e x p e c t e d 
m o n e t a r y value c r i t e r i o n is not necessar i ly a r e l i ab le g u i d e i n pre-
d i c t i n g t he ac t ions or s t ra tegies a person w i l l choose in a g i v e n 
dec is ion m a k i n g s i t u a t i o n . " 
T h e most f u n d a m e n t a l tene t of M o d e r n P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y is t h e idea o f 
d i v e r s i f y i n g a w a y the i nhe ren t u n w a n t e d r isks o f i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t s . As 
P h i l i p p a t o s ( I 9 7 3 p 4 2 5 ) po in t s o u t i n s u p p o r t o f t he asser t ion m a d e i n the 
above quo te : 
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" T h e i nves to r w h o o n l y seeks t o m a x i m i z e expec t ed r e t u r n 
w i l l never d i v e r s i f y . He w i l l a l loca te a l l his f u n d s t o the s e c u r i t y 
w i t h the grea tes t expec ted r e t u r n . . . B y the same reason ing , i f 
several secur i t ies had the same ( h i g h e s t ) e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s , t h e 
i nves to r w o u l d be i n d i f f e r e n t be tween t h e m . " 
C o n s e q u e n t l y , a s t r a t e g y o f m a x i m i z i n g E M V c o n s t i t u t e s a c o m p l e t e con-
t r a d i c t i o n t o b o t h t he t h e o r y and the a c t u a l w i d e l y obse rved p r a c t i c e o f 
p o r t f o l i o d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n . 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , perhaps the mos t i n f l u e n t i a l a n d persuas ive c r i t i q u e o f the 
Expec t ed M o n e t a r y Va lue a p p r o a c h lies i n t he area o f pure m a t h e m a t i c s . 
T h e now i n f a m o u s St . Pe t e r sbu rg P a r a d o x g a i n e d n o t o r i e t y i n the w r i t i n g s 
o f B e r n o u l l i ( 1738 ) h u t can be t r aced back even f u r t h e r t o the less w e l l k n o w n 
w o r k o f C r a m e r (1750 ) w h o , as can be seen, p u b l i s h e d his w o r k s o m e w h a t 
be la ted ly . T h e Pa radox can be e x p l a i n e d as f o l l o w s : G i v e n a f a i r c o i n w h i c h 
is tossed u n t i l the first head appears a n d a g a m b l e r t h e n wins 32" w h e n the 
first head appears o n the n^^ toss t h e n the e x p e c t e d r e t u r n f r o m t h e g a m e 
is g i v e n by the s u m o f the p r o b a b i l i t y o f each o u t c o m e m u l t i p l i e d by t he 
r e t u r n f r o m the o u t c o m e . T h i s d e f i n i t i o n is d e r i v e d f r o m the f ac t t h a t i n 
m a t h e m a t i c s such a game has a B i n o m i a l D i s t r i b u t i o n . T h u s : 
£•[/•; = P\h,\ < 2^ - P[h2: X 22 - PU12] X 2^ -r ...etc. 
= 1/2 V 2 -r (1/2)=^ :< 2^ -f- ( 1 / 2 ) ^ ;•: 2^ - r . . . etc. 
= 1 - 1 - f 1 - . ..eic. 
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W h e r e : 
£^[rj = E x p e c t e d R e t u r n 
P[fii] = P r o b a b i l i t y o f a head on 1 ' ' toss. 
P ( / i 3 j = - P r o b a b i l i t y o f a head on 2"*^ toss. 
P l / i a j = P r o b a b i l i t y o f a head on toss. 
etc. e tc . etc. 
T h u s , the expec t ed r e t u r n is an i n f i n i t e s u m o f ones and t h e o r e t i c a l l y , 
t he re fo re , the va lue o f the g a m b l e is i n f i n i t e . C o n s e q u e n t l y . E x p e c t e d M o n e -
t a r y V a l u e t h e o r y suggests t ha t someone w h o uses E M V as the dec i s ion c r i -
t e r i o n w o u l d be w i l l i n g to pay a v e r y h i g h p r i ce t o t ake p a r t i n the g a m b l e . 
However , logic suggests t h a t th is is e x t r e m e l y u n l i k e l y since the p r o b a b i l i t y 
o f w i n n i n g o n l y S4 or less, say, is 0.75. T h e S t . P e t e r s b u r g Pa radox t h u s pro-
vides even m o r e i r r e f u t a b l e evidence o f t he d e f i c i e n c y o f t he s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d 
E M V a p p r o a c h t o i n v e s t m e n t dec is ion m a k i n g . 
T h e q u e s t i o n now arises as t o w h a t m e t h o d o l o g y c o n s t i t u t e s a m o r e ap-
p r o p r i a t e s u b s t i t u t e fo r the app ra i s a l o f a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t poss ib i l i t i e s . 
T h e answer lies i n the a p p l i c a t i o n o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y . T h i s t h e o r y was o r i g i -
na l ly deve loped a n d has subsequen t ly been l a r g e l y a p p l i e d in the e c o n o m i c 
theo ry o f c o n s u m e r d e m a n d . Since inves to r s are one spec ia l ized f o r m o f 
consumer , i t is w i d e l y accepted t h a t i n v e s t o r cho ice now f o r m s one d i s t i n c t 
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corne r s tone o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y . I t is i m p o r t a n t at t h i s s tage to p o i n t o u t t h a t 
t h i s t h e o r y o f i nves to r choice relates p u r e l y to t he cho ice be tween t imeless 
r i sky a l t e r n a t i v e s . As such , i t is a s t a t i c , r a t h e r t h a n a d y n a m i c c o n c e p t . 
A c c o r d i n g t o Douglas ( 1 9 8 3 p 8 3 ) : 
" U t i l i t y is d e f i n e d as t he psych ic s a t i s f a c t i o n w h i c h t he con-
sumer o b t a i n s f r o m the c o n s u m p t i o n o f goods a n d services. W'e 
p o s t u l a t e t h a t consumers are bas ica l ly hedon i s t s a n d wish t o m a x -
i m i z e t h e i r u t i l i t y . T h u s , t hey choose p r o d u c t s fo r c o n s u m p t i o n 
on t he basis o f the u t i l i t y t h e y expec t to receive f r o m each p r o d -
A n o t h e r i n s igh t is p r o v i d e d by P h i l i p p a t o s ( 1 9 7 3 p ' i 2 5 ) w h o w r i t e s : 
" U t i l i t y , i n a b r o a d sense, is i n t e r p r e t e d as w a n t - s a t i s f y i n g 
p o w e r . As such i t is a p r o p e r t y c o m m o n to a l l c o m r n o d i t i e s 
w a n t e d by an i n d i v i d u a l where c o m m o d i t i e s are d e f i n e d to i n -
c lude b o t h present a n d f u t u r e c o n s u m p t i o n goods (assets) . C o n -
sequen t ly , u t i l i t y is a s t a te o f m i n d — k n o w n to the dec is ion-
m a k e r by in t rospec t ion . " ' 
A t t h i s stage o f the d i scuss ion , t he r e fo re , the focus s h o u l d not be on ex-
pected p r o f i t , expec t ed r e t u r n or expec t ed m o n e t a r y va lue b u t on t he u t i l i t y 
t h a t w o u l d be d e r i v e d f r o m d i f f e r e n t o u t c o m e s . I n t h i s sense, u t i l i t y refers 
to the pleasure or d isp leasure associated w i t h d i f f e r e [ i t o u t c o m e s . W i t h i n 
U t i l i t y T h e o r y , t he t e rms ; p r o f i t , w e a l t h , r e t u r n , m o n e y and m o n e t a r y value 
can . t o a l l i n t e n t s a n d purposes , be r ega rded as i n t e r c h a n g e a b l e . 
A t the hear t o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y is the idea o f m a r g i n a l u t i l i t y . W i t h i n 
the c u r r e n t c o n t e x t , t h i s can be de f i ned as the a d d i t i o n a l u t i l i t y an i [ i ve s to r 
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receives f rom a change in wealth. Marginal u t i l i t y is a measure of the increase 
or decrease in u t i l i t y derived by increasing or decreasing to ta l wealth by one 
uni t . Thus, in the theoretical graph shown in Figure 4 .1 : 
A' /( / (0 - 5000) = 8 
i\[U{o - 10000) = 5 
A / f / ( L O - 15000) = 3 
AA[ / ( 15 - 20000) = 2 
Figure 4.1: A Risk Averse U t i l i t y Curve 
Utility (Utils) 
10000 15000 
Wealth or Return ($) 
20000 
In the theory of Financial Economics, i t is generally assumed t h a i in-
vestors make decisions consistent wi th Dimin i s l i ing Marginal U t i l i t y ( D M L - ) , 
As Borch (1968p31) states: 
•*ln this theory we can f ind statements which really i m p l y 
something like *3 bottles of wine contain onlv twice as much u l i l i t v 
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as one bot t le ' or 'S2,000 contains only 50% more u t i l i t y than 
SLOOO'." 
In relation to investment theory, this phenomenon exists where investors 
derive less and less incremental u t i l i t y f rom each addi t ional increment in 
wealth. Investors who conform wi th this assumption are classified as risk 
averse. An ind iv idua l w i t h wealth x expects some satisfaction, or u t i l i t y . 
U{x) f rom the consumption possibilities that wealth x affords, f t is usually 
assumed that the ind iv idua l prefers more wealth to less (non-sal ia l ion) and 
that , therefore, U{x) is an always increasing func t ion of x. 
The risk averse investor wi l l prefer the certain outcome of some future 
wealth X made secure by a safe investment over and above some uncertain 
fu ture wealth, which for s implic i ty shall be assumed to be either x-hai-x-h 
with equal probabi l i ty of 0.5 each. As such, i t is clear that the u t i l i t y f rom 
the consumption of a known future wealth x is greater than the expected 
u t i l i t y f rom the same wealth (on average) but which is more uncertain. Con-
sequently: 
U{x) > 0.5 X U{x - / i ) -r 0.5 :< U{x 4- h) 
M u l t i p l y i n g by 2 and rearranging the terms then; 
b'{x / i ) - U{x) < U'{x) - U'{x - h) 
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Thus, i t is clear that u t i l i t y increases less rapidly at higher levels of wealth 
than at lower levels. Consequently, the risk averse investor displays Dimin -
ishing Marginal U t i l i t y . In other words, for the risk averse investor, the gain 
in u t i l i t y f rom an increase in wealth does not make up for the loss in u t i l i t y 
f rom an equal loss in wealth. Another impl ica t ion of the existence of such 
a u t i l i ty curve is that if , as a result of risky investments, wealth or income 
is allowed to deviate randomly around a certain fixed level of wealth or in-
come, then there wi l l usually be a net loss of u t i l i t y on average because of 
the steeper slope of the u t i l i t y curve for negative deviations than for positive 
deviations. Franks, Broyles and Carleton (1985) graphical ly describe this 
phenomenon as follows: 
"For the risk averse investor, it is nice to win but it really 
hurts to lose." 
Figure 4.1, previously shown, is an example of a risk averse investor's u t i l -
i ty curve, i.e. where such an assumption is upheld. However, any analysis of 
u t i l i ty curves (or functions) does not fal l down i f this assumption is relaxed. 
Rather, the assumption is made on the basis of general consumer logic, in 
the sense that in the m a j o r i t y of cases the displeasure of losing large amounts 
is much greater than the pleasure of winning that same amount . Also, this 
assumption is typical ly made purely to faci l i ta te the object ive of using hy-
pothetical examples to i l lustrate the underlying concept. The assumption of 
98 
D M U is well supported by empirical evidence in consumer demand theory 
which suggests that consumers derive progressively declining marginal u t i l i t y 
as they increase their consumption of a part icular product du r ing any given 
period of t ime. As Douglas (I983p86) points out: 
"Products for which it is said one must 'acquire a taste', such 
as caviar, frog's legs and truffles are of ten suggested as contra-
dictions to the principle of Diminish ing Marginal U t i l i t y , since, 
as you eat more and more caviar, for example, you may enjoy • 
i t more and more. But the principle of Diminish ing Marg ina l 
U t i l i t y is only contradicted if, at any one meal, you enjoy sub-
sequent spoonfuls more than you enjoyed preceding spoonfuls. 
Try ing caviar again a week later and enjoying i t more this t ime 
is not the same as having a second serving on the first occasion. 
The principle of Diminishing Marginal U t i l i t y refers to the de-
cline of marginal u t i l i t y dur ing a part icular period of t ime when 
more than one uni t of the product is consumed. Thus we expect 
marginal u t i l i t y to decline as the consumer increases the rate of 
consumption dur ing a given time period. Even i f you like caviar 
more the second time you t ry i t ( for example, a week la ter) , your 
marginal u t i l i t y is expected to decrease as you increase your rate 
of consumption." 
As has been suggested in the previous discussion, the assumption of D M U 
need not necessarily be appropriate to an investment consumer. This is 
evidenced in the existence of gambling. A n indiv idua l who, because of an 
increasing rather than a diminishing marginal u t i l i t y for money, has a definite 
tendency for undertaking highly speculative investments, such as the case 
with gambling, is said to be risk prone, a risk preferrer or to have a preference 
for risk. A typical u t i l i t y curve of a risk preferrer is shown below in Figure 
4.2. 
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Figure 4.2: A Risk Prone U t i l i t y Curve 
Utility (Utils) 
5000 10000 15000 
Wealth ar Return ($) 
20000 
The risk prone investor is different to the risk averse investor in that a 
profi t w i l l increase his u t i l i t y much more than a loss of the same amount 
would decrease i t . Such an investor would take large risks possibly feeling 
that a large loss would not make things worse than they already are while 
a large prof i t would be very rewarding. Perhaps tl ie best i l lus t ra t ion of the 
difference between these two att i tudes towards risk is provided by a coin 
tossing analogy. A risk averse investor would accept S11} rather than take 
part in a 50-50 gamble whereby he might win SO or S20 on the toss of a 
coin. The risk prone investor, on the other hand, prefers to opt {or the 
gamble. The corollary of this i l lus t ra t ion is that a risk averse investor has 
to be persuaded to accept a greater risk by the existence of an associated 
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greater level of expected re turn . The risk prone investor chooses to accept 
higher risks, even w i t h associated lower expected re turn . This is due to the 
fact that the expected return f r om an investment conceals the fact that there 
is a potent ial for a profi t much higher than that expected. This potent ial ly 
higher prof i t , however, has an associated small probabil i ty of occurrence. 
Reference has already been made to individuals who behave as i f they 
were immune or indifferent towards risk. Such an investor is described as 
risk neutral . W i t h such an investor as this, u t i l i t y increases or decreases 
s t r ic t ly in proport ion to the prof t t or loss that is made. Because of the 
linearity of this individual 's u t i l i t y curve, he can make decisions purely on 
the basis of an E M V decision cri ter ia . .A risk neutral u t i l i t y curve can be 
seen in Figure 4.3. 
Whatever the assessed shape of an individual 's u t i l i t y curve Philippatos 
(I973p425) states: 
".As i t turns out, the pursuit of a specific goal, be i t the un-
constrained maximizat ion of expected return, or the constrained 
maximizat ion of the same value through diversif icat ion, is condi-
tioned by the shape of the u t i l i t y funct ion of the decision maker." 
There exists a widely held view that in reality the shape of an individual 's 
u t i l i t y curve does not remain constant through all situations. For example, 
risk neutra l i ty is probably true (i.e. the u t i l i t y curve is l inear) only around 
the or ig in , since the indiv idual wi l l probably become more and more risk 
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Figure 4.3: A Risk Neutral U t i l i t y Curve 
Utility (Utils) 
5000 10000 15000 
Wealth or Return ($) 
20000 
averse as the amount of money involved increases. Indeed, in order to take 
account of the factual considerations of ind iv idua l behaviour, par t icular ly the 
contemporaneous investment in insurance and gambles by a single ind iv idua l , 
Friedman &: Savage (1948) suggest that an individual 's true u t i l i t y curve 
should be somewhat akin to that shown in Figure 4.4. 
This generalized shape of what Friedman *§; Savage (1948) suggest is a 
t ru ly realistic u t i l i t y curve is explained by dif ferent ia l behaviour at various 
levels of income. This in tu rn is accounted for more or less direct ly by socio-
economic class. However, this view of the shape of a ' real ' u t i l i t y curve mav 
not be appropriate, by vir tue of its analyt ical in t rac tab i l i ty , to an analysis of 
a specific decision choice as is hoped to be undertaken w i t h i n this study. 
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Figure 4.4: The Friedman-Savage U t i l i t y Curve 
Utility (Utils) 
5000 10000 15000 
Wealth or Return ($) 
20000 
The actual shape of an individual 's u t i l i t y curve is due to psychological 
factors such as expectations about the fu ture , the decision maker's conception 
of his present financial position, the nature of the decision being made etc. 
These psychological factors can be summarized by an individual 's a l t i t u d e 
towards risk and i t is this a t t i tude which effects the shape of the i n d i v i d -
ual's u t i l i t y curve. Consequently, this u t i l i t y curve is entirely subject ive and. 
therefore, extremely likely to vary between individuals and even for the same 
individuals at different times. Somewhat problemmatical ly, however, it is 
the very shape of the u t i l i t y curve that u l t imate ly determines the alterna-
tives that w i l l be chosen in a decision problem involv ing risk. This can be 
i l lustrated in the fol lowing numerical example: 
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Suppose an investment costs 84,000. I f the investment is successful then 
a profi t of S 16,000 wi l l be made. I f not, then the 54,000 wil l be lost. Assume 
also that the probabil i ty of success is i).2 and, therefore, the probabi l i ty of 
failure is 0.8. A payoff ma t r ix can be constructed as shown in Table 4.L. 
Table 4. L: Hypothet ical Payoff M a t r i x 
j ij Invest Don ' t Invest | Probabi l i ty 
! Successful !! 316,000 SO 1 
1 
0.2 
j Unsuccessful j -54,000 s o 1 o . s 
The expected prof i t f rom investment is then given by: 
316,000 X 0.2 - f ( - 3 4 , 0 0 0 ) :< 0.8 = S3,200 ( - 3 3 , 2 0 0 ) = 30 
The expected profi t f rom not investing is also 30. Making a judgement 
based purely upon the expected value c r i te r ion , the investor would be indif-
ferent between investing and not investing. However, i f i t is now assumed 
that this investor has a risk averse u t i l i t y funct ion ' then the expected u t i l i t y 
of investment can, be described as shown in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2: Expected U t i l i t y of Lnvestment 
Money U t i l i t y 
-S4,000 1 - I 
SO 
S16,000 1.2 
Looking now at the to ta l expected u t i l i l j ' then 
E\U: 
tinvcat: 
6'(Si6,Q00) X 0.2 -r 6^(-S4,000) 0.8 
1.2 < 0.2 -f - L X 0.8 
. 2 4 - -O.S 
-0 .56 
0 
Consequently, w i t h the given risk averse u t i l i t y func t ion , the investment 
would not be taken up since the expected u t i l i t y of not investing is higher 
than that of investing. 
4.2 Rational Behaviour and the Axioms of 
Cardinal Utility 
In order to properly apply U t i l i t y Theory and hence, U t i l i t y Analysis, 
one must make the fundamental assumption that the investor, in the face 
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of uncertainty, makes rat ional choices in order to achieve a par t icular goal. 
This overr iding assumption of ra t ional i ty can be expressed in ternts of a 
subset of several other, more specific and very precise, assumptions about 
an individual 's behaviour. These assumptions have become known as the 
.-Vxioms of Cardinal U t i l i t y and, as Copeland & Weston (L980p65) point out: 
. . provide the m i n i m u m set of necessary condit ions for con-
sistetit and rational behaviour." 
The development of the Axioms is invariably a t t r i bu t ed to the seminal 
work of Von iN'eumarni & .Morgenstern (1953). However, the original proof 
can be traced back to Ramsey (L931) though this work remains confined to 
comparative obscurity. Several authors have sought to adjust and further 
develop the .Axioms, the most notable a t tempt being that of Friedman Sc 
Savage (1948). However, for ease of understanding, the ensuing version of 
the .Axioms presented herein can be a t t r ibu ted to Fama & Mil le r (1972). 
A x i o m 1: C o m p a r a b i l i t y ( o r c o m p l e t e n e s s ) ' For the entire set(s) of 
uncertain alternatives, an ind iv idua l can say either that outcome .V is 
preferred to outcome Y {X > )') or V is preferred to A' ( ) ' > A') or 
that the indiv idual is indifferent between A' and V (.V V ) . 
A x i o m 2: T r a n s i t i v i t y ( o r c o n s i s t e n c y ) I f A' is preferred to Y and Y to 
^The mathemaiical symbols used over the next few pages are not meant to represent 
any strict mathematical relationship. Rather, they relate to relational operators such as, 
'is preferred more than', or 'is indifferent between' etc. 
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Z , then X is preferred to Z. Similarly, i f the ind iv idua l is indifferent 
as to X and V and to V and Z , then he is indifferent as to A' and Z. 
A x i o m 3: S t r o n g I n d e p e n d e n c e Suppose a gamble is constructed where 
an ind iv idua l has a probabi l i ty a of receiving outcome A' and a prob-
abi l i ty ( I — a ) of receiving outcome Z. I f this gamble is wr i t t en as 
C ( A ' . Z : a ) , then strong independance says that i f an ind iv idua l is 
indifferent as to X and Y then he wi l l also be indifferent as to a first' 
gamble set up between X w i th probabi l i ty Q and a mutua l ly exclusive 
outcome Z and a second gamble set up between V w i t h probabi l i ty 
a and the same mutual ly exclusive outcome Z . i.e. If A' Y then: 
6'(A', Z : Q) - G ( V ; Z : Q) 
A x i o m 4: M e a s u r a b i l i t y I f outcome Y is preferred less than X but more 
than Z . then there is a unique a (a probabi l i ty ) such that the indiv idual 
wi l l be indifferent between Y and a gamble between A' w i t h probabil i ty 
Q and Z w i t h probabi l i ty ( I - a ) . Thus , i f X > Y > Z or A' > Y > Z , 
then there exists a unique Q such that : Y 6 ' (A' , Z : a ) 
A x i o m 5: R a n k i n g If alternatives V and U lie somewhere between A' and 
Z and we can establish gambles such that an ind iv idua l is indifferent 
between Y and a gamble between X ( w i t h probabi l i ty Oi ) and Z . 
while he is also indifferent between U and a gamble between X ( w i t h 
probabil i ty a 2 ) and Z , then i f a i is greater than a 2 , V* is preferred to 
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U. Thus, i f X > Y > Z and A' >U>Z then i f V - G{X.Z : a^) 
and U G(A' , Z : 0 3 ) , i t follows that: I f a i > a 2 then >' > U. 
.Alternatively, i f a i = 0 2 then Y f / . 
The Axioms of Cardinal U t i l i t y , as out l ined above, are most f u l l y dis-
cussed by Herstein & Mi lnor (1953) but are best summarized in a qual i ta t ive 
fashion by Friedman Savage (1948) who point to the salient features as 
being: 
1. The decision maker has a consistent set of preferences. 
2. These preferences can be completely described by a func t ion a t taching 
a numerical value - to b e designated " u t i l i t y " - to alternatives each of 
which is regarded as certain. 
3. The decision maker's object ive is to maximize his e . K p e c t e d u t i l i t y . 
Together w i th the basic assumption that individuals prefer more wealth to 
less, these .Axioms provide the basis of a means of mapping preferences into 
measurable u t i l i ty . This facilitates the applicat ion of .Modern Por t fo l io The-
ory since it necessitates the inclusion of at t i tudes towards risk as a variable. 
Hopefully, this method wi l l allow the determinat ion of a u t i l i t y funct ion for 
shipowners. 
This f inal assumption, that individuals prefer more wealth to less, can. 
in Economics, be defined as meaning that the marginal u t i l i t y of wealth is 
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always positive. What this implies is that al though the Axioms say nothing 
about the shape of the final determined u t i l i t y curve U{x), i t does mean that, 
as Borch (1968) points out, U{x) must increase wi th increasing x. i.e. 
^ > 0 
dx 
Where: 
X = Some monetary value, prof i t , reward or return. 
U{x) = The u t i l i t y derived f rom x. 
Explaining the raison d'etre for the existence of this phenomenon of ra-
tional behaviour is a task for other areas of social science such as anthropol-
ogy.- psychology, poli t ical science, sociobiology and sociology. Consequently, 
in order to facili tate the empirical measurement of a u t i l i t y func t ion , it is 
necessary merely to accept, wi thout question, the val idi ty of the Axioms of 
Cardinal U t i l i t y and the assumption that an indiv idual s behaviour is indeed 
rational wi th in the definitions provided by those .Axioms. 
4.3 The Measurement of Utility Functions 
As far as est imating u t i l i t y functions is concerned. Cough t Hi l l (1979p.*i2) 
suggest that : 
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"This is very d i f f icul t at a practical level. However, it seems 
clear that even a subjective assessment of a u t i l i t y funct ion is 
preferable to ignoring the problem."' 
Impl ic i t in the development of the. Axioms of Cardinal U t i l i t y by Vo[i 
Neumann Sc Morgenstern (1953) lies a proof of the nteasurability of u t i l i ty . 
Al the t ime, this proof confounded the then prevailing e c o n ' . ) m i c piiilosophy. 
even though now i t has become the accepted w i s d ^ ' t n . Ilowtrver. c l a s s i c a l 
economic t h e i ^ r y [oo, par t icular ly that -^f the Austr ian Schu'4 ' . ' f e c o n t j t n i c 
thought, did incorporate a belief in the p^.neiitial mensuration of u t i l i t y . How-
ever, the .-\ustrian School's e x p c ' s i t i o n of the pro«jf of this w a s based o n the 
sole existence of Diminishing .Marginal U t i l i t y . .As has been s e e n , such an 
assumption does not hold for all cases and s o their versi-Mi the ()r':"jf h a s 
subsequently bee[i refuted. .As well as der iving a matheEiiatical jus i i f ica t i i^n 
' j f the measurability of u t i l i t y . \'»:»n Xeumarm i : .Morgenstern (l053p'S) d r a w 
parallels wi th the development of thei>ries in the physical s c i f [ic(*s in '.>rder t-^ 
j u s t i f y the mensuratiori of u t i l i t y on the basis of ( jual i ia t ive reasoning. Their 
logic is e . K p o u n d e d as follows: 
" I t is sometimes claimed in econ':>mic l i terature that di.scus-
sions of the notions of u t i l i t y and preference are altogether uti-
necessary. since these are purely verbal defini t ions wi th n.> enipir-
ically observable consequences, i.e. ent irely tautological. It does 
not seem to us that these notions are qual i ta t ively inferior to cer-
tain well established and indispensable notions in physics, like 
force, mass, charge, etc. Tha t is, while they are in their imme-
diate form merely definit ions, they become subject to empir ical 
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control through the theories which are bui l t upon them - and 
in no other way. Thus, the notion of u t i l i t y is raised above the 
status of tautology by such economic theories as make use of i t 
and the results of which can be compared w i t h experience or at 
least w i th common sense." 
The methodology typical ly used for collecting in format ion to faci l i ta te the 
derivation of a decision maker's u t i l i t y funct ion is based on a modif ica t ion 
of the methodology established by Friedman Savage ( l94Sp294). This 
methodology is itself based on the .-\xiom of Archimedes wliich states that to 
any prospect f { x ) in the set, there corresponds a cer ta inty equivalent x. In 
popular terms, x is the lowest price at which a part icular investor wi l l sell the 
prospect, or the highest price at which that same investor would be wi l l i ng to 
purchase the prospect. Consequently, the decision maker exhibits indifference 
between owning the prospect f { x ) or an amount of cash equal to x. By the 
collection of such informat ion in relation to several different prospects w i th in 
a given universal set, then a mapping of the decision maker's u t i l i t y curve 
can be developed. As Friedman & Savage (1948) suggest: 
•'Given a u t i l i t y func t ion obtained in this way, it is possible, i f 
the hypothesis is correct, to compute the u t i l i t y attached to ( tha t 
is, the expected u t i l i t y o f ) any set or sets of possible incomes and 
associated probabihties and thereby to predict which of a number 
of such sets wi l l be chosen.'' 
The choice of mathematical model to fit the consequent mapping is largely 
a matter of subjective judgement , indeed. Phil ippatos (I973p4*27) goes so 
111 
fa r as to suggest t h a t 
" T h e choice o f a r ep re sen t a t i ve shape fo r t he i i t i h t y f u n c t i o n 
o f an inves to r is u sua l ly a r b i t r a r y - the f i n a l dec is ion b e i n g c o n -
d i t i o n e d by i n t u i t i o n a n d a n a l y t i c a l t r a c t a b i l i t y . " 
T h i s a r b i t r a r i n e s s is i l l u s t r a t e d by M a r k o w i t z ( 1959 ) w h o chose s ix d i f f e r -
en t possible u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s and j u s t i f i e d i h e m on the basis o f the measure 
o f r isk e m p l o y e d in the analys is o f r e t u r n s . These six cases are c i t e d be low: 
C a s e 1 : T h e inves to r m a x i m i z e s the va lue o f some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n , a n d de-
cides on the re levant p o r t f o l i o s on t he basis o f t h e i r e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
and s t a n d a r d d e v i a t i o n s . I n th i s case, the i nves to r ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n 
w i l l be q u a d r a t i c . 
^,/'(r) = c -r a r - 6r" 
For the r isk aver te r . i n t l i i s case, b < 0. Such u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s reach a 
m a x i m u m t h a t m a y occur a b o v e or be low the range o f r e l evan t r e t u r n s . 
However , i n genera l , i t is a ssumed t h a t , over some re levan t range o f 
r e t u rn s , t he a c t u a l u t i l i t y o f an i n v e s t o r is a p p r o x i m a t e d by a q u a d r a t i c 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n . 
C a s e 2 : T h e inves to r m a x i m i z e s t he va lue o f some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n ar\d de-
cides on the re levant p o r t f o l i o s on t he basis o f t h e i r e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
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and the semiva r i ance o f r e t u r n s . T h e s emiva r i ance ( 5 ^ ) is d e f i n e d as 
the e x p e c t e d value o f [i\'[in(r — 6,0)P . I n th i s case, t he i nves to r ' s 
u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n w i l l be o f t h e f o r m : 
U{r) = [ A / m ( r - 6 , 0 ) | ' 
C a s e 3 : T h e inves to r m a x i m i z e s t he va lue o f some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n and de-
cides o n the re levant p o r t f o l i o s on t he basis o f t he i r e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
and the e x p e c t e d value o f loss . E x p e c t e d loss is d e f i n e d as t he e x p e c t e d 
value o f [ — A / i n ( r , 0 ) ) . I n t h i s case, t he inves to r ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n w i l l 
be o f the f o r m : 
U{r) = c T- a r b:\fin{r,{)) 
C a s e 4 : T h e i nves to r m a x i m i z e s the va lue o f some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a n d de-
cides o n the re levant p o r t f o l i o s on t he basis o f t he i r e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
and the expec t ed abso lu te d e v i a t i o n o f r e tu rns . In t h i s case, the i n -
vestor ' s u t i l i t v f u n c t i o n w i l l be o f the f o r m : 
U(r) = c -h a r -r 6 I r I 
C a s e 5: T h e i nves to r m a x i m i z e s some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a n d decides on the 
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re levan t p o r t f o l i o s on the basis o f the expec t ed r e t u r n s a n d the p roba -
b i l i t y o f loss. I n th i s case, the p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t the e x p e c t e d r e t u r n w i l l 
be less t h a n or equa l to zero can be expressed as the e x p e c t e d r e t u r n 
o f the f u n c t i o n : 
• IJ r > ( J 
/ ( r ) = . 
I r < 0 
T h e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n associated w i t h t h i s measure o f r isk consis ts o f t w o 
p a r a l l e l l inea r segments separa ted by a d i s c o n t i n u i t y at r = 0. 
C a s e 6 : T h e i nves to r m a x i m i z e s some u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n a n d decides on the 
re levant p o r t f o l i o s on the basis o f t h e i r expec t ed r e t u r n s a n d m a x i m u m 
expec ted loss . I n th is case, the i nves to r a t t e m p t s to m i n i m i z e his losses 
for a n y g i v e n value o f expec ted r e t u r n , a r id his ac t ions are based on a 
m u l t i s t a g e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n of r e t u r n s . I f tl»e inves to r ' s a c t i ons were 
based on a s ingle-stage u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n U(r), t hen the r i sk measure o f 
m a x i m u m loss w o u l d c o n t r a d i c t t he a x i o m s o f expec t ed u t i l i t y . 
C o m p a r e d to o t h e r a u t h o r s , M a r k o w i t z ( 1 9 5 9 ) e x h i b i t s an u n t i s u a l degree o f 
r i gou r i n a t t e m p t i n g t o j u s t i f y , o n the basis o f the measure o f r isk e m p l o y e d , 
the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s he has selected. T h e vast m a j o r i t y o f a p p l i e d research 
i n t h i s area, f o r e x a m p l e L o r a n g e k N o r m a n ( L 9 7 0 ) . evoke no j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
( a p a r t f r o m the goodness o f fit o f the a r b i t r a r i l y chosen m o d e l ) fo r t he f o r m 
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o f the f u n c t i o n w h i c h seeks to represent t he obse rva t ions t a k e n on u t i l i t y . 
4.4 Alternatives to Utility Theory 
A p a r t f r o m an a x i o m a t i c u t i l i t y t h e o r y a p p r o a c h , A r r o w ( L 9 7 1 ) p o i n t s to 
o t h e r re levant approaches to dec is ion m a k i n g under c o n t l i t i o n s o f r i sk and 
u n c e r t a i n t y . T h e three most a p p r o p r i a t e to i n v e s i i n e n t dec is ion m a k i n g , and 
the re fo re the most i m p o r t a n t to th i s d i scuss ion are de t a i l ed be low: 
I . O n e a p p r o a c h stresses an a d a p t i v e r a t h e r t h a n a m a x i m i z i n g process (as 
is i m p l i c i t i n u t i l i t y t h e o r y ) , where t h e a d a p t i v e i nves to r makes dec i s ion 
choices on the basis o f the o u t c o m e s o f a l l t he p rev ious decis ions t h a t 
i n v e s t o r has made . C o n s t a n t and progress ive m o n i t o r i n g o f o u t c o m e s 
t h r o u g h t i m e resul t i n a coEi t inuous process o f r ev i s i ng the i nves to r ' s 
e x p e c t a t i o n s a b o u t the f u t u r e . H o w e v e r , as P h i l i p p a t o s ( I97.*ip426) 
po in t s o u t : 
'"As such, the a d a p t i v e a p p r o a c h is more a p p r o p r i a t e i t i 
e x p l a i n i n g the f o r m a t i o n o f e x p e c t a i i o t i s t h a n in a n a l y s i n g 
the i n v e s t m e n t dec is ion unde r u n c e r t a i n t v . " 
Desp i te th is c r i t i c i s m , t h i s is i n v a r i a b l y t he a p p r « ^ a c h a d o p t e d b y s h i p o w n 
ers as a m a t t e r o f course. 
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2. A n o t h e r app roach stresses h e u r i s t i c b e h a v i o u r whe re s i m u l a t i o n s are 
used t o p red ic t i n v e s t m e n t o u t c o m e s . A g a i n , such an a p p r o a c h does not 
su i t the purposes o f d i r e c t l y d e a l i n g w i t h the e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f dec i s ion 
rules i n a r i sky e n v i r o n m e n t . 
3. A f u r t h e r a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h t o u t i l i t y ana lys i s , a n d perhaps t h e most 
w i d e l y accepted a l t e r n a t i v e , is one w h i c h e m p l o y s t he e c o n o m i c concep t 
o f i n d i f f e r e n c e curves . 
Douglas ( I 9 8 3 p 8 2 ) states; 
• ' A n i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e is d e f i n e d as the locus o f c o m b i n a t i o n s 
o f t w o p r o d u c t s , or o f o t h e r va r iab les , a m o n g w h i c h c o m b i n a t i o n s 
t he consumer is i n d i f f e r e n t . T h a t is. each p o i n t (each c o m b i n a t i o n 
o f the t w o var iab les ) on an i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e is e q u a l l y des i rab le , 
g i v i n g the consumer the same leve l o f u t i l i t y . ' ' 
As is o b v i o u s f r o m the above d e f i n i t i o n , a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p exis ts be-
tween u t i l i t y analysis and a n d an ana lys i s based on i n d i f f e r e n c e cu rves . Since 
the inves to r ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n d e t e r m i n e s the re levancy, t o t he f i n a l dec is ion 
choice, o f the specif ic cha rac t e r i s t i c s o f the var ious p o r t f o l i o s a v a i l a b l e to 
t h a t i nves to r , t hen i t fo l lows t h a t t he inves to r ' s u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n w i l l deter-
m i n e h o w m a n y m o m e n t s o f the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n o f e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
are s i gn i f i c an t t o the p o r t f o l i o se lec t ion process. 
T h e r e l a t i o n s h i p be tween u t i l i t y curves and i n d i f f e r e n c e cu rves is e v i -
denced by the fac t t h a t each u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n con t a in s i m p l i c i t l y an i n d i f f e r -
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ence m a p , whe re the shape o f t he i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e can be f o u n d eas i ly by 
h o l d i n g t he u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n c o n s t a n t a n d d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g w i t h respect t o each 
m o m e n t . I n r e l a t i o n to i n v e s t m e n t decis ions , a l t e r n a t i v e choices are t y p i c a l l y 
cons idered i n t e rms o f t w o m o m e n t s ; t he e x p e c t e d r e t u r n ( / / ) a n d the va r i ance 
o f t h i s r e t u r n ( C T " ) ( t h e va r iance c o n s t i t u t i n g a measure o f r i s k ) . A s a l r e a d y 
m e n t i o n e d , i n d i f f e r e n c e curves can , i n t h e o r y , be f o u n d be tween r e t u r n a n d 
var iance . As is also t r u e o f u t i l i t y curves , t he shape o f th i s i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e 
ind ica tes t he a t t i t u d e o f the inves to r t o w a r d s r isk . For e x a m p l e , t he i n d i f -
ference c u r v e o f the r isk averse i n v e s t o r w o u l d have a steep p o s i t i v e slope 
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t as va r iance ( r i s k ) increases, e x p e c t e d r e t u r n m u s t increase 
s teeply i f the i nves to r is to r e m a i n i n d i f f e r e n t . Such an i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e for 
a r isk averse inves to r can be seen in F i g u r e 4.5. 
Because o f th i s r e l a t i o n s h i p be tween u t i l i t y analys is a n d t h a t based on 
i n d i f f e r e n c e curves , and because the mos t a p p r o p r i a t e measure o f r isk i n 
s h i p p i n g has not ye t been e v a l u a t e d , i t has been d e c i d e d , fo r the purposes 
o f t h i s w o r k , t h a t a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s r i sk i n the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y be assessed 
w i t h the a id o f u t i l i t y t h e o r y . A p r a c t i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n also s u p p o r t s th i s 
choice, since as C o u g h Sc H i l l ( I 9 7 9 p 3 1 ) say o f i n d i f f e r e n c e c u r v e ana lys i s : 
" T h i s a p p r o a c h emphasizes t h a t t he d i spe r s ion o f r e t u r n s m u s t 
be t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t , b u t e s t i m a t i n g i n d i f f e r e n c e cu rves is even 
m o r e d i f f i c u l t t h a n e s t i m a t i n g u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s . " 
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Figu re 4.5: .A T h e o r e t i c a l Rep re sen t a t i on o f I n d i f f e r e n c e C u r v e s fo r a Risk 
Averse I n v e s t o r 
R e t u r n 
Risk 
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4.5 The Use of Utility Functions in Portfolio 
Selection 
Once inves to r preferences have been f o r m a l i z e d w i t h t he a i d o f u t i l i t y 
ana lys is , the final chosen p o r t f o l i o can be d e t e r m i n e d by l o o k i n g a t these 
preferences i n assoc ia t ion w i t h a locus o f e f f i c i e n t p o r t f o l i o s . A n e f f i c i e n t 
p o r t f o l i o i n th i s c o n t e x t re la tes to those w h i c h y i e l d the m a x i m u m ex:pected 
r e t u r n associated w i t h a specif ic level o f r i sk or those w i t h t he m i n i m u m 
level o f r isk associated w i t h a speci f ic level o f e x p e c t e d r e t u r n . T h e chosen 
p o r t f o l i o is c a l c u l a t e d as t h a t p r e v a i l i n g at the p o i n t o f t angency b e t w e e n 
the e x p e c t a t i o n s and the preferences. T h i s is t he basic m e t h o d o l o g y o f M o d -
e rn P o r t f o l i o T h e o r y w h i c h is e x p o u n d e d u p o n to a rnuch g rea t e r e x t e n t i n 
C h a p t e r 6. 
Once the locus o f e f f i c i e n t p o r t f o l i o s has been c o n s t r u c t e d , by m o v i n g 
a long i t the i n v e s t o r can t rade-ofT r isk a n d r e t u r n i n o r d e r to m a x i m i z e his 
u t i l i t y . T h i s b r ings i n t o ques t i on the p r o b l e m o f i n v e s t m e n t goals . .At the 
most e l e m e n t a r y l eve l , l o n g - t e r m as aga ins t s h o r t - t e r m goals m a y resu l t i n 
d i f f e r e n t p o r t f o l i o s be ing selected. T h i s is t he case since as P h i l i p p a t o s ( I 9 7 ! i ) 
po in t s o u t , p o r t f o l i o s w i t h g rea te r v a r i a t i o n t e n d to have h ighe r l o n g - t e r m 
expec ted r e t u r n s t h a n s h o r t - t e r m . H o w e v e r , such p r o b l e m s as these are as-
sumed t o be a u t o m a t i c a l l y s u r m o u n t e d w i t h i n u t i l i t y ana lys i s s ince such ob-
j ec t ives are he ld t o be i m p l i c i t l y c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n t he i n v e s t o r ' s u t i l i t y c u r v e . 
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I n t u r n , the shape o f t he u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n w i l l also d e t e r m i n e t he p a r a m e t e r s 
o f the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f expec t ed r e t u r n s w h i c h are u l t i m a t e l y d i r e c t l y r e l evan t 
t o the dec i s ion . 
T h i s m e t h o d o l o g y fo r d e t e r m i n i n g the cho ice o f the f i n a l p o r t f o l i o is s i m -
i l a r to the e q u i l i b r i u m s o l u t i o n o f c o n s u m e r choice: A n o b j e c t i v e f u n c t i o n , 
t h a t is the e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y , mus t be m a x i m i z e d s u b j e c t t o the c o n s t r a i n t o f 
ava i l ab l e p o r t f o l i o s . As has a l r eady been s t a t e d , the s o l u t i o n is o b t a i n e d a t 
the p o i n t o f t angency be tween the t w o f u n c t i o n s . 
I m p l i c i t i n t h i s m e t h o d o l o g y fo r p o r t f o l i o se lec t ion are th ree basic steps: 
1. Se lec t ion o f the un ive r sa l set o f poss ib le i n v e s t m e n t s 
2. E s t i m a t i o n o f t he r i s k - r e t u r n p r o p e r t i e s o f the i n d i v i d u a l i n v e s t m e n t s . 
3. A l l o c a t i o n o f the ava i l ab le f u n d s fo r i n v e s t m e n t a m o n g the o p p o r t u n i -
ties so as t o m i n i m i z e risk fo r a spec i f i ed ra te o f r e t u r n . 
T h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y and the subsequent d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n s re la te to p o i n t 3 above in t h a t t h e y p r o v i d e an i n p u t i n t o the 
m e t h o d o f a l l o c a t i o n o f f u n d s w h i c h is u l t i m a t e l y a d o p t e d . W i t h respect 
to p o i n t 2 above , i n an u n c e r t a i n w o r l d i nves to r s c a n n o t k n o w in advance 
w h i c h i n v e s t m e n t s w i l l y i e l d t he h ighes t r e t u r n s . Inves tors need t o m n k e 
es t imates o f the risk and r e t u r n p a r a m e t e r s . C o n s e q u e n t l y , unde r c o n d i t i o n s 
o f u n c e r t a i n t y , inves tors make decis ions t h a t m a x i m i z e expec t ed u t i l i t y . T h i s , 
in i t se l f , is d e t e r m i n e d as P h i l i p p a t o s ( 1 9 7 3 p 4 2 6 ) po in t s o u t , by e x p e c t e d 
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r e t u r n a n d e x p e c t e d r isk: 
" I n t he select ion o f a p o r t f o l i o , t he i nves to r relies on his ex-
p e c t a t i o n s , w h i c h i n v o l v e several poss ib le o u t c o m e s o f his ac t i ons , 
E x p e c t a t i o n o f r e tu rns f r o m a p o r t f o l i o are f u n c t i o n a l l y deter-
m i n e d by the d i s t r i b u t i o n o f r e t u r n s on the i n d i v i d u a l assets." 
G i t m a n , J o e h n k & Pinches ( I985p251) ) p r o v i d e f u r t h e r s u p p o r t fo r th i s 
c o n t e n t i o n w h e n thev s ta te : 
" T h e o r e t i c a l l y , inves to rs s h o u l d seek t o m a x i m i z e u t i l i t y i n a n 
u n c e r t a i n w o r l d , b u t i n an o p e r a t i o n a l sense t h e y t r y to m a x i m i z e 
e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y . " 
T h u s , i n genera l , any decis ion m o d e l fo r a n inves to r revolves a b o u t t w o 
sets o f pa r ame te r s : 
• T h o s e t h a t descr ibe the e x p e c t a t i o n s o f the i n v e s t o r a b o u t t h e f u t u r e 
s tates o f the w o r l d . 
• T h o s e t h a t descr ibe the preferences o f the inves to r w i t h i n t h e f r ame-
w o r k o f ava i l ab l e o p p o r t u n i t i e s . 
H a v i n g a s s i m i l a t e d the necessary i n f o r m a t i o n , the i nves to r can t h e n look at 
the p r o b l e m as one o f m a x i m i z i n g E[U.j where : 
B'U\ ~ /{expected return, risk) 
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O n e i m p l i c a t i o n o f such a p r o b l e m is t h a t an increase i n e x p e c t e d r e t u r n s 
w i l l increase t he inves to r ' s e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y i f r i sk does not increase. S i m i l a r l y , 
a decrease i n the r i sk o f the r e t u r n s w i l l increase e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y i f the 
expec t ed r e t u r n does not decrease s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . 
T h i s o b j e c t i v e o f a t t e m p t i n g t o m a x i m i z e e x p e c t e d u t i l i t y is i n c o r p o r a t e d 
w i t h i n the A x i o m s o f C a r d i n a l U t i l i t y a n d as such , s h o u l d be v i e w e d as a 
means f o r m a k i n g a r a t i o n a l choice . As P h i l i p p a t o s ( 1 9 7 3 p 4 2 6 ) avows , th i s 
r a t i o n a l cho ice a m o u n t s to: 
• 'The s t a t i s t i c a l m a x i m i z a t i o n o f t he e x p e c t e d value o f a f u n c -
t i o n a s s ign ing u t i l i t i e s t o t he p o t e n t i a l o u t c o m e s o f his por t fo l i i : ) 
s e l ec t ion . " 
T h i s s t a t e m e n t p rov ides us w i t h a q u a l i t a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f w h a t has be-
come k n o w n as the E x p e c t e d U t i l i t y H y p o t h e s i s or B e r n o u l l i P r i n c i p l e . I n 
m a t h e m a t i c a l t e^mino log \^ expec t ed u t i l i t y is c a l c u l a t e d by s u m m i n g , over 
a l l the possible o u t c o m e s t h a t m a y resu l t f r o m a dec i s ion , the p r o d u c t o f t he 
u t i l i t y o f each o u t c o m e Hi t imes i t s r e spec t ive p r o b a b i l i t y o f occurence P,-. 
Ui i n t h i s ins tance refers to the ass igned u t i l i t y t o each p o t e n t i a l o u t -
come o f an i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ion . T h e E x p e c t e d U t i l i t y H y p o t h e s i s is t hus 
represen ted i n m a t h e m a t i c a l f o r m by the f o l l o w i n g express ion : 
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T h e p r o o f o f th i s hypo thes i s , mos t pe r suas ive ly p r o p o u n d e d b y V o n Neu-
m a n n & M o r g e n s t e r n ( 1 9 5 3 ) , has as a c o r o l l a r y the resu l t t h a t such ca lcu la -
t ions can be used to d e t e r m i n e a p re fe rence o r d e r i n g over a set o f d i f f e r i n g 
i n v e s t m e n t prospects or a l t e r n a t i v e s . 
O n e f u r t h e r f ac to r , w h i c h s h o u l d be i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a n y i n v e s t m e n t 
ana lys i s , s tems f r o m the fac t t h a t the w e a l t h o f inves to r s is i n v a r i a b l y l i m -
i t e d . C o n s e q u e n t l y , inves tors m u s t a l loca te t h e i r a v a i l a b l e f u n d s a m o n g the 
possible i n v e s t m e n t s ava i l ab l e t o t h e m , t a k i n g accoun t o f the d i f f e r e n t costs 
a n d d i f f e r e n t u t i l i t y expec ted f r o m a l t e r n a t i v e i n v e s t m e n t s so t h a t u t i l i t y is 
m a x i m i z e d s u b j e c t to a w e a l t h c o n s t r a i n t . As is i m p l i e d by the A x i o m s o f 
C a r d i n a l U t i l i t y , an inves to r w h o is seeking t o m a x i m i z e u t i l i t y is said t o 
be a c t i n g " r a t i o n a l l y ' . However , t h i s w e a l t h c o n s t r a i n t p r even t s the i nves to r 
f r o m a c t i n g r a t i o n a l l y i n an a b s o l u t e sense a n d so resul ts i n the i nves to r 
a d o p t i n g an i n v e s t m e n t p o s i t i o n w h i c h a l t h o u g h is p r a c t i c a l , is i n fac t sec-
o n d best a n d , the re fo re , s u b o p t i m a l i n a r a t i o n a l sense. T h e i n v e s t m e n t 
p r o b l e m t h e n becomes s i m i l a r to t h a t de sc r ibed by iVay lor , V e r n o n *k W e r t z 
( I 9 8 3 p 5 8 ) i n r e l a t i o n to consumer cho ice : 
" I n consumer theo ry , the d e m a n d f u n c t i o n s o f a s ingle con-
sumer are de r ived f r o m the i n t e r a c t i o n o f t w o concepts : t he u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n a n d the budge t c o n s t r a i n t . T h e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n is a for-
m a l way o f express ing w h a t a c o n s u m e r prefers t o have . T h e 
budge t c o n s t r a i n t expresses w h a t a c o n s u m e r can a f f o r d to b u y . 
A s s u m i n g t h a t a c u s t o m e r w i l l select f r o m a l l a f f o r d a b l e c o m b i -
na t ions o f goods ( a c c o r d i n g t o t he b u d g e t c o n s t r a i n t ) t he c o m -
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b i n a t i o n he or she most w a n t s t o have ( a c c o r d i n g to t he u t i l i t y 
f u n c t i o n ) , we d e r i v e the q u a n t i t i e s t h a t t he c o n s u m e r seeks t o 
b u y . " 
H a v i n g a t t e m p t e d to j u s t i f y t he t h e o r e t i c a l a t t r a c t i v e n e s s o f t h e u t i l i t y 
a p p r o a c h , i t is now necessary to h i g h l i g h t t he p o t e n t i a l p r a c t i c a l d r a w b a c k s . 
M c G u i g a n A: M o y e r (1983) p o i n t t o th ree : 
L. W h o s e u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s h o u l d be used as the basis o f a c o r p o r a t e ana l -
ysis. 
2. Since the u t i l i t y f u n c t i o n s o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s are not d i r e c t l y corn-
pa rab le , how can a g r o u p f u n c t i o n be a r r i v e d at . 
3. T h e approaches used in a t t e m p t i n g to e m p i r i c a l l y d e r i v e a u t i l i t y f unc -
t i o n somet imes resul t i n i ncons i s t en t u t i l i t y assessments. 
These are a l l v a l i d p rob lems w h i c h need t o be resolved w i t h i n t h i s s t u d y . 
Howeve r , i n response t o p o i n t 3, B o r c h ( L 9 6 8 p 2 l ) ve ry p r a g m a t i c a l l y sug-
gests: 
" T h e r e m a y exis t persons w i t h m o r e or less ' pe rve r se ' prefer -
ence o rde r ings w h o do not fit o u r m o d e l , b u t we can i g n o r e t h e m 
as l o n g as we do not set o u r leve l o f a s p i r a t i o n t o o h i g h . " 
A t t he e n d o f the day. desp i t e the o b v i o u s p r o b l e m s , the final j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for the use o f the u t i l i t y t h e o r y m e t h o d o l o g y m u s t l ie i n the f a c t t h a t g i v e n 
the l ack o f a su i t ab l e s u b s t i t u t e , t he re seems to be no b e t t e r m e t h o d o f 
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i n c o r p o r a t i n g the dec is ion maker ' s preferences i n t o the dec is ion ana lys i s . .-Vt 
t he same t i m e , as F r i e d m a n & Savage ( 1 9 4 8 ) p o i n t o u t , i t m u s t be b o r n e in 
m i n d t h a t u t i l i t y t h e o r y does not s i iggest t h a t the i n d i v i d u a l dec i s ion m a k e r 
consc ious ly refers to his o w n u t i l i t y c u r v e i n m a k i n g a dec i s ion . R a t h e r , the 
c u r v e exp la in s the a c t u a l dec is ion t a k e n i n a l o g i c a l way, a n d can , t he r e fo re , 
o n l y be d i s p r o v e d where a p r e d i c t i o n based on such an ana lys i s proves to be 
i naccu ra t e . .As V o n N e u m a n n k M o r g e n s t e r n ( I 9 5 3 p 2 0 ) so po igEian t ly p o i n t 
o u t i n r e l a t i o n to the m e a s u r a b i l i i y o f u t i l i t y : 
" T h e o b j e c t i o n c o u l d be raised t h a t i t is no t necessary t o 
go i n t o a l l these i n t r i c a t e de ta i l s c o n c e r n i n g the m e a s u r a b i l i t y o f 
u t i l i t y , since e v i d e n t l y the c o m m o n i n d i v i d u a l , whose b e h a v i o u r 
one w a n t s to descr ibe, does not measure his u t i l i t i e s e x a c t l y b u t 
r a t h e r c o n d u c t s his e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t i e s i n a sphere o f cons ide r ab l e 
haziness. T h e same is t r u e , o f course , for m u c h o f his c o n d u c t 
r e g a r d i n g l i g h t , heat , m u s c u l a r e f f o r t e tc . B u t i n o rde r to b u i l d 
a science o f physics these p h e n o m e n a had t o be measu red . .-\nd 
s u b s e q u e n t l y the i n d i v i d u a l has come t o use the resul ts o f such 
measu remen t s - d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y - even i n his e v e r y d a y l i f e . 
T h e same m a y o b t a i n i n economics at a f u t u r e d a l e . ' 
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Chapter 5 
A n Or ig ina l Analysis of Risk 
A t t i t u d e s i n Shipping: Results 
f r o m a Survey 
Prev ious sect ions o f th i s w o r k have s h o w n the i m p o r t a n c e o f r isk as a ma-
j o r i n f l u e n c i n g f ac to r i n i n v e s t m e n t dec i s ion m a k i n g . I f an accu ra t e m o d e l o f 
m a r k e t i n v e s t m e n t i n s h i p p i n g is to be d e v e l o p e d , t h i s i n f l u e n c e necessitates 
the measu remen t o f a t t i t u d e s t o w a r d s r i sk , f t has also been s h o w n t h a t the 
t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l aspects o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y p r o v i d e an a p p r o p r i a t e 
f o u n d a t i o n for the d e v e l o p m e n t o f such a measure . I t is now necessary t o 
c o n v e r t U t i l i t y T h e o r y i n t o an a n a l y t i c a l l y t r a c t a b l e m e t h o d « j l o g y for de-
t e r m i n i n g the p r e v a i l i n g r i sk a l t i t u d e s in t he s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y . For t he 
purposes o f th i s w o r k , the re levan t p a r t o f t he s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y u p o n w h i c h 
the ana lys i s w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e is t he s h i p o w n i n g c o m m u n i t y , w i t h p a r t i c u l a r 
emphas is p laced u p o n those i n v o l v e d i n t he d r y b u l k sector . 
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5.1 Derivation of Survey Database and His-
torical Context of Survey Methodology 
T h e r e have been several a p p l i c a t i o n s o f U t i l i t y T h e o r y to the d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n o f r i sk a t t i t u d e s i n n o n - s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r i e s . E x a m p l e s i n c l u d e M o s t e l l e r 
& Nogee ( 1 9 5 1 ) , Jackson (1960 ) a n d G r e e n ( 1 9 7 6 ) , w h o i n v e s t i g a t e d the 
c h e m i c a l , o i l d r i l l i n g a n d f o o d i n d u s t r i e s r e spec t ive ly . Indeed , d u e t o the 
p o p u l a r i t y o f th i s a p p r o a c h over the last t w o decades, these e x a m p l e s are 
d r a w n f r o m a l is t t h a t is a l m o s t endless. Q u i t e s u r p r i s i n g l y , h o w e v e r , the re 
has been o n l y one a t t e m p t t o a p p l y t he t h e o r y t o t he d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d sub-
sequent m e a s u r e m e n t o f r isk a t t i t u d e s o f s h i p o w n e r s . T h i s w i d e l y a c c l a i m e d 
s t u d y , by L o r a n g e & N o r m a n (1970 ) was a i m e d e x c l u s i v e l y a t p r o v i n g the 
supposed r i sk p rone a t t i t u d e s o f N o r w e g i a n t a n k e r o p e r a t o r s i n t he ea r l y 
1970's. Because o f t h e i r c o n c e n t r a t i o n o n such a r e l a t i v e l y s m a l l a n d speci f ic 
sector o f t he s h i p p i n g c o m m u n i t y , i t is poss ib le t h a t the resul ts o f t h e i r s t u d y 
bear no resemblance t o those ach ieved i n th i s w o r k . However, , t he m e t h o d -
o logy w h i c h was a d o p t e d by L o r a n g e Si N o r m a n ( 1 9 7 0 ) p rov ides a v a l u a b l e 
f o u n d a t i o n for t he d e v e l o p m e n t o f a s u i t a b l e a p p r o a c h for the u t i l i t y ana lys i s 
c o n t a i n e d w i t h i n th is w o r k . C o n s e q u e n t l y , i t m a y p rove b e n e f i c i a l t o d r a w 
para l le l s , whe reve r a p p r o p r i a t e , b e t w e e n t h e i r a p p r o a c h a n d resul ts a n d those 
o f t h i s s t u d y . 
T h e first s tep i n a t t e m p t i n g t o i m p l e m e n t U t i l i t y T h e o r y t o d e r i v e a mea-
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sure of attitude towards risk, is to develop a database of potential suppliers 
of attitudinal information. Initially, it was thought that this study should 
concentrate solely on British shipowners. Consequently, because it catego-
rizes shipowners by country, Lloyd's Maritime Directory (1987) was used to 
derive a list of the names and addresses of all British shipowners. This ini-
tial database contained a number of "shipowners" who could only loosely 
be described as such. A typical example being a County Council entered 
in Lloyd's Maritime Directory (1987) by virtue of its ownership of dredging 
vessels or sludge carriers. However, it was thought unwise lo filter such pe-
ripheral shipowners out of the database at this early stage. Justification for 
such a policy exists because; 
• The person within the organization who actually provides the infor-
mation vis a uis risk attitudes could well be very qualified within the 
shipowning community, even if his company was not, to provide repre-
sentative and, therefore, valuable information. 
• Should reasonable responses be obtained from such relatively minor 
shipowning interests and consequently be included in the final database 
of information for analysis, it would then be possible to isolate their 
overall combined effect and determine whether or not they significantly 
changed the results had the analysis been based solely on a database 
of major shipowning companies. 
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• Given a certain overall response rate, expressed in percentage terms, 
then statistics dictates that several of snch minor shipowners would i\ot 
provide any information anyway. The potential inability of this group 
of shipowners to respond may lead to a group response rate which is 
below the overall mean. Hence, the potential problem of the replies of 
such shipowners being unrepresentative of the shipowning community 
would not arise in these cases. 
• Should information that was supplied by such minor shipo\vners not be 
of the [lecessary quality to be included in the database for analysis, it 
could be filtered out at that stage with much less effort involved. 
Having thus arrived at a surprisingly large database of-l-l I British shipown-
ing companies, it was then necessary to determine exactly how the re(|uired 
information should be collected and exactly what information was needed in 
order to undertake a viable Utility analysis. Obviously, these two aspects 
are linked in that a two-way interdependence exists between them. Conse-
quently, determining how the necessary information should be collected and 
what exactly constiiutes that necessary information should be looked at in 
conjunction. 
Lorange & Norman (1970) applied an approach, developed by Friedman 
Savage (1948) and discussed in the previous chapter, where they collected 
information pertaining to a "certainty equivalent*' {JI) . expressed in money 
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terms, which the respondent would be willing to accept as a minimum amount 
in return for surrendering a probabilistic outcome or prospect f { x ) . Th i s is by 
far the most usual method employed for the collection of utility information. 
However, it can take either of two similar forms. As it happens, Lorange 
Sz Norman (1970) used both of the available methods in order to draw a 
comparison between them. The observations which they made in this respect 
were somewhat inconclusive, and therefore, provided no clue as to how ihis 
study should progress. Consequently, the method employed in this study will 
be justified on the basis of other criteria. Both methods are based on asking 
the respondent the following type of question: 
Q. Given a potential investment where the probability of earn:^. 
ing SX is p% and the probability of losing SV is (100-p)%, what 
is the minimum amount that you would be willing to accept in 
order to forego the investment opportunity? 
The development of information in order to undertake a utility analysis 
progresses by asking the same question but with either varying values for p. or 
alternatively, varying values for .V and V*. These two alternative approaches 
constitute the two different methods by which utility information may be 
obtained. At the end of the day. by mapping the various responses to each 
question posed, the derivation of an overall utility function relating expected 
returns to a utility index is possible. The final resulting function constitutes 
an empirical model of the respondent's attitude towards risk. Here, the risk 
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implied by the questions is implicit in the probabilities attached to each 
potential outcome. 
Lorange k Norman (1970) chose to derive their utility database from in-
terviewing a sample of 17 major Norwegian tanker operators. There are a 
number of advantages and disadvantages to the adoption of the interview-
technique, as there are with any survey method, all of which are fully dis-
cussed in the relevant paper by the writers. However, using the latter method 
of data collection, ie. with varying values of A' and the first question is 
posed with predetermined values for .V and but all subsequent questions 
are based on the answer to the previous question. Consequently, the adoption 
of such a style of information gathering leads to the development of a linked 
chain of questions, the form of which ultimately depends upon the response to 
the first question posed. Lorange Norman (1970) found that their respon-
dents could understand perfectly well the implications of different potential 
returns, but could not so easily understand the implication of the differential 
probabilities attached to the possible outcomes. The major advantage of a 
technique which employs a method of data collectio[i based on varying the 
values of A' and V is that it negates this conceptual difficulty, found on the 
part of the respondents, in dealing with varying probabilities. Typically, in 
a survey of this type, the value of p is held at 50% since this figure poses few 
of these conceptual difficulties in interpretation. Presumably, this is the case 
because of the existence of such well-known analogues as tossing a coin. Ob-
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viously, this approach lends itself very well to an interview-based technique 
for the collection of data since the interviewer having received an answer to 
one question may then use that answer in posing the next question. Inter-
view based techniques thus have one advantage in promoting flexibility in 
the choice of methodology adopted. 
The interview technique, however, was dismissed as a viable method of 
data collection for the purposes of this study. Because the objective of.this 
work is the development of a generally applicable model for market invest-
ment in the dry bulk shipping industry, data sources should be as widely 
based as possible. Interviews place unavoidable constraints on the number 
and range of such sources. Said constraints typically manifest themselves in 
terms of budgetary, time and practical considerations. 
It was decided that the most appropriate method for data collection, 
bearing in mind the objectives of this study, would be a pi>stal survey. The 
adoption of this method has the potential advantage of achieving large num-
bers of responses very quickly and in a standard format. However, such a 
methodology precludes (without a great deal of ingenuity and expense) the 
use of questions where X and Y vary in accordance with a responderit's previ-
ous answer. As a consequence, the type of questions asked in order to derive 
utility information must be based on varying p values. This could lead to 
the introduction of those conceptual difficulties, previously discussed, which 
the respondent may have in understanding probabilities. However, Lorange 
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& Norman (1970) found that only 3 out of their 17 interviewees encountered 
such problems. Also, over the last 20 years, since the Lorange & Norman 
(1970) study, the promulgation of management education could well have 
served to mitigate the conceptual difficulties in dealing with probabilities. 
There are now very few management/business courses which do not include 
a component of probabihty theory. If such problems should still occur they 
should be apparent in the type of responses obtained, at which time some 
filtering or adaptive procedure could be instigated. 
A further problem with the adoption of a data collection method such as a 
postal survey lies in assessing how much information to ask of the respondent. 
One should be careful in not deterring a reply. Such a problem is much less 
likely to exist in the intimate atmosphere of an interview. This requirement 
has to be balanced with the necessity of obtaining sufficient results in order 
to obtain significant analytical properties. 
Since Lorange & Norman (1970) found that the liquidity position of the 
respondents significantly affected the replies made in their interviews, it was 
deemed necessary to incorporate this variable into an analysis based on postal 
survey. Consequently, two sets of the same questions were formulated; one 
set under the assumption of a good liquidity position, the other under an 
assumption of poor liquidity, [t was finally decided, therefore., on balancing 
statistical rigour with the practical consideration of not wishing to deter re-
spondents, that the part of the questionnaire to be sent that related to utility 
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analysis should comprise two sets of 3 questions. Each set would contain the 
same questions, but one set would be placed within the context of go<jd \k\' 
uidity while the other would deal with a poor liquidity situation. A preamble 
.to the questions was also enclosed in an attempt to make requirements clear 
and to set the context of the questions. The actual questions asked, together 
with the preamble can be seen in Section B of the questionnaire, a copy of 
which is provided in Appendix A. 
The questionnaire and survey method were designed and implemented in 
accordance, as far as possible, with the Total Design Methodology ( T D M ) 
suggested by Dillman (1978). This methodology is to a large extent a for-
mal statement of the apparently obvious. However, it does provide a formal 
framework to work within and also has some useful suggestions to make in 
many respects. For example, T D M suggests that in order to optimize the 
rate of response achieved on a survey, a reminder shoiild be sent out approx-
imately two weeks after the initial questionnaire. This reminder should be 
printed on a postcard for ease of despatch. Similarly, T D M suggests that the 
survey database should be computerized so that names and addresses can be 
reprinted by computer very easily. .Additionally, survey forms were designed 
to be self-coding to lessen the effort involved in data entry for analysis. These 
were three examples of T D M suggestions which were implemented within this 
study and proved fruitful. Particularly beneficial was the use of a reminder 
which, on average increased the response rate by about 100% in most cases. 
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The sort of T D M requirements which were omitted were such features as 
addressing each questionnaire to the name of the .\[anaging Director of each 
company in the survey, signing each covering letter individually and using 
certain colour questionnaires for psychological reasons. These sorts of sug-
gestions were not adhered to because of either their impracticality in terms 
of the effort involved or by virtue of the additional e.Kpcnse incurred. 
Prior to sending a pilot survey to a 10% random sample of the British 
shipowning community, a pre-piloi survey was undertaken by asking for local 
'e.Kpert' comment on the questionnaire's structure and content. this stage, 
the average time taken for completing the questionnaire was assessed at eight 
minutes. Having made adjustments in accordance with the advice received, 
the pilot survey was then despatched. .After sending a reminder two weeks 
later, it soon became obvious that the response rate would never reach a level 
whereby the absolute number of reasonable responses would be such as to 
support an analysis which produced significant results. Consequently, it was 
decided that in order to achieve a significant number of responses, in abso-
lute terms, the survey database would have to be increased. .Although this 
would increase the complexity of the analysis, it was thought worthwliile if 
it simultaneously increased the significance of the results achieved. Because, 
therefore; the analysis was to be aimed at determining the utility functions 
of the shipowning community, it was decided to include the shipowners of 
Norway, Hong Kong and Greece. The choice of these three extra countries 
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was somewhat arbitrary but can be justified on the grounds that they are all 
major traditional shipowning countries, either directly or indirectly. Their 
inclusion not only facilitated a larger shipowning database, it also allowed 
for the analysis of utility from a cultural perspective. For example, do the 
Norwegians have a different attitude towards risk than do the Greeks. This 
meant that the final database of shipowners included 441 from Britain. 234 
from Norway, 117 from Hong Kong and 530 from Greece, yielding a total of 
1,322. 
5.2 Details of Responses Achieved 
Full details of the survey responses achieved can be seen in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Details of Survey Responses 
Country | Valid Non-responses Non-responses •) Total 
1 Responses Received Not !! Number in ; 
1 
t 
Received Received survey 
Britain: | 37 66 338 ;] 44 1 
Norway: ! 18 4 212 •: 234 
Hong Kong: | 8 3 106 ;i U 7 
Greece: j 32 57 441 1 530 
Total: 95 130 1097 ! 1322 
At first sight, this Table suggests that the response rates for the diH'erent 
nationalities surveyed are as follows: Britain 8.4%, Norway 7.7%, Hong Kong 
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6.8% and Greece 6.0%. However, consideration must be given to the fact that 
nearly all the non-responses received were questionnaires returned to sender 
by the postal service because the companies concerned no longer existed. 
Obviously, this means that the original sampling frame as derived from Lloyds 
Maritime Directory (1987) was out of date before it was even published. If 
these companies are deleted from the original database, then the response 
rates achieved will rise to: Britain 9.9%, Norway 7.8%. Hong Kong 7.0% 
and Greece 6.8%. This yields an overall average response rate of 8.0%. In 
absolute terms, this represents a possible set of 95 responses to analyse. 
Although the response rates achieved could be viewed as being disappoint-
ing, it must be borne in mind that according to Cragg ( 1987), the average 
response rate of small companies to surveys which utilize the unabridged 
version of the T D M is only 30%. He also found that larger companies were 
less likely to reply to surveys than smaller ones. The shortfall could be ex-
plained by the sensitive nature of some of the questions asked in sections of 
the questionnaire other than that dealing with utilities. Another explanation 
could be found in the infamously secretive nature of companies in the ship-
ping industry. Many of the questions posed in tlie utility section could be 
viewed as being quite complex in nature and, hence, could well have deterred 
a large number of potential respondents. From a more pragmatic point of 
view, the fact that the British response rate is higher than that of Norway, 
Hong Kong and Greece suggests that there could be a language factor which 
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tends to reduce the overall response rate. 
Further analysis of the responses received led to the fact that the average 
asset size of the respondents was 533,207,176. This very high value suggests 
that it was the larger shipowning companies which tended to respond to 
the questionnaire. Support for this assertion is provided by the fact that 
responses were received from 6 of the 9 companies which are quoted under 
the shipping categorization on the London stock market. Clearly, the low 
response rates achieved imply the potential existence of bias in the analysis 
and subsequent results. However, it would seem that if bias is present, it is 
due to a weighting in the responses received in favour of larger shipowning 
companies. Since the study undertaken.within this work is aimed at providing 
a decision making methodology for complicated market investment appraisal 
where large investments are made at regular intervals, the results of the work 
would seem to be more appropriate to larger rather than smaller shipowning 
companies. Consequently, the potential existence of size bias is not such a 
problem as it first appears. 
Consideration of the available alternative methods for collection of the 
necessary data does not yield any quick solution to the problem of a low 
response rate. Invariably, methods of data collection involve a trade-off be-
tween the quantity and the quality of the responses received. The com-
plex nature of the information being sought, and the diversity of shipowning 
companies, mitigate against the probability of an alternative method prov-
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ing more efficient, especially insofar as quality is concerned. Perhaps, with 
hindsight, the best solution to this problem would have been the use of two 
separate questionnaires, one dealing with utility information and the other 
with structural questions. 
Despite the relatively low response rate, however, the fact remains that 
the absolute number of reponses achieved is 95. This is much more than 
required in order to undertake an analysis which yields significant results. 
Moreover, the study of risk attitudes using utility analysis undertaken by 
Lorange Sc Norman (1970) achieved notoriety on the basis of a sample of 
only 17 interviewees. 
5.3 Implementing the Utility Analysis 
In order to facilitate the utility analysis of the responses received, the first 
step involved the categorization of these responses in terms of risk averse, risk 
prone, risk neutral and illogical responses. The term "illogical res[)onses" is 
defined as those which do not conform to the axioms of cardinal utility as 
laid down by Von Neumann k Morgenstern (1953). or those which exhibited 
inconsistent risk attitudes over the range of questions asked. This categoriza-
tion was achieved simply by plotting the responses against a derived utility 
index and then assessing by eye the type of curve which resulted. .-Vs implied 
by the existence of four categories, the curves could be of four forms. 
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For this purpose of curve plotting and categorization, the first step in 
the data analysis involved the definition of a utility index so that associated 
y values could be attached to each x value supplied by the respondents. 
Because of the way the questions were formulated, a utility index value of 0 
was attached to an expected return of —S3m and a utility index value of 100 
was attached to an expected return of S30m. These ( x , y ) values provide the 
endpoints of each individual company's utility curve and are derived from 
the survey questions as follows: 
E[x\ = 100% :< - S 3 m -r 0% x S30m = - S 3 m 
Therefore; 
f / ( -S3m] = 0 
E{x\ = 0% X - S 3 m ^ 100% :< S30m - S30m 
Therefore; 
Ui^'.lOm] = 100 
The type of questions asked of the respondents follow the methodology 
inherent in state preference theory, as explained by Kroes L Sheldon (1988), 
and were all of the same general form. 
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Q. Given a potential investment where the probability of earn-
ing S30m is 75% and the probability of losing S3m is 25%, what 
is the minimum amount that you would be willing to accept in 
order to forego the investment opportunity? 
The expected value E[x\ of this investment opportunity is given by: 
E[x\ = 75% X S30m -^  25% :•: - S 3 m = .75 >: S30m -!- .25 x - S 3 m = S21.75m 
Similarly, if the probabilities are now varied as was the case with the 
questions asked of the respondents: 
E\x\ = 50% :•: S30m ~ 50% x -S:hn = .50 x S30m ~ .50 x -Slim = S 13.5m 
E[x\ = 25% X S30m -f 75% x - S 3 m = .25 x S30m ~ .75 x - S 3 m = S5.25m 
These expected values provide us with a mapping of the different oppor-
tunities in terms of an expected monetary value criterion. As mentioned 
earlier, if the decision maker is risk neutral then expected monetary values 
summarize that decision maker's attitude towards risk. Thus, if respondents 
gave responses to the questions asked which corresponded to the expected 
monetary values of the choices, then a plot of their responses against the 
utility index will be the same as plotting the E M V ' s against the index. This 
will take the form of a straight line as shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: .An Example of a Risk Neutral Response 




The calculation of y values (which relate to the utility index t/l.cj), what-
ever the value of x (the response to the question asked), is performed as 
follows: 
U[x\ = ^ ( - S 3 m ) K p% -r f/[S30! •< (100 - p)% 
The values of —S3m| and ty'[S30m| have previously been defined as 0 
and 100 respectively. Where the response {x) achieved is the same as £[x\, 
ie. risk neutrality is exhibited, then: 
When p = 0% 6^;S30m| = KlO 
When p = 25% U[^2[.7om] = 75 
When p = 50% O'iS 13.50m: = 50 
When p = 75% USo.'lbm] = 25 
When p = 100% 6'[-'^^^i = 
By plotting x along the x-axis and [/[x] along the y-axis, the result given 
in Figure 5.1 is achieved. In order to ascertain whether the curves resulting 
from plotting the responses (x) against the utility index values {U'x.) are risk 
averse, risk prone or illogical, therefore, the method progresses by assessing: 
1. whether the curve is above the risk neutral line for all values of x. If 
so, then this can be classified as risk averse since for a given invest-
ment opportunity with a predetermined E[x\, the value quoted for the 
143 
surrendering of that oppor tun i ty wi l l be less than E{x\. Thus, for risk 
aversion; 
X < E[x\ Vx 
-','> 
2. whether the curve is below the risk neutral curve for all values of x. U 
so, then this can be classified as risk prone since for a given invesiment 
oppor tun i ty w i t h a predetermined E[x\ the value quoted for the sur-
rendering of that oppor tun i ty wi l l be greater than Elx^. Thus , for risk 
proneness: 
X > E' 7 X 
3. whether the curve is inconsistent over the relevant range. Thus, i f it 
exhibits risk proneness in certain responses and risk aversion in others 
then the curve can be classified as " i l logicar ' and ignored for analyt ical 
purposes. The inherent d i f f i cu l ty in model l ing such illogical responses 
precludes their analysis no matter how realistic such a l ternat ing a l t i -
tudes towards risk may be. 




Figure 5.2: An Example of a Risk Averse Response 









Figure 5.3: A n Example of a Risk Prone Response 





Figure 5.4: An Example of an '[ i logicaT Response 
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This method of response classification needs to be undertaken for tlie 
responses given under the assumptions of both good and poor l iqu id i ty . The 
data for analysis can then be described in the terms given in Tables 5.2 and 
5-3. 
Table 5.2: Classification of U t i l i t y Responses Under Condit ions of Good 
Liquid i ty 





Neut ra l 
Illogical jj 
Respotises i| 
Tota l ! 
Number . 
Br i t a in : 17 6 2 12 l| 37 i 
Norway: 8 I L s il 18 
Hong Kong: o 0 3 '1 8 
Greece: 12 3 1 16 ij 32 
Tota l : 39 13 4 39 n 95 i 
; 5.3: Classification of U t i l i t y Responses Under Condit ions of Poor 





Neut ra l 
Il logical ij 
Responses \\ 
To ta l . 
Number 
Br i t a in : 23 L 2 l i ;i 37 
Norway: 14 I 0 3 1 L8 ; 
Hong Kong: 0 4 1 8 
Greece: 20 1 0 11 !t 32 
Tota l : 61 ! 3 2 29 J 95 
The object ive at this point then becomes to develop a mathematical 
model of the different u t i l i t y functions under a number of si tuations. A t 
the moment, in fo rmat ion may be classified by: 
• Shape of the u t i l i t y func t ion . 
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0 Whether a s i tuat ion of good or poor l iqu id i ty prevails. 
0 The count ry of or ig in of the respondents. 
Addi t ional ly , since this study is aimed p r imar i ly at the dry bulk trades, 
responses have been classified in accordance w i t h whether the respondent is 
mainly a dry bulk operator or not. 
5.4 Results of the Utility Analysis and the 
Specification of Utility Functions in Ship-
ping 
The analysis progresses by deriving a mathemat ical model, on the basis 
of ordinary least squares regression, for each of the possible combinations of 
classification. Thus , for example, separate models are derived for Greek, risk 
averse, bulk shipping operators in times of good l iqu id i ty and the same in 
times of poor l iqu id i ty . 
The fo rm of the models to fit the various sets of data can be chosen 
arb i t ra r i ly in the sense that all that is required of them is that they ' f i t ' 
the data well . However, since the main object ive is to fit a model which 
predicts u t i l i t y f r om monetary values, then the type of model chosen to fit 
the data should reflect the pat tern of the responses vis a vis risk aversion, risk 
pronenesS; and risk neutrali ty. Thus, the mathemat ica l func t ion embodied in 
a particular model should, when plot ted, coincide w i t h the shape of the risk 
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a t t i tude which is being modelled. What this means when modell ing a risk 
averse a t t i tude , for example, is that the relevant parameterized mathematical 
u t i l i t y funct ion should be concave to the x-axJs, in the same way as the 
standard portrayal of a risk averse a t t i tude as shown previously in Figure 
5.2. 
Clearly, for risk neutral i ty, this mathematical model l ing process merely 
necessitates the determinat ion of the straight line which passes through the 
expected values of each choice. Thus, a line is required which passes through 
the values for x and y shown in Table 5.4. 







The equation of the required line which passes through these points is 
given by 
y = 9.09 -r 3.03x 
where: y = U'lx] 
This model for risk neutra l i ty applies to al l classifications of data which 
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are risk neutral. Risk averse and risk prone models, however, w i l l vary de-
pending upon the survey data classification. Bearing in mind that the func-
tion which is used to model a set of data must reflect the underlying shape of 
the risk a t t i tude , because of the nature of the risk averse curve, the fol lowing 
models were tested for goodness o f fit and, therefore, explanatory power. 
L. U[x] = a-r bx 
2. U[x: = a -T bx -r cx' 
3. U'\x] = ai- b\n{x) 
4. b'\x. = a -r 6x5 
5. U\x\ = a — b/x 
A l l the above models, suggested by Draper L Smi th (1981). produce 
curves which correspond to the typical risk averse curve, ie. a curve concave 
to the X -axis . The number of final models which are eventually derived wil l 
relate to the number of data classifications that exist. Since this classification 
process was undertaken on the basis of; 
• four countries; 
• whether the respondent was a d ry bulk shipowner or otherwise: 
• whether the prevailing l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion was good or bad; 
. . . there is a to ta l of sixteen possible categories for analysis. Addi t iona l ly , 
models were also derived for databases where one or more of the classifications 
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were ignored. Thus, for example, the 'best ' u t i l i t y curve for a Greek dry bulk 
shipowner wi th good l iqu id i ty could be compared to the u t i l i t y curves derived 
for: . 
• Greek dry bulk shipowners irrespective of l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion. 
• Greek shipowners w i th good l iqu id i ty irrespective of trade. 
• Dry bulk shipowners w i th good l iqu id i ty irrespective of nat ional i ty . 
• Greek shipowners irrespective of trade or l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion. 
• Dry bulk shipowners irrespective of l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion and nationali ty. 
• Shipowners w i t h good l iqu id i ty irrespective of trade or nat ional i ty. 
• A l l shipowners irrespective of trade, l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion or nationali ty. 
What this implies is that t h i r t y combinations are possible and tha t . thus, 
th i r ty u t i l i t y curves were estimated and assessed. The explanatory power of 
the models tested were compared on the basis of r - . t-ratios and analysis 
of residuals. By correlating the fits f rom the different models w i t h i n the 
pyramidical structure of classification impl ied by the above, i t is possible 
to determine whether the factors of nat ional i ty , l iqu id i ty or trade have any 
impact on at t i tudes towards risk. tVone of these tests of correlat ion proved 
to be significantly different f rom unity. Thus, one may conclude tha i the 
risk averse u t i l i t y curve for the to ta l database of risk averse shipowners. 
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irrespective of any part icular characteristics, is representative of every type 
of risk averse shipowner. In other words, the nat ional i ty of the shipowner, 
whether he is a dry bulk operator or not and, most surprisingly, whether 
good or poor l iqu id i ty prevails have no influence over his a t t i tude towards 
risk. 
This is a surprising result when compared to the theoretical arguments of 
Friedman & Savage (L948) who suggest that an investor's a l t i t u d e towards 
risk wi l l be governed by his l iqu id i ty s i tuat ion. Similarly, this result contra-
dicts the empirical findings of Lorange & Norman (1970) who d id , in fact, 
find overwhelming evidence that risk a t t i tude is affected by l iqu id i ty . They 
suggested that because the existence of perfect capital markets would make 
l iquidi ty unimpor tant w i th respect to risk preferences, their results implied 
that the capital markets open to shipowners were any th ing but perfect. The 
most plausible cause of the difference between the results of this s tudy and 
those of Lorange Sc Norman (1970) would , therefore, seem to lie in the area 
of a general improvement in the supply of capital markets and in a greater 
appreciation and understanding of their role amongst shipowners. This con-
stitutes a very interesting conclusion in its own r ight . 
According to the analysis undertaken, the 'best' model of a risk averse 
u t i l i t y curve for shipowners of al l types is given by the expression: 
U{z) = -9 .96 - 19.1v'x - 3.5 r- = 89.0^1 
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A similar analysis was undertaken for the database of risk prone shipown-
ers. The possible forms of the risk prone model which were investigated and 
which, by def in i t ion , yield functions that are convex to the i-axJs; are: 
1. U\x] = a-^bx 
2. U[x] = a -r bx -r cx" 
3. U[x] = ae^^ 
-bx 
U[x] = o. \ \ ax^ 
The general results achieved were analogous w i t h those of the risk averse 
results. Again, the overall u t i l i t y curve for risk prone shipowners, irrespective 
of specific characteristics, was found to be representative of the indiv idual 
subsets. Again , nationali ty, trade specialization and l iqu id i ty bore no in lh i -
ence on the prevailing a t t i tude to risk. The resultant risk prone u t i l i t y curve 
wi th the highest r- of the models tested is. therefore, given by the equation: 
\n{U{x) -h 0.5) = 0.181 -r l . 2 l l n ( x -h 3.5) r~ = 97.6% 
L ' * ( x ) - h 0 . 5 - e ° - ^ ^ ^ - ^ - - " " < ' - ^ - ^ ' 
t / ( x ) ^ 0 . 5 = e 0 . l 3 l ^ l . 2 1 l n ( x ^ 3 . 5 ) 
i / ( x ) ^ 0 . 5 = e°-^«Ve'"<'^^-^*'" 
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^ { x ) - F ( 3 . 5 - e ° ' ^ ^ ( x - 3 . 5 ) ' - * 
U'{x)= L 1 9 8 4 1 5 2 ( x - ^ 3 . 5 ) ' ' ' - 0 . 5 
This form of u t i l i t y equation is known as the Cobb-Douglas model. Lor-
ange & Norman (1970), when investigating the risk proneness of Norwegian 
tanker operators, also found that this form of func t ion best fitted their risk 
prone dataset. 
The u t i l i t y equations which have been derived in this way were then 
assessed on the basis of their analyt ical tract abi l i ty w i th regard to the fur ther 
use to which they wil l he put w i th in the total Modern P'.-^rtfolio Theory 
methodology. Part icularly impor tan t in this respect is the need for the u t i l i t y 
functions to be easily differentiable. They also need to be able to cope wi th 
the negative returns on invesiment that , unfortunately, are so common in 
shipping. 
W i t h hindsight, it was found that the risk averse func t ion , out l ined above, 
suited the purposes for which i t has been estimated. Flowever, the risk prone 
funct ion proved to be inadequate w i th respect to the mathematics thai is 
involved in applying Modern Portfol io Theory. This was par t icular ly evi-
dent where returns were negative. Instead, i t was decided to sacrifice some 
explanatory power in order to reap the benefits of potent ia l ly easier math-
ematical manipula t ion. Al though the risk prone u t i l i t y fuuc t io t i , outl ined 
above, is the best model of risk prone at t i tudes in shipping, i t was decided 
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that a model in quadratic form would suit better the purpose for which it was 
derived. This quadratic form of risk prone utility curve provided the second 
highest value of r- when the data was fitted using least squares regression 
to the different potential models. Thus, the risk prone utility function which 
has been adopted for inclusion in the remaining analysis is that given by the 
expression: 
^/U'{x)~0.5 =2.37 4-0.23 Ix r- = 82.5?c 
U{x) + 0.5 = (2.37 -f 0.23 Ix-)-
U'(x) 4- 0.5 = 5.6169 4- 1.09494x - 0.05336 
Therefore; 
b'{x) = 5.1169 4- 1.09494J; 4- 0.05336U-
It is important to remember that statistical models, such as those that 
have already been specified and which will be used in the ensuing analysis, are 
only valid over the range for which data was collected. They thus represent 
merely local approximations to a shipowner's utility curve. An attempt was 
made to derive a generally applicable utility curve over all possible values 
of x (or return) for a risk averse shipowner. Castellani (1972) suggested a 
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generally applicable u t i l i t y model of the fo rm: 
0'{x) = k{i - e-^) 
This fo rm of model satisfies al l the necessary mathemat ical cr i ter ia for a 
'perfect ' risk averse u t i l i t y func t ion . The parameters of this model were esti-
mated, using numerical procedures, for the dataset of risk averse shipowners. 
The resultant parameterized func t ion fu l f i l led all the mathematical require-
ments placed upon i t , but proved to be non-robust w i t h i n the interval w i th 
which this study concerns itself. Thus, i t is better to use a local approxi-
mat ion, which behaves well w i th in the interval of interest, than a generally 
applicable curve. The reason that this is the case is that u t i l i t y functions are 
independent of scale and intercept (by vi r tue of the fact that they are based 
on an index) and consequently, can be applied to any interval of interest. 
This aspect wi l l be i l lustrated in greater depth in a later p a n of this work 
but, needless to say, justif ies the omission of a similar invest igat ion into a 
generally applicable risk prone u t i l i t y curve. 
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Chapter 6 
M o d e r n Po r t fo l i o Theory 
6.1 An Historical and Conceptual Perspec-
tive 
.Although there have been many contr ibut ions to Modern Por t fol io Theory 
through the years, its or iginal conception as a workable idea can be a t t r ibu ted 
to the seminal work of Markowi tz (L952). Previous to this date, t rad i t iona l 
por t fo l io theory const i tuted purely a vague philosophy that investors should 
not 'put all their eggs in one basket'. Markowi tz (1952) adopted this skeleton 
idea and attached to i t fiesh in the form of mathematical rigour. Thus, a 
scientific, or 'modern' , approach to por t fo l io investment was born. As Sharpe 
(1970p3) points out: 
"Markowi tz ' con t r ibu t ion was so monumental that i t must be 
noted explici t ly. Others have extended, modif ied , and tested his 
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original theory, but the core remains unchanged. In fact, many 
prefer the term Markowitz theory to portfolio theory. The terms 
are, for al l practical purposes, synonymous." 
Modern Portfol io Theory differs f r om what went before not only by vir tue 
of its analytical rigour but also because i t purports to incorporate the in-
teractive effect of holding different investments. Trad i t iona l por t fo l io theory 
espouses the assessment of investments on an ind iv idua l basis and u l t imate ly 
led to the well known procedures for security analysis. However, i t fails to 
incorporate the interactive effect which is present whenever a number of dif-
ferent investments are held. Thus , a s i tuat ion may exist where t rad i t iona l 
por t fol io theory points to the holding of the, say. three 'best" investments in 
terms of potential return. If, however, the forecast returns f rom these three 
investments are perfectly correlated wi th each other and w i t h the market, 
then a 20% decline in the prosperity inherent in the market wi l l lead to a 
20% fall in the value of all three of the investments. Goiisequently, t rad i t iona l 
por t fol io theory is synonymous w i t h an investment appraisal based on Ex-
pected Monetary Value: It takes no account of risk, and therefore at t i tudes 
towards risk, and so is only useful for the risk neutral investor. 
By accounting for the interactive effect of investment holdings. Modern 
Portfol io Theory expl ic i t ly incorporates the risk effect and. therefore, must 
necessarily incorporate a feature whereby di f fer ing risk a t t i tudes result in the 
selection of different portfolios. 
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F u n d a m e n t a l l y , Modern Portfolio T h e o r y const i tutes a. model w h i c h , when 
appl ied to real investments, should lead to an o p t i m u m portfolio selection. 
As a model , the theory does not seek to reflect reality exactly. Al l models 
const i tute abstract ions from reality and :\[odecn Portfolio T h e o r y is no differ-
ent. Inherent in the building blocks of such models are a set of assumptions 
which at tempt to s impli fy reality to a level whereby tlie model then becomes 
feasible for appl icat ion. Such assumptions are invariably totally unreal is t ic , 
but. as F r i e d m a n (1976) avows, the strength of the resultant model can only 
be judged in terms of how well it predicts or prescribes real bel iaviour. T h e 
rela:dng of certain assumptions may be [lecessary to achieve this a i m , but this 
need not lead to the dismissal of the overal l model as a viable explanatory 
mechan i sm. 
T h e major advantage of using a model as a loose reflection of reality is 
that the relationships inherent in a model can be thorougiily specified and 
studied, whereas the analogous relat ionships i[i the real world are unclear. 
T h e processing of inputs through a model results in clear and unambiguous 
outputs which is not the case in reality, though the a im is thai the model 
outputs are closely aligned with those that do or should occur within the real 
environment that is being studied. 
In general , models may take one of two forms. T h e y may be either 'nor-
mative' or 'positive' models. A normat ive model results in an output which 
is a prescription for real behaviour. W h a t should be done rather than what 
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will be done. A positive model, on the other h a n d , i s .predict ive in nature 
and attempts to describe what will happen if a certain course of act ion is 
adopted. Modern Portfolio T h e o r y const i tutes a model which can be either 
normative or positive depending vipon the appl icat ion for which it is used. In 
at tempting to deduce subject ive ly o p t i m a l portfolio selection, as is the case 
within this work, it is regarded as a normat ive model. T h i s work seeks to 
apply Modern Portfolio Theory in the de terminat ion of the market portfolio 
that part icular types of shipowners should hold. 
6.2 The Nature of the Markowitz Model 
T h e model made explicit within the confines of Modern Portfolio T h e o r y 
provides a tool for the selection of investment portfolios. T h i s prescribed 
selection process, embodied in the model , can be regarded as par i of a range 
of activit ies collectively referred to as 'portfolio maEiagement ' . R y a n (1978) 
describes these activit ies as follows: 
1. T h e definition of the portfolio's objec t ive and the constraints under 
which it is held. 
2. T h e choice of an asset universe, or opportuni ty set, from which the 
portfolio is to be d r a w n . 
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3. T l i e formulat ion of the decision rules, or cr i ter ia , on which to build the 
portfolio. 
-1. T h e es t imat ion of the relevant character i s t i cs of the ind iv idual assets in 
the asset universe, a n d , on the basis of such evaluat ion, their inclusion 
in , or omiss ion from, the portfolio. 
5. E s t a b l i s h i n g the cr i ter ia for monitoring the performance of the portfolio 
through time, and for changing its composit ion whenever and wherever 
it is deemed necessary. 
T h e Modern Portfolio T h e o r y model c learly has a part to play in points 
2-4 above. Its use is dependent on the object ive of the portfolio (point 1) 
being to opt imize the r isk-return trade-off in line with the c o m p a n y s own 
specific at t i tude towards risk. Where this object ive is not present, a n alter-
native portfolio selection process may be more appropriate . T h e advantage 
of Modern Portfolio T h e o r y as an investment selection methodology lies in 
the fact that this required object ive can be regarded as 'positive', or in other 
words behav ioura l , in nature. Impl ic i t ly , the vast major i ty of companies 
will have this object ive in mind when selecting an investment portfolio and 
consequently, Modern Portfolio T h e o r y becomes almost universal ly appl ica-
ble. T h i s is due to the fact that the M a r k o w i t z (1952) model embodies the 
appl icat ion of Ut i l i ty T h e o r y which itself is built upon the m a t h e m a t i c a l 
logic of Von N e u m a n n Sc Morgenstern (1953) and their concept of 'rat ional 
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behaviour*. T h u s , such an object ive can be regarded as merely a ratioi iai 
one. 
T h e role of Modern Portfolio T h e o r y , w i th respect to point 5 above, in 
terms of monitoring the performance of the portfolio through time, is ques-
tionable because it was developed as a s tat ic model . However, the d y n a m -
icizing of the model may be possible when some of the assumptions upon 
which it is based are relaxed. T h i s possibil ity will be addressed at a later 
point in this work. Nevertheless, it is clear that Modern Portfolio T h e o r y 
may provide an extremely useful tool in the portfolio inanagetnerit process 
as itemized above. 
T h e model implicit in Modern Portfol io T h e o r y takes the form of an 
algorithm which, when applied, results in the outptit of a subject ive ly opt imal 
portfolio. A n a lgori thm, in this context, can be viewed as a sequence of logical 
steps which form part of the overal l model or which tijgether compose the 
overall model. As R u d d k Rosenberg ( L 9 7 9 p 2 l ) describe it: 
' 'An a lgori thm may be thought of as an expl ic i t ly defined pro-
cedure, which, when followed, leads to the resolution of a well de-
fined problem. T h u s a portfolio opt imizat ion algorithm obtains , 
through a sequence of steps, an opt imal portfolio. T h e input is 
a set of goals ( the utility function and constra ints on permissible 
solutions); an investment opportuni ty set ( the universe of avai l -
able assets and their relevant charac ter i s t i c s ) ; a formalization of 
the portfolio revision process (possibly taking into account trans-
act ion costs incurred in modifying the portfolio); and a mathe-
mat ica l specification of the solution sought ( a desired o p t i m u m 
defined by a convergence criterion or possibly a search of the 
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range of opt ima for a l ternat ive goals)." 
Conceptual ly , the role of the Markowitz model can clearly be seen in 
Figure 6. L. 
Figure 6.1: Systems Conceptua l i za t ion of Modern Portfol io T h e o r y 
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6.3 A Critique of the Assumptions of Mod 
ern Portfolio Theory 
It has already been stated that Modern Portfol io T h e o r y , in common with 
all mathemat ica l models, is based upon a set of a s sumpt ions which may or 
may not be realistic. .Amling (L984) provides a comprehens ive l ist ing and 
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discussion of those assumptions but for the purposes of this work only a 
s u m m a r y is required. 
I . T h e marketplace is efficient. T h a t is, every th ing is known or know-
able about each investment . T h i s suggests that the market is perfectly 
competit ive. T h e validity of this a s sumpt ion with respect to shipping 
is implied by C o u p e r ( I972p83) wlien he writes: 
' ' Individual shipowners cannot influence world commod-
ity supply or demand to any extent . iXor have they any real 
control over the deployment of the world supply of ships, 
or therefore on freight rates, other than when operat ing in 
close knit conferences. Al l that the owner can do to ensure 
a good average level of earnings, over poor and favourable 
markets , is cont inual ly to improve his eff iciency and reduce 
operat ing costs to a m i n i m u m . At tent ion to costs is c learly 
of vital importance in what is an internat ional ly compet i t ive 
industry." 
2. Investors are risk averse. As has a lready been seen in C h a p t e r -1, this 
means that the marginal utility of the return declines as returns are 
increased. 
3. Risk is measured by the variabil i ty of the rate of return using the 
stat ist ical measure of s tandard deviat ion as a pro.xy. 
4. Investors are rat ional in that they prefer a higher rate of return lo a 
lower rate of return. 
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5. Al l decisions will be made on the basis of expected rate of return and 
the expected s tandard deviation of the rate of re turn . 
6. T h e way in which investment returns are correlated to each other must 
be known. 
7. T h e rate of return and risk are calculated for a single t ime period. 
S. T h e investment units are perfectly divis ible so that a risky investment 
can be added to or subtracted from a portfolio in any unit value amount . 
9. Investors attempt to maximize returns and min imize risks from a port-
folio. Natura l corollaries of this as sumpt ion are: 
(a ) Investors will try to obtain the highest return per unit risk. 
(b ) Investors will at tempt to maximize return for a given level of risk 
and will a t tempt to minimize risk for a given level of return. 
10. It is assumed that the higher the return then the higher the risk and 
that the lower the return, the lower the risk. 
L I . In order to reduce risk, an investor must add another investment to 
the portfolio. T h i s also reduces the return. In consequence, the risk 
and return from a portfolio is increased as the number of ind iv idual 
investments that compose that portfolio is reduced. 
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12. T h e investor must determine the efficient set of investments tliat will 
provide the portfolios that meet the above set of assumpt ions . T y p -
ically, this efficient set is composed, almost exclus ively , of diversified 
portfolios, [f this proves to be the case for shipping, it indirect ly jus t i -
fies the diversif ication policies of companies such as P k 0 , who, as a 
consequence of this policy, may well have a better r i s k / r e t u r n trade-off 
than would otherwise be the case, but may st i l l not be operat ing under 
the opt imum diversified portfolio. 
As has already been seen in C h a p t e r 5, not al l investors in the shipowning 
industry are risk averse. In fact, in times of good l iquidity I5?c of respondents 
were risk prone and 5% were risk neutral . C o m p a r a b l e figures for times of 
poor l iquidity were 4% and 2% respectively. T h e a s sumpt ion of risk averse-
ness, implic i t in Modern Portfol io T h e o r y , is, therefore, highly questionable. 
However, as shall be seen in the following section, where the methodology is 
actual ly described, this assumption is oidy necessary in order to allow math-
emat ica l tractabi i i ly . In fact, several of the assumpt ions outl ined above are 
aligned to the requirement for risk aversion and , therefore. t(j the promotion 
of feasible mathemat ics . T h i s work, as will be seen, relaxes this assumption 
thus allowing a more general appl icat ion of the model but at the expense of 
greater complication in the mathemat ics involved. W i t h o u t detract ing from 
the normative power of the methodology, this relaxing of the requirement of 
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risk aversion allows for the direct ly obvious and immedia te disposal , in their 
present form, of assumptions 2, 9 and 12. 
T h e dismissal of risk avers ion as a necessary prerequisite to the applica-
tion of Modern Portfolio T h e o r y also results indirect ly in the dismissal of 
assumption 10. [t is only a risk averse investor who would be faced with 
a choice in deciding between iuvestrfients or portfolios with high return and 
high risk and those with low return and low risk. .A risk prone investor would 
obviously select the high r e t u r n / h i g h risk option since he would be getting 
the best of both worlds, while a risk neutral investor would disregard the 
risk factor and opt for the investment or portfolio which yielded the great-
est return. T h u s , when considering investors with a variety of different risk 
att i tudes, i t . is necessary to allow investments or portfolios which yield high 
returns and low risk or low returns and high risk into the universal set of 
possible investments. Obvious ly , this results in a much more realistic erwi-
ronment since logic dictates that it is not necessarily true that high potential 
payoffs have associated high risks. O n e only needs lo observe the high level 
of, v irtual ly risk-free, returns from the recent privat izat i ' jus of natii.inalizecl 
industry to realize that this is the case. 
.Another major cr i t ic i sm which could be levelled at the set of assump-
tions outl ined above is the use of s tandard deviation as the measure of risk. 
T h e use of s tandard deviat ion a n d / o r variance (the square of the s tandard 
deviat ion) is common in most applicat ions where a risk measure is required. 
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Again , the reason behind the adoption of s t a n d a r d deviat ion or variance 
as the relevant risk measure is the analyt ica l properties which ensue. T h e s e 
properties will be i l lustrated in the next section where the original Markowi tz 
(1952) methodology is outl ined. However, such a risk measure is itself based 
on a requirement for the returns from investments to be normal ly distr ibuted 
as shown in Figure 6.2. 
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Many researchers in this field, for example S i m k o w i t z h Beedles (197S) 
and .Vlao Brewster (1970) , have shown that the as sumpt ion of normal re-
turns is unrealist ic . R a t h e r , the pattern of returns tend to be skewed. T h i s 
tendency can be logically explained by the s imple fact that the downside 
potential for returns from investment is l imited by factors such as losing the 
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whole investment or bankruptcy . T h e upside potential is, however, tlieoreti-
cally limitless. T h u s , a skewed pattern of returns, as shown in F igure 6.3, is 
much more common in real world investments . 
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By dispensing with the absolute requirement to use s tandard deviat ion 
and /or variance as the measure of risk, embodied in assumpt ion 3 of the 
previous list, it is possible to test much more realistic measures. However, 
this amounts to yet another step away from the original Modern Portfolio 
Theory model and again increases the m a t h e m a t i c a l compl icat ions that are 
present. 
T h e effect on other assumptions , of removing the necessity of measur ing 
risk by s tandard deviat ion or variance, can be s u m m a r i z e d as follows: 
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o T h e term 'expected risk' should be subst i tu ted for 'expected s tandard 
deviation' in assumpt ion 5. Thereby , permit t ing the assessment of an 
investment decision on the basis of any potent ial risk measure. 
o .Assumption 6 now becomes unnecessary, s ince this is related to eas-
ing the computat ional difficulties in ca l cu la t ing portfolio variance from 
individual investment variances. O n l y where s t a n d a r d deviat ion or 
variance is used as the risk measure would this information be useful, 
though even then not absolutely vi tal . W h e r e a l ternat ive risk measures 
are used it is useless. 
0 .Again, assumption I I is only absolutely true where s tandard deviat ion 
or variance is the measure of risk employed . .-Vs will be seen, this is 
because of the mathemat ica l laws that govern a l inear combinat ion of 
individual investments in forming a portfolio. W h e r e other risk mea-
sures are used, it is not necessarily a "hard a n d fast' rule. 
.-\s a consequence of these cr i t ic isms, the orig inal assumptions which un-
derlie Modern Portfolio T h e o r y have been abridged somewhat for the pur-
poses of the analysis undertaken within this work. By doing so, the level of 
realism of the model has been increased a n d a greater degree of flexibility 
in approach has been introduced. T h e final set of model assumptions which 
this work is governed by can thus be s u m m a r i z e d as: 
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1. T h e marketplace is efficient. T h a t is. every th ing is known or knowahle 
about each investment . 
2. Investors are rat ional in that they prefer a higher rate of return to a 
lower rate of return. 
3. .All decisions will be made on the basis of expected rate of return and 
the expected risk of the rate of return. 
-I. T h e rate of return and risk are calculated for a single t ime period. 
5. T h e investment units are perfectly divisible so that a risky investment 
can be added to or subtracted from a portfolio in any unit value amount . 
6. T h e investor must determine the efficient set of investments that will 
provide the portfolios that meet the above set of assumpt ions . 
.As can be seen from the above list, a s sumpt ion L2 from the original list 
has been retained as assumpt ion 6 of the new set of assumpt ions . However, 
the meaning is now completely different since many, other as sumpt ions , upon 
which this assumption relies, have either been deleted or changed in some 
way; T h e paramount effect of these alterat ions has been to fundamenta l ly 
change the meaning of the term 'efficient'. As will be seen in the following 
section, 'efficient' in the original Markowitz sense relates solely to portfolios 
that are appraised by risk averse investors. W i t h i n the context of this work, 
an 'efficient' portfolio will differ between risk averse, risk neutral and risk 
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prone investors. W h a t is an efficient portfolio for a risk averse investor is 
invariably inefficient for the risk prone investor. T h u s , the term not only has 
a much wider l i teral meaning, but also completely breaches the mathemat ica l 
definition of 'efficient' provided by Markowitz (1952) . 
6.4 An Exposition of Modern Portfolio The-
ory 
Remember ing that the Markowi tz Portfolio T h e o r y is based on the orig-
inal L2 assumptions out l ined in the previous sect ion, it is now possible to 
describe the methodology, or a lgor i thm. it\herent in the Modern portfolio 
theory model for portfolio selection. T h e first step in the methodology must 
be the establishment of the purpose for or object ive of the approach . .As has 
already been implied, the methodology should result in a part i cu lar portfo-
lio selection which minimizes risk in accordance wi th an investor's att i tude 
towards that risk. Consequent ly , given a universal set of n ind iv idual invest-
ments from which a v ir tual ly infinite number of portfolios may be composed, 
then the decision maker requires the following in format ion: 
• T h e expected return of each indiv idual inves tment , denoted by E f r ; ! . 
In most applicat ions of Modern Portfolio T h e o r y , the mean of a set of 
historical observations of the investment is used as a proxy. Obvious ly , 
there wil l be n values for E f i ] w i th i = I . . u. W h e r e Xfc denotes indi-
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vidual observations of a time series of m observations of an indiv idual 
investment, then the expected re turn , or mean , ( £ ( r i j ) is given by: 
rn 
• T h e variance of returns of each investment , denoted by where i = 
i . . . n, which are again typical ly derived from historical data analys i s . 




• T h e covariances associated with the universa l set. T h e covariarice Is a 
stat ist ical measure of the relationship between two sets of observations. 
Because of its pairwise nature and the number of investments in the 
universal set, there will be ( n - - n)/2 covariances which need to be 
calculated. Covar iance is mathemat ica l ly defined by: 
1 • 
fc=i 
T h e numerous covariances that have to be ca lculated from historical 
sets of da ta has often mitigated against the use of the Modern Port-
folio T h e o r y methodology. However, modern computer technology has 
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greatly eased this problem in recent years . 
G i v e n this da ta with respect to the ind iv idual investments that compose 
the universal set, it is now possible to automat i ca l ly determine the risk and 
return character is t ics of any combinat ion of these investments as represented 
in a portfolio. If the variable (where / = [ . .. ri) represents the weights or 
percentage holding of each indiv idual investment within a portfolio, then it 
is clear that: 
n 
y2Pi = i.o 0 < pi < I 
1 = 1 
T h e expected return from a portfolio (£"1/^ 1) composed «:>f certain per-
centages of the indiv idual investments is given by die l inear combinat ion; 
n 
As Sharpe (1985) puts it; 
"Since a portfolio's expected return is a weighted average ol 
the expected returns of its securities, the contr ibut ion of each 
security to portfolio expected return depends on its expected re-
turn and its proportionate share of the current portfolio's market 
value. Nothing else is relevant." 
Since variance is the measure of risk employed, one must now detcrmi[ie 
the variance of, and therefore the risk associated wi th , the portfolio ((7^). 
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Because the returns f rom the diK^eretit ind iv idua l investments are not in-
dependent, as they would be i f Covij = 0 (V i ^ j ) . then the necessary 
calculation of por t fol io risk is given by: 
I t is in this calculation of the por t fo l io risk lha t one can set; t l ie necessity 
for having previously calculated al l possible covariances between the ind iv id -
ual investments in the universal set. 
It is obvious f rom the above t i i a l the number of possible [)<<rlfolios is 
vast. Even where one l imi ts a part icular por t fo l io holding (pi) to rounded 
1% chunks, the possible number of por t fo l io combinations of the iud iv idna l 
investments increases fantast ical ly as the number of ind iv idua l investments 
w i t h i n the universal set increases. In terms of por t fo l io selection, the ne.xt 
stage of the Modern Portfol io Theory procedure is to 'sort out the wheat 
f rom the chaff ' . Theoretically, however, at this stage a measure of expected 
return { £ { f p - ] ) and of risk ( f p j can be deduced for every pijssible [>ortfo-
lio combinat ion. It is for this reason that i l lus t ra t ive examples in standard 
textbooks are usually based only on por t fo l io mixes of jus t two indiv i t lua l in-
vestments. Despite the number of ind iv idua l investments whicl i are included 
in any real por t fol io combinat ion (this can vary f r o m I to n), i t is clear that 
each por t fo l io may be plot ted in two-dimensional r isk-return space, since ev-
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ery possible por t fo l io can be described solely and exclusively by these two 
characteristics. A theoretical example of such a plot is given in Figure 6.4. 
Figure 6.4: A Theoret ical Representation of Portfolios in Two-Dimensional 





Each point in this Figure represents a separate por t fo l io of investments 
where the {x,y) coordinates represent the risk, as measured by variance, 
and the expected re turn respectively. If certain of these portfolios are now 
identified by ihe nomenclature .A to H as in Figure 6.5, then a-risk averse 
investor wi l l prefer por t fo l io A lo por t fol io C because it provides the same 
level of return but for less risk. A risk averse investor wi l l also prefer por t fo l io 
A to por t fo l io B since i t provides greater return for the same level of risk. 
177 
Figure 6.5: A Theoretical Comparison of the R i sk /Re tu rn Characteristics of 
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Similar comparisons can be drawn for all portfolios lyir ig i^n the edge of the 
scatter between por t fo l io E and por t fo l io F. T l i i s f ront ier is what M a r k o u i t z 
(L952), and therefore Modern Portfol io Theory, refers lo as eff icient . .All 
portfolios that lie on this edge or curve are deemed to be efficient wi th in 
the original meaning of the term insofar as i t relates solely lo the risk averse 
irivestor. Once the efficient portfolios liave been ident i f ied , the probletn of 
portfol io selection is greatly simplif ied since all the portfol ios that are not 
•efficient' can be ignored. 
By digressing f rom the mainstream theory for jus t a moment , fur ther 
study of Figure 6.5 promotes a clearer understanding of how the term effi-
L7S 
cient ' relates to the analysis vis a vis sliipou-ners' market portfol ios. It has 
already been stated that this s tudy is not only concerned w i t h the por t fo l io 
selection of risk averse decision makers but also w i t h those of the risk prone 
and risk neutral investors. In all cases, a risk neutral investor ignores risk 
completely in a quest for the maximizat ion of returns. It is obvious, there-
fore, that such an investor wi l l select por t fo l io F for the placement of his 
funds. On the other hand, a risk prone investor wi l l actual ly prefer por t fo l io 
C to portfol io A by vir tue of the fact that there is greater risk for the same 
level of expected return. Also, he prefers por t fo l io C to por t fo l io D because 
he derives a greater expected return for the same level of risk. Similar com-
parisons may be drawn for any portfolios which lie on the front ier between 
portfol io F and por t fo l io G. W i t h i n the confines of this work, this curve has 
been deemed as "efficient' for the risk prone investor since at any point on 
this curve, there exist no other portfolios w i th the same level of risk which 
give greater returns or no other portfolios which for the same level of return 
give more risk. 
Obviously, this def in i t ion o f ' e f f i c i e n t ' for the risk prone investor is logical 
in the sense that i t constitutes merely the analogvie of that for a risk averse 
investor, the difference resulting purely because of their different risk pref-
erences and, therefore, different objectives in por t fo l io selection. The reason 
why Markowitz (1952) and other notable authors in the area, such as Lintner 
(1965) and Archer & Francis (1979), have l imi t ed their def ini t ior i of 'eff ic ient ' 
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to that pertinent only to risk averse investors is that the mathematics of de-
termining which portfolios lie on this front ier is far easier for the risk averse 
case than the risk prone. It is to this problem that the next step in the Mod-
ern Portfol io Theory a lgor i thm addresses itself; namely the determinat ion 
of the portfolios which lie on the t radi t ional ly 'eff ic ient ' f ront ier of the risk 
averse investor. 
There are basically three methods which may be employed for the solution 
of this problem: 
1. A graphical method. 
2. .-\ calculus method. 
3. .A quadratic programming method. 
Clearly, the graphical method can equally well be applied lo finding the 
efficient frontier of a risk prone as well as a risk averse investor. However, 
when dealing wi th a large number of possible portfol ios this method C|uickly 
becomes intractable even where jus t two indiv idua l investments are combined 
wi th varying weights to form portfolios. Far more elegant are the other two 
alternatives. 
The calculus solution is based on the fact that once an efficient set of 
portfolios has been determined, each defined in terms of expected return 
( £ f r p . ) ) and variance (o"pJ, then the investor wi l l have a preference for one 
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of those portfolios in accordance w i t h his risk a t t i tude . Th i s por t fo l io has 
a unique expected return which is the max imum for a given level of risk as 
defined by the statist ical measure of variance. Let this 'desired' expected 
return be denoted £^[^^1. On the efficient f ront ier for a risk averse investor, 
for every level of re turn the risk, or variance, is [ninimized. Thus, the calculus 
method seeks to minimize: 
Where: 
Pk 
Here, A: = 1 . . . A'' and relates to the number <:»f portf<>lios. while i , j ~ 1 . . . // 
and relates to the number of ind iv idua l investments that compose the port-
folios. This minimiza t ion of por t fol io variance is subject to two l.agrangian 
constraints. The first constraint is derived f rom the investor's wish to achieve 
a desired expected return (E'r'^]) f rom his por t fo l io selecti '»n. I 'hus: 
n 
Y.PiE'r^l - E\r;\ = 0 
1 = 1 
The second constraint relates to the requirement that the proportions of 
individual investments that compose the por t fo l io should, of course, sum to 
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unity. In other words; 
E p . - 1 = 0 
By combining these three quantit ies, the Lagrangian object ive func t ion of 
the risk min imiza t ion problem wi th a desired re turn constraint is: 
1 = 1 J = l 1=1 t = l 
The particular desired' por t fo l io which yields m i n i n u i m risk is now de-
rived by part ial ly differen't iating z w i th respect to pi where i — I . . . a and 
wi th respect to ( the Lagrangian mul t ip l iers ) where j = 1,2. This results 
in an M - 2 system of equations as follows: 
dz 
—^ = '2piC0Vu -r 2P2C0V12 -r . . . 2pnC0V\n ~ ^\ E\r{\ - A2 = 0 
= '2p\CoV2\ — 2ptC0Vnt -r . . .2pnCov-yn ~ "V E'.r-y'- — X-y — 0 
Op2 
^ = 2piC0V^i - r 2p2C0Vn2 - r . . . 2p^C0Vnn "T A, E T , / - Ao - 0 
OPn 
~ = P\E[ri\ - p2E'r2 -r . . .pnE'r,,] - E[r'^' = 0 
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Since this system of equations is linear w i t h respect to the proportions, 
or weights, of each indiv idua l investment w i th in the por t fo l io then i t can be 
presented in the fo rm of a Jacobian mat r ix equation given by: 
c P k 
2Covn ... 2Coi;,, I Pi 0 
2C0V21 2C0V22 . . . 2C0V2n E'r. L Pi 1) 
'2C0V^y 2C0Vn2 . . . 2C0Vr,n. I Pn 
-
0 
. . . E[rJ 0 1) -^;! 
I L 1 I) 0 A . 1 
In this ma t r ix equation. C is a matr ix of coefficients, the weight vector is p 
and A; is a vector of constants. The purpose of the exercise is to determine 
the components of p so lhat the proportiori of each ind iv idua l investment 








The solution to this equation wi l l give the n r 2 variables in the weight 
vector in terms of E[rp] where the n weights wi l l be of the fol lowing fo rm: 
P2 - C2~d2E[rp 
Clearlyj Y^-i Pi = I and tlie c,- and di are constants. The proportions 
of each indiv idual investment that together comprise the overall m i n i m u m 
variance port fol io can be deduced f rom these equations merely by establishing 
a value for the desired return ( f T j r ' j ) . A l l the portfolios in the efficient set 
•can be determined by varying the value of E'.r'p] and recalculating the p,-. 
M a r t i n (1955) showed that such a process would lead to the same efficient 
set as that which is derived graphically. 
Similar techniques for determining the efficient set of portfolios have been 
devised which use areas of mathematics such as C'rarner's rule or maximiza-
t ion, as opposed to min imisa t ion , of Lagrangian object ive functions. Il-^w-
ever. the process jus t out l ined is i l lus t ra t ive of the general rjundatii.-.ns of 
such methods as embodied in di f ferent ia l calculus. For applicat ion to the 
determination of an efficient f ront ier for a risk prone investor, the methods 
need to be adjusted somewhat. 
IS^I 
A tota l ly diverse approach to solving the efficient set problem is that 
provided by Quadratic Programming. This is the method which Markowi tz 
(1952) actually used in his or iginal exposition of the theory. According to 
Fischer k Jordan (L983p5l4) : 
"Markowi tz (1952) devised an ingenious computa t ional model 
designed to trace out the efficiency locus and to iden t i fy the port-
folios that make i t up. In other words, he produced a scheme 
whereby large numbers of feasible portfolios could be ignored 
completely where they were dominated by more efficient port-
folios. In the calculations, .Vlarkowitz (1952) used the techniques 
of quadratic programming. He assumed that one could deal w i t h 
.'V securities or fewer. Using the expected return and risk for 
each security under consideration, and covariance estimates for 
each pair of securities, he is able to calculate risk and return for 
any por t fo l io made up of some or all of these securities." 
Quadratic Programming is a technique based on i terat ive numerical anal-
ysis and consequently, therefore, is only feasible through the use of a com-
puter. The Quadratic Programming a lgor i thm starts by f inding the por t fo l io 
w i th max imum ^ ^ ^ p j and progresses through all possible portfolios one at a 
t ime adding and removing portfolios f rom an in te r im efficient set in accor-
dance wi th the rules of 'efficiency' un t i l the total and absolute efficient set has 
been identif ied. However, again, such a method needs to be adjusted if the 
location of the 'eff icient ' portfol ios of a risk prone investor is the object ive. 
Needless to say, al l three methods for iden t i fy ing the efficient set o f portfo-
lios lead to the same conclusions. For the purposes of this work, the methods 
have been given merely the briefest description but for a ful ler discussion of 
185 
the various methods and their relative merits see Alexander (1976). 
The final stage of Modern Portfol io Theory involves the selection of a 
particular investment por t fo l io f rom the set of efficient ones. .As has been 
impl ied, this is a question of applying ind iv idua l preferences, i.e. ind iv idua l 
at t i tudes towards risk, to the efncient set. The efficient set of portfolios 
involves the choice between trade-offs. In the risk averse case, the efficient 
por t fo l io wi l l contain a max imum re tu rn / tnax imum risk por t fo l io and other 
portfolios which yield lesser return for less risk. .-\s has been mentioned in 
Chapter 4. at t i tudes towards risk are encapsulated in measures of u t i l i t y as 
represented by a part icular u t i l i t y curve. It has also already been slated that 
embodied in every u t i l i t y func t ion lies a set of indifference curves. It is these 
latter which invariably are employed as the basis for selecting f rom an efficient 
set of portfolios. Each indifference curve represents trade-offs of risk and 
return which yield equal levels of satisfaction or u t i l i t y . Thus, the investor 
is indifferent between all the trade-offs that lie on a part icular indifference 
curve. The interaction between a risk averse investor's indifference curves 
and the efficient f ront ier of portfolios available to h im is shown in Figure 6.6 
.A.S mentioned in Chapter 4. the rational investor seeks to maximize his ex-
pected u t i l i ty . Thus , the rat ional investor prefers to lie on indifference curve 
[3 to A and on A in preference to It is impor t an t to remember that there 
are an inf ini te number of indifference curves which could be placed on this 
graph since they are independent of intercept. .-Vs long as they remain paral-
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lei to [1J2 and f-^ they can, in effect, move wherever they like, f^, however, 
is an impossible indifference curve for the investor to lie on since there are no 
physical investment portfolios which he can select in this posi t ion. By impl i -
cation, the risk averse investor seeks to lie on the indifference curve which is 
farthest away f rom the x-axis and yet, at the same t ime, lies on the efficient 
portfol io. Thus, he wi l l select por t fo l io A, where the indifference curve is 
tangential to the efficient frontier , as his subject ively op t ima l j^or t fol io . It 
can be concluded that this por t fo l io has the fol lowing characteristics: 
1. From the def in i t ion of an efficient por t fo l io , there are no •)thcr portfolios 
which yield greater return for the same level of risk. 
2. From the def ini t ion of an efficient por t fo l io , there are no - ' iher portfolios 
which yield less risk for the same level of re turn. 
3. The decision maker does not wish to sacrifice return for the sake of 
reducing his risk st i l l farther. 
4. The decision maker does not wish to increase his risk in the h.;.pe of 
achieving greater return. 
The mathematics involved in assessing this subjectively o p t i m a l portfo-
lio selection usually revolves around the modell ing of the efficient frontier 
in funct ional fo rm. A l l the portfolios wli ich lie on the eff icient f ront ier are 
uniquely characterized in terms of their expected return and their variance 
I8S 
as a measure of risk. A n est imation procedure, such as least squares regres-
sion, can be used to determine the approximate relationship which links the 
expected return of the portfolios which are efficient to their variance. Thus , 
the expected return f rom a por t fol io can be approximated by a func t ion of 
its risk. If this funct ional relationship is denoted <p(a-^) and the equivalent 
funct ional relationship impl ic i t in the indifference curves, is denoted f{o'p), 
then the solution to the overall problem is given by; 
The solution of this equation provides a value for risk which is uniquely 
associated wi th a single por t fo l io (and, therefore, a unique value of expected 
return) on the efficient f ront ier . It is this por t fo l io which represents the 
subjectively opt imal por t fo l io selection. .\s Phill ips Ritchie ( I98i jp247) 
say of the solution procedure: 
"This point represents a solution lo the problem in the sense 
that the rate at which the investor in question is jus t wtlltn.(j to 
exchange expectation for risk is precisely equal to the rate at 
which his or her opportunit ies wi l l allow. The resulting solut ion, 
moreover, identifies a por t fol io that lies on the efficient f ront ier . 
That is, the langency condi t ion identifies an efficient por t fo l io . " 
Having thus explained the nature of the a lgor i thm inherent in M a r k o w i i z 
Port fol io Theory, it only remains to explain why the methodology is based 
solely on the use of variance (or standard deviat ion) as a measure of risk. This 
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is an important point insofar as variance may not const i tute an appropriate 
measure of risk for shipowners. A later chapter of this work wi l l examine 
various measures of risk w i t h i n the context of the shipowning industry, but it 
is impor tan t to recognize that the use of a risk measure other than variance 
or standard deviation wi l l invalidate certain aspects of the strict .Modern 
Portfol io Theory approach to op t ima l por t fo l io selection. The use of an 
alternative risk measure w i l l , therefore, necessitate an adjus tment to the 
procedure previously out l ined. 
The use of variance or standard deviation as the appropriate measure 
of risk can be jus t i f ied logically on the grounds that they are measures of 
the dispersion of returns. This has an obvious psychological impact on the 
perception of risk. However, there are other, equally sound, methods of 
measuring dispersion. As has already been alluded to earlier, in instances 
where returns are not normally d is t r ibuted , al ternative measures may be even 
more appropriate. The real jus t i f i ca t ion for the use of variance and standard 
deviat ion as measures of risk lies in the existence of a part icular stat ist ical 
characteristic which they exhib i t . 
The final stage of the Markowi tz (1952) por t fo l io selection procedure in-
volves determining the mathemat ical interaction of the efficient por t fo l io wi th 
an individual investor's indifference curves. The indifference curves represent 
that investor's a t t i tude towards risk. As slated in chapter they are noto-
riously d i f f i cu l t to estimate. The preferred methodology for determining risk 
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a t t i tude is to undertake a u t i l i t y analysis, [ t has been stated that in every 
u t i l i t y curve, there is an implied set of indifference curves. The practical 
evaluation of indifference curves f rom u t i l i t y functions is only possible when 
variance is the measure of risk used. The proof of this fact vindicates the 
exclusive use of variance (or standard deviat ion) as the measure of risk in 
Modern Portfol io theory. The proof also explains why, qui te unrealistically. 
u t i l i t y functions are usually in the form of a quadratic. Given a quadratic 
u t i l i t y funct ion where x represents a part icular level of re turn , then: 
U{x) — a ~ 3x - 7J:~ 
As has been seen, in accordance wi th the expected u t i l i t y hypothesis, an 
investor wi l l a t tempt to maximize his expected u t i l i t y . This is equivalent to 
determining the point of tangency between an investor's risk preferences, as 
contained in his risk-return indifference curves, and the efficient por t fol io . 
However: 
E[U{x)\ =z E'ct -^3x - ')x-
= a - 6 E [ x \ - ' f E y \ 
Now, since: 
E'x^] = { E { x y V a r ' x 
= ( E [ X ] ) ' ^ < T ' 
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Then: 
E[U{x)] = Q + 0E[x\ - l{{E[x\)- + cr-} 
This equation shows that the expected utility of a quadratic utility function 
is determined by the Krst lu'o moments: E\x\ and cr. [t is for this reason 
that standard deviation and variance are virtually always chosen as proxies 
for risk in real applications. By fixing the value of E[U{.u)\ in this equation 
and solving for varying values of E':x\ and a- a set of indifference curves 
linking risk and return can be determined. Variance and standard devia-
tion are the only measures of risk where this mathematical tractability is 
obtained. Alternative measures of risk do not allow the same relatively easy 
transformation from a utility function to a set of indilference curves. Thus, 
the application of Modern Portfolio Theory is inappropriate, in its standard 
form, to cases where other risk measures are utilized. 
This work does, in fact, investigate other measures of risk which may be 
more applicable to shipowners in the dry bulk sector. Because of this facet of 
the work, it is necessar}' to adjust the Modern Portfolio Tlieory methodology 
in order to cope with the potential risk measures employed in the portfo-
lio analysis. With this aspect in mind, the rest of this work is devoted to 
a portfolio analysis (utilizing several different risk measures) of the market 
investments available to dry bulk shipowners and the development of a suit-
ably adjusted Modern Portfolio Theory procedure which can be practically 
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The Available M a r k e t 
Investments i n D r y B u l k 
Shipping 
Before proceeding vviih the details of portfolio analysis, it is necessary to 
define the market investments tliat are available to shipowners in the dry 
bulk sector. As has already been implied, said market investments may take 
the form of the traditional physical shipping contracts, but additionally these 
may now be supplemented by freight futures contracts since the 'ijpening of 
B I F F E X on May l^' L9S5. This chapter seeks to define the pertinent charac-
teristics of each available market investment and to discuss their respective 
differences within the context of a Modern Portfolio Theory a[)proach to op-
timization of the portfolio investment decision. The final corollary of the 
discussion contained within this chapter will be the specification of the po-
tential market investment set, or set of individual investments, that will be 
used as the basis for the formation of portfolios. 
The traditional contracts between two parties for the physical carriage 
L9-1 
of goods can take many specific forms but are generically k l lOv^•^ as charter-
parties. According to Packard (L986): 
"A properly signed and authenticated charter-party states in 
written form the contract between a shipowner and a charterer 
and should factually record their negotiated agreement and the 
terms and conditions therein." 
Charter-parties relate to those situations where a single cargo owner or 
a single charterer enters into a contract with a shipowner for the hire of his 
ship. Such contracts are by far the most common in bulk shipping. Although 
it is permissible for a charterer of a ship to then siibcharter to some third 
party, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the shipowner 
is the actual owner of the ship (thus incurring capital and otlier ass<jciated 
costs) and that the charterer actually provides the cargo either directly or as 
agent. 
Merely within the dry bulk sector of shipping, tliere e.xist numerous "stan-
dard* form charterparties which may constitute the basis of this contract be-
tween a shipowner and a charterer. L ' N C T A D (1975) discovered that up to 
TO such standard forms are in general use as the basis of [)hy5ical ct>ntracts 
governing dry bulk trades. In commercial practice, these standard forms are 
inevitably altered by the addition and deletion of clauses and conditions in 
accordance with the individual requirements of either the charterer or the 
shipowner. Clearly, a complete and comprehensive specihcation of the de-
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tails contained within a charter-party is, therefore, impossible. Nevertheless, 
it is possible to identify the major features and characteristics of the basic 
elements which differentiate the general types of charter-party within the 
shipping industry. The following sections seek to achieve this task without 
becoming too involved in the legal and operational niceties which can, and 
do, pervade the different forms of charter-party. For a fuller discussion of 
the minutiae, the reader is recommended to a standard text such as Branch 
(1989) or Hardy Ivamy (L979). 
7.1 Voyage Charters 
Under a voyage charter, the shipowner agrees lo provide the vessel and her 
crew while the charterer provides the cargo. This form of charter inv(>lves the 
carriage of cargo (which is usually, but not necessarily, identified) between 
specified ports by a named ship for a prearranged freight. As Nersesian 
(1981) puts it: 
'"The most common contractual arrangement between a char-
terer and an owner is the single-voyage charter. The owner re-
ceives a freight payment for the movement of a cargo between 
two or more ports, from which he must pay all voyage and op-
erating costs. Cargo-handling charges are paid by the owner if 
gross terms apply and by the charterer if free in and out ( F I O ) 
terms apply." 
The freight receivable by a shipowner under a voyage contract is, in the 
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vast majority of cases, expressed in terms of S/ton of cargi:». However, implicit 
in this price is the requirement that the sliip be fully laden. Consequently, 
the charterer is obliged, to the best of his abilitV; to fully load the ship within 
certain prescribed limits. According to Metcalfe (I959pr22), the amount of 
cargo a vessel is capable of carrying is determined by: 
•*. . . a vessel's deadweight carrying capacity in long tons at her 
summer load line." 
The one area where the accrual of costs may vary dramatically between 
particular voyage charters has already been intimated. This area relates to 
the costs incurred in handling cargo. Under gro:>s terms, the shipowner is 
responsible for the payment of all loading and discharging costs. It is much 
more usual, however, that voyage charters, particidarly in the bulk trades, 
contain free in and out ( F I O ) or free on board ( F O B ) terms. There are other 
variations of these two terms, for instance F I O T (free in and i:>nt trimmed), 
but basically they all relate to the fact that loading and discharging costs 
are deemed to be the responsibility of the charterer. The difference between 
these various terms arises with respect to who is liable U>r cargo damage 
sustained at different points in the carriage of the cargo. Because the 
prevalence of charterer responsibility for cargo handling costs. F I O terms 
have been assumed for the purpose of comparing charters. 
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7.2 Consecutive-Voyage Charters 
To all intents and purposes, this form of charter is exactly equivalent to a 
single-voyage charter except for the fact that, as the name implies, the ship 
makes the same voyage on a number of occasions on a round-trip basis. The 
shipowner is still usually paid in terms of S/ton of cargo for a named ship on a 
specified route. Similarly, the costs incurred by the shipowner are analogous. 
Obviously, such charters can very easily be perceived as a number of separate 
single-voyage charters which just happen to be consecutive. It is only the 
fact that the number of trips required is speciKed in the original contract 
that differentiates this form of contract from that percepl ioEi . 
7.3 Contracts of Affreightment 
This form of charter is closely related to tlie consecutive voyage charter and 
hence, is again very similar to the single-voyage charter. The two major 
differences between this form of charter and a consecutive voyage charier is 
that firstly the actual ship is not precisely designated, although the technical 
details of the type of ship required usually are, and secondly, the voyages are 
not undertaken on a round-trip basis. Instead, the total amount of cargo to 
be lifted over a certain time period is specified. As long as that amount of 
cargo is transported between the nominated ports by the end of the period, 
then, within reason and subject to individual negotiations, it does not matter 
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when the shipowner fulfils his obligation or in what ship as long as it is 
technically capable of carrying the cargo. T h e shipowner, under a contract of 
affreightment, is still paid on the basis of S/ton of cargo and is still responsible 
for the same costs as incurred under a straightforward voyage charter. 
7.4 Period Time Charters 
As Hudig (1975) points out: 
"Whereas on a voyage charter, the owner undertakes lo carry 
the cargo from point A to point B and. within the terms of the 
charter-party, pays all of the expenses so incurred, the time char-
ter is quite different. Here, the vessel is let to the charterer from 
the actual lime and place of delivery, and, consequently, the ves-
sel's Master is under time charterer s orders as to movements, 
ports of call and bunkering, and cargoes lo be carried. The time 
charterer pays, among other things, for all port charges, loading, 
slowing, and discharging costs, and fuel oil etc., consumed during 
the period of the charter, until the vessel is ultimately redelivered 
to her owners. The ship, however, remains at all times the prop-
erty of the shipowner wlio is responsible for insurance of the hull, 
crew wages and, of course, the upkeep of the ship." 
Under a period time charter, therefore, a shipowner agrees to hire his 
ship to a charterer for a specified period of time. The shipowner provides 
the crew to man the ship. What the charterer then does with it is. up to a 
point, his business. The shipowner will receive remuneration on the basis of 
a price quoted in S/day and referred to as the daily hire rate. Occasionally, 
he may receive his revenue in terms of S/Dwt. /month, but this can easily 
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be converted to a S/day basis for the purposes of comparison. Clearly, such 
revenue can only be fairly earned when the ship is fully operational for the 
whole period of the time charter. As a consequence, in order to protect the 
interests of the charterer, provision is invariably made within a time charter, 
in the form of an off-hire clause, for hire revenue to cease should a ship prove 
to be, or become, temporarily unfit for service at sea. 
The time charter constitutes a major deviation from a voyage charter with 
respect to the responsibility of costs. Under a time charter, the charterer 
becomes responsible not oidy for the day-to-day operation of the ships, but 
also for the voyage costs. Most importantly, under a time charter, fuel costs 
become the responsibility of the charterer rather than the owner. Given 
the different basis of revenue earning and the different responsibilities for 
the payment of costs, it is clear that there is an enormous financial divide 
between a time charter and a voyage charter. 
7.5 Trip Time Charters 
This form of charter-party represents only a slight variation on the provisions 
of a period time charter. In this case, rather than hiring a ship for a prespec-
ified period of time, the charterer instead hires a ship to undertake a certain 
prespecified trip, described in only general geographic terms, but where usu-
ally some indication of the time involved is given. The cost responsibilities 
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of the shipowner remain the same as under a period time charter and the 
revenue basis of S/day is also similar. These forms of charter are most widely 
used in the liner trades, to fill gaps in the service when problems arise. 
7.6 Bareboat Charters 
A bareboat charter is sometimes referred to as either a demise charter or a 
time charter by demise. Under this form of charter, the shipowner delivers a 
ship to the charterer which is totally bare. It is the charterer's responsibility 
to provide a crew and to pay all operating costs as well as voyage costs. In 
effect, a bareboat charter constitutes a lease of the ship by the shipowner 
to the charterer. The charterer then becomes, what is referred to as, the 
disponent owner and is free to subcharter or re-let the ship as he wishes, as 
long as the period of such a contract does not overlap the time which he has 
agreed for returning the ship into the hands of the actual shipowner. The 
charterer might also be constrained by certain provisions within the bareboat 
charter with respect to cargoes carried or ports of call etc. Ihre, Gorton ic 
Sandevarn (1984p9L) suggest that: 
"The bareboat charter has been a comparatively unusual type 
of charter but with changing trading and investment patterns it 
has become more common. Sometimes a second-hand sale has 
been disguised as a bareboat charter with an option to buy in 
order that taxation can be avoided." 
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The bareboat charter is sometimes linked to other practices in the ship-
ping industry which are of questionable morality. Most notable amongst 
these is the, now infamous, .Japanese Shikumisen deal whereby high crew 
costs can be avoided by bareboat chartering to a brass plate company in .a 
flag of convenience country. 
A bareboat charter is akin to a time charter by virtue of the fact that 
the shipowner derives his revenue in the form of charter hire. Flis only cost 
responsibility under such a charter lies with the payment of capital costs. As 
has been said, all other costs are the responsibility of the charterer. 
7.7 Freight Futures 
The Baltic International Freight Futures Exchange ( B I F F E X ) began oper-
ating on May l^' 1985 after a prolonged period of investigati«jn and research 
into how it should work. The aim of the market is to provide shipowners and 
charterers with a flexible means for hedging their risk exposure to freight 
rate movements. Commodity futures markets, such as those for potatoes, 
grain, tin etc., are well established means of hedging against adverse com-
modity price movements. However, the trading of futures is based on the 
existence of a product which exhibits comparative h«-»mogeneiiy, since the 
contract which is actually traded on the futures market must be represen-
tative of a market standard. Such was the case with the traditional futures 
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markets. In shipping, however, there are so many market variables, such as 
the size and type of ship, cargo carried, possible ports of call etc., that it 
seemed that the development of a futures market for the hedging of freight 
might be impossible. 
The need for a standard commodity to form the basis of a futures market 
is derived from the fact that there must be a large volume ':>f players in the 
market who wish to trade the futures contract. Also, in traditional futures 
markets, it is feasible that a particular futures trade might be allowed to 
run to maturity and that then there could be a physical delivery of the 
commodity. Clearly, in such a case, the specification of exactly the form of 
that commodity must be clear. 
Obviously, because of the tack of homogeneity in shipping, a freight fu-
tures contract based on traditional commodity futures markets is impossible. 
With the development of futures markets such as L I F F E (London Interna-
t i o E i a l Financial Futures Exchange) and the N'VCRB (New \'ork Commodity 
Research Bureau) came the idea of futures markets based on the trading of 
an index value. This prompted the B I F F E X Committee, when investigating 
the viability of a freight futures market, into the development •:»f a suitable 
index that might form the basis of futures trading in shipping. 
The resultant index is known as the Baltic Freight Index ( B F l ) and rep-
resents a basket of single-voyage trades from the dry bulk shipping sector. 
As such, it is deemed to constitute a barometer of the prosperity of the dry 
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bulk sector. In deriving its constitution, B I F F E X research analysts sought 
to include dry bulk trades which represented the major revenue contributors 
to the market in general. Additionally, it was important that specific voyage 
charters that were included in the index were frequently and regularly traded 
and that some geographic, ship size and tonne-mile balance was present in 
the index. Initially, 13 trades were selected for inclusion in the B F l . each 
weighted in accordance with the above factors. These weightings varied from 
20% down to just 2.5%. 
Provision was made in the original development of the B F I that the com-
position of the index could be altered as time progressed in line with changes 
that occurred in the physical dry bulk sector ois a the factors outlined 
above. In fact, this has proved to be the case since now the B F I is composed 
of just 12 trades and several of the original constituent routes have been 
deleted from the index and new oties added. 
On each B I F F E X trading day, eight members of the Baltic Exchange, 
who happen to be the eight leading international shipbroking companies, 
supply either the current actual freight rates pertaining on each of the index 
routes or estimates of those rates should there be no actual fixtures that they 
may refer to. The Baltic Exchange average the quoted rates for each route, 
after ignoring the highest and lowest quotes, and then compute the weighted 
average to calculate the day's value of the B F I . Carter (1987) states: 
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"The B F I has received wide acceptance as fairly refiecting 
'the market' and the Baltic Exchange intends to ensure that it 
will be amended, as may be necessary within its Rules, so as to 
continue to reflect the current trading patterns in the daily spot 
market. No other fixture collating service matches the Baltic 
Exchange in benefiting from receipt of a disciplined, verified daily 
input reflecting ship charters being negotiated as well as those 
fixed during each twenty-four hour period. This is the unique 
contribution of the Baltic Exchange enabling it to produce daily 
a tamper-proof and audited B F I . " 
Clearly, since the B F I is composed of averaged freight rates, it represents 
the movement in gross cost to the charterer or gross revenue to the shipowner, 
rather than, for example, the net earnings of a shipowner. Figure 7.1 shows 
the movement of the B F I from its introduction until the end of 19S8. 
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The B F I forms otily the basis of B I F F E X . It represents an economic 
indicator of the state of the dry bulk voyage charter market, but is not traded 
on the market. Operationally, the B F I s sole purpose is to provide the price 
at which open contracts are settled at, should those contracts be allowed to 
run to maturity. In fact, in order to prevent manipulation of this settlement 
price, the value of the B F I for the five days previous to the settlement day 
are averaged out to provide the settlement price. 
Originally, there were eight actual futures contracts that could be traded 
on B I F F E X . The four "'nearby" contracts were for Jat»uary, .-\pril, July and 
October of the current year, while the four "distant" contracts were for the 
same months of the following year. Each futures contract matures on the 
last trading day of the month. In July 1988. a new nearby cotitract was 
introduced which was for the nearest end of month should this not coincide 
with a contract that already existed. Thus, in February 1988, a futures 
player could trade contracts for April, July, October 1988 and for January, 
ApriL July, October 1989 as well as for January 1990. In September 1988. 
the following contracts would be available: September and October 19SS: 
January, April. .luly and October 1989; January. April , July 1990. Clearly, 
this means that the time horizon of the market is anything up to two years 
ahead. 
A trader on B I F F E X can open a position, i.e. invest in freight futures, by 
going long or short on a particular freight futures contract as just discussed. 
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The terms long tind short within the context of a futures market are respec-
tively synonymous with buying and selling. If a trader, for example, sells a 
September 1989 contract at the beginning of September 1989, he may close 
out his position by buying a similar contract before the end of September 
1989 or he may hold on to the contract until it reaches maturity at which 
time the value of that contract is determined by the level of the B F I as 
previously outlined. 
The price of the respective futures contracts at any given point in time 
is related to the B F I insofar as those prices are the expected future values of 
the B F I at the dates of maturity of the individual futures contracts. These 
expectations are summarized by the price of those contracts by virtue of the 
fact that the prices are determined by the demand and supply of willing 
purchasers and willing sellers. Thus, there is continuous market agreement 
on the future value of the B F I and, therefore, on the current prices of the 
individual futures contracts. 
Each index point of the B F I and of the individual futures contracts is 
valued at SlO. Thus, if a futures trader goes long on one contract valued at 
981, he will be buying one particular futures contract for S9,810. He may soli 
a contract with the same date of maturity before the settlement date in order 
to close out his position or he may just maintain his open position until the 
settlement date of the contract. If the latter is the case and the average level 
of the B F I over the five days previous to the settlement date is 092, then he 
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wil l be deemed to have sold his exist ing bought contract at that value and 
wi l l have made a prof i t of S9,920 - S9,810 = Si 10 on that single contract . 
When hedging, and indeed speculating, on BLFFEX, traders, unless they 
are new to the market, invariably do not l i m i t themselves to the t rad ing of 
jus t a single contract . The number of contracts which a hedger purchases 
is related to his degree of risk exposure in the physical dry bulk market. 
Perhaps the best way to i l lustrate the mechanics of the market in a hedging 
context is to reproduce an example f rom the B I F F E X market ing l i terature. 
To that end. the fol lowing is a s implif ied theoretical example of a shipowner's 
hedseon B I F F E X : 
A t the end of October 19S4, a shipowner knows that his ship wi l l be free 
of charter in 3 months t ime, but is unable to find a charterer to fill that slot. 
.At the end of October 1984, the spot single voyage charter rate is SL2 per 
ton of cargo carried. His ship can carry 100,000 tOEis. Fearing that the spot 
voyage freight rates wi l l decline before a fixture is concluded, the shipowner 
intends to sell on B I F F E X to hedge liis posit ion. 
— i f the shipowner could arrange a charter now to c a r r y 100,000 tons of 
coal at S l2 per ton for the free period in three months t ime, he would be 
expecting to receive Sl.2 mil l ion in revenue (less commissioEis) . 
— W i t h the spot market at Sl2 for this voyage, the B F l stands at 1000. 
The January 1985 futures price also stands at LOOO. 
—One contract on B I F F E X at S10 per index point with index at 1000 has 
a value of SlOjOOO. Thus, the shipowner sells contracts forward ( the January 
1985 contracts) equivalent to the value of the hoped for revenue. T h a i is, 
120 contracts each at SlO,000 equals Sl.2 mi l l ion . 
— Dur ing the interval between effecting this hedge and fixing his ship on 
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the freight market, rates drop by L0% so that the shipowner obtains a freight 
rate of only SlO.80. Thus, earning only Si.08 mill ior\ . 
— A t the same time, the January 1985 futures, which the shipowner had 
previously sold at the end of October 1984, wi l l also have fallen by 10% to 
stand at an index value of Q U O . W i t h a value of S L O per index point , the 
current contract value is now S9,000. 
—The shipowner now buys back the 120 fulvires contracts he sold when 
the index was at lOUO- The price he pays is at the new lower level. T h a t is. 
121) contracts xS9,000 = 3l. i)8 mi l l ion . This closes out his open futures sale, 
making a futures profi t of Sl20,000. Thus , the profi t on the shipowner's fu-
tures sell hedge compensates for the drop in earnings on the actual charter ing 
fixture. The position can be seen in fu l l in Table 7.1 below: 
Table 7.L: Actuals and Futures Results of The ' j ret ical Investment 
Act ual , Futures 1 
Expected . Value of Sold 
income = Sl .2 mil l ion , • futures contracts = S 1.2 mi l l ion 
.Actual income 
1 
; Cost of buying back 
after 10% drop ! : futures position after 
in rates = S1.08 mil l ion ' i 10% drop in rales = Sl.OS mi l l ion ! 
.Actual Loss =3120,000 1 ; Futures Profi t = 3 1 2 0 -01 )0 i 
The existence of speculators as investors in B I F F E X is v i ta l in provid-
ing the l iquid i ty to ensure that the hedgers can trade. This is par t icular ly 
the case where the hedgers on the market have similar exjx-ctations of the 
future and would consequently all line up on one side of the market . .As a 
consequence no trades would be completed for the whole of the period of 
similar expectations amongst hedging shipowners, ll is for this reason that 
speculators are required in order to provide the necessary l iqu id i ty . The in-
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t roduct ion of the new nearby futures contract in August 1988 was, in fact, 
an a t tempt to draw more speculative capital into the market to provide that 
much needed l iqu id i ty for successful hedging. Obviously, the a t t r ac t ion of 
greater broking commission is another reason. 
B I F F E X investment is highly geared in that for each contract traded 
i t is only necessary to make a deposit of S500 irrespective of the value of 
a contract. However, for the purpose of this analysis, i t is deemed that 
investment in freight futures relates to the to ta l value of the comnnitment 
of resources. This circumvents the problems encompassed in perceiving the 
meaning of investment where only a deposit is paid and where contracts can 
be sold prior to being bought. 
A t this point , i t might be useful to make some observations concerning the 
degree of acceptance of B I F F E X amongst shipowners, since i t is w i t h their 
investment decisions that this study concerns itself. Does B I F F E X provide 
a hedging mechanism that is actually used by shipowners? Sections A and 
C of the questionnaire, contained in Appendix A and sent to a sample of 
shipowners, a t tempt to answer this and other questions. 
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7.7,1 The Use of B I F F E X by Shipowners: Results 
from a Survey 
The survey concerned was sent to all shipowners in B r i t a i n , Greece, Hong 
Kong and Norway. The methodology, detai l of survey design and response 
rate statistics have already been discussed in Chapter 5 in relation to U t i l i t y 
Analysis which was the pr imary reason for sending the survey. However, 
responses to sections A and C* provide addi t ional i n f o r m a t i o n which allow 
the analysis of the use of B I F F E X by shipowners. Suffice i t to say at this 
point that 85 usable responses were received which f o r m the basis of the 
following analysis. 
Of the 85 responses received, only 13 had ever traded freight futures con-
tracts. This represents 15.3% of respondents. Initiall}^, this might be deemed 
to be reasonably respectable. However, of these 13, 11 respondents used the 
market exclusively for speculative purposes, 2 invested as both speculators 
and hedgers and only 2 used the market purely as a hedging device. Thus, 
only 4.7% of respondents had ever used the market for hedging purposes. I t 
is interesting to note that 2 of these 4, were not shipowners p r imar i ly in-
volved in the dry bulk market. A contingency table showing the relationship 
between hedging on B I F F E X and dry bulk operat ion was derived f rom the 
responses and is shown in Table 7.2. 
A ^est was run on this contingency table to test the hypothesis that 
there is no relationship between the two variables. A statist ic of 0.1005 was 
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Table 7.2: Contingency Table of P r imary Dry Bu lk Opera t ion vs. Hedging 
on B I F F E X 
Hedging 
on B I F F E X 
Pr imary Dry Bu lk 
Operat ion 
Yes iVo Total 
Yes 2 2 4 
No 47 34 1 81 
Total 49 36 1 85 
derived w i t h 1 degree of freedom. This is to ta l ly insignificant and no evidence 
whatsoever exists to reject the nul l hypothesis. Thus , the evidence suggests 
that there is no relationship between hedging on B I F F E X and whether the 
hedger is involved pr imar i ly in the dry bulk market . 
This prompts the question as to whether these 2 shipowners are merely 
hedging their secondary trades or whether they are actual ly a t t empt ing to 
hedge trades which are not dry bulk. The answer to tha t question might be 
imputed f rom the related contingency tables, i l lus t ra ted in Tables 7.3 and 
7.4, which show the frequency of responses received f r o m dry bulk operators 
as against their self-avowed knowledge of B I F F E X . 
A test of the first of these contingency tables yields a statistic of 
21.326 wi th 1 degree of freedom. Th is statistic is very significant and, conse-
quently, provides overwhelming support , not unexpectedly, that fami l i a r i ty 
w i t h the te rm ' B I F F E X ' is dependent on whether a shipowner operates pri-
mari ly in the dry bulk sector or not. A n analysis of the components of the 
X^ statistic shows that a shipowner who does not operate p r imar i ly in the 
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Table 7.3; Contingency Table of P r imary Dry Bulk Opera t ion vs. Famil ia r i ty 
w i th the Term ' B I F F E X ' 
Familiar w i t h Pr imary Dry Bulk 
te rm ' B I F F E X ' ' Operat ion 
Ves No Total 
Yes 48 21 69 
No I L5 16 
Total 49 36 85 
Table 7.4: Contingency Table of Pr imary D r y Bulk Operat ion vs. Degree of 
Understanding B I F F E X 
Understand Pr imary Dry Bulk 
B I F F E X Operat ion 
Yes \ No Total 
Very well 12 j 4 16 
Fairly Well 20 1 5 25 
Only slightly 17 1 13 30 
Not at all 0 i 14 14 
Total 49 : 36 85 
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dry bulk trade is much more likely to be unfami l ia r merely w i t h the term 
B I F F E X . I t is interesting to note that 18.8% of the sample had never even 
heard of B I F F E X . 
A similar stat ist ical analysis of the second of these contingency tables 
again provides a very significant statistic of 26.16 w i t h 3 degrees of free-
dom. Thus, the level of a shipowner's understanding of how B I F F E X works 
is very dependent on whether he is p r imar i ly a dry bulk operator or not. 
Analysis of the components of the x' statistic suggests that a shipowner who 
understands nothing at all about how B I F F E X works is again l ikely not to 
be involved pr imar i ly in the dry bulk sector. 
These two sets of analysis, taken together, imp ly that an understand-
ing of at least some aspects of B I F F E X is almost to ta l ly dependent on the 
shipowner being involved p r imar i ly in the d ry bulk trades. The level of con-
fidence wi th which this statement can be made makes i t very unlikely that 
the 2 rogue shipowners, previously discussed, are a t t empt ing to hedge trades 
that are not dry bulk. Probabihty suggests, therefore, that they are likely to 
be hedging dry bulk trades which are secondary to their mainstream shipping 
business. 
Given the analyses undertaken thus far, i t can be seen that f ami l i a r i ty 
w i t h and knowledge of B I F F E X is very much related to a shipowner's expe-
rience in the dry bulk trades. However, perhaps somewhat dichotomously, i t 
has also been shown that hedging is not necessarily dependent upon d ry bulk 
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operation. One could draw the conclusion, therefore, that a l though hedging 
does not depend upon what pr imary trade the shipowner operates, specula-
tion in the market does. To test this hypothesis, a x^ test was implemented 
on the data contained in Table 7.5. 
Table 7.5: Contingency Table of Pr imary Dry Bulk Operat ion vs. Speculative 
Investment on B I F F E X 
Speculate 
on B I F F E X 
Pr imary Dry Bulk 
Operat ion 
Yes No Total 
Yes 9 2 11 
No 40 34 74 
Total 49 36 85 
:\n analysis of this contingency table yielded a x^ statistic of 3.0325 wi th 
1 degree of freedom. The associated p —value lies between 0.05 and 0 .1 . This 
provides only comparat ively weak evidence of the existence of a relationship 
between speculation on B I F F E X and the shipowner's p r imary involvement in 
the dry bulk trades. The components of the x^ statistic suggest that shipown-
ers involved p r imar i ly in the dry bulk trades are more likely to speculate on 
B I F F E X than those who are not. 
Using the survey data, there are several other interesting relationships 
that can be analysed in the same way. One of the questions on the survey 
asked whether respondents had used any futures market other than B I F F E X . 
Quite a large propor t ion of the sample (35.3%) replied that they had. In 
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order to investigate whether previous knowledge of futures t rading influenced 
either hedging or speculating on B I F F E X , the fol lowing contingency tables 
were analysed using the i^si. 
Table 7.6: Contingency Table of Previous Futures Experience vs. Hedging 
on B I F F E X 
Hedging 
on B I F F E X 
Previous Futures 
Experience 
i'es No Total 
Yes 2 2 4 
No 28 53 81 
Total 30 55 85 
Table 7.7: Contingency Table of Previous Futures Experience vs. Speculation 
on B I F F E X 
Speculating Previous Futures 
on B I F F E X Experience 
Yes Total 
r e s 7 4 11 
No 23 51 74 
Total 30 55 85 
The statistic for the first of these tables is 0.397 w i t h 1 degree of 
freedom. This is to ta l ly insignificant. Consequently, one may conclude that 
there is no relationship between previous experience of futures t rading and 
hedging on B I F F E X . A shipowner who has traded on other futures markets 
is no more l ikely to hedge on B I F F E X than a shipowner w i t h no previous 
knowledge of futures markets. 
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The second of these tables, however, yields a x' statistic of 4.444 w i t h 
1 degree of freedom. The associated p — value of this statistic lies between 
0.05 and 0.025. This suggests that there is some evidence of a relationship 
between whether a shipowner has previous futures experience and whether or 
not he speculates on B I F F E X . Analysis of the components of the x^ s tat ist ic 
suggests that a shipowner w i th previous futures experience is more l ikely to 
speculate on B I F F E X than one who has not . 
Given that futures t rading is a d i f f i cu l t concept to grasp and debatably, 
even more diflficult to practice, these results might be deemed to i m p l y that 
speculation on B I F F E X is a more complex task than hedging and is gen-
erally undertaken by the more sophisticated players. Conversely, i t might 
imply that the hedging strategies adopted by shipowners who are t rading 
on B I F F E X are comparatively naive in the sense that they might be v i r t u -
ally semi-automatic. I t might be that even ' b l i n d ' hedging ( to be discussed 
in Chapter 8) is the norm. However, perhaps the most realistic interpre-
tat ion of these results lies w i th the degree of broker supervision. Hedgers 
are more likely to ask the advice of their futures broker in implement ing a 
suitable hedging strategy, whereas the speculator wi l l inevi tably play his own 
hunches based on past experience and i n t u i t i o n . 
The affect of various structural characteristics of shipowners upon their 
par t ic ipat ion in B I F F E X trading is also interest ing. For example, the size of 
a shipowning company might exert some influence over whether they trade 
217 
freight futures contracts. Question 1 of section C of the questionnaire asked 
respondents for their total asset size. T h e par t icular ly sensi.tive nature of 
this question (or perhaps ignorance), meant tha t only 39 responses to this 
part icular question were received. Each of these respondents was classified as 
being a ' b ig ' or ' smal l ' shipowning company on the basis of whether the value 
of their assets was greater or smaller than the mean for all the respondents. 
The mean asset value of the responses received was 333,207,176. Table 7.8 
shows the interact ion between size of shipping company, as determined by 
this classification cr i ter ion, and whether or not the company concerned trades 
on B I F F E X . 
Table 7.8: Contingency Table of Size of Company vs. B I F F E X Trad ing 
Trades on Size Classification 
B I F F E X of Company 
Big Small Total 
Yes 7 
No 9 23 32 
Total 28 1 39 
The X' statistic of this contingency table is 0.0006 w i t h I degree of free-
dom and is to ta l ly insignificant. As a result, one can conclude that the size 
of a company bears no influence whatsoever on whether or not that company 
trades on B I F F E X , either as a hedger or speculatively. This is a somewhat 
surprising result especially when fu r the r analysis suggests that neither specu-
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lat ion nor hedging are indiv idual ly dependent on size of company. Thus , size 
of company is to ta l ly irrelevant to al l forms of B I F F E X t rading and, assum-
ing that larger companies are more sophisticated than smaller ones, seems to 
belie the assertion that futures t rading requires a degree of sophist ication. 
Since the survey was sent to the shipowning companies of four nations, 
an investigation of the relationship between nat ional i ty and B I F F E X usage 
might prove f r u i t f u l . The contingency table representing this relationship 
can be seen in Table 7.9. 








Trades on B I F F E X 
Yes 1 ^Vo Total 
5 j 32 37 
5 19 24 
0 7 7 
3 1 14 17 
13 72 85 
The x^ statistic for this contingency table is 1.996 wi th 3 degrees of free-
dom and again is to ta l ly insignificant. The nul l hypothesis cannot, therefore, 
be rejected and one must construe that there is no relationship between the 
nat ional i ty of a shipping company and whether or not i t trades on B I F F E X . 
This suggests that B I F F E X itself is t r u ly an internat ional market at least as 
far as these t rad i t iona l mar i t ime nations are concerned. 
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The f inal s t ructural relationship that is tested is whether investment in 
B I F F E X is explained by a par t icular a t t i t ude to risk. Using the classification 
of responses to the u t i l i t y questions, seen in Chapter 5, Tables 7.10 and 7.11 
relate risk a t t i tude to par t ic ipa t ion in B I F F E X under conditions of both 
good and poor l iquid i ty . The first of these contingency tables yielded a 
statistic of 2.239, while the second yielded 4.23. Bo th statistics have 3 degrees 
of freedom and are both insignificant. Thus , risk a t t i tude has no bearing on 
whether a company invests in B I F F E X or not. This conclusion supports 
the finding that speculation on B I F F E X , where a t t i tude to risk is to ta l ly 
variable, is much more prevalent than hedging, where traders are inevi tab ly 
mot ivated by risk aversion. 
Table 7.10: Contingency Table of Risk A t t i t u d e in Good L iqu id i ty vs. BIF-
F E X Trading 
A t t i t u d e Trades on B I F F E X 
to Risk 
Yes No j Total 
.4 i ; er5e 8 31 1 39 
Prone 1 12 1 13 
Neutral 1 3 1 4 
Others 3 26 1 29 
Total 13 72 85 
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Table 7.11: Contingency Table of Risk A t t i t u d e in Poor L iqu id i ty vs. BIF-
F E X Trading 
A t t i t u d e Trades on B I F F E X 
to Risk 
Yes No Total 
Averse 50 1 61 
Prone 0 3 1 3 
Neutral 1 1 2 
Others 1 18 1 1 19 
Total 13 72 1 85 
45.9% of the to ta l sample, but more i m p o r t a n t l y 53 .1% of respondents 
involved pr imar i ly in the dry bulk trades, regarded B I F F E X as a m a j o r in -
novation in the shipping industry. Th i s must augur well for the f u t u r e of 
the market as long as the market ing strategy which promotes i t is appropr i -
ate. Implicat ions for the fu ture development of B I F F E X are also imp l i c i t in 
certain of the other responses received. 
The B I F F E X Commit tee would like to see the in t roduc t ion of options 
contracts in the near fu ture since they are regarded as a more powerfu l mech-
anism for hedging risk exposure than pure futures contracts. The nature of 
options contracts is explained in several texts but notably that of Cox & Ru-
binstein (1985). Of the survey sample, a surprising 77.7% of the respondents 
were, at least, familiar w i th the t e rm "options'. Of those 66 respondents that 
were famil iar w i t h the term, 8 (12.1%) would trade options on B I F F E X i f 
they became available, 16 (24.2%) said that i t would depend on the nature of 
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the options market adopted and 5 (7.6%) of the respondents replied tha t they 
d id not know whether they would trade such contracts. However, 37 (56.1%) 
of the respondents replied that they def ini te ly would not trade options w i t h i n 
B I F F E X . Perhaps more interestingly, the split of the 13 companies w i th in 
the sample that do current ly trade on B I F F E X is as follows: would trade 
options on B I F F E X ; 5, would not trade options on B I F F E X ; 4, depends; 3 
and 1 current B I F F E X trader who had never heard of the t e rm 'options ' . 
W i t h regard to whether shipowners perceived freight futures contracts 
as providing possible security on a loan, in the same way as t ime charters 
are sometimes used, 18.9% of respondents felt that this was indeed possible, 
while 40% felt that i t was not. 
7,8 A n Overall View of Market Investment 
in Dry Bulk Shipping 
I n order to implement a Modern Por t fo l io Theory methodology, i t is nec-
essary to ident i fy the ind iv idua l market investments for fur ther consideration. 
These individucJ investments are combined in to portfolios which can be anal-
ysed by applying the principles of the theory. I t is imperat ive to recognize, 
however, that Modern Portfol io Theory and specifically the required inputs 
to the theory, vis a vis the ind iv idua l market investments, are financially 
oriented. Thus, i t is the financial differences between potent ia l market in-
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vestments that form the jus t i f i ca t ion for their inclusion in the universal set. 
The inclusion of freight futures investment can clearly be j u s t i f i ed on 
the basis of its financial uniqueness w i t h i n the shipping wor ld . T h e basis 
of revenue earning and cost of investment are so completely incomparable 
w i t h the alternative market investments that i t would provide an interesting 
analysis even when considered on its own merits. When considering the 
interact ion of freight futures investments w i t h the more t rad i t iona l physical 
market investments, i t is clear that the results could consti tute an or iginal 
and valuable insight in to the holding of shipping portfol ios. 
When considering which of the i n d i v i d u a l physical market investments 
should be included in the universal set for fu r the r analysis, i t has been decided 
that the financial returns f r o m consecutive voyage charters and contracts of 
affreightment would be the same as those f r o m voyage charters given the 
assumptions of a standard t ime uni t for comparison and f u l l employment . 
The basis of this decision can be imputed f r o m Table 7.12 w^hich shows the 
cost responsibihties of a shipowner. I t is apparent that the costs to the 
shipowner do not differ between these three forms of charter. Similar ly , since 
revenue earning is derived f rom the same basis of S/ton of cargo, there is 
clearly no different ial effect on the returns to the shipowner. Because of the 
comparative rar i ty in the d ry bulk trades of the alternatives, voyage charters 
are assumed to be on FIO terms. 
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Table 7.12: Cost Responsibilities of the Shipowner Under Different Forms of 
Charter-Party 
Cost Bareboat Period Trip Single- Consecutive Contract 
Items Charter Time Time Voyage Voyage of 
Charter Charter Charter Charter Affreightment 
Capital Costs 
Repayment of 
Capital y y y y 




wages etc. - y y y y 
Provisions y ^. y y y y 
Spare parts y y y y y 
Lube oils y y y y y 
R &: iVI y y y y y 
Insurance y y y y y 
Admin. y y y y y 
Others y y y y y 
Voyage Costs 
Bunkers y y y 
Port dues y y y 
Canal tolls y y y 





This table also suggests that there is no financial difference between a 
period time charter and a trip time charter. As a result of this, and also the 
fact that trip time charters are nearly adways associated with the liner trades 
rather than the dry bulk sector, i t has been decided to include only period 
charters in the set of possible individual investments for further analysis. 
This set is now solely composed of just four possible market investments; 
period time charters, single-voyage charters (FIO terms), bareboat charters 
and freight futures. I t is this set which will be carried forward as the basis 
for the ensuing analysis under the principles and methodology of Modern 
Portfolio Theory. 
As has already been mentioned, this method of analysis is based purely on 
the financial characteristics of the individual investments. Before completely 
dispensing with the more nebulous qualitative features of the different physi-
cal market investments, it might prove beneficial to illustrate the advantages 
and disadvantages of each (from the shipowner's point of view), in order to 
place the ensuing quantitative analysis into some form of perspective. To 
this end, Yolland (1978) summarizes them as shown in Table 7.13. 
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Table 7.13: Advantages and Disadvantages of the Different Forms of Charter-
Party 
Type of Charter Advantages Disadvantages 
Bareboat No operational problems. 
Long-term income guarantee. 
Loss of control of asset 
Total loss of flexibility. 
No high market benefits 
Period Time 
i 
Guaranteed period income. 
Protected against low 
markets. 
Reduced operational problems. 
Partial loss of control. 
No high market benefits. 
Limited flexibility. 





Benefits on high markets. 
Maximum control of asset. 
No income guarantee 
except short-term. 
Suffer on low markets. 




Guaranteed period income. 
Considerable low market 
protection. 
Maximum control of asset. 
May not fully benefit 
on high market. 




A Bui ld ing Block Approach to 
Model l ing the Returns i n D r y 
Bu lk Shipping 
8.1 Definition of Returns and Framework for 
Data Collection 
From the exposition of Modern Portfolio Theory outlined in Chapter 6, 
i t is clear that, along with utili ty and risk measures, the returns accrued 
from different investments constitute one of the three major inputs to the 
modelling process. It has been implied that most of the applications of Mod-
ern Portfolio Theory have been to the determination of subjectively optimal 
portfolios in the stock market. The standard definition of 'return* reflects 
this. McLaney (1986) suggests that return is calculated as follows: 




rt = The return from the security or portfolio at time t. 
Pt = The price of the security or portfolio at time t. 
Pt-i = The price of the security or portfolio at time £ — 1. 
dt = The dividend arising, if any, from holding the security or portfolio for 
the standard unit time period. 
Obviously, such a definition relates directly, and very specifically, to the 
stock market and the nature of the returns that are made within that envi-
ronment. Capital gains and dividends which accrue over the holding period 
are expressed as a percentage of the original value of the asset. This sug-
gests that the term 'return' implicitly relates to the 'return on investment' 
as defined by: 
Profit 
Cost of Investment 
In the case of the stock market, the capital gains plus the dividend received 
represent the profit. However, Profit = Revenue — Cost. This representa-
tion is implicit in the stock market definition of return outlined above, but 
is more directly apparent in the definition of return on investment provided 
by Bromwich (1976): 
Ri - li 
Where: 
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r; = The rate of return from the i^^ security. 
Ri = The revenue accrued by the z''* security during a given time period. 
/; = The original cost of the i " * security. 
This formula leads directly to the definition of return on investment which 
will be used in this work as the basis for calculating the returns to dry bulk 
shipping services. Precisely, that definition is given by the expression: 
Revenues - Costu 
riUiit = -p:;— 
Where: 
ROIit = The return on investment of the i ' ' * security or portfolio during a 
standard time period. 
Revenueu = The revenue earned by the i^^ security or portfolio during the 
standard time period t, 
Costit = The costs incurred or investment made in holding the i " " security 
or portfolio for the standard time period £. 
As mentioned in the earlier parts of this work, any cost incurred by a 
shipowner entering into and fulfilling a particular market transaction can be 
considered as an investment. The two phrases are directly interchangeable. 
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The previous chapter highlighted the fact that as far as financial aspects 
are concerned, as differentiated from legal and operational considerations, 
there are basically just four market investments which a shipowner can make. 
As has already been emphasized, these investments materialize in terms of a 
commitment of resources and can generally be categorized as follows: 
1. Voyage charters. 
2. Time charters. 
3. Bareboat charters. 
4. Freight futures contracts. 
Of these four categories of market investment, the importance of the 
bareboat charter is comparatively minute. Although they do represent a 
theoretical alternative market investment, their occurrence in practice is so 
rare they are hardly worthy of consideration. Because of their rarity, the col-
lection of cost and revenue information, necessary to undertake an analysis 
of returns, becomes extremely difficult i f not impossible. Their scarcity of 
occurrence also implies that a shipowner may not he able to invest in such 
a transaction even if he should choose to do so. Modern Portfolio Theory 
concerns the optimization of a certain decision making process. Since the 
decision as to whether or not to invest in a bareboat charter is effectively 
removed from the shipowner, the inclusion of such transactions seems incon-
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gruous. It is for these reasons that the bareboat charter has been expunged 
from the universal set of individual market investments considered within 
this analysis for inclusion in a subjectively optimal market portfolio. 
The constraint of considering only three market investments within the 
confines of Modern Portfolio Theory greatly simplifies the analysis which 
needs to be undertaken in applying the methodology. This is most appar-
ently relevant to the calculation of covariances necessary to the application 
when variance or standard deviation is the measure of risk employed. As will 
be seen in Chapter 9. covariance measures shorten the process of portfolio 
risk calculation where variance or standard deviation are used as the proxy 
for risk. For other measures of portfolio risk, no such short-cuts exist. Con-
sequently, each possible portfolio mix needs to be considered individually. 
Limiting the number of individual investments that compose those portfolios 
to just three, obviously, greatly facilitates ease of analysis. This is especially 
important in that this work seeks to determine an adjusted Modern Portfolio 
Theory methodology which can be practically applied by shipowners in their 
regular market decision making. 
At first sight, it would seem that as far as returns are concerned, the 
analysis now progresses by determining the return on investment accruing to 
shipowners in the voyage charter, time charter and freight futures markets. 
However, Chapter 3 pointed to the fact that there is no such thing as a 
voyage charter market or a time charter market. These are merely generic 
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terms which, in effect, represent an amalgam of specific submarkets which 
can be delineated in terms of; 
• ship size. 
• cargo carried. 
• traded route. 
As such, an analysis of the returns in the general voyage and time charter 
markets will mean nothing since the shipowner does not actually receive such 
returns. Such returns are inevitably merely averages of the actual achievable 
returns. Their analysis within the framework of Modern Portfolio Theory, 
therefore, would contribute nothing to the required objective of ameliorating 
the decision making processes of shipowners. Clearly, the analysis needs 
to be undertaken at the level of specific submarkets so that the estimated 
returns constitute, at least approximately, realistic and, therefore, achievable 
returns. 
To analyse the returns of each dry bulk submarket over however short 
a period would be a mammoth task. In order to simplify the analysis still 
further it is necessary to concentrate the analysis solely on a sample of the 
available submarkets. To this end, the following three trades have been 
selected for in-depth analysis. 
I . 30,000 Dwt. US Gulf Coast (USGC) to Japan (JAP) carrying grain. 
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2. 55,000 Dwt. Hampton Roads (HR) to Japan (JAP) carrying coal. 
3. 120,000 Dwt. Brazil (BRZ) to North-West Europe (NWE) carrying 
iron ore. 
These trades will be analysed under both voyage and time charters. Sim-
ilarly, returns from freight futures will be derived for shipowners involved in 
these trades. The reasons why these three have been chosen are several. 
1. They represent a good cross-section, in terms of size of ship and cargo 
carried, of the overall dry bulk market. 
2. These trades are very important to the overall dry bulk shipping mar-
ket. This can be seen very clearly in Table S.L. 
Table 8.1: The Importance of the Three ^Sample' Trades to the Overall Dry 
Bulk Market in 1985 




Total Tonnes on 
Sample Routes 
Grain 181.5m USGC-JAP 21.0m 
Coal 271.6m HR-JAP 32.3m 
Iron Ore 320.6m B R Z - L \ W E 35.2m 
Source: FeamleySj World Bulk Trades 
In 1985, 21.0m tonnes of grain, representing 11.6% of the total world 
grain cargoes, was shipped from USGC to JAP, 32.3m tonnes of coal, 
representing 11.9% of the total world coal cargoes, was shipped from 
HR to JAP and 35.2m tonnes of iron ore, representing 11.0% of the 
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total world iron ore cargoes, was shipped from BRZ to NWE. The 
ranking of the respective international trades within their commodity 
grouping is as shown in Table 8.2. 
Table 8.2: Ranking of 'Sample' Trade Movement Within Cargo Grouping 
Route &C. Rank within 






Iron Ore: 2 
Source: Feamleys, World Bulk Trades 
The proportions of the specific cargo trades that are carried in the size 
of ship with which this study concerns itself are shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: Proportions of Trades Carried in 'Sample' Ship Sizes 
Specific 'Sample' Proportion of Trade | 
trade ship size carried in 'Sample' ship size ! 
USGC-JAP i 
Grain: 30,000 29.0% ' 
HR-JAP 
Coal: 55,000 24.0% \ 
BRZ-NWE 
Iron Ore: 120,000 65.5% 1 
Source: Feamleys, World Bulk Trades 
3. The routes are regularly traded. It is for this reason that the freight 
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rate data pertaining to each of these trades is readily available. In fact, 
Lloyd's Shipping Economist publishes the prevailing freight rate for 
each of these trades every month. From a practical viewpoint, it was 
this ready availability of the data which formed the major consideration 
when selecting which trades to base the analysis on. .Apart from the 
fact that these trades can be justified on other grounds (as seen in 
the points above), freight rate data is just not so consistently or easily 
accessible for alternative trades. 
The availability of monthly freight rate data for the three trades consid-
ered prompted the analysis of returns on the basis of monthly observations. 
Most applications of Modern Portfolio Theory, such as that by Vandell, Har-
rington k LevkofF (1978), Jensen (1975) and Blume k Friend (1975), base 
their analyses on monthly observations of the data. When analysing the 
returns in shipping, a major advantage of using monthly data arises from 
the relative simplicity of converting time charter rates to monthly voyage 
equivalents. 
Before actually collecting and analysing the data, the final operational 
aspect which needs to be dealt with is the period of analysis. Since the 
objective of this part of the analysis lies in the determination of the returns 
of portfolios composed of voyage charters, time charters and freight futures 
contracts, a constraint is placed on the period of interest by virtue of the fact 
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that freight futures were unavailable before May 1985. As a consequence, it 
was decided that the data should be collected for the period: May 1985 to 
December 1988 inclusive. This means that 44 observations of each individual 
investment is possible for the period. 
8.2 The Methodology of Returns Analysis 
As has already been mentioned, return on investment is dependent on revenue 
and costs. The revenue side of the equation depends upon the supply of 
shipping services and the price at which they are supplied. Prices, in the 
form of freight rates, are readily available for the three trades considered in 
this study since they are published on a monthly basis in Lloyd's Shipping 
Economist. For the purposes of this analysis, the supply of shipping services 
is deemed to be constant. More precisely, ships are assumed to be fully 
employed within each trade and on that trade alone. This is a very unrealistic 
assumption to make since it is based on the prerequisite that suitable repeat 
charters are constantly available and that unproductive ballast voyages do 
not, therefore, exist. This assumption implies that fully laden ships trade to 
and fro between the same two ports of call all the time. 
In order to calculate revenue, it is necessary to make some assumptions 
vis a vis employment of the ships. Any such assumptions made can be criti-
cized as being unrealistic. However, as long as the assumptions are applied 
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across the board to all three trades considered and to all types of invest-
ment, the errors in estimating returns will be of the same order for each of 
the trades and for each of the market investments. The level of relative error 
is, therefore, minimal. Since Modern Portfolio Theory considers mixes of dif-
ferent investments, the resultant subjectively optimal portfolio should be the 
same whatever the assumptions governing employment. The absolute level 
of return on portfolio investment may be erroneous, but different portfolios 
will remain directly comparable. In fact, because of the assumption of ful l 
employment for the ships on each of the trades, the expected returns for the 
different portfolios will inevitably be overestimated because of the fact that 
non-revenue earning ballast legs are ignored. Nevertheless, this feature in 
itself does not negate the methodology employed nor the results achieved. 
Having made the required assumptions regarding a ship's employment 
pattern, the revenue calculations, necessary as input into the calculation of 
return on investment, are relatively straightforward. Revenue calculations 
become primarily based on the price charged for the provision of shipping 
services. This price is known as the freight rate and, as will be seen in the 
sections which actually deal with revenue estimation, may be quoted in a 
number of different ways which usually depend on the form of the specific 
market transaction. 
The issue of cost calculation is another matter. Companies in all indus-
tries are extremely sensitive where costs are concerned. A widely-held view 
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exists that the secrecy over costs which pervades the shipping industry is even 
more extreme. Because of this inherent dearth of publicly available informa-
tion with regard to accurate shipping costs, most research which requires 
such knowledge, for example Glen (1987), invariably bases its cost estimates 
on the output from some modelling exercise. 
Within the field of cost estimation in the shipping industry, there are 
basically two approaches which may be adopted. The first is known as the 
elasticities approach and has gained a much greater following amongst the 
academic community involved in shipping research than among industrial 
practitioners. The leading contemporary proponents of this method of cost 
estimation are undoubtedly Jansson &c Shneerson (1987), especially insofar 
as it relates to the liner shipping industry. Glen (1988) discusses the applica-
bility of this methodology to the determination of costs in the tanker market. 
When describing the model upon which the elasticities approach is founded, 
he writes: 
"The model contains a set of estimated size elasticities for 
capital, operating and fuel and port costs, which are combined 
with daily operating expenditures to provide an estimate of the 
total voyage costs of transporting a given volume of cargo on a 
given trip." 
The attempted general applicability of the elasticities approach is implicit 
in this statement. The motivation in adopting the elasticities approach often 
lies in an attempt to optimize ship size to attain the most efficient carriage 
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of goods. This was the explicit aim in the work of Heaver (1969), Goss k 
Jones (1971) and Jansson k Shneerson (1982). Apart from the optimization 
of ship size, other possible motivations for the employment of the elastici-
ties approach to costing arise from attempts to explain and/or predict cost 
movements in the industry. Such motivation lies at the heart of the work 
by Shimojo (1978) who adopted another form of theoretical mathematical 
costing model as the bcisis of his analysis of freight rate determination in the 
shipping markets. 
It is apparent that the aim of the elasticities approach, and other theoret-
ical modelling exercises, is not just the determination of costs but rather the 
determination of underlying factors which influence costs. Such approaches 
are, therefore, defined being 'fundamental' in nature. They are undoubt-
edly important in their own right since they provide insight into shipping 
costs over and beyond the mere specification of values and amounts. The 
results produced by such models permit the explanation, prediction and con-
trol of costs. However, for the purposes of this work such models exhibit 
elements of overkill. This analysis is only concerned with the costs incurred 
by shipowners under different forms of contract for a limited period of only 
44 months. Why or how such costs arise is irrelevant. It is for this reason 
that the alternative building block approach to costing is used within this 
study. Such an approach is expounded in several basic standard shipping 
textbooks such as Packard (1978), Casas (1981) and Downard (1981) and is 
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widely used in industry. 
The building block approach to the estimation of shipping costs is ba-
sically an accounting procedure whereby detailed estimates of the various 
categorized cost components are added together to arrive at a total cost. 
This is undertaken separately for each ship size. The categorized cost es-
timates used within this work were derived from approximated data pub-
lished monthly in various shipping trade journals such as Lloyd's Shipping 
Economist and Drewry Shipping Statistics and Economics. Again, criticism 
could be levelled at the use of such approximated data. However, given.the 
lack of a feasible alternative, particularly access to real company cost data, 
the use of such approximate data seems the only way forward. Also, the 
errors in estimation will again be of the same order as they affect each of 
the potential market investments. Consequently, the existence of such errors 
or inaccuracies should not introduce any bias into the portfoLo analysis and 
the resultant theoreticcdly suggested subjectively optimal market portfolio. 
Heaver (1985p35) supports this pragmatic stance by suggesting that: 
"Costing is often discussed as though there were a 'true cost' 
of providing a service. There is no such single cost. The relevant 
cost is always dependent on the purpose for which the costing is 
to be performed." 
Such a view points to the impossibility of assessing the magnitude of 
errors made in any estimation of costs. It also suggests that errors may even 
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exist in costs supplied direct from a company, especially when the objective 
for which they are required differs from that of pure management or financial 
accounting. Goss (1985p3) provides further support for this view: 
". . . we cannot expect to get the right answer unless we know 
the right question and we are unlikely to get that without defining 
our terms and purposes very carefully." 
In view of this advice, suffice it to say that in summary the purpose of 
this costing exercise is to provide an input into the calculation of returns 
in shipping which, in turn, will provide input to a Modern Portfolio Theory 
model of market portfolio selection for shipowners. A building block ap-
proach has been adopted as the basis of cost determination since i t is only 
required to determine cost values for a certain pre.specified period. As long as 
the same rules of cost estimation are applied across the board, there will be 
no differential error effect and, therefore, the results from the final portfolio 
selection model will be unbiassed and free from error at least as far as the 
cost estimation methodology is concerned. 
The following sections describe in detail the revenue and building block 
cost calculations undertaken to arrive at a time series of returns on invest-
ment. As one can imagine, the level of intricate detail necessary to undertake 
this analysis is such as to mitigate against the in-text inclusion of the precise 
calculations. For this reason, only appropriate summaries are presented at 
this stage. However, an exhaustive presentation of the modelling process and 
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results is provided in Appendices B-D. For the purpose of clarity, in the en-
suing sections, the various cost estimations and associated assumptions are 
discussed within the context of the standard cost component classification 
recommended by Stopford (1988). 
8.3 The Returns on Investment of Voyage 
Charters 
8.3.1 Revenue Considerations 
Voyage charters are most normally quoted in terms of S/ton of cargo. A 
summary of the freight rates under voyage charter for the three trades with 
which this study concerns itself are shown in Appendix E for the 44-month 
period of interest. A plot of the data is presented in Figure 8.1. 
Gross freight revenue for a voyage charter is derived from the above time 
series of freight rates by multiplying the individual monthly freight rates, 
expressed in S/ton of cargo terms, by the amount of cargo carried on the 
voyage. For the purposes of simplicity of calculation, this has been assumed 
to be equal to the deadweight tonnage of the ship which carries it . 
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Figure 8.1: Average Monthly Voyage Freight Rates of the Three 'Sample' 
Trades (1985-1988) 
$/ton USGC-JAP HR-JAP BR2-NWE 
Source: Lloyd's Shipping Economist 
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8.3.2 Cost Considerations 
In order to undertake some of the cost calculations made within this section 
it was necessary to obtain very specific route, charter and ship information 
on which to base certain of the assumptions made. Having decided on the 
three trades that would be analysed in detail, Mardata fixture reports were 
scrutinized for actual fixtures which corresponded to the three trades which 
are analysed herein. The details of the reported fixtures were then looked up 
in the appropriate editions of Lloyd's List. The fixtures which were randomly 
selected and deemed as being representative of the three sample trades were 
as follows: 
• USGC-JAP, Otientai King, 31,000t HSS, SI8.8O, FIO, 3 days/5 days, 
Apr. 1987. 
• HR-JAP, 55,000t, Pacer, Coal, S24, FIO, 5 days Shine, March 1988 
( N Y K ) . 
• Tubarao-Rtm, Dimitrios^ owner's option /rene, 125,000t, Iron Ore, 
34.90, FIO, 6 days Shine, Aug. 1-10 1988 (DiUingen). 
Performance and structural characteristics of each of the ships involved in 
these charters were then derived from their respective entries in Lloyd's Reg-
ister. These characteristics were compared to other similar sized ships in 
Lloyd*s Register in order to deduce their representativeness. It soon became 
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obvious that the Oriental King burned an excessive amount of fuel and could 
not, therefore, be regarded as representative of a handy-sized ship. Neverthe-
less, after some deliberation, it was decided that the characteristics of this 
ship should remain the basis upon which certain modelled cost estimates 
would be made. Clearly, one would expect such a ship to operate very un-
economically. However, this should be reflected in the results provided by 
the application of Modern Portfolio Theory. Consequently, should the results 
of applying the model serve to emphasize the uneconomic nature of this ship 
then this, in itself, validates the application of Modern Portfolio Theory. The 
necessary route, charter and ship characteristics which were determined in 
this way are summarized in Table 8.4 and are used in some of the later cost 
calculations. 
Voyage Costs 
Commissions This is the amount due to brokers and agents involved in 
negotiating the voyage charter. By contacting various people in the shipping 
industry, it was established that 2.5% of gross freight revenue would be a 
realistic figure to use. 
Fuel The total bunker or fuel cost is composed of the cost of heavy fuel 
oil plus the cost of diesel oil . These costs are dependent upon the respective 
prices of the different oils and on their consumption. Monthly prices of heavy 
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Table 8.4: Route, Charter and Ship Characteristics of the Three 'Sample 
Trades 
Route: USGC-JAP HR-JAP BRZ-N'WE 
Ship size: 30,000Dwt 55,000Dwt 120,000Dwt 
Cargo: Grain Coal Iron ore 
Proxy ship: Oriental King Pacer Dimilrios 
Actual Dwt: 36,138 61,737 129,882 
Single leg 
distance (nm): 9115 9504 5256 
Via Panama 
Canal; Yes Yes No 
Laden speed 
(knots): 14.5 15.0 15.5 
Laden Fuel Oil 
cons, ( t /day): 74.5 52.0 87.5 
Laden Diesel Oil 
cons, ( t /day): 4.5 3.0 5.25 
Loading time 
(days): 3 2 3 
Discharging time 
(days): 5 3 3 i 
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fuel oil and diesel oil (for USGC and Rotterdam) are itemized in Appendices 
H and I , but a plot of the price movements can be seen in the Figures 8.2 
and 8.3. For the purposes of this analysis i t is assumed that fuel for the 
USGC-JAP and HR-JAP voyages is purchased at USGC prices and fuel for 
the BRZ-NWE voyage is purchased at Rotterdam prices. 







The total heavy fuel oil consumption is obtained by multiplying the daily 
consumption rate by the total number of days at sea. The total number of 
days at sea is deduced by dividing the total voyage distance by the speed in 
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lias - it»% 
knots multiplied by 24 hours steaming in a day. Thus: 
TCHFO = ^ X CHFO PHFO 
Where: 
T^CHFO = The total cost of heavy fuel oi 
d = The single leg voyage distance in nautical miles, 
5 = The laden speed of the ship in knots, 
CHFO = The consumption rate of heavy fuel oil at sea in tonnes per day. 
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PHFO = The price per tonne of Heavy Fuel Oil . 
The total consumption of diesel oil is obtained by multiplying the at 
sea consumption rate by the number of days at sea and adding the in port 
consumption rate multiplied by the number of days in port. Thus: 
Where: 
TCDO = The total cost of diesel oil. 
d - The single leg voyage distance in nautical miles. 
s = The laden speed of the ship in knots. 
CoOa = The consumption rate of diesel oil at sea in tonnes per day. 
CoOp = The consumption rate of diesel oil in port in tonnes per day. 
Tp = The number of days in port. 
PDO = The price per tonne of diesel oil . 
Total bunker cost is simply the addition of the total cost of heavy fuel oil 
and the total cost of diesel oil . Thus: 
'^CFUCI = TCHFO + TCDO 
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Por t Charges Estimates of port costs were derived from the Lloyd's Ship-
ping Economist database. A summary of the port costs used can be seen in 
Table 8.5. 
Table 8.5: Port Costs for the Three 'Sample Trades 
USGC-JAP HR-JAP BRZ-NWE 
30,000Dwt 55,000Dwt 120,OOODwt 
Grain Coal Iron ore 
Jan 85-Jan 87: 335,750 347,625 3105,658 
Feb 87-Jan 88: 336,750 348,625 3135,342 
Feb 88-Dec 88: 336,750 348,625 3147,711 
As can be seen, port charges depend upon the size of the ship. However, 
they also vary depending upon the sort of ship and actual ports of call. 
Since precise data for the ports involved in the three 'sample' trades was 
unavailable, the charges of the ports shown in Table 8.6 were used as proxies. 




















Canal dues The USGC-JAP and HR-JAP trades involve passage through 
the Panama canal. Consequently, canal dues are payable. The magnitude 
of this cost depends upon the size of the ship and whether it is laden or in 
ballast. Lloyd's Shipping Economist provides quotes for laden 20,000 Dwt. 
and 60,000 Dwt. ships. The amounts to be paid as canal dues within this 
analysis are derived by simple arithmetic interpolation. They are 328,200 for 
USGC-JAP and S45,700 for HR-JAP. 
General Comments Gross voyage surplus is derived by subtracting all 
the above voyage costs from the gross freight revenue. In Appendices B and 
C, an additional item called net freight revenue refers to the amount after 
subtracting just commissions from the gross freight revenue. However, after 
arriving at a figure for gross voyage surplus it is then converted into a daily 
figure by dividing it by the number of days taken to undertake the voyage. 
Thus: 
GVS 
GVS/day = T - L Q 
' a x 24 
Where: 
GVS — The gross voyage surplus. 
Tp = The number of days in port. 
d = The single-leg voyage distance in nautical miles, 
5 = The speed of the ship in knots. 
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The actual number of days taken to complete the one-way voyages used 
within this analysis are USGC-JAP: 35 days, HR-JAP: 32 days and BRZ-
NVVE: 21 days. 
Opera t ing Costs 
Operating costs refer to the costs that are incurred whatever trade the ship 
is employed in. They are not specific to the voyage. They constitute the 
amalgamation of the following individual costs: 
Crew Cost which includes victuals, relieving and repatriation costs and, of 
course, the wages of the seafarers. 
Technical Cost which includes the costs of stores, supphes, luboil and run-
ning repairs and maintenance. 
Management &c Miscellaneous Cost which includes a management fee 
and the costs incurred in obtaining insurance and communications. 
The values which are used as estimations for the monthly operating costs of 
the three sample trades of this analysis are shown in Table 8.7. 
A daily operating cost is derived by dividing the monthly operating cost 
by 30.4375. Lloyd's Shipping Economist assumes that these costs are rele-
vant to ships registered under an open flag and operating with Indian officers 
and Korean ratings. In modern times the practice of flagging-out has become 
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Table 8.7: Operating Cost Estimates for the Three 'Sample' Trades 
USGC-JAP HR-JAP BRZ-NVVE 
30,000Dwt 55,000Dwt 120,000Dwt 
Grain Coal Iron ore 
1985 371,000 379,600 3100,700 
1986 372,100 379,000 3100,700 
1987 373,200 378,400 .3100,700 
1988 374,300 377,800 3100,700 
extremely common as a cost cutting exercise. Consequently, such assump-
tions cannot be regarded as unrealistic. Since the ships considered within 
this analysis are assumed to be constantly employed, it would seem illogical 
to make provision for drydocking. This omission can also be justified on 
the basis that such provision does not constitute an actual cash flow and, as 
such, should make no negative contribution to return on investment unti l the 
cost actually materializes. As long as the study maintains consistency, there 
should be no differential affects on the results. 
Cargo H a n d l i n g Costs 
Since all three trades considered within this analysis are operating under 
FIO (free in and out) charters, there are obviously no cargo handling costs 
to consider. 
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C a p i t a l Costs 
The value of capital costs depends upon factors such as: 
• The purchase price of the ship. 
• The sale price of the ship. 
• When the ship was purchased and when sold. 
• The arrangements made with regard to the financing of the purchase. 
Obviously, in order to determine some modelled values for capital costs, it is 
necessary to make certain assumptions concerning these factors. To this end. 
it is assumed, in order to maintain comparability, that all three ships were 
purchased in December 1983 and then sold in December 1988. The purchase 
and sale prices were deemed as being the average market price at the time of 
purchase and sale for the type and size of ship concerned. These values are 
summarized in Table 8.8. 
Table 8.8: Purchase and Sale Prices of the Three 'Sample' Ships (Smillion) 
30,0OODwt 55,000Dwt l20,000Dwt 
Purchase Price 
(Dec. 1983): 15.0 18.1 28.0 
Sale Price 
(Dec. 1988): 12.4 15.0 27.5 
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In order to simplify the calculations necessary for determining capital 
cost, it was decided that, rather than use the complicated 'LIBOR-i- ' financ-
ing system cis the basis of analysis, it would be more advantageous to use 
standard OECD financing terms. This system provides finance for 80% of 
the purchase price at 8% interest to be repaid in 17 equal semi-annual instal-
ments over 8^ years. Such an assumption is reasonably realistic since many 
ship purchases do actually meet the requirements necessary to obtain this 
financially advantageous package. Tables 8.9-8.11 show calculations of the 
total interest payable under OECD financial arrangements for each of the 
three ships over the five year holding period. 
Table 8.9: Interest Payable on 30,000 Dwt. Ship (Smillipn) 
Month Period Capital Capital Interest 
Outstanding Repaid Payable 
Dec 1983 0 12.00 0.00 0.00 
Jun 1984 1 11.29 0.71 0.48 
Dec 1984 2 10.59 0.71 0.45 
Jun 1985 3 9.88 0.71 0.42 
Dec 1985 4 9.18 0.71 0.40 
Jun 1986 5 8-47 0.71 0.37 
Dec 1986 6 7.76 0.71 0.34 
Jun 1987 7 7.06 0.71 0.31 
Dec 1987 8 6.35 ; 0.71 0.28 
Jun 1988 9 5.65 0.71 0.25 
Dec 1988 10 0.00 ' 5.65 0.23 
Total Interest: 3.53 
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Table 8.10: Interest Payable on 55,000 Dwt . Ship (Smi l l ion) 
M o n t h Period Cap i ta l Capi ta l Interest 
Outs tanding Repaid Payable 
Dec 1983 0 14.48 0.00 0.00 
Jun 1984 1 13.63 0.85 0.58 
Dec 1984 2 12.78 0.85 0.55 
Jun 1985 3 11.92 0.85 0.51 
Dec 1985 4 11.07 0.85 0.48 
Jun 1986 5 10.22 0.85 0.44 
Dec 1986 6 9.37 0.85 0.41 
Jun 1987 7 8.52 0.85 • 0.37 
Dec 1987 8 7.67 0.85 0.34 
Jun 1988 9 6-81 0.85 0.31 
Dec 1988 10 0.00 6.81 0.27 
Total Interest: 4.26 
Table 8.11: Interest Payable on 120,000 D w t . Ship (Smil l ion) 
M o n t h Period Capi ta l Cap i ta l Interest 
Outs tanding Repaid Payable 
Dec 1983 0 22.40 0.00 0.00 
Jun 1984 1 21.08 1.32 0.90 
Dec 1984 2 19.76 1.32 0.84 
Jun 1985 3 18.45 1.32 0.79 
Dec 1985 4 17.13 1.32 0.74 
Jun 1986 5 15.81 1.32 0-69 
Dec 1986 6 14.49 1.32 0.63 
Jun 1987 7 13.18 1.32 0.58 
Dec 1987 8 11.86 1.32 0.53 
Jun 1988 9 10.54 1.32 0.47 
Dec 1988 10 0.00 10.52 0.42 
Total Interest: 6.59 
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The to ta l capital cost for the whole five year holding period for each 
ship is calculated by summing the interest payable, the amount of capital 
outs tanding at the end of the period and the book loss/prof i t on sale. The 
resultant capital cost figures are shown in Table 8.4.2. 
Table 8.12: Cap i ta l Cost Summary 
Capi ta l cost 30,000 D w t . 55,000 D w t . 120,000 Dwt.-
Tota l : Sl l .OTm Sl3 .32m 316.31 
M o n t h l y : 5184,500 3222,000 3271,833 
Dai ly: S6,061-6 37,293.63 1 38,930.86 
The dai ly capital cost figures have been calculated by d iv id ing the mon th ly 
capital cost by 30.4375. A net dai ly p rof i t figure can now be obtained by 
subtract ing the dai ly operating cost and the dai ly capital cost f r om the dai ly 
gross voyage surplus. For the purpose of calculat ing return on investment, i t 
is this figure that constitutes re turn. Summing the to ta l dai ly costs provides 
the denominator for calculating re turn on investment. The subsequent value 
is then expressed as a percentage to give the dai ly re turn on investment . The 
month ly return on investment wi l l obviously be the same percentage figure. 
A complete summary of the whole 44-mori th period calculations for voyage 
charters is shown in Appendix B. How^ever, a plot of the resulting t ime series 
of returns on investment for each ship can be seen in Figure 8.4. 
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Figure 8.4: Est imated Average M o n t h l y Returns on Investment f r o m Voyage 
Charters (1985-1988) 
1 5 0 
Return on Investment (%) U S G C - J A P H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
1 0 0 H 
I t is interesting to note the generally poor levels of re turn which result 
f r om this analysis and also the fact that they have been improving over recent 
years. I t is also interesting to look at the levels of re turn on investment when 
capital costs are excluded. These can be seen in Figure 8.5. 
By comparing Figure 8.4 w i t h Figure 8.5, i t is clear that shipping, at least 
as far as the trades analysed herein are concerned, would be a reasonably 
profi table business i f i t were not for the astronomical ly high value of capital 
required to partake in that business. Consequently, the widely-held view in 
the indust ry that i t is capital charges and debt provision which are c r ipp l ing 
shipping would seem to be borne out by the results of this part of the analysis. 
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Figure 8.5: Est imated Average M o n t h l y Returns on Investment f r o m Voyage 
Charters Excluding Cap i t a l Costs (1985-1988) 
4 0 0 
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8.4 The Returns on Investment of Time Char 
ters 
8.4.1 Revenue Considerations 
The price or freight rate which pertains under a t ime charter is usually quoted 
in terms of S/day. The to ta l revenue is thus derived by m u l t i p l y i n g this 
figure by the length of t ime of the t ime charter. T h e month ly revenue which 
is implied f rom a t ime charter rate is usually at a discount to the equivalent 
voyage charter rate. One reason for this is tha t a t ime charter has an in -bu i l t 
premium in terms of security of prolonged employment . T i m e charters may 
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theoretically be of any length but by far the most usual durations are six 
months and a year. As has been seen in Chapter 7, another reason why t ime 
charter revenue cannot be direct ly compared to that derived f r o m voyage 
charters is that under a t ime charter the shipowner is not responsible for 
voyage costs. Natural ly , this is reflected in the f re ight rate that he obtains. 
The corollary of this is that the returns on investment f rom a t ime charter 
cannot be direct ly compared to those of a voyage charter where t ime charter 
revenue is based on a S/day freight rate. Instead, the prevail ing t ime charter 
rate needs to be converted to a S/ton of cargo basis so that direct comparisons 
w i t h voyage charters is possible. 
The formula which pernlits this conversion is given by: 
TjC rate per day X round voyage time + total voyage expenses 
cargo quantity in tons 
The original S/day t ime charter rates and the converted voyage equivalent 
rates can be seen in Appendices F and G respectively. A plot of the converted 
voyage equivalent rates in terms of S/ton of cargo can be seen in Figure 8.6. 
The revenue calculations now become direct ly comparable to those un-
dertaken in the analysis of voyage charters. 
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Figure 8.6: Average M o t h l y Voyage Equivalent T i m e Charter Freight Rates 
for the Three ^Sample' Trades (1985-1988) 
$ / t o n U S G C - J A P H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
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8.4.2 Cost Considerations 
I t is not necessary to go into too great a depth at this point w i t h regard 
to the cost estimates necessary under a t ime charter. Suffice i t to say that 
now the basis of the revenue calculations is S/ ton of cargo, the costs remain 
broadly calculated on the same basis as under voyage charter. Voyage costs 
need to be included because of the conversion previously undertaken and 
wi l l take exactly the same values as under a voyage charter. Commission is 
again calculated at 2.5% of gross freight revenue which, of course, w i l l now 
differ because of the different freight rate base being used. A i l the other 
cost assumptions and, indeed, values remain the same. Consequently, the 
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process of calculating return on investment of a t ime charter is ident ical to 
that of a voyage charter once the conversion to a s imilar revenue base has 
been performed. A complete set of figures used in the analysis together w i t h 
the results can be seen in Appendix C. However, a plot of the t ime series of 
returns on investment f rom the three trades ( inc luding and excluding capital 
costs) can be seen in Figures 8.7 and 8.8. 
Figure 8.7: Estimated Average M o n t h l y Returns on Investment f r o m T ime 
Charters (1985-1988) 
Return on .nvoatment (%) U S G C - J A P H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
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Figure 8.8: Est imated Average M o n t h l y Returns on Investment f r o m T i m e 
Charters Excluding Capi ta l Costs (1985-1988) 
1 2 0 
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8.5 The Return on Investment of Freight 
Futures 
The calculation of returns on investment f r o m freight futures contracts is 
extremely d i f f i cu l t . The method adopted in order to derive a pa t te rn of 
returns on investment through t ime is basically one of s imulat ion. The first 
th ing to consider is the mot iva t ion for the shipowner in playing the futures 
market . Since this work is concerned w i t h hedging in a por t fo l io context , i t 
would seem inappropriate for the simulated shipowner to be mot iva ted by 
speculative desires. The science or art of speculation lies beyond the bounds 
of an analysis based on op t imiz ing por t fo l io holdings since a speculator's 
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a t t i tude tends to be one of 'a l l or n o t h i n g \ Consequently, the first assumption 
that was made when developing the s imula t ion was that the shipowner player 
was mot ivated by the desire to hedge his physical contracts. 
This assumption obviously implies some f o r m of interrelat ionship between 
actions on the futures market and circumstances in the physical market . As 
was seen in Chapter 7, the nature of this interrelat ionship may take several 
forms. The simulat ion was begun by placing a theoretical hedging shipowner 
back in t ime to May 1985 when B I F F E X was in i t i a ted . The under lying 
philosophy of the s imulat ion was that the shipowner should make decisions, 
vis a vis the purchase or sale of freight futures contracts, which were logically 
consistent w i t h his circumstances in the physical market as t ime progressed. 
Some of the physical market factors which may affect the freight futures 
decisions of a hedger include: 
• Whether the trade which the shipowner is seeking to hedge is under 
voyage or t ime charter. 
• Whether the shipowner has any forward commitments or not. 
• the prevailing freight rate of the physical trade i n which the ship is 
involved. 
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8.5.1 Revenue Considerations 
Mathematical ly , the determinat ion of the revenue f rom freight futures con-
tracts is comparatively simple. I t is given by the equation: 
\RFF\={PO-Pc)x N 
Where: 
I R f f 1 = The absolute value of revenue f r o m freight futures contracts. 
Po = The price of the freight futures contracts at the t ime of opening the 
posit ion. 
Pc = The price of the freight futures at the t ime of closing out the posi t ion. 
= The number of contracts held and closed out . 
This equation constitutes a drastic overs impli f icat ion of the revenue calcu-
lations that are typical ly necessary when dealing w i t h freight futures in the 
real wor ld . I t results f r om the fact tha t the s imulat ion undertaken w i t h i n 
this work is based on an assumption of what is referred to as ' b l i n d ' hedg-
ing. A shipowner decides on his risk exposure and then a t tempts to hedge 
the f u l l amount on B I F F E X . He then lets the hedge run the whole course 
of i ts l ife as determined by the length of the physical contract he is involved 
in . The only t ime a shipowner w i l l re-hedge his physical posi t ion is where 
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a futures contract expires before the expira t ion of the physical risk. A true 
hedging strategy on B I F F E X is usually much more dynamic in nature in 
that the shipowner w i l l constantly revise his hedged position in line w i t h 
what is happening both in the physical market and in the futures market . 
Such a policy requires a degree of ski l l and the adopt ion of expectations of 
the fu ture which would be very d i f f i cu l t to simulate w i t h i n the context of this 
work. As a consequence, the ' b l i n d ' hedging strategy adopted in this work 
wi l l provide a pat tern of returns on freight futures investments which consti-
tute a m i n i m u m level of re turn. The implicat ions of this assumption w i l l be 
discussed in a later chapter once the results f r om the por t fo l io analysis have 
been discussed. 
For the purposes of calculating the returns f rom a ' b l i n d ' hedging strat-
egy, i t is assumed that the shipowner maintains to ta l f l ex ib i l i ty in choosing 
between operat ing the specific physical trade under a t ime charter or a voy-
age charter. I t is fur ther assumed that this decision should be based on 
whichever contract provides the highest freight rate in terms of the compa-
rable S/ton of cargo measure. Thus , a shipowner operat ing a 30,000 D w t . 
ship on USGC-JAP wi l l run under a voyage charter where the S/ton of cargo 
freight rate for a voyage charter is greater than the equivalent freight rate 
of a t ime charter. Under voyage charter, the shipowner is commi t t ed to the 
contract only for the length of t ime taken to make the voyage which in this 
example is 35 days. This shipowner is then free to again choose between 
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a time and a voyage charter for the next 35 day period. I f a shipowner 
chooses to operate under t ime charter, he is assumed to be commi t t ed to 
that contract for a period of 6 months, or approximate ly 5 voyages in this 
case, despite any improvement in voyage rates. 
A fu r ther assumption made in the runn ing of the B I F F E X hedging simu-
lat ion is that the hedger transacts only the nearest futures contract however 
short the length of t ime left to run on that contract . Thus , a shipowner 
involved in the USGC-JAP trade wi l l open a posi t ion on B I F F E X by trans-
acting the nearest futures contract. I f this contract expires before the com-
pletion of a 35 day voyage, he wi l l then re-hedge his posit ion on the new 
nearest futures contract . 
Remembering that a player on B I F F E X need not have bought previous to 
selling contracts, the price at the t ime of opening a posit ion may be the price 
at which contracts are bought or the price at which contracts are sold. The 
si tuat ion is analogous w i t h respect to the closing price. Thus , the calculation 
of the absolute value of revenue is simple (as shown in the equation above), 
but the calculation of revenue in its t rue f o r m depends upon the sign of the 
right hand side of the equation above and on whether the opening posit ion 
was a buy or sell. Where the closing price is higher than the opening price, 
then the sign of the right hand side of the equation above w i l l be positive. 
However, where the or iginal opening posit ion was a sell then the true revenue 
w i l l be negative. Where the opening posit ion was a buy then the true revenue 
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wi l l be positive. The converse is true for a s i tua t ion where the closing price 
is lower than the opening price. 
I t is clear that whether a shipowner buys or sells in opening a posit ion 
on B I F F E X is of v i t a l importance to the de te rmina t ion of revenue, at least 
insofar as i t effects the flow of funds either posit ively or negatively. Thus , the 
mot ivat ion behind the choice of either buy ing or selling is of overwhelming 
impor t . I t has been assumed for the purposes of the s imulat ion that this 
mot ivat ion is based on whether or not he holds any forward physical contracts 
which are deemed to start when his current contract is completed. The 
freight rate at which the forward contract w i l l be performed is assumed to 
be that prevciiling at the t ime of his wishing to open a position on B I F F E X . 
I f the shipowner concerned is t rading on B R Z - N W E at a rate of S5.3 per 
ton of cargo, then he is deemed to have locked in that rate for a subsequent 
forward contract due to begin in 21 days t ime after the complet ion of his 
current voyage contract. He hopes that the market rate at that t ime w i l l 
not be higher than S5.3 since he w i l l then have lost out by being commi t t ed 
to the forward contract . In an a t tempt to hedge against this possibility, he 
wi l l buy on B I F F E X . Conversely, i f a shipowner does not hold any forward 
contracts, he hopes that the market will rise in the in t e r im period while he 
completes his current contract but is a f ra id tha t i t w i l l fa l l . To hedge against 
this potent ial risk he wi l l sell futures contracts on B I F F E X . 
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The buy/sel l decision is thus completely prescribed by the existence or 
otherwise of forward contracts. The fact that the s imula t ion assumes ' b l i n d ' 
hedging means that ind iv idua l perceptions or expectations o f the fu tu re can 
be ignored. In the s imulat ion a random number generator, programmed to 
provide integer values on a un i fo rm interval between 0 and 1, was used in 
the determinat ion of whether or not forward contracts were held. 
I t has already been stated that revenue is a r i thmet ica l ly dependent on 
the prices pertaining at the t ime of the opening and closing positions and on 
whether the futures contracts were opening sale/closing purchase or open-
ing purchase/closing sale. However, the final factor in the de terminat ion of 
freight futures revenue is the number ( iV) of contracts that are transacted. 
This is entirely dependent on the level of risk exposure and is logically cal-
culated as follows: 
The price of the nearest futures contract at the t ime of opening a posit ion 
implies some fu ture freight rate. Where this price is less than the current 
value of the B F I , then a decline in the general level of d ry bulk freight rates 
is expected. The converse is true when the price of this futures contract is 
higher than the current level of the B F I . A precise expected fu tu re freight 
rate can be impl ied f r o m this price by relating the level of the B F I to the 
actual current physical freight rate and then relat ing the current level of the 
B F I to the futures price. I f a shipowner is cur ren t ly engaged in a contract 
which yields S17.5 per ton of cargo, the current value of the B F I is 1062 and 
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the current price of the nearest futures contract is 981 then an impl ied fu ture 
freight rate of 316.17 can be imputed f rom the figures as follows: 
981 
X 317.5 = 316.17 1062 
The level of expected fu tu re freight revenue can be deduced by m u l t i p l y i n g 
the impl ied fu ture freight rate by the cargo car ry ing capacity of the ship 
concerned. Thus, this shipowner seeking to hedge a 30,000 D w t . ship would 
expect to receive 3484,958 on a fu tu re forward contract . The level of risk 
which he faces in the in t e r im period is dependent upon how far the freight 
rate varies f rom this imp l i c i t predicted level. Since the predicted freight rate 
is derived purely f r o m the price of a freight futures contract , i t is necessary 
to determine the precise relationship between the movement in the physical 
freight rates of a part icular trade and the price movements on B I F F E X . This 
relationship is termed the 'Basis' risk and is calculated by comparing the 
vo la t i l i ty of a part icular trade freight rate w i t h that of the B F I . Mathemat i -
cally, this is achieved as follows: 
Basis Risk = 
Where: 
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(Tpfr = The standard deviat ion of a sample t ime series of physical freight 
rates for the trade considered. Th i s measures the vo la t i l i t y of those 
freight rates. 
—. 
X p f r = The mean of a t ime series o f physical freight rates. This divisor serves 
to standardize the units of vola t ih ty . 
o-b/i — The standard deviation of a sample t ime series of B F I values. This 
measures the vola t i l i ty of the B F I . 
Xbfi = The mean of a t ime series of B F I vadues. This divisor serves to stan-
dardize the units of vola t i l i ty . 
In statistical terms, this measure relates the coefficient of var iat ion of specific 
trade freight rates to the coefficient of var ia t ion of the B F I . T h e 'Basis' risk, 
therefore, measures relative volatiUty and is, therefore, aligned to measures 
of correlation. Where the basis risk is equal to uni ty , the freight rates of the 
trade considered have the same degree of vo la t ih ty as the B F I . Where the 
basis risk is greater than uni ty , the physical market exhibi ts greater vo la t i l i ty 
than the futures market and vice versa where the basis risk is less than unity. 
To ta l risk exposure is arrived at by m u l t i p l y i n g the i m p l i c i t l y expected fu tu re 
revenue by the basis risk of the trade considered. Basis risk estimates have, 
therefore, been calculated for the three trades considered in this study, under 
both voyage and t ime charter, so that risk exposure may be determined for all 
possible physical market circumstances. The results of those calculations are 
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given in Table 8.13 and are obviously derived f rom the database of physical 
market freight rates shown in Appendices E and G. 
Table 8.13: Basis Risk Estimates 
T y p e of USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 1 
Charter 30,000 D w t . 55,000 D w t . 120.000 D w t . 1 
Grain Coal Iron Ore 1 
Voyage Charter: 1.08 1.19 1.08 1 
T ime Charter: 0.60 0.71 0.65 I 
Thus, in the example being considered, expected revenue is S484.958 for a 
30,000 D w t . ship current ly on t ime charter, so the risk exposure is S484, 958 x 
0.6 = 3290,975. I t is this arnount that the shipowner wi l l seek to cover or 
hedge on B I F F E X . The current price of the nearest futures contract is 981 
which is valued at SlO per index point . Thus , one contract w i l l cost S9,810. 
Consequently, the to ta l number o f futures contracts necessary to hedge the 
current physical t ime charter contract is given by: 
N = = 29.66 = 30 Contracts 
S9810 
Because of the necessity for rounding, the shipowner w i l l in effect be hedging 
a risk exposure of 30 x S9,810 = 3294,300. As has been stated already, 
whether he buys or sells 30 contracts depends on whether or not he holds 
any fu ture forward contracts. 
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8.5.2 Cost Considerations 
Whether a hedger buys or sells freight futures contracts in opening a posi t ion, 
he is s t i l l deemed to have aiade an investment i n terms of the c o m m i t m e n t of 
resources, which in this case is money. The to ta l cost of the hedge is s imply 
the level of this investment. T h a t is, the number of contracts purchased or 
sold mul t ip l ied by the price at the t ime of opening a posit ion. T h e calcu-
lat ion of cost is, therefore, very much related to the calculat ion of revenue, 
since revenue actually direct ly depends upon the cost. In fact , the cost of in-
vestment in the theoretical example previously quoted is 8294,300. However, 
to this must be added a sum for broker's commission which is calculated as 
S30 per contract transacted. This to ta l is then used as the denominator for 
calculating the return on investment. 
The f u l l results of the s imulat ion used to generate returns on investment 
f rom freight futures contracts can be seen in Appendix D. I t is impor t an t 
to note that the t ime intervals used to calculate the profi ts and losses f rom 
freight futures contracts were dependent on the length of the voyage consid-
ered. Thus, all resulting profits/losses and investments had to be apport ioned 
on a month ly basis so as to finally arrive at a 44-period t ime series of returns 
on investment f rom freight futures. A plot of this t ime series relevant to the 
hedging of each of the three sample trades can be seen in Figure 8.9. 
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Figure 8.9: Est imated Average M o n t h l y Returns on Investment f rom Freight 
Futures Contracts (May 1985-Dec 1988) 
Roium on Investment (%) U S G C - J A P H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
8.6 Some General Observations on the Time 
Series of Returns on Investment 
The returns on investment for each possible ind iv idua l investment have 
now been determined. These ind iv idua l investments can be combined to form 
portfol ios. As has already been seen, the expected re turn f r o m a por t fo l io is 
derived f rom a simple calculation. Since this study concerns itself w i t h three 
possible ind iv idua l investments that may be included in the por t fo l io , then 
that calculation takes the fo rm: 
i = 1,2,3 




E[xp\ = The expected re turn f rom a por t fo l io of the three ind iv idua l invest-
ments. 
E[xx] = The expected return on investment f rom voyage charters. 
E[x2] = The expected return on investment f rom t ime chai'ters. 
£^[13] = The expected return on investment f rom freight futures contracts. 
pi = The propor t ion of the por t fo l io which is in the fo rm of voyage charters. 
p2 = The propor t ion of the portfoUo which is in the f o r m of t ime charters. 
P3 = The proport ion of the portfoHo which is in the fo rm of freight futures 
contracts. 
As Harr ington (1983) points out , the statist ical means of an historic t ime 
series of returns on investment are usually used as proxies for the expected 
returns on investment. The means of the ind iv idua l returns on investment 
as ccilculated herein are shown in Table 8.14. 
These mean returns on investment, act ing as proxies for expected return, 
can be combined to determine por t fo l io expected returns. For example, a 
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Table 8.14: The Ind iv idua l Mean Returns on Investment 
Individual Mean Return 
Investment on Investment 
USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 
30,000 D w t . 55,000 D w t . 120,000 D w t . 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
Voyage Charter -8-18 27.55 18.33 
T i m e Charter -22.02 -17.15 -13.81 
Freight Futures -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
por t fo l io for a 30,000 Dwt . ship t rading .USGC-JAP (gra in) composed of 
10% t ime charters, 10% freight futures and 80% voyage charters w i l l y ie ld an 
expected re turn on investment cis follows: 
(0.8 X - 8 . 1 8 ) - i - (0.1 X -22-02) (0.1 x -0 -02 ) = - 8 . 6 7 % 
Obviously, the expected returns of any por t fo l io mix can be s imply calculated 
in the same fashion. 
Several other conclusions can be d rawn f rom the analysis of returns on 
investment which has jus t been undertaken. Some are very interesting in 
their own right , but by vir tue of the fact that they coincide w i t h the market 
sentiment as expressed in trade journals , they also serve to j u s t i f y the results 
of the returns modell ing process in that they are logical. 
1. The fact that most of the returns on investment were negative, illus-
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trates the depression inherent in the d ry bulk shipping sector. However, 
analysis of the actual t ime series f r o m which these means were drawn 
shows that results have been improv ing over recent times. 
2. The previous point suggests that returns on investment move in parallel 
to freight rates given that f reight rates too have been improv ing in 
recent times. The proof of this conclusion lies w i t h the correlat ion of 
returns on investment w i t h the related freight rates. The results of 
such an exercise are provided in Table 8.15. 
Table 8.15: Correlations of Freight Rates w i t h Returns on Investment 
Type of USGC-JAP H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
Charter 30,000 D w t . 55,000 D w t . 120,000 D w t . 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
Voyage Charter 0.96 0.98 0.98 
T ime Charter 0.70 0.92 0.90 
The implicat ion of these high levels of correlat ion is that changes in the 
p ro f i t ab i l i ty of dry bulk shipping companies are almost ent i rely due to 
changes in the freight rates. 
3. Despite the previous point , the absolute levels o f p ro f i t ab i l i ty are most 
drastically effected by the level of capi ta l cost which is paid. Taking 
bo th these points together, i t is clear that there must exist a reason-
ably high freight rate which provides enough revenue to cover capital 
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charges. Thus , a break-even freight rate exists which is usually fa i r ly 
high. 
4. Over the period of analysis ( M a y 1985-Dec 1988) voyage charters have 
consistently outperformed t ime charters. This is probably due to the 
fact that the market has been consistently rising dur ing this period and 
shipowner expectations are, therefore, reasonably high. Charterers, on 
the other hand have been a t t empt ing to peg back the prices tha t they 
pay for t ransporta t ion so have not responded to this op t imis t i c view of 
the fu tu re by offering higher t ime charter rates. 
5. As far as the prof i tab i l i ty of ship size is concerned, the Panamax bulk 
carrier clearly outperforms the alternatives, at least under voyage char-
ter. The handy-sized market is extremely weak, while the Cape-sized 
market provides an unhappy med ium. Undoubtedly, the explanat ion 
of such results lies in the flexibility of the Panamax bulk carrier. This 
size ship is large enough to achieve economies of scale in cargo carrying 
so reducing the capital cost per ton of cargo carried, while at the same 
time is not that l imi ted w i t h respect to what trades i t may ply. 
6. The s imulat ion of a B I F F E X hedging strategy yields returns on invest-
ment for ai l three sample trades which are not s ignif icant ly diff'erent 
f r o m zero. This points to the accuracy of those estimates. Since the 
methodology adopted was based on the premise of ' b l i n d ' hedging, one 
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should not expect returns that are d i f ferent f r om zero. Each prof i t 
made on the B I F F E X simulat ion should match a loss in the physical 
market. The converse is true of losses made on B I F F E X . This supports 
the contention that B I F F E X does const i tu te a viable hedging medium 
and that freight futures returns can only improve i f an al ternat ive, 
more informed and more logical approach were adopted. Thus , zero 
returns consti tute the m i n i m u m level that would be achieved by an 
intelligent hedger. This is especially a t t rac t ive given the comparat ive 
level of returns f rom the physical market . 
7. Certain authorit ies, notably Gemmi l l (1985), suggest that t ime char-
ters cannot be effectively hedged on B I F F E X . The point above seems 
to mit igate against this view insofar as t ime charters were seemingly 
very successfully hedged using a *blind^ hedging policy. The benefits 
to be derived f rom using B I F F E X as a hedging medium are, as Gray 
(1986) points out, dependent upon the level of correlation between the 
freight rates of the trade for which a hedge is sought and the B F l . The 
apparent success achieved i n hedging t ime charters w i t h i n the simula-
t ion prompted an investigation of the correlations between the freight 
rates, both t ime and voyage, of the three sample trades and the B F I . 
The results are shown in Table 8.16. 
I t seems clear that a B I F F E X hedging policy is indeed possible for the 
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Table 8.16: Correlations of Voyage and T i m e Charter Freight Rates w i t h the 
B F I 
Type of USGC-JAP H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
Charter 30,000 Dwt- 55,000 D w t . 120,000 D w t . 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
Voyage Charter 0.98 0.97 .0.91 
T ime Charter 0.63 0.93 0.89 
t ime charters of at least two of the three trades considered. 
As has been seen, having deduced the t ime series of returns on investment 
for the three sample trades, i t is now easily possible to combine them in 
portfolios to assess the returns on investment f r o m the por t fo l io . However, 
they are also a prerequisite to the assessment of risk and i t is to this problem 
that the next chapter w i l l address itself. 
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Chapter 9 
The Mensuration of Risk in 
Dry Bulk Shipping 
One of the ma jo r explici t assumptions of Modern Por t fo l io Theory is that 
risk can be summarized by a measure of the variat ion of returns. In fact, as 
Ryan (1978p58) points out: 
"The theory of por t fo l io selection under conditions of risk can 
only be made operational by using a measurable concept of risk." 
I t has already been shown that , for computa t ional reasons, Modern Port-
folio Theory assumes this measure to be the variance or standard deviat ion 
of returns. The computat ional benefits of using either of these measures arise 
f rom the fact that the risk of a por t fo l io ( in terms of variance or standard de-
via t ion) can be deduced direct ly f r o m the risk of the ind iv idua l investments 
that compose that por t fo l io . Thus , in relation to this study, knowledge of 
the variance and standard deviat ion of the three ind iv idua l investments wi l l 
enable the generation of risk measures for any linear combinat ion of those 
281 
three investments as represented by a por t fo l io . 
Because of the mathematical properties of the al ternative risk measures 
which are examined in this chapter, such benefits are not always present. 
Knowledge of a part icular risk measure for the three ind iv idua l investments 
may not necessarily allow the deduct ion of a similar risk estimate for a port-
folio composed of the three ind iv idua l investments. The corol lary o f this is 
that , for some measures of risk, i t is necessary to assess its quan t i t a t ive value 
for each and every possible por t fo l io on an ind iv idua l basis. Th i s is done by 
deducing the t ime series of expected returns that would occur given a par-
t icular por t fo l io combinat ion and then observing the value of the par t icular 
risk measure. To i l lustrate how much work is involved in implement ing this 
process. Table 9.1 below shows the to ta l number of possible portfol ios (com-
posed of jus t three ind iv idua l investments) which would occur i f the holdings 
of each ind iv idua l investment w i t h i n those portfolios were constrained to 
10%, 5% and 1% 'chunks' of investment. 
Table 9.1: To ta l Number of Portfol ios Under Different Holding Constraints 
Percentage To ta l Number 




Obviously, where the amount of an ind iv idua l investment contained in a 
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port foho is to ta l ly unconstrained, then the possible number of portfol ios ap-
proaches in f in i t y . Because assessments of risk measures other than variance 
and standard deviat ion have to be undertaken on the basis of ind iv idua l port-
folios, i t is necessary to place a constraint on the 'chunk-size' o f investment 
holdings. For the sake of s implic i ty , i t was decided i n i t i a l l y that holdings 
of ind iv idua l investments w i t h i n portfol ios should be i n blocks o f 10%. The 
resulting 66 possible portfolios can be seen in Table 9.2. 
Table 9.2: Specification of the Possible Portfol ios Under a 10% Chunk-size 
Constraint 
Por t fol io Percentage of Percentage of Percentage of 
Identif ier Voyage Charters T i m e Charters Freight Futures 
1 0 0 LOO 
2 0 10 90 
3 0 20 80 
65 90 10 0 
66 .100 0 0 
Clearly, the assessment of risk measures other than variance and standard 
deviat ion is not possible wi thou t having detailed knowledge of the t ime series 
of returns for each ind iv idua l investment that may compose the por t fo l io . By 
linearly combining the three t ime series of returns on ind iv idua l investments, 
a t ime series of returns on investmerit for a par t icular por t fo l io may be de-
duced. As a consequence, the analysis undertaken in the previous chapter is 
always a prerequisite to risk analysis. W i t h these t ime series of returns on 
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indiv idual investments to hand, i t is now possible to evaluate the associated 
risk, whatever measure may be used. As has already been stated, this is 
a t tempted in i t i a l ly for portfolios where the three ind iv idua l investments are 
represented in 10% chunks. 
9.1 Variance and Standard Deviation as Mea-
sures of Risk 
I t has been emphasized that the variance f rom a por t fo l io of investments 
may be deduced automat ica l ly f r o m the variances of the ind iv idua l invest-
ments that compose that por t fo l io . T h e mathematical means by which this 
is achieved is given by the formula : 
i=ij=i 
In this formul 
Where: 
Covij = The covariance between the t ime series of returns on ind iv idua l 
investment i and those of ind iv idua l investment j. 
ai = The standard deviat ion of the t ime series of returns on investment i. 
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<Tj = The standard deviat ion of the t ime series of returns on investment j . 
pij = The correlation between the t ime series of returns on investment i and 
those of investment j . 
Bearing in mind that standard deviation = y / v a r i a n c e , the process of evalu-
ating the risk, as measured by variance, of a par t icular por t fo l io (o-^) becomes 
obvious. The inputs necessary in order to undertake such calculations are 
merely the variance of each ind iv idua l investment that may be included in the 
por t fol io , all the pairwise correlations between the t ime series of the different 
indiv idual investments and the proportions of each ind iv idua l investment in-
cluded in the por t fo l io . This in fo rmat ion for the three i n d i v i d u a l investments 
considered herein is shown in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. 
Table 9.3: Variance Data of the Ind iv idua l Investments 
Trade T y p e of Ind iv idua l Investment 
Voyage Charter T i m e Charter Freight Futures 
USGC-JAP 
30,000 D w t . 
Grain 
1047.17 133.35 71.70 
HR-JAP 
55,000 D w t . 
Coal 
2118.77 338.93 43.65 
B R Z - N W E 
120,000 D w t . 
I ron Ore 
1249.69 198.01 23.57 I 
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Table 9.4: Correlations Between the Returns f r o m the I n d i v i d u a l Investments 
Trade Pairs of Ind iv idua l Investments 
Voyage Charter 
/ T i m e Charter 
Voyage Charter 
/Fre ight Futures 
T i m e Charter 
/F re igh t Futures 
USGC-JAP 
30,000 D w t . 
Gra in 
0.905 -0.058 0.004 
HR-JAP 
55,000 D w t . 
Coal 
0.964 -0.004 -0.072 
B R Z - N W E 
120,000 Dwt . 
Iron Ore 
0.896 -0.012 -0.15 
The more variat ion there is i n a t ime series of returns on investment, 
then the greater is the range of possible results. Hence, the risk is greater 
since there is equal potent ial for returns which are a long way below average 
as there is for returns well above average. Consequently, larger values of 
variance are associated w i t h greater levels of risk. O n this basis, voyage 
charters are the most risky of the possible ind iv idua l investments and freight 
futures are the least risky. This is t rue of all three sample bulk market 
trades where variance is used as the measure of risk. I t has been shown 
in the previous chapter that the expected returns f rom each of the three 
indiv idual investments for each sample trade is as given in Table 9.5. 
When looking at the expected returns together w i t h the risk estimates 
of the different ind iv idua l investments, i t can be seen that , for the handy-
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Table 9.5: The Expected Returns of the Ind iv idua l Investments 
Individual Mean Return 
Investment on Investment 
USGC-JAP H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
30,000 D w t . 55,000 D w t . 120,000 D w t . 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
Voyage Charter -3.18 27.55 18.33 
T ime Charter -22.02 -17.15 -13.81 
Freight Futures -0.02 0.02 -0.01 
sized market, freight futures provide the investment w i t h the least risk and 
the greatest return. Logically, therefore, w i t h variance as the measure of 
risk, one would expect the risk averse investor to prefer to have his money 
in freight futures rather than in the physical market itself. This is a sad 
reflection on the general state o f that part icular market over the last few 
years. I n the other two sample trades, freight futures provide the median 
level of re turn for least risk while voyage charters y ie ld the biggest expected 
return for the greatest risk. This fits i n w i t h the typical r i s k / r e t u r n trade-off 
phenomenon expounded by authors such as Weston & Br igham (1979) and 
so provides support for the adoption of an approach to investment selection, 
such as that of Modern Por t fo l io Theory, where risk a t t i t ude is incorporated. 
By way of i l lus t ra t ing the calculation of por t fo l io risk, the portfoUo vari-
ance formula wi l l be used to calculate the variance of a por t fo l io for USGC-
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JAP composed totally of voyage charters. Thus; 
1=1 j= i 
an( 
Covij = (Tiajpij 
Let the subscripts 1,2,3 refer respectively to voyage charters, time charters 
and freight futures. Thus: 
Covu = v'1047.17 X vn:047.17 x 1.000 = 1047.17 
Coviz = \/1047.17 X \/l33.35 x 0.905 = 338.185 
Caviz = \/1047.17 x X / T T T O X -0.058 = -15.893 
Cov2i = Covi2 = 338.185 
Cav22 = \/l33.35 x v/l33.35 x 1.000 = 133.35 
Cov23 = N/133.35 X V / T T T O X 0.004 = 0.391 
Covai = Covi3 = -15.893 
C0V22 = C0V23 = 0.391 




i=i j= i 
3 
(TI = ^PiPlCoVii + PiP2C0Vi2 + PiPzC0Vi2 
= P\P\Covii + P1P2C0VX2 -r P1P2C0V12 
P2P\C0V2l + P2P2C0V22 + P2P2C0V23 - i-
P3P3C0U31 + PZP2C0VZ2 -f P3P2C0VZZ 
= (1)(1)(1047.17) + (1)(0)(338.185) + (1)(0)(-15.893) + 
(0)(1)(338.185) -f (0)(0)(133-35) + (0)(0)(0.391) ^ 
(0)(1)(-15.893) + (0)(0)(0.391) + (0)(0)(71.70) 
= 1047.17 
This truism, whereby the variance of a portfolio composed solely of voy-
age charters is equal to the variance of voyage charter returns, proves the 
mathematics involved in assessing portfolio variance. The mathematics is 
identical for any portfolio in that it is only the proportions of each individual 
investment that will vary while the covariances will always stay the same. 
By virtue of the fact that standard deviation = vvariance, the calcula-
tion of the standard deviation of a portfolio's returns is directly analogous to 
that outlined above for variance, except that the functional interrelationship 
between the two terms needs to be taken into account. The ordinality of the 
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results achieved under each measure will be exactly the same. A computer 
program for evaluating the expected return, variance and standard deviation 
of a portfolio was written in F O R T R A N 77 in order to ease the burden of 
calculation. The only inputs required for the running of the program are the 
expected return, standard deviation and pairwise correlations of the three 
individual investments that may be included in any portfoho combination. 
The program also requires a further input with respect to the 'chunk-size' 
constraint that is required of the portfolio. Remembering that it has been 
assumed initially that the individual investments must be held in blocks of 
10%, the program will generate portfolio expected return, variance and stan-
dard deviation for 66 possible combinations. A listing of the program can 
be seen in Appendix J and the results from the run based on this initial 
assumption can be seen in Appendix K. 
It has been emphasized in Chapter 6 that Modern Portfolio Theory uti-
lizes variance and/or standard deviation as the measure of risk because of the 
mathematical properties that have just been discussed. I t has also been men-
tioned that an implicit assumption behind their use as such a measure is the 
fact that the returns from the possible portfolios are normally distributed. 
Plots of the distribution of returns for each of the individual investments for 
each trade can be seen in Figures 9.1-9.9. 
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Figure 9.1: Distribution of Returns for USGC-JAP Voyage Charter 
Frequency 
Figure 9.2: Distribution of Returns for USGC-JAP Time Charter 
Frequency 
AO.^ ^^0.^ ^xO-Q .b.Q 0.^ 
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Figure 9.3: Distribution of Returns for USGC-JAP Freight Futures 
Frequency 
A*b-^  x^o.^  «b.^  NO.^  ^o.^  
Figure 9.4: Distribution of Returns for HR-JAP Voyage Charter 
Frequency 
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Figure 9.6: Distribution of Returns for HR-JAP Freight Futures 
Frequency 
-10.0 - 5 . 0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 
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Figure 9.7: Distribution of Returns for BRZ-NWE Voyage Charter 
Frequency 
10 
o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o o 
Figure 9.8: Distribution of Returns for BRZ-NWE Time Charter 
Frequency 
15 
l O H 
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Figure 9.9: Distribution of Returns for BRZ-NWE Freight Futures 
Frequency 
15.0 -10.0 - 5 . 0 0.0 5.0 10.0 
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It is clear that in almost all cases, the returns from the individual in-
vestments are roughly negatively skewed. When considering portfolio com-
binations of these investments, therefore, it is extremely unlikely that they 
will be normally distributed. This brings into question the validity of us-
ing variance or standard deviation as the measure of risk. This is due to 
the fact that these measures do not reflect the greater probabiHty of poor 
performance implied by the existence of negatively skewed distributions of 
returns. In effect, variance and standard deviation as measures of risk attach 
no differential importance whatsoever to levels of return which are below the 
average. 
Because of the functional relationship between variance and standard de-
viation, Markowitz (1952) points out that i t does not matter which measure 
is used since the final subjectively optimal portfolio as prescribed by Modern 
Portfolio Theory will be the same in either case. This is true only where 
the returns on investment being considered are normally distributed. Where 
they are not, as is apparently the situation in this study, the results will 
differ. Consequently, variance and standard deviation have been treated as 
two separate measures of risk for the purposes of this application of Mod-
ern Portfolio Theory. Should each measure result in differing subjectively 
optimal portfolios, then one may be justified in assuming that the returns 
on investment in dry bulk shipping are not, in fact, normally distributed. 
Should this prove to be the case, then the suitability of variance and stan-
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dard deviation as measures of risk can only be judged in comparison to the 
underlying nature of the alternatives and the results that such alternatives 
produce. 
9.2 The Interquartile Range as a Measure 
of Risk 
The use of the interquartile range as a measure of risk constitutes an at-
tempt to overcome the problems associated with those occasions when skewed 
returns are apparent. The calculation of interquartile range is undertaken as 
follows: 
1. The time series of returns on investment is ordered from its lowest value 
{RL) up to its highest value (RH)-
2. If the new ordered series has n values of return, then the first quartile 
{Qi) is given by the observation in the series starting from R^. 
The third quartile [Q^) is given by the (3a/4)"' observation. 
3. The interquartile range is defined by — Qi. 
The advantage of this measure of risk as compared to variance and standard 
deviation is that it is not mean dependent. The interquartile range gives the 
spread between the upper and lower limits of the middle 50% of observations 
irrespective of whether this range includes the mean or not. Variance and 
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standard deviation are derived from the calculation of distances away from 
the mean. For this reason, in cases where the distribution of returns is non-
normal, the interquartile range may be a more appropriate measure of the 
variation in those returns, since'proportionately more weight is attached to 
that part of the distribution where observations are most dense. 
Other measures of risk have been suggested which essentially achieve the 
same objective. That is, they do not rely on the assumption of the normality 
of the distribution of returns. Such alternatives include the semi-interquartile 
range which is merely half of the interquartile range and more controversially, 
the semi-variance which can be mathematically defined as: 
s v = j 2 { [ x i < x \ - x y 
Thus, this measure is similar to the calculation of variance except that only 
those observations which are below the mean for the series are taken into 
account. Undoubtedly, this measure of risk will lead to the choice of different 
subjectively optimed portfolios than would be the case if the interquartile 
range is used. Nevertheless, it does represent a measure of risk which is of 
the same family as the interquartile range. By virtue of the fact that the 
automating of its calculation is extremely difficult and since this study is 
aimed at deducing the most appropriate type of risk measure for inclusion 
in a Modern Portfolio Theory approach to the dry bulk shipping industry, 
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it has been decided to ignore its possible use in this analysis. Should the 
interquartile range prove to be the most viable method of risk assessment, 
this would suggest that, in general, measures of dispersion for non-normal 
distributions are the best type of risk estimate and that, therefore, the actual 
form that such an estimate takes should be further investigated. 
A major shortcoming in the use of the interquartile range as a proxy for 
risk lies with the practical consideration of its calculation for all possible 
portfolios. Unlike variance and standard deviation, the interquartile range of 
a portfolio cannot be calculated directly from the summary statistics of the 
individual investments that compose that portfolio. Consequently, for each 
possible portfolio, a time series of returns has to be derived in accordance 
with the laws governing the linear combination of the individual investments. 
Subsequent to this, the interquartile range has to be measured for each spe-
cific time series. For the purposes of this analysis, this was achieved by the 
incorporation of a 'do-loop' into a pre-programmed set of commands within 
M I N I T A B . 
The results of this analysis of the interquartile range of the 66 10% 'chunk-
size' portfolios for each of the three trades considered can be seen in full in 
Appendix L. However, a summary of the interquartile range risk estimates 
for the three individual investments can be seen in Table 9.6. 
These results can be compared to those achieved by using variance or stan-
dard deviation as the measure of risk. Obviously, the larger the interquartile 
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Table 9.6: The Interquartile Ranges of the Individual Investments 
Trade Type of Individual Investment 












55.00 28.00 5.703 
range, then the greater is the dispersion of returns and, therefore, the risk. 
Again, in all cases, voyage charters are assessed as being the most risky of the 
three individual investments, while freight futures are judged the least risky. 
One difference between the results provided by these alternative measures of 
risk is that under the variance and standard deviation measures, cape-size 
voyage charters are deemed more risky, in an absolute sense, than handy-
sized voyage charters. Similarly, freight futures transactions which attempt 
to hedge the handy-sized market incur more risk than futures transactions 
hedging the Panamax market. Where the interquartile range provides the 
measure of risk, these results are reversed. 
Because the application of Modern Portfolio Theory contained within this 
work bases itself on the determination of the subjectively optimal portfolio for 
each of the three sample trades individually, this disparity does not adversely 
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affect the analysis. As long as the ordinality of the results are consistent with 
respect to the individual investment, there is no necessity to explain such 
phenomena. However, the result is interesting when considered in isolation. 
Intuitively, one might expect the investments pertaining to larger ships and, 
therefore, to a greater commitment of resources, to exhibit more risk. Such 
a supposition might lead to the conclusion that the interquartile range is a 
better measure of risk than either variance or standard deviation. However, 
the logical basis of this notion does not extrapolate exactly to the other 
results achieved. 
9.3 Minimum Return as a Measure of Risk 
All the measures of risk considered thus far have been concerned with the 
dispersion of returns, albeit where those returns exhibit normal or skewed 
distributions. It may be, however, that what most worries investors is the 
worst possible result that could occur irrespective of how small its probability. 
It is for this reason that certain authorities have advocated the minimum level 
of possible return as an appropriate proxy for risk. 
Again, it is not possible to calculate the minimum level of return for each 
possible portfolio on the basis of the summary statistics of the individual 
investments. Consequently, a similar process to that undertaken in the cal-
culation of the interquartile range was instigated for the determination of 
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the minimum level of portfolio return. In the terminology used to illustrate 
the Ccdculation of the interquartile range, the minimum level of return from 
any portfolio is given by R[,. The results of these calculations for all the 
10% 'chunk-size' portfolios under each of the sample trades are shown in Ap-
pendix L, but a summary of the results for the three individual investments 
is shown in Table 9.7. 
Table 9.7: The Minimum Return of the Individual Investments 
Trade Type of Individual Investment 
Voyage Charter Time Charter Freight Futures 
USGC-JAP -46.91 -39.19 -16.86 
30,000 Dwt. 
Grain 
HR-JAP -30.86 -38.07 -10.51 
55,000 Dwt. 
Coal 
BRZ,-NWE -37.19 -32.94 -14.02 
120,000 Dwt. 
Iron Ore 
This measure of risk assesses the absolute lowest possible level of return 
that might be earned from a particular investment irrespective of the proba-
bility attached to that potential outcome. Obviously, the lower the minimum 
rate of return, the greater the risk. This measure provides results that are 
consistent with those of the alternative measures insofar as freight futures 
again provide the investment with the lowest level of risk across all trades. 
The major inconsistency when comparing the results derived from this mea-
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sure with those from the alternatives is that time charters for Panamax trades 
are assessed as being more risky than voyage charters. An analysis of cross-
trade results suggest that the handy-sized market is the most risky irrespec-
tive of contractucil arrangements, while the Panamax market is the least risky 
except when comparing time charter investments. The slight inconsistency 
in risk ranking across the individual investments when using this measure of 
risk is almost certainly attributable to the fact that certain of the minimum 
levels of- return might have associated probabilities of occurrence which are 
minute. These very small probabilities of achieving very low returns could 
well result in the distortion of the risk assessment process by virtue of the 
fact that investment decision makers might regard the attainability of such 
returns as being virtually impossible. 
9.4 A Capital Asset Pricing Model Estimate 
as a Measure of Risk 
When introducing Modern Portfolio Theory in Chapter 6, it was pointed 
out that the vast number of calculations necessary to operationalize the the-
ory has deterred many potential practical applications. Since the advent 
of improved computer technology over the last decade this is no longer the 
case. The methodology has grow^n in popularity since the hardware has been 
available for its successful implementation. The initial exposition of the the-
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ory, therefore, was ahead of its t ime. In an a t t empt to s i m p l i f y the or iginal 
Markowi tz Por t fo l io Theory, Sharpe (1963) devised what has become known 
as the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model . This model constitutes an impor tan t 
adjunct to the or iginal Modern Por t fol io Theory. 
Sharpe suggested that , rather than having to calculate the covariances 
between all pairs of ind iv idua l investments/assets that comprise the universal 
set, the applicat ion of the fundamenta l tenets of Modern Por t fo l io Theory 
could be greatly faci l i ta ted i f the returns f rom al l i nd iv idua l investments 
could be compared w i t h a single market index. For this reason, the Capi ta l 
Asset Pricing Model is o f ten referred to as a single-index model. As Rudd &c 
Rosenberg (I979p22) point out: 
"The central theme of the development of por t fo l io opt imiza-
t ion algori thms has been selective s impl i f i ca t ion of the problem 
and even approximations to the problem. This has been done 
chiefly for three reaisons: ease of exposi t ion, reduction of compu-
ta t ional cost and s impl i f ica t ion of use through a reduction in the 
complexity of inputs . A history of algori thms is thus a record of 
simplif ications and their explanation. These s implif icat ions have 
occurred in three forms. First , the problem has been s impl i f ied 
by deleting some of its salient features; as a leading instance of 
this, transaction costs have been assumed away. Second, the u t i l -
i t y func t ion has been simplif ied. T h i r d , the realistic model of 
variances and covariances o f security returns, a l lowing a ' f u l l co-
variance' mat r ix , has been simplif ied to the 'diagonal ' or 'single-
index* model." 
Because Sharpe was pr imar i ly concerned w i t h op t imiz ing the por t fo l io 
holdings of stocks and shares, he suggested tha t the S & P 500 would be 
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a suitable market index. Basically, this is the Amer ican equivalent of the 
F T Index. He advocated that the covariance between each possible indi -
vidual investment f r o m the universal set and the market index be measured 
and used instead of the pairwise covariance necessary in the more general 
Modern Por t fo l io Theory. I n effect, this means that the number of covari-
ance calculations for n ind iv idua l investments is reduced f r o m (n^ — n ) / 2 for 
the Markowi tz Por t fo l io Theory down to jus t n for the Cap i ta l Asset Pric-
ing Model . The potent ia l savings on computa t iona l t ime and effort can be 
imputed f rom Figure 9.10. 
Figure 9.10: The Input Requirements of the Markowi t z and Sharpe Models 
Inpu t Requirements 
/ F u l l M a r k o w i t z Model 
' Sharpe Model 
Asset Universe Size 
Source: Ryan (1973) 
The Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model can be applied to numerous areas of 
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interest i n financial economics. As El ton & Gruber (1979p3) suggest: 
"Capitci l asset pricing models are prominent ly discussed in 
most new texts, are being used by business firms in investment de-
cisions, and are f requent ly discussed in regulatory proceedings." 
This work concentrates on the potential appl icat ion of the Cap i ta l Asset 
Pricing Model to risk measurement. Before proceeding to the analysis nec-
essary to undertake such an appl icat ion, i t is advantageous to provide some 
insight into the nature of this model. 
The fundamental logic upon which Sharpe based the subs t i tu t ion of in-
vestment/market covariance for pairwise ind iv idua l investment covariance is 
as follows: Given that an investor is seeking to opt imize his por t fo l io hold-
ings, the very existence of that ' po r t fo l io ' , and the decision maker's desire to 
find i t , mitigates against the existence of specific risk w i t h i n the portfoUo. 
The only risk influence over the por t fo l io has to take the fo rm of systematic 
risk since the specific risk is, by def in i t ion , diversified away. Systematic risk 
is industry and economy wide. Thus, any index which reflects the state of the 
economy or indust ry concerned wi l l also reflect the prevalence of systematic 
risk. Systematic risk need not influence portfolios to the same extent as the 
general market , but a measurement of the covariance between the two wi l l 
show the relative impact of systematic risk. 
The Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model has another feature which difl'erentiates 
i t f r om Markowi tz Por t fo l io Theory, that being the inclusion of a new hy-
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pothetical ind iv idua l investment which is risk free. T h a t is, the covariance 
between i t and the market index is equal to zero as is the variance of its 
returns. The inclusion of this new asset has the affect of in t roduc ing a new 
efficient f ront ier in the form of a straight line known as the Capi ta l Market 
Line ( C M L ) . A graphical representation of the Cap i t a l Asset Pricing Model 
can be seen in Figure 9.11. 
Figure 9.11: The Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model 
Expected Return 
Risk 
Source: McLaney (l9S6) 
The C M L represents the new risk/ re turn trade-offs for efficient portfol ios. 
However, the Capi ta l Asset Pricing \ f o d e l can be derived mathematical ly to 
yield a relationship between the risk and re turn of individual securities that 
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compose the portfol ios. This relationship is given by: 
E[Ti]=rj + [ E [ r ^ \ - r j ) 
Where: 
E[Ti\ — The expected return f r o m an ind iv idua l security or investment i. 
rj = The risk free rate. 
E[rm] = The expected re turn f rom a por t fo l io conta ining every investment 
available in the market in proport ion to their respective presence in 
that market . 
Covim = The covariance of the returns f rom ind iv idua l investment i w i t h 
those of the market por t fo l io m. 
cr^ = The variance of the market returns. 
The term ^ ^ ' ^ in the above equation is of ten referred to as /3. Thus , the 
m 
Capital Asset Pricing Model is of ten specified as: 
£;[r.l = r / - h ( £ ; [ - r ^ j - rj)(3 
Since systematic risk, as has already been impl ied , embodies the way i n which 
the expected returns f r o m an asset or por t fo l io vary relative to the returns 
f rom the market por t fo l io , i t is clear that f3 represents an estimate of that 
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systematic risk. Since i t is assumed that there is no specific risk inherent in 
a por t fo l io holding, then /? represents the to ta l risk of a part icular por t fo l io . 
Por t fol io risk, as measured by its (3 value can be determined, in the same 
way as the expected re turn f rom a por t fo l io , by l inearly combining the ^ '^s of 
the ind iv idua l investments that compose the por t fo l io in propor t ion to their 
respective holdings. Thus: 
/3p = E Pi.3i 
i=l 
Where: 
0p ~ The P risk estimate of the por t fo l io . 
Pi = The .3 risk estimate of an ind iv idua l investment i. 
Pi = The propor t ion of the portfoho which contains the ind iv idua l invest-
ment i. 
I t is impor tan t to recognize that 0 may only provide a sensible measure 
of por t fo l io risk when the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model is adjudged to be 
appropriate for the applicat ion under consideration. Thus , the f u l l model 
needs to be tested for accuracy and then, i f the model is proved well-founded, 
exact 0 estimations can be made for each of the 66 10% 'chunk-size' portfolios 
that are current ly being considered w i t h i n this analysis. Should the model 
not be appropriate to the d ry bulk market , then i t cannot be assumed that 
the 0 estimate is a good proxy for risk. 
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In order to test the appropriateness of the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model , 
previous research has concentrated on convert ing the conceptual Capi ta l As-
set Pricing Model to what is known as a market model f o rm . In general, 
these market models can take any one of three forms: 
The general market model 
Rit = oci +0iiRmt)'+ eu 
The r isk-premium market model 
Rit - Rft = ai-\-0i{Rmt - Rft) ^ ei* 
The less-compact r i sk-premium market model 
Rit = ai^(3n{Rjt)-\-Pi2{Rmt) + e,-. 
Where: 
Rit = The re turn f rom indiv idual investment i at t ime t. 
Rmt = The return impl ied the value of some market proxy at t ime t. 
Rjt = The return f rom some investment that is used as a proxy for a risk 
free investment at t ime t. 
e,( = The error or residual of the model at t ime t. 
a,- = A n estimated intercept term. 
0i — A n estimated slope term. 
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Pil = A n estimated slope term. 
0i2 = A n estimated slope term. 
The purpose of converting the theoretical Cap i ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model to 
these market model forms is to permit the testing of the models using least 
squares linear regression techniques on historical sets of data. Whatever 
market model is tested, the results achieved should be direct ly comparable. 
The intercepts should be the same as should the 0 estimates. Th i s means that 
the fol lowing should a l l be equal: a,- i n the general market model, a; -I - Rjt 
in the r i sk-premium market model and a,- - i - 0ii{Rft) i n the less-compact 
r isk-premium model. 
The regression analyses that have been undertaken on this basis have 
invariably used the U.S. 3-month treasury b i l l rate as a proxy for the risk 
free rate and the impl ied rate of return f rom a relevant market index as a 
proxy for the market re turn. Since the po r t fo l io analysis undertaken w i t h i n 
this work concerns only investments made under the auspices of d ry bulk 
shipping, i t was decided that the most appropriate proxy for market return 
would be the rate of re turn implied by values of the B F I . From a t ime series 
of B F I values, the impl ied rates of re tu rn were derived f rom the fol lowing 
formula: 
The jus t i f i ca t ion for using B F I values as the basis of a market re turn proxy 
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is derived f rom the fact that there is no suitable al ternative shipping index 
which reflects solely the prosperity of the dry bulk sector. Also, as Moreby 
(1987) points out , this index is increasingly being used as the basis for setting 
prices for forward contractual commitments . Th i s suggests that the shipping 
indust ry itself accepts the B F I as an economic indicator of the d ry bulk 
trades. In common w i t h other similar analyses, this study uses the U.S. 
3-month treasury b i l l rate as the proxy for the risk free rate o f ' r e t u r n . 
The underlying principle of the market model forms, and indeed, the 
Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model itself, is that there is very nearly a clear linear 
relationship between the returns of an ind iv idua l investment and the returns 
f r o m the market. As a consequence, an exploratory data analysis can be 
undertaken, prior to testing the regression equations that are impl ied by 
the market model forms, by p lo t t i ng the appropriate historical t ime series 
representing the rate of return on ind iv idua l investments against an historical 
t ime series of market returns. To this end, dai ly B F I values were averaged 
over a calendar month for the 44-month period May 1985 to December 1988. 
These month ly averages were then converted to impl ied rates of re turn and 
plot ted against the fol lowing t ime series: Ru^ Ru — Rjt and Ru - Rji. The 
resulting plots were nearly all random in nature as can be seen in the example 
given in Figure 9.12. 
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Figure 9.12: Example of Test Plot for A p p l y i n g the Capi ta l .^sset Pr icing 
Model 
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• The random nature of these plots suggests that no real linear relation-
ship exists between the market re turn and the returns f r o m ind iv idua l invest-
ments. This would suggest, i n t u r n , that the Cap i ta l Asset Pricing Model can 
be considered inappropriate to the est imation of risk in d ry bulk shipping. In 
order to conf i rm this suspicion, each of the three forms of the market model 
were, i n fact, tested using regression analysis. The derived estimated models 
had very low values w i t h the max imum being 41.2%. For each type of 
investment in each trade, hypothesis tests were inst igated to deduce whether 
the estimated intercepts and 0 values were s ignif icant ly different f rom the 
mean value of the estimates of the intercept and 0 produced by the three 
market model forms. For example, USGC-JAP voyage charter rates of return 
were used in three regression models dictated by the three market models. 
This yielded estimates of Iij2,h,0\, 02 and 0^ where the subscripts relate to 
the three market models, the Ps relate to estimated intercepts and the 0^s to 
estimated values of ^ . They were then subjected to the fol lowing hypothesis 
tests: 
Ho-. Ii = ^^^^ t = 1,2,3 
: 0i = ^i±^±ii i = 1,2,3 
A t a 95% significance level, i n each of the result ing 18 sets of such hy-
pothesis tests at least one (and on 10 occasions t w o ) of the estimated values 
314 
were significantly diff'erent f r o m the mean value for a l l model forms. 
This constitutes overwhelming evidence that the three market model 
forms do not yield consistent results. I t is possible to conclude f rom this 
feature that the Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model , at least in these straightfor-
ward market model forms, does not provide an appropriate mechanism for 
the determinat ion of risk, as measured by .6, for the dry bulk shipping indus-
try . This conclusion conforms w i t h the view of Har r ing ton (1983p53) w i t h 
respect to its more general applicat ion: 
' 'Substantial evidence exists that something is basically wrong 
wi th the simple f o r m of the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model . No one 
piece of research is sufl iciently strong to allow us to reject the 
model ou t r igh t , but we should at least be skeptical of the model 
at this point ." 
It may be that some more complicated version of the market model, 
perhaps after a log-linear t ransformat ion, might provide useful risk estimates. 
However, this constitutes a potent ial ly massive area of research in its own 
right, which al though interesting and possibly profi table , is beyond the scope 
of this work. 
Having deduced that there is no useful appl icat ion of the Capi ta l .Asset 
Pricing Model to the determinat ion of risk estimates in the dry bulk shipping 
market, i t now remains to speculate on the possible reasons why this should 
be the case. There exist several potent ia l jus t i f ica t ions: 
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1. Regression analysis assumes that the variables w i t h i n the regression are 
normal ly d is t r ibuted . Bawa Sc Chakr in (1979p47) make the fo l lowing 
point w i th respect to the Cap i ta l Asset Pricing Model : 
" I t has been well known for some t ime that the approach 
is of l imi ted generality since i t is the o p t i m a l selection rule 
only i f investors have quadratic u t i l i t y funct ions or invest-
ment returns are normal ly d is t r ibuted . A r r o w (1971) and 
Hicks (1962) have pointed out that the assumption of quadrat ic 
u t i l i t y is highly implausible in that i t implies increasing ab-
solute risk aversion. Also, the assumption of normal ly dis-
t r ibu ted investment returns carries w i t h i t the unrealistic i m -
plication of un l imi ted l i ab i l i ty and rules out asymmetry or 
skewness in the probabi l i ty d i s t r ibu t ion of returns." 
I t has already been shown that normal d is t r ibut ions do not accrue f rom 
the time series of the rates o f return on the ind iv idua l investments used 
in this study. This factor suggests that some t rans format ion of the data 
may lead to a more appropriate market model which might fac i l i ta te 
the applicat ion of the Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model to d ry bulk ship-
ping. The v i t a l importance of the shape of the d i s t r i bu t i on o f returns 
is supported by the evidence of Cooley, Roenfeldt Modan i (1977) 
who, using Cluster Analysis, compared the s imi la r i ty of in fo rmat ion 
provided by different measures of risk. They found that measures of 
kurtosis and skewness provided in format ion that was dis t inct f r o m that 
of all other measures tested. Th i s points to the fact that non-normal 
returns may have an overwhelming influence on risk and its percep-
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t ion . A r d i t t i (1967) and Kraus & Litzenberger (1976), work ing inde-
pendently, have drawn the same conclusions f r o m their analyses based 
on different methodologies. 
2. A fu r the r assumption of regression analysis is that observations on a 
par t icular variable should be independent in a s ta t is t ical sense. K i n g 
(1966) found that this was very rarely true when dealing w i t h real data. 
One may conclude f r o m this that the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model may 
well be inappropriate to the explanation of the relationship between 
risk and return since i t is i m p l i c i t l y dependent on estimations based on 
regression analysis. Cull inane (1989), by applying the Box Jenkins 
(1970) approach to t ime series analysis, has found evidence that the 
B F I , used wi th in this study as a proxy for the market por t fo l io , does 
not exhibi t independent observations. In fact, the nature of the inter-
relationship between successive vaJues of the B F I was determined to 
be: 
BFIt = l.DoQBFlt.i - 0 . 5 5 6 5 F A _ 2 + 0 . 1 8 9 ( 5 F / , _ 3 - BFIt.^) 
3. The B F I might not be a very realistic proxy for market re turn . Since 
the B F I includes only voyage charters in its composi t ion, i t might not 
reflect the true state of d ry bulk shipping which must be effected by 
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the returns derived f rom t ime charters. 
4. The final and perhaps, most convincing, reason why the Cap i t a l Asset 
Pricing Model has proved inappropr ia te i n explaining the relationship 
between risk and return as i t exists w i t h i n this study, is due to the 
fact that one of the ind iv idua l investments that may be included in a 
por t fo l io relates to futures contracts. There is a large body of evidence, 
for example Wi l l i ams (1986) and Stein (1986), which suggests that 
the underlying assumptions of the Capi ta l Asset Pr ic ing Model are 
inappropriate to portfolios which include futures markets. 
The major cr i t ic ism which arises w i t h respect to this area, is the fact 
that estimates of market re turn are invar iably based on the preconcep-
t ion that a declining market index results in negative returns and vice 
versa. In futures markets, however, positive returns can accrue f r o m 
negative index or price movements. Th i s implies that futures market 
returns are not present in the market por t fo l io as represented by the 
B F I , even though this index underpins the actual freight futures mar-
ket. Obviously, this is due to the fact that in futures markets, unlike 
ordinary share markets, contracts can be sold previous to being pur-
chased. Al though this aspect does not n u l l i f y the val idi ty of the Cap i ta l 
Asset Pricing Model itself, i t does serve to invalidate the s impl i f ied tests 
of the model that are undertaken. 
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Dusak (1973) has found that the correlat ion between the U.S. futures 
markets and U.S. share prices is very close to zero. In itself, th is find-
ing suggests that returns f r o m futures should be included i n the market 
por t fo l io . However, Black (1976) points out that this is not possible 
since the aggregate posit ion in futures is always zero. Addi t iona l ly , 
Bodie &c Rosansky (1980) have found that by including futures con-
tracts in portfolios, i t is possible to reduce the standard devia t ion of 
the returns f rom those portfolios by between 13% and 19% wi thou t any 
reduction in the expected re turn . Here lies a ma jo r incongrui ty of the 
Capi ta l Asset Pricing Model since as Taylor (1986p202) points out: 
"Risk measurement is now d i f f i cu l t as zero covariance and 
a positive risk p remium are cont radic tory in the usual asset 
pricing f ramework." 
I n other words, this breaches a r igid assumption of the Cap i t a l As-
set Pricing Model in that i t is only the risk free rate which has zero 
covariance, but has an associated zero risk p remium. 
Having now assessed and quant i f ied various risk measures for the pos-
sible investment portfolios analysed w i t h i n this work, the ensuing chapter 
at tempts to integrate both risk and re turn measures to derive 'e f f ic ient ' port-
folios f rom which the o p t i m u m w i l l be chosen. The fol lowing chapter, there-
fore, serves to kni t together the various aspects of the analysis and to arrive 
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at a point where some conclusions may be drawn, 
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Chapter 10 
Selecting the Optimum 
Portfolio 
Thus far, this study has concerned itself with the collection, modelling 
and analysis of the data required as inputs to the Modern Portfolio Theory 
methodology. This chapter seeks to apply the model inherent in that theory 
as first developed by Markowitz (1952). The first stage in operationalizing 
the model involves the determination of the efficient frontiers for each type 
of risk attitude. It should be reiterated at this stage that the definition of 
'efficient' as used within this study is much more wide-ranging than that 
originally used by Markowitz (1952). That original study assumed that an 
'efficient' frontier existed only for the risk averse investor. This analysis 
redefines the term to include the possibility of an 'efficient' frontier for a risk 
prone investor. Consequently, whether or not a frontier is deemed efficient 
depends upon the risk attitude that is being applied to it. It should be borne 
in mind that the three possible risk attitudes are: 
Risk Aversion where the investor is willing to sacrifice some expected re-
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turn in order to reduce his risk. 
Risk Proneness where the investor is willing to sacrifice some expected 
return in order to increase his risk. 
Risk Neutrality where the investor does not care about the risk influence 
and so will merely select the option which provides the highest expected 
return. 
As was seen in Chapter 6 and in the analysis that followed, it is necessary 
that each portfolio considered can be totally and uniquely described by its 
expected return and its risk. This has now been achieved for all possible 
portfolios which are governed by the constraint that each holding of indi-
vidual investments within the portfolio should be in multiples of 10%. As 
a consequence, at this stage, the analysis is based on the consideration for 
investment selection of 66 possible portfolios within each trade. 
10.1 The Determination of the Efficient Fron-
tiers 
Because each possible portfolio within each trade can be uniquely de-
scribed by its level of expected return and level of risk, it is now possible to 
plot these portfolios in two-dimensioncil risk/return space. These plots will 
form the basis of a graphical determination of the portfolios that lie on effi-
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cient frontiers. Remembering that four measures of risk have been employed 
in the analysis, then for each of the three trades there exist four plots of 
expected return against risk (as measured by; variance, standard deviation, 
interquartile range and minimum level of return). 
10.1.1 U S G C - J A P , 30,000 Dwt., Grain 
Variance as the Measure of Risk 
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It can be seen in Figure LO.l that the efficient portfolios for a risk averse 
investor lie on the edge of the scattergram between portfolio A and portfolio 
B. In this case, they lie between the portfolio yielding minimum risk and the 
portfolio yielding maximum expected return. To the risk averse investor, all 
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portfolios along this edge are more efficient than all other alternatives since 
none of the others yield less risk for the same level of expected return or more 
expected return for the same level of risk. 
The efficient portfolios for a risk prone investor lie on the edge of the 
scattergram between portfolio A and portfolio C. That is, between the port-
folio yielding maximum expected return and the portfolio yielding maximum 
risk. No other portfolios provide more risk for the same level of expected 
return. Such an investor is "'logicaV to the extent that he prefers a greater 
expected return to less given the same level of risk and it can be seen that 
no portfolios provide greater expected return for the same level of risk than 
those on the efficient frontier. 
The risk neutral investor will obviously select portfolio A since this is the 
portfolio which provides maximum expected return. Implicitl}^ therefore, 
it is preferable to ignore the decisions made by risk neutral investors when 
an assumption of this analysis is that investment holdings are in multiples 
of 10%. At a later stage, the analysis will look at portfolios composed of 
individual investments which are held in multiples of 1%. This will provide 
much more accurate and, therefore, realistic investment decisions. The risk 
neutral investor will not change his decision criteria and will still select the 
portfolio yielding maximum expected return. Consequently, this analysis 
reserves its conclusion as to the portfolio chosen by a risk neutral investor 
until that later stage has been reached. 
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Standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk 
Figure 10.2: USGC-JAP: Scattergram of Standard Deviation Against Ex-
pected Return 
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As expected, by virtue of the fact that standard deviation = y/variance, 
this risk/return scattergram is very similar to that derived when variance 
is the measure of risk. Consequently, the portfolios lying on the efficient 
edge are analogous. A risk averse investor, for the same reasons outlined 
above, will select a portfolio between portfolio A and portfolio B. Similarly, 
a risk prone investor will invest on the edge of the scattergram lying between 
portfolio A and portfolio C. 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of R i sk 
Figure 10.3: USGC-JAP: Scattergram of Interquartile Range Against Ex-
pected Return 
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From Figure 10.3, it is clear that the use of the interquartile range as the 
measure of risk results in a different pattern of plots than the two previous 
measures discussed. In this case, there is no efficient frontier for the risk 
averse investor. This is due to the fact that portfolio A. provides the portfolio 
with the greatest expected return and the least risk. There is no need for 
a risk averse investor to select between portfolios since portfolio A uniquely 
satisfies all his criteria for investment. There are no other portfolios which 
yield a higher expected return for the same level of risk or less risk for the 
same level of expected return. Where holdings of individual investments 
within portfohos are constrained to 10% multiples, portfolio A constitutes 
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the optimum for a risk averse investor. 
Efficient portfolios for a risk prone investor lie on the edge of the scat-
tergram fcdling between portfolio A and portfolio B . That is, between the 
portfolio yielding maximum expected return and the portfolio yielding max-
imum risk. 
Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk 
Figure 10.4: USGC-JAP: Scattergram of Minimum Return Against Expected 
Return 
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Yet another pattern of plots in risk/return space is achieved by using the 
minimum level of return as a proxy for risk. The minimum level of return 
is different from the other measures of risk with respect to the fact that the 
smaller this minimum level of return, then the greater the risk. Since all 
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the minimum levels of return measured for the purposes of this study are 
less than zero, then the greater the absolute value of the negative minimum 
level of return, the greater the risk. This cispect must be borne in mind 
when inspecting plots of minimum level of return against expected return. It 
implies that there needs to be a slight shift in perspective when interpreting 
the plots. This new perspective becomes intuitively obvious when analysing 
Figure 10.4. 
.A risk averse investor will automatically choose to invest in portfolio 
A. This constitutes the only efficient portfolio in that there are no other 
portfolios that provide greater expected return for the same level of risk or 
less risk for the same level of expected return. Consequently, there exists no 
frontier as such, from which the risk averse investor must select a particular 
portfolio. 
A risk prone investor has an efficient frontier which lies between portfolio 
A and portfolio B. Again, these are the portfolios which yield maximum 
expected return and maximum risk. There are no portfolios which yield a 
higher expected return for the same level of risk or more risk for the same 
level of expected return than those that lie on the edge of the scattergram 
between these two points. 
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10.1.2 HR-JAP, 55,000 Dwt., Coal 
The analysis of the risk/return plots for the other two trades is analogous to 
that undertaken for the USGC-JAP trade. In an effort to avoid repetition 
of the explanations and arguments presented above, comments made with 
respect to the nature of the plots will be more succinct from this point on. 
Variance as the Measure of Risk 
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Risk averse investors will select portfolios which lie between portfolio A 
and portfolio B. Portfolios lying on this edge are deemed efficient. Risk prone 
investors will automatically select portfolio A since it provides maximum 
expected return and maximum risk. 
329 
standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk 
Figure 10.6: HR-JAP: Scattergram of Standard Deviation Against Expected 
Return 
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Again, this plot in risk/return space is similar to that where variance is 
the measure of risk. A risk averse investor has an efficient frontier which lies 
between portfolio A and portfolio B. Risk prone investors will automatically 
select portfolio A since it yields maximum expected return and maximum 
risk. 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of Risk 
Figure 10.7: HR-JAP: Scattergram of Interquartile Range Against Expected 
Return 
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The efficient frontier for a risk averse investor lies along the edge between 
portfolio .A and portfoho B. A risk prone investor has no efficient frontier 
since portfolio .A fulfils all his portfolio selection criteria. That is, this is the 
single portfolio w h^ich provides maximum expected return for maximum risk. 
Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk 
Adopting a slightly different perspective on Figure 10.8 than that adopted 
for the three previous plots, a risk averse investor will select a portfolio which 
lies on the edge of the scattergram between portfolio A and portfolio B. The 
efficient frontier for a risk prone investor is defined as the edge of the scatter 
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Figure 10.8: HR-JAP: Scattergram of Minimum Return Against Expected 
Return 
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l}'ing between portfolio A and portfoHo C. 
10.1.3 B R Z - N W E , 120,000 Dwt., Iron Ore 
Variance as the Measure of Risk 
The efficient frontier for a risk averse investor lies between the portfolio 
yielding minimum risk and the portfolio yielding maximum expected return. 
That is, between portfolio A and portfolio B. The risk prone investor chooses 
portfolio A because it has the greatest expected return for the greatest risk. 
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Standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk 
Figure 10.10 is again similar to that achieved when variance is the measure 
of risk. Consequently, the conclusions drawn vis a vis efficient frontiers are 
similar. The risk averse investor will choose a portfolio which lies on the 
edge of the scatter between portfolio A and portfolio B, while the risk prone 
investor automatically selects portfolio A because it provides both maximum 
risk and maximum expected return. 
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Figure 10.10: BRZ-NWE: Scattergram of Standard Deviation Against Ex-
pected Return 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of Risk 
The efficient frontier for a risk averse investor lies between portfolio and 
portfolio B. For a risk prone investor, the set of efficient portfolios contains 
only the single portfolio A since this portfolio contemporaneously provides 
maximum risk and maximum expected return. 
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Figure 10.11: BRZ-NVVE: Scattergram of Interquartile Range Against Ex-
pected Return 
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Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk 
As is seen from Figure 10.12, an unusual plot is achieved for minimum 
return as the level of risk. However, it is just as simple to interpret if one bears 
in mind the standard rules which govern the risk preferences of investors. 
Risk averse investors prefer a greater expected return for the same level of 
risk and less risk for the same level of expected return. Remembering also 
that the lower the level of minimum return, then the greater the risk, one 
can deduce that the efficient set of portfolios for a risk averse investor lies 
between portfolio A and portfolio B. The risk prone investor prefers greater 
expected return for the same level of risk and greater risk for the same level 
of expected return. Consequently, such an investor merely selects portfolio 
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Figure 10.12: BRZ-NVVE: Scattergram of M i n i m u m Return Against Ex-
pected Return 
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A since this provides max imum return and m a x i m u m risk. This por t fo l io 
constitutes a risk prone investor's sole eff icient por t fo l io . 
10.1.4 Comment on the Graphical Analysis of the Ef-
ficient Frontiers 
The circumstances where i t is necessary to deduce an efficient set of port-
folios (i.e. those containing more than one por t fo l io ) is clear f r o m the analysis 
that has just been undertaken. Where there is no necessity for deducing an 
efficient set, i t is a relatively simple task to iden t i fy the single o p t i m u m port-
folio that a particular investor wi l l automat ica l ly select. 
Under conditions where automatic por t fo l io selection has been the case, 
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the risk neutral investor wi l l always select the por t fo l io that yields m a x i m u m 
expected re turn , the risk prone investor w i l l always select the por t fo l io which 
yields max imum expected return because i t is the por t fo l io w i t h the maxi-
m u m risk, and the risk averse investor w i l l also always select the por t fo l io 
w i t h max imum expected return since this w i l l be the por t fo l io w i t h m i n i m u m 
risk. As a consequence of these characteristics, i t becomes a relatively simple 
task, for all types of investors, to select, f rom the database of all possible 
portfolios, the por t fo l io which yields the m a x i m u m expected re turn . 
Tables 10.1-10.3 summarize, on a per trade basis, the results of the pre-
vious graphical analysis. The tables highl ight those circumstances where i t 
is necessary to determine an efficient set of portfol ios before the analysis 
progresses any fur ther . 
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Table 10.1: USGC-JAP: Summary of Results Achieved f rom Graphical Anal-
ysis of Portfolios in Two-Dimensional R i s k / R e t u r n Space 
Measure Risk Need to Find 
of risk A t t i t u d e Eff ic ient Set 
Variance Averse Yes 
Neutra l No 
Prone Yes 
Standard Averse Yes 
Deviat ion Neut ra l No 
Prone Yes 
Interquar t i le Averse No 
Range Neut ra l No 
Prone Yes 
M i n i m u m Averse No 
Return Neut ra l No 
Prone les 
Table 10.2: H R - J A P : Summary of Results Achieved f rom Graphical Analysis 
of Portfolios in Two-Dimensional R i sk /Re tu rn Space 
Measure Risk Need to Find 
of risk A t t i t u d e Eff ic ient Set 
Variance Averse Yes 
Neutra l No 
Prone No 
Standard Averse Yes 
Deviat ion Neut ra l No 
Prone No 
Interquar t i le Averse \es 
Range Neutral No 
Prone No 
M i n i m u m Averse Yes 
Return Neutra l No 
Prone No 
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Table 10.3: B R Z - N W E : Summary of Results Achieved f r o m Graphical Anal-
ysis of PortfoHos in Two-Dimensional R i s k / R e t u r n Space 
^ieasure Risk Need to Find 
of risk A t t i t u d e Efficient Set 
Variance Averse Yes 
Neut ra l No 
Prone No 
Standard Averse Yes 
Deviation Neut ra l No 
Prone No 
[nterquart i le Averse Yes 
Range Neutra l No 
Prone No 
M i n i m u m Averse Yes 
Return Neutral No 
Prone No 
10.1.5 The Derivation of Approximations to the Ef-
ficient Frontiers 
Given that a particular investor can select a por t fo l io f rom an efficient 
set of possible portfolios, the actual choice is made on the basis of his risk 
a t t i tude . This is encapsulated in his u t i l i t y func t ion as derived in Chapter 5 
for risk averse and risk prone investors. In order that u t i l i t y funct ions, in their 
mathematical f o r m , can be applied to sets of efficient portfolios, i t is necessary 
to derive a mathematical def ini t ion of the portfol ios that are included in an 
efficient set. Consequently, the curve that delineates an efficient f ront ier 
needs to be mathematical ly modelled. 
Because at this stage of the analysis on ly 66 portfolios are being con-
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sidered, i t is a relatively simple task to deduce, via the scrut inizat ion of 
the r i sk / r e tu rn graphs, which of the 66 por t fol ios lie on an efficient f ront ier . 
These then comprise what has been referred to as the efficient set. Each port-
folio w i t h i n this efficient set is uniquely characterized by its level of expected 
return and level of risk (whatever measure is used for this purpose). Simi-
larly, each por t fo l io w i t h i n the efficient set can be uniquely ident i f ied by its 
percentage mix ( in multiples of 10% at this stage) of the different ind iv idua l 
investments. 
The process of mathematical ly model l ing each efficient f ront ier is based 
on finding a relationship between the risk of the portfolios included in the 
efficient set and their expected re turn . Since u t i l i t y is expressed as a func t ion 
of expected re turn , i t is necessary to mathemat ica l ly define risk also as a 
func t ion of expected return. This is achieved by the applicat ion o f linear 
regression analysis. This procedure is data driven and is based on a least 
squares methodology. The input data for the regression analysis w i l l be the 
{returTiyrisk) coordinates of the portfol ios that are included in the efficient 
set. The ou tpu t f rom the analysis w i l l take the general fo rm:" 
y = / ( x ) 
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Where: 
X = re turn . 
y = risk. 
Given that an efficient set of portfolios contains n portfolios that lie on the 
efficient edge of a r i sk / re tu rn scattergram, then each of them w i l l be defined 
by unique {return, risk) coordinates. There are thus n d is t inct values of 
return or x and n distinct values oi risk or y which consti tute the inputs to 
the regression analysis. The fact that the values are dist inct arises direct ly 
f rom the fact that the portfolios are eff icient . 
For each set of efficient portfolios, regression analysis produces an equa-
t ion which explains risk in terms of expected re turn . This equation wi l l be 
linear in its coefficients. The a im of the analysis is to produce analy t ica l ly 
tractable functions which have high explanatory power and yet remain in as 
simple a f o r m as possible. The degree of explanatory power is dependent 
on how well the resultant regression equation fits the data. This is assessed 
by summing the squares of the errors in predict ion. Hence, the t e rm ieas t 
squares', since the smaller this value, the smaller the errors produced and 
the more accurate the fitted equation. The explanatory power of a regression 
equation is summarized by the statist ic. Thus , the dual a im of the analysis 
is the maximiza t ion of and the min imiza t ion of the number of terms in 
the equation. 
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Stepwise regression analysis is a par t icular process for ins t igat ing this 
dual object ive of achieving high explanatory power and parsimony. Given 
the or iginal input data in f o r m , new inputs are provided by taking 
mathematical transforms of the x and y values. Stepwise regression, which 
is only usually viable w i t h i n a computerized environment , analyses the input 
data to produce regression equations which f u l f i l these requirements. Taking 
a dependent variable; either y or a t ransform of y, stepwise regression first of 
al l includes in the regression equation the independent variable, x or one of 
its transforms, which has the highest correlat ion w i t h the dependent variable 
being used. I t then continues by progressively adding in to the equation other 
independent variables on the basis of their correlat ion, after adjus tment for 
the variables already included in the equation, w i t h the dependent variable. 
The process ceases when the addi t ional explanatory power achieved does not 
j u s t i f y the consequential loss in parsimony. This is assessed on the basis of 
the i-statistics of each independent variable. Th i s statistic summarizes the 
significance of each variable in adding to the explanatory power of the overall 
regression equation. Stepwise regression and the statistics that i t employs 
are explained in most basic statistics texts such as that by Chatter jee &: Price 
(1977). 
For each set of efficient portfolios, therefore, the data shown in Table 10.4 
was entered in to M I N I T A B : 
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Since the data is cross-sectional, summary statistics relating to autocor-
relation are irrelevant. However, since regression analysis is based on the 
assumption of the observations being normal ly d is t r ibuted , i t is impor t an t 
that the residuals of each possible regression equation be analysed for nor-
mali ty. As a consequence, the regression equations selected as the 'best' 
approximations to the efficient frontiers for each s i tuat ion, are not neces-
sarily those w i t h the highest associated statist ic. Explanatory power, as 
measured by r^, has on occasion, been sacrificed in order to achieve more the-
oretically viable results. The f inal set of chosen equations, which are deemed 
to be representative approximations to the efficient frontiers that needed to 
be found, can be seen in Tables 10.5-10.7. 
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Table 10.5: USGC-JAP: Mathemat ica l Approx imat ions of the Eff ic ient Fron-




A t t i t u d e 






y = 83 -r 8.65x - i - 0.545x2 







y = 9.15 -h 0.515x -r 0.0295x2 
y = 7.69 + 1.35z -h 0.891x2 
98.2% 
99.4% 
Interquart i le 
Range 
Prone y = -4.71 - 6.12x -r 0.568x2 99.9% 
1 
M i n i m u m 
Return 
Prone y = -17.5 - 2.45x - 1.16x2 99.8% j 
' i 
1 
Table 10.6: H R - J A P : Mathemat ical Approx imat ions of the Efficient Frontiers 




A t t i t u d e 
Regression Equat ion for the 
Eff ic ient Frontier 
Value of 
•» r' 
Variance Averse y = 52.6 - 14.3x -!- 2.87x2 100.0% 
Standard 
Deviat ion 
Averse y = 8.65 -h 2.27x - 5 . 38v^ 99.9% 
Interquart i le 
Range 
Averse y = 16.0.+ 4.35x - V2.iy/i 100.0% 




y = -1.97 - 0.595X - 0.0134x2 




Table 10.7: B R Z - N W E : Mathemat ica l Approx imat ions of the Eff ic ien t Fron-




A t t i t u d e 
Regression Equat ion for the 
Eff ic ient Frontier 
Value of 
r2 
Variance Averse y = 22.7 + 0.791X -f 1.39x2 100-0% 
Standard 
Deviat ion 
Averse 2/ = 3.93 + 0 .766X+0 .0137x2 99.9% 
Interquart i le 
Range 
Averse y =z 5.67 -h 1.77x 0.045x2 99.7% 
M i n i m u m 
Return 
Averse y = -14.5 - 0.937X - 0.0129x2 99.8% 
As can be seen f r o m the exceptioncdly high values of obtained for each 
of these equations, there is clearly a very s t rong relationship between risk 
and return. This feature supports the theoretical tenet that the degree of 
risk increases as the expected re turn increases. 
10.2 The Portfolio Selection Procedure 
Having determined the efficient frontiers of the different sets of eff icient port-
folios, i t is now necessary to deduce where on those frontiers the investors' 
choices wi l l lie. As has been stated, this depends on their u t i l i t y func t ion . 
A n efficient frontier , which shall be denoted i 2 ( x ) , represents an in te rpo la t ing 
curve between a l l the true efficient por t fol ios w i t h i n a set. For a risk averse 
investor, for example, movement along that curve implies either a reduct ion 
in the level of expected return and in the risk or an increase in the level of 
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expected return but w i t h an associated increase in the level of risk assumed, 
depending upon which direction the investor is moving. The choice of a 
specific r i sk / r e tu rn trade-ofF is a mat ter for personal preference. 
The u t i l i t y func t ion U{x) represents these personal preferences. Impl ic -
i t ly , therefore, the actual investment por t fo l io selection is dependent upon the 
interact ion of these two conceptual and mathemat ical processes. In Chapter 
5, representative u t i l i t y functions for both risk averse and risk prone investors 
were derived. I t is the task of this analysis to now integrate those t w o u t i l i t y 
functions w i t h the efficient frontiers which have been derived in this chapter. 
Before proceeding w i t h the analysis, i t is necessary to re turn to a discus-
sion of the properties of u t i l i t y curves. Because they are derived f r o m cal-
culations based on index values, two extremely impor tan t properties which 
they exhibi t are: 
1. They are independent of sccde. 
2. They are independent of intercept. 
In the original derivation, u t i l i t y index values were associated w i t h choices 
relating to a probabilistic loss of S3m and a probabil ist ic prof i t of S30m. 
The attached u t i l i t y index values would be the same i f the values involved 
were jus t S3 and S30. The impor tan t feature is that the degree o f relative 
preference, impl ied by the u t i l i t y index values, is maintained. This obviously 
implies that the u t i l i t y curves that have been derived on the basis of the 
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original values can now be used w i t h any values, irrespective of the scale of 
those values or their units. A similar result can be imputed i f the u t i l i t y index 
values are varied. Tha t is, the extrema of the u t i l i t y index scale could equally 
well have been 0 and 1 rather than 0 and 100. I n fact, the extrema could 
take any values, since the u t i l i t y index only relates one outcome or opt ion 
relatively to another. Thus, the original u t i h t y curves can be applied to 
returns on investment, expressed as percentages, and to the range of returns 
on investment which are inherent in the data of this study. 
The fact that u t i l i t y curves are independent of intercept can easily be 
deduced f rom the fact that the same relative levels of u t i l i t y wou ld have 
been achieved had the extrema of the monetary values of the outcomes been 
SOm and S33m rather than -S3m and S30m. For example, the risk neutral 
a t t i tude towards the probabilistic outcomes of the u t i l i t y analysis wou ld be 
encapsulated in a u t i l i t y curve which is a straight line that passes through 
the point (-3,0). Had the lower ex t remum of the outcomes been SOm, then 
the same risk neutral a t t i tude , embodied in a straight line, would then pass 
through the point (0,0). The re la t iv i ty of al l probabihstic outcomes is main-
tained since the risk a t t i tude has remained constant, but the u t i l i t y func t ion 
now has a different intercept w i t h the y-axis. 
Wha t these features imply for this stage of the actual appl ica t ion of the 
Modern Por t fo l io Theory methodology, is that the u t i l i t y funct ions , as de-
rived in Chapter 5, can be applied direct ly to the magnitude and range of 
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the returns impl ic i t in the efficient f ront iers . However, because of the inde-
pendence of the intercept, there are in f in i t e u t i l i t y functions which can be 
superimposed over a plot of an efficient f ront ie r in r i sk / r e tu rn space. They 
are obtained simply by varying the value of the intercept. Th i s aspect is 
shown expl ic i t ly in Figure 10.13. 
Figure 10.13: The Interact ion o f the Efficient Frontier and an Investor 's 
U t i l i t y Curves 
Risk U t i l i t v 
- / 
Return 
There are many more u t i l i t y curves than those shown in Figure 10.13. 
In fact, they can go through any intercept as long as they remain parallel 
to each other. This is due to the fact tha t i t is only in that circumstance 
that they then represent exactly the same risk a t t i tude . The in te rpre ta t ion 
of Figure 10.13 is central to the fu r the r progression of the ana ly t ica l process. 
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As a consequence, i t is necessary to discuss i t in some detai l . 
The methodology implies a search for the interact ion of an investor's 
risk/return preferences, inherent in the u t i l i t y curves, w i t h the available in-
vestment opportunit ies imp l i c i t i n the eflricient f ront ier . Obviously, therefore, 
u t i l i t y curves (J\{x) and f /2 (x) are impossible in a pract ical sense since no 
investment opportunit ies are available at any point along them. I t only re-
mains, therefore, to observe the situations along U2{x) and U'4{x). 
The to ta l u t i l i t y derived on each of these curves increases as one moves 
along each of them f r o m bo t tom left to top r ight . This might suggest that 
por t fo l io C, ly ing on both the efficient f ront ier and U^{x)j is preferable to 
both por t fo l io A and por t fo l io B . This could be impl ied f r o m the fact that 
i t lies fur ther along its u t i l i t y curve and, therefore, has an associated higher 
to ta l u t i l i ty . I t can be seen that u t i l i t y curve (/^{x) cuts th rough the efficient 
f ront ier in two places. However, remembering that the efficient f ront ier rep-
resents merely the edge of al l the available portfolios, Lf4{x) passes through 
other portfolios between por t fo l io B and por t fo l io C. These other portfol ios 
are inefficient and are represented by the dots on the u t i l i t y curve. The 
u t i l i t y curve denoted by [/^{x)^ therefore, yields a number of possible port-
folio choices. This feature does not gel w i t h the general pr inciple of Modern 
Por t fo l io Theory that a unique solution is obtained. 
A l though por t fo l io C does y ie ld the highest to ta l u t i l i t y , this does not take 
in to account the cost incurred in achieving that high u t i l i t y . I n fact, i t is the 
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u t i l i t y curve denoted by £/3(x) that should be used for the der ivat ion of the 
op t ima l portfol io selection. The in teract ion of this curve w i t h the efficient 
f ront ier yields a single unique por t fo l io choice of por t foho A. This feature 
coincides w i t h the general principle of Modern Por t fo l io Theory. A l t h o u g h 
i t is clear that por t fo l io A accrues greater to ta l u t i l i t y than por t fo l io B , this 
cannot be used as the reason for its preference because i t is also clear that 
por t foho C accrues even greater to ta l u t i l i t y . The ju s t i f i ca t ion for preferring 
por t fo l io A to both por t foho B and portfoUo C lies w i t h the relationship 
between improving u t i f i t y at the cost of increasing risk. 
The efficient front ier is tangential to U^ix) at por t fo l io A . Th i s implies 
that at por t fol io A , the marginal risk is equal to the marginal u t i l i t y , or in 
mathematical terms: 
dR{x) _ dU{x) 
dx dx 
Using this mathematical property, i t is obvious that at portfoUo B: 
dR{x) dU{x) 
dx dx 
and at por t fol io C; 
dRiz) ^ dU{x) 
dx dx 
The te rm 'marginal ' in the context of economics relates to the rate o f change 
of a variable. Consequently, at por t fo l io B , the rate of change of risk is 
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less than the rate of change of utiUty. The opposite is t rue at po r t fo l io C. 
Wha t this means is that at por t fo l io B , a percentage change in risk w i l l lead 
to an even greater percentage change in u t i l i t y . A t por t fo l io C, however, a 
percentage change in risk w i l l lead to a smaller percentage change in u t i l i ty . 
The ul t imate conclusion that may be drawn f r o m these properties is that 
i f an investor has invested in por t fo l io B , he wi l l achieve greater u t i l i t y for 
only a small cost, i n terms of risk, as he moves along the efficient f ront ier to 
the right u n t i l he reaches por t fo l io .A. I f , on the other hand, an investor holds 
por t fo l io C, he sacrifices only small amounts of u t i l i t y in re turn for making 
large reductions in his risk by moving along the efficient f ront ier u n t i l he 
reaches portfoho A . A l l other portfolios that lie on U^ix), between por t fo l io 
B and por t fo l io -C , are not viable since they are inefficient and, therefore, 
other portfolios must exist which are preferred to these purely on the basis 
of risk and expected re turn . One may conclude f rom this analysis tha t port-
folio A is the subjectively o p t i m a l por t fo l io in this instance since i t matches 
investor preferences w i t h what is available. Consequently, if^i^) is the ap-
propriate u t i l i t y curve to consider because of the nature of its in teract ion 
w i t h the efficient f ront ier . One may deduce, therefore, that the means by 
which the subjectively op t ima l por t fo l io is determined is by solving for x the 
relationship given by: 
dR{x) _ dU{x) 
dx dx 
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The utility functions of risk averse and risk prone investors in the shipping 
industry, as derived in Chapter 5, are provided in Table 10 .8 . Taking these 
functions as U{x) and the equations of the efficient frontiers, provided in 
Tables 1 0 . 5 - 1 0 . 7 , as R{x), it is now possible to derive solutions to x such 
that = The mathematics involved for each situation covered by 
this analysis can be seen in the next few subsections. 
Table 10.8: Specification of the Utility Functions ( / { x ) in Shipping 
Risk Attitude Utility Function 
Risk Averse U{x) = - 9 . 9 6 -f 19. Vx -1- 3 .5 
Risk Prone U { x ) = 5 . 1 1 6 9 -h 1 .09494X -i- 0 . 0 5 3 3 6 1 x 2 
3 5 2 
10.2.1 U S G C - J A P , 30,000 Dwt., Grain 
Variance as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor Preferences 
U{x) = -9 .96 -i- 19. Wx + 3.5 
R{x) = 83 + 8.65z+0.545x2 
dUjx) . _ 9.55 
dx y/x+3.S 
^ = 8-65 + 1.09x 
dx dx 
9.55 8.65 + 1.09x 
?4225 = 74.8225 -f 1 8 . 8 5 7 x 1 . 8 8 1 x 2 
91.2025 = 74.8225x + 18.857x2 + 1.881x^+ 
3.5(74.8225 + 18.857x - 1.881x2 
Thus : 
0 = 1.881x2 + 23.01535x2 ^ 140.822x -f 170.67625 
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Variance as the Measure of Risk: Risk Prone Investor Preferences 
U{x) = 5.1169 + 1.09494X+ 0.053361X-
R{x) = 271 + 210X + 53.5x2 
^ = 1.09494 -r 0.I06722X 
ax 
^ = 210 -r 107x 
dx dx 
1.09494-h 0.106722x = 210 -r 107x 
-208.90506 = 106.89327X 
Th us 
X = -1.9543331 
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Standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = - 9 . 9 6 + i9.ly/x + 3.5 
R{x) = 9.15 + 0 . 5 1 5 X + 0 . 0 2 9 5 x 2 
dU{^. ^ 9.55 
dx v'x-r3.5 
^ = 0 . 5 1 5 + 0 . 0 5 9 X 
dx dx 
= 0.515 + 0.059Z 
= 0.265225 + 0.06077X + 0.0034811^ 
91.2025 = 0.2652251+ 0.06077z'-f 0.003481x^4-
3.5(0.265225 + 0.06077x + 0.0034811^] 
Thus : 
0 = 0.003481x3 + 0.073z='+ 0.4781 - 90.274 
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Standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk: Risk Prone Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = 5.1169 + 1.09494X + 0.053361x2 
R{x) = 7.69 + 1 .35x+ 0.891x2 
^ = 1.09494 + 0.106722X 
^ = 1.35 + 1-782X 
ax ax 
1.09494 + 0.106722X = 1.35 + 1.782x 
0.25506 = L 6 7 5 2 7 8 X 
Thus 
X = - 0 . 1 5 2 2 4 9 3 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of Risk: Risk Prone Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = 5 .1169 -f 1 .09494X 0.0.53361x2 
R{x) = - 4 . 7 1 - 6 . 1 2 X + 0.568x2 
dx = 1 .09494 + 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 1 
^ = - 6 . 1 2 + 1 .136X 
dx dx 
1.09494 -f 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 X = - 6 . 1 2 -i- 1 .136x 
7 .21494 = 1 .029278X 
Thu. 
x = 7 .01 
3 5 7 
Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk: Risk Prone Investor 
Preferences 
( / { x ) = 5 . 1 1 6 9 + 1.09494X + 0 .053361x2 
R{x) = - 1 7 . 5 - 2.45x - 1.16x2 
^ = 1 .09494 -^ 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 x 
^ = - 2 . 4 5 - 2 . 3 2 x 
dx dx 
1.09494 ^ 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 X = - 2 . 4 5 - 2 . 3 2 i 
3 . 5 4 4 9 4 = - 2 . 4 2 6 7 2 2 X 
Thus : 
X = - 1 . 4 6 0 8 
3 5 8 
10.2.2 H R - J A P , 55,000 Dwt., Coal 
Variance as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor Preferences 
U{x) - -9.96 + 19. Vx +3 .5 
R{x) = 52.6 - 14 .3x+ 2.87x=' 
dU(,x) _ 9.55 
dx y/x+3.5 
^ = -14.3 + 5.74Z 
dx dx 
^ = - 1 4 . 3 - f 5 . 7 4 x 
= 204.49 - 1 6 4 . 1 6 4 X -r 32.9476x2 
9 1 . 2 0 2 5 = 204.49x - 164.164x2 ^ 32.9476x2-f 
3.5(204.49 - 1 6 4 . 1 6 4 X + 32.9476x2 
Thus : 
0 = 32.9476x2 - 48.8474x2 - 3 7 0 . 0 8 4 x + 6 2 4 . 5 1 2 5 
3 5 9 
standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = - 9 . 9 6 + 19.1 s/x + 3.5 


















(x + 3.5)2.37445v/i 
(x -r 3.5)2.37445v/i 




2 . 2 7 v ^ - 2 . 6 9 5 
5.1529X - 12.2353v/^ ^ 7.263025 
X - 2.37445v^ + 1.4095 
\7.7x 
(7T3T5 + 1.4095 
(x-i-3.5)x-17.7x + l.-1095(j-r3.5) 
= X' 3.5x - 17.7x - r 1.4095X -f 4.93325 
= x2 - 12.7905X+ 4.93325 
= - 25.581x2 + 173.4635x2 - 126.19746x + 24.33' 
x-* - 31.219x3 + 133.9975x2 _ I95.26296x + 24.337 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = -9.96 + 19.1 vT+TS 












5 2 . 6 3 5 v / x 
5 2 . 6 3 5 v / i 
(x+3.5)52.635V; 
18.9225 
2 . 7 8 1 6 1 ( x + 3 . 5 ) x / 5 
2 . 7 8 1 6 1 ( x + 3 . 5 ) v ^ 
7 . 7 3 7 3 5 4 2 ( x -h 3.5)2x 
7 . 7 3 7 3 5 4 2 ( x 2 + 7 x + 1 2 . 2 5 ) x 
Thus 
4 . 3 5 -
4.35v^ - 6 . 0 5 
1 8 . 9 2 2 5 X - 5 2 . 6 3 5 v / i + 3 6 . 6 0 2 5 
= 1 8 . 9 2 2 5 X - f 3 6 . 6 0 2 5 - 91.2025X (^+3.5) 
_ (x+3.5)ia.9225i4-36.6Q25(x+3.5)-91.2025x 
= ( x + 3 .5 )x + i . 9 3 4 3 3 7 4 ( x ~ 3.5) - 4 . 8 1 9 8 x 
= x2 + 3.5x -h 1 . 9 3 4 3 3 7 4 X + 6 . 7 7 0 2 - 4 . 8 1 9 8 x 
= x2 + 0 . 6 1 4 5 3 7 4 X -1- 6 . 7 7 0 2 
= (x2 -h 0 . 6 1 4 5 3 7 4 X 6 . 7 7 0 2 ) ^ 
= x ^ + 1 . 2 2 9 x 3 - f 13.9181x2 + 8 . 3 2 1 0 8 2 2 x + 4 5 . 8 3 5 6 0 8 
0 = X-* - 6 . 5 0 8 4 x 3 - 40.2434x2 - 8 6 . 4 6 1 5 x + 4 5 . 8 3 5 6 
3 6 1 
Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = - 9 . 9 6 - h l 9 . l N / x - r 3.5 
R{x) = -1 .97 - 0.595X - 0.0134x2 
dU{x) _ 9.55 
dx v ' l —3.5 
= -0.595 - 0.0268X 
dU(x) _ dR{x) 
dx dx 
= -0.595 - 0.0268X 
= 0.354025 -h 0.031892X 4- 0.00071824x2 
91.2025 = 0.354025X + 0.031892x2 -f- 0.00071824x^4-
3.5[0.354025 ^ 0.03l892x -r 0.00071824x2] 
Thus : 
0 = 0.00071824x2 -h 0.0344058x2 + 0.465647x - 89.963412 
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Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk: Risk Prone Investor 
Preferences 
U { x ) = 5 . 1 1 6 9 + 1 . 0 9 4 9 4 x + 0 . 0 5 3 3 6 1 x ' 
R { x ) - - 3 5 . 4 + 0 . 1 6 Z - 0 . 0 0 0 1 5 3 x 2 
djHf) 
dx 
1 . 0 9 4 9 4 + 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 X 





1 . 0 9 4 9 4 -h 0 . 1 0 6 7 2 2 X = 0 . 1 6 - 0 . 0 0 0 3 0 6 x 
0 . 9 3 4 9 4 = - 0 . 1 0 7 0 2 8 X 
Thus : 
X = - 8 . 7 3 5 4 7 1 
3 6 3 
10.2.3 B R Z - N W E , 120,000 Dwt., Iron Ore 
Variance as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor Preferences 
U{x) = -9.96 + 19.1\/x + 3.5 
R{x) = 2 2 . 7 0 . 7 9 1 X - h 1.39x2 
dx v^i+3.5 
^ = 0.791-r 2.78x 
dU^ ^ d _ ^ 
dx dx 
9.55 
v'x + 3.5 0.791 -h2.78x 
= 0.625681 -^  4.39796x4- 7.7284x2 
91.2025 = 0.625681X + 4.39796x2 -h 7.7284x2 + 
3.5(0.625681 + 4.39796x 4- 7.7284x2j 
Thus : 
0 = 7.7284x2-h 31.44736x2 + 16.018541X - 89.012616 
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standard Deviation as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = - 9 - 9 6 + 1 9 . 1 \ / x - h 3.5 
R{x) = 3-93 + 0-766x-f 0.0137x2 
dU{x) _ 9.55 
dx y/x-r3.5 
^ = 0.766-f 0.0274X 
dUjx) _ dfl(x) 
dx ~ ~sr^  
= 0.766 -r 0.0274x 
= 0.5868 -TO.04198x-f 0.00075x2 
91.2025 = 0.5868X + 0.04198x2 ^ 0.00075x3-f 
3.5)0.5868 -h 0.04198X + 0.00075x2 
Thus : 
0 = 0.00075x2 0.044605x2 + 0.73345x - 89.1487 
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Interquartile Range as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U(x) = - 9 . 9 6 + 19.Vx +3.5 
R{x) = 5.67 + 1.77X+ 0.045x2 
dU(x) _ 9.55 
dx v'x+3.5 
^ = 1.77 + 0.09X 
dx dx 
9.55 
v'i + 3.5 
1.77 + 0.09X 
= 3.1329 + 0.3186X + 0.0081x2 
91.2025 = 3 .1329x+ 0.3186x2 + 0.0081x3 + 
3.5(3.1329 + 0.3186X + 0.0081x2) 
Thus : 
0 = 0.0081x3 _^ 0.34695x2 + 4.248x - 80.23735 
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Minimum Return as the Measure of Risk: Risk Averse Investor 
Preferences 
U{x) = - 9 . 9 6 + 19. Vx + 3 .5 
R{x) = - 1 4 . 5 - 0 . 9 3 7 X - 0 .0129x2 
dUjx) _ 9.55 
~ax"^ v/x + 3.5 
^ = - 0 . 9 3 7 - 0 . 0 2 5 8 X 
dx dx 
= -0.937 - 0.0258X 
= 0 . 8 7 8 - f 0 . 0 4 8 3 4 9 2 X -f- 0 . 0 0 0 6 6 5 6 4 x 2 
9 1 . 2 0 2 5 = 0 . 8 7 8 X + 0 . 0 4 8 3 4 9 2 x 2 4- 0 . 0 0 0 6 6 5 6 4 x 3 ^ 
3 . 5 ( 0 . 8 7 8 -{- 0 . 0 4 8 3 4 9 2 X - f 0 . 0 0 0 6 6 5 6 4 x 2 
Thus : 
0 = 0 . 0 0 0 6 6 5 6 4 x 3 0 . 0 5 0 6 7 9 x 2 + 1 . 0 4 7 2 2 X - 8 8 . 1 2 9 5 
From the above analysis, it is apparent that the optimal value of x can only 
be determined exactly on relatively few occasions. In most instances the final 
result is in the form of a polynomial in x . Each polynomial has a number 
of solutions to the value of i equal to the order of the polynomial. Thus, 
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a polynomial of degree 4 has four roots. This implies that there are four 
points of tangency between the two curves. Remember, of course, tha t the 
curves are merely mathematical approximations to the u t i l i t y f unc t i on and 
the efficient frontier . To al l intents and purposes, the only viable permissible 
roots to the polynomials must be contained w i t h i n , or be as close as possible 
to, the region of interest. This region is bounded by the smallest and high-
est values of expected re turn of the portfolios w i t h i n the efficient set being 
considered. Al though this greatly simplifies the problem, i t maintains real-
ism and makes a practical solution possible. A l though analyt ical methods, 
involving the appUcation of Galois Theory, do exist to determine the roots of 
these polynomials ( to give the required values of x) as i l lus t ra ted by Stewart 
(1973). i t is much simpler to solve for the roots of the polynomials using 
numerical methods. 
To this end, a F O R T R A N program (see Appendix M ) was w r i t t e n to 
locate a single root of a given polynomial by providing an in i t i a l rough esti-
mate of the root. This estimate should obviously be related to the interval 
of interest. Consequently, the mid-point of each interval of viable por t fo l io 
expected return for each efficient set const i tuted this in i t i a l value. Having 
located the nearest root to the mid-point value, the end-points of the interval 
of interest were then used as the in i t i a l estimates in order to check whether 
more than one root existed w i t h i n the interval . The specific root - t rapping 
a lgor i thm upon which the program was based was that of Newton's Divided 
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Difference method as described by Burden & Faires (1985). 
Before providing the results of the exercise, i t migh t be advantageous to 
» 
reiterate what exactly is t r y ing to be achieved. By solving the in i t i a l problem 
of: 
^ ^ ( x ) _ dR{x) 
dx dx 
. . . a value of x is determined. This value relates to the level of expected re-
tu rn achieved by a por t fo l io which the investor would choose, i n accordance 
w i t h his risk at t i tudes, given a range of alternatives. Consequently, this value 
of X is the expected re turn achieved by the subject ively op t ima l portfoUo. 
Obviously, for the investor to choose a remotely feasible por t fo l io , that value 
of expected re turn, denoted by x , must lie between the highest and lowest 
values of expected return derived f rom portfolios contained w i t h i n the effi-
cient set. By supplementing the values of x which were derived direct ly by 
solving the above equation, w i t h those derived f rom the solution of polyno-
mials, the values of i (expected re turn) for each s i tuat ion where the investor 
has an investment choice can be seen in Tables 10.9-10.11. 
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Table 10.9: USGC-JAP: The Level of Expected Return ( i ) of the Subjec-
tively O p t i m a l Por t fol io on Each Efficient Frontier 
Measure Risk Method of O p t i m a l Value 
of Risk A t t i t u d e Deduct ion of X 
Variance Averse Polynomial -1.592% 
Prone Direct -1.954% 
Standard Averse Polynomial 22.818% 
Deviat ion Prone Direct -0.15% 
Interquar t i le Prone Direct 7.01% 
Range 
M i n i m u m Prone Direct -1.4608% 
Return 
Table 10.10: H R - J A P : The Level of Expected Return ( x ) of the Subject ively 
Op t ima l Por t fo l io on Each Eff ic ient Frontier 
Measure Risk Me thod of O p t i m a l Value 
of Risk A t t i t u d e Deduction of X 
Variance Averse Polynomial 3.137% 
Standard Averse Polynomial 26.426% 
Deviat ion 
Interquart i le Averse Polynomial 10.895% 
Range 
M i n i m u m Averse Polynomial 35.131% 
Return Prone Direct -8.735% 
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Table i O . l l : B R Z - N W E : The Level of Expected Return ( x ) of the Subjec-
t ively O p t i m a l Por t fo l io on Each Efficient Frontier 
Measure Risk Method of O p t i m a l Value 
of Risk A t t i t u d e Deduction of X 
Variance Averse Polynomial 1.286% 
Standard Averse Polynomial 31.212% 
Deviat ion 
Interquar t i le Averse Polynomial 9.624% 
Range 
M i n i m u m Averse Polynomial 28.806% 
Return 
No reference has yet been made to whether or not these values of x (ex-
pected return) lie inside the interval of interest. For each set of efficient 
portfolios, the interval of interest lies between the lowest expected re turn 
provided by any por t foho in the set and the highest expected return pro-
vided by any por t foho in the set. The relevant intervals of interest for each 
circumstance can be seen in Table 10.12 and then compared to the derived 
op t imal values of x as shown in Tables 10.9-10.11. 
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Table 10.12: The Intervals of Interest of Each Eff ic ient Frontier 
Trade Measure Risk In te rva l of Interest 
of Risk A t t i t u d e Lower L i m i t Upper L i m i t 
U S G C - J A P Variance Averse -7.68% -1.6% 
Prone -6.25% -1.6% 
Standard Averse -7.68% -1.6% 
Deviat ion Prone -6.25% -1.6% 
Interquar t i le Prone -6.25% -1.6% 
Range • 
M i n i m u m Prone -6.25% -1-6% 
Return 
H R - J A P Variance Averse 0.28% 29.43% 
Standard Averse 0.28% 29.43% 
Deviat ion 
In terquar t i le Averse 2.15% 29.43% 
Range 
M i n i m u m Averse 10.33% 29.43% 
Return Prone -16.56% 29.43% 
B R Z - N W E Variance Averse -2 .41% 19.1% 
Standard Averse -2 .41% 19.1% 
Deviat ion 
In terquar t i le Averse -1.17% 19.1% 
Range 
M i n i m u m Averse -2 .41% 19 .1% 
Return 
By comparing the op t ima l values of x , as shown in Tables 10.9-10.11, to 
their associated intervals of interest, i t is clear that some of the x values lie 
outside the interval of interest. Since no portfol ios exist outside the in terval , 
then such a result can be deemed to imp ly either a desire to invest in the 
portfol io w i th the mciximum expected re tu rn (where x is greater than the 
upper l im i t of the interval of interest) or a desire to invest i n the por t fo l io 
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w i t h the min imum expected re turn (where x is less than the lower l i m i t of 
the intervaJ of interest). I n such instances, the ident i f ica t ion of the por t fo l io 
which exhibits such features is comparatively simple. However, where the 
derived value of x lies w i t h i n the interval of interest, i t is then necessary to 
precisely ident i fy the portfoUo which yields that expected re turn . 
For every derived value of x (expected re turn) that lies w i t h i n the appro-
priate interval of interest, there is an associated value of y ( r isk) which can be 
determined by subs t i tu t ing the x value back in to the equation o f the efficient 
frontier . Having done so, this yields the (x , y) coordinates of the subject ively 
op t imal portfol io. However, because the efficient f ront ier is merely a theo-
retical approximation of the relationship between risk and expected re turn 
which interpolates the levels of risk and expected re tu rn of actual real avail-
able portfolios, i t is highly probable that these coordinates do not actually 
relate to a real por t fo l io choice. Remembering that each por t fo l io is uniquely 
defined by its (return^ risk) coordinates, i t is now necessary to determine the 
real por t fol io choice which lies closest to the theoretically derived por t fo l io 
as defined by its (x , y) coordinates. This is easily achieved by the appl icat ion 
of coordinate geometry and, in part icular , by the appl icat ion of Pythagoras' 
Theorem. 
The distance between two coordinate locations denoted ( x i , y i ) and (x2 ,2 /2) 
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is derived f rom Pythagoras' Theorem and is given by; 
y ( x i - X 2 ) 2 + ( y i - 2 / 2 ) 2 
A graphical in terpreta t ion of this result is shown in Figure 10.14 below: 
Figure 10.14: Graphical Presentation of the M i n i m u m Distance Between T w o 
Points 
y/{xi - x.y + {yi - 2 / 2 ) = 
1 ( 2 / 1 - y 2 ) l 
(2:2,^2) 
l ( X l - X 2 ) | 
The distance between the modelled (x , y ) coordinates and the {return^ risk) 
coordinates of each of the real available portfol ios w i t h i n an efficient set can 
be determined using this formula . The m i n i m u m of these values w i l l show 
the real por t fo l io which is closest to the theoretical subject ively o p t i m a l port-
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folio and this then constitutes the por t fo l io that should be selected by the 
investor. 
The subject ively op t ima l portfol ios that are u l t imate ly derived by the 
appl icat ion of these various filtering techniques are defined in terms of 10% 
holdings of the indiv idual investments of which they are composed. Thus , the 
stage that the analysis has now reached, means that for every possible com-
binat ion of circumstance {vis a vis trade, measure of risk and risk a t t i t ude ) , 
there is a unique por t fo l io which is the subject ively op t ima l and is defined 
in terms of a 10% chunk-size. I f , for example, such an o p t i m a l por t fo l io is 
defined as 10% voyage charter, 10% t ime charter and 80% freight futures, 
then this por t fo l io is subjectively preferable to all others where the holdings 
of the ind iv idua l investments are defined in mult iples of 10%. 
I f the holdings of the ind iv idua l investments that compose this por t fo l io 
are allowed to be in multiples of 5%, then there may be a subject ively op t imal 
portfoUo which is preferable to that defined as above, but which is composed 
of 5% holdings. I t is clear, however, tha t i f such a por t fo l io should exist, 
the ind iv idua l investments that compose i t must fa l l w i t h i n the fol lowing 
ranges: voyage charters 0%-20%, t ime charters 0%-20% and freight futures 
70%-90%. I f the characteristics of the possible portfolios that f a l l w i th in 
this range constraint are now estimated ( that is, their expected re turn and 
associated risk according to the different measures), i t is then possible to 
re-apply the m i n i m u m distance technique to locate the subject ively opt imal 
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por t fo l io defined in terms of 5% holdings of the ind iv idua l investments. 
I f the subject ively op t imal por t fo l io is now found to be, for example, 15% 
voyage charters, 10% time charters and 75% freight futures, these values then 
provide constraints on the subject ively o p t i m a l por t fo l io where holdings of 
the ind iv idua l investments are in mult iples of 1%. In fact, the constraints 
would be: voyage charters 10%-20%, t ime charters 5%-15% and freight fu -
tures 70%-80'%. I f the process jus t out l ined is now repeated for portfolios 
composed of 1% holdings of the ind iv idua l investments,.the f ina l subject ively 
op t ima l por t fo l io for each circumstance is now more precisely defined in that 
the holdings of the ind iv idua l investments are to the nearest 1%. 
This i terat ive process allows the de terminat ion of a very accurate subjec-
tively op t ima l por t fo l io wi thout the need to become involved in the numerous 
calculations resulting f rom the consideration of a massive number of possi-
ble portfol ios. Performing the above analysis finally results in the selection 
of the subject ively op t imal portfoHos defined in Tables 10.13-10.15 for each 
circumstance vis a vis trade, measure of risk and a t t i tude towards risk. 
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Table 10.13: USGC-JAP: Subjectively O p t i m a l Por t fo l io Selections 
Por t fo l io 
Measure Risk holdings Expected Coefficient 






re turn of risk 
Variance Averse 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 71.74 
Prone 5% 1% 94% -2.04% 64.87 
Neut ra l 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 71.74 
Standard Averse 0% 0% 100% - i . 6 % 8.47 
Deviation Prone 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 8.47 
Neut ra l 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 8.47 
Interquart i le Averse 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 7.28 
Range Prone 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 7.28 
Neutral 0% 0% 100% -1.6% 7.28 
M i n i m u m .Averse 0% 0% 100% -1.6% -16.86 
Return Prone 0% 0% 100% -1.6% -16.86 
Neutra l 0% 0% 100% -1.6% -16.86 
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Table 10.14: HR-JAP: Subjectively O p t i m a l Por t fo l io Selections 
Por t fo l io 1 
Measure Risk holdings 1 Expected Coefficient 
of Elisk A t t i t u d e Voyage Time Freight j 
return of risk 
charters charters futures 1 
Variance Averse 0% 9% 9 1 % i 0.47% 37.49 
Prone 100% 0% 0% ! 29.43% 2118.76 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 29.43% 2118.76 
Standard Averse 89% 0% 11% 1 26.43% 40.97 
Deviat ion Prone 100% 0% 0% 1 29.43% 46.03 
Neutral 100% 0% 0% I 29.43% 46.03 
Interquart i le Averse 32% 0% 68% ; 10.88% 23.39 
Range Prone 100% 0% 0% j 29.43% 78.28 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 1 29.43% 78.28 
M i n i m u m Averse 100% 0% 0% 1 29.43% -30.86 
Return Prone 17% 83% 0% -8.74% -36.819 
Neutral 100% 0% 0% I 29.43% -30-86 
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Table 10.15: B R Z - N W E : Subjectively O p t i m a l Por t fo l io Selections 
Por t fo l io 
Measure Risk holdings 
of Risk A t t i t u d e Voyage Time Freight Expected Coefficient 
charters charters futures re turn of risk 
Variance Averse 12% 1% 87% 1.14% 25.99 
Prone 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 545.22 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 545.22 
Standard Averse 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 23.35 ; 
Deviation Prone 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 23.35 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 23.35 
Interquart i le Averse 53% 0% 47% 9.57% 26.73 ; 
Range Prone 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 55.0 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 19.1% 55.0 
M i n i m u m Averse 100% 0% 0% 19.1% -37.19 i 
Return Prone 100% 0% 0% 19.1% -37.19 
Neutra l 100% 0% 0% 19.1% -37.19 
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The objective of the analysis having been achieved, the results presented 
in Tables 10.13-10.15 represent the portfolios which shipowners in the dry 
bulk shipping market should seek to hold i f their ob jec t ive is to maximize 
their u t i l i t y w i t h respect to the potent ial trade-offs between risk and ex-
pected re turn . Clearly, the actual subjectively o p t i m a l por t fo l io for a given 
shipowner depends upon how he perceives and, therefore, measures risk. The 
following chapter concludes this study by discussing this aspect and other 
specific issues raised by the results and the methodology used to achieve 
those results. Similarly, i t also provides a general perspective on the ap-
plication of Modern Por t fo l io Theory to market investment decisions and 
discusses the implications for shipping in general and shipowners specifically. 
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Chapter 11 
Conclusions and Further 
Research 
11.1 Comment on Results Achieved 
The results achieved for the three sample trades considered w i t h i n this study 
are presented in Tables 10.13-10.15 on the previous few pages. The results 
for the USGC-JAP, 30.000 D w t . , grain trade are interesting because Mod-
ern Por t fol io Theory recommends an almost exclusive investment i n freight 
futures rather than in the physical market . In fact , the one exception to 
this result is a statistical ' f luke ' since the por t fo l io which is chosen for a risk 
prone investor where variance is the measure of risk yields less re turn and 
less risk than the standard choice. This is entirely i l logical for a risk prone 
investor since he is only wi l l i ng to sacrifice expected returns for more risk. 
This incongruity is the result of using a quadratic u t i l i t y func t ion as an ap-
proximat ion to an investor's risk preferences. The disadvantages of using 
this fo rm of funct ion have been theoretically discussed i n Chapter 4, but this 
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result now provides practical evidence of its shortcomings. 
Apar t f r om this single outl ier , the methodology of Modern Por t fo l io The-
ory recommends a 100% investment in freight futures in this trade, for all 
types of investor despite the measure of risk adopted. Because the risk neu-
t r a l investor prefers this por t fo l io , i t must yie ld the highest re turn of all the 
portfol ios considered. Depending on the measure of risk, this por t fo l io must 
also represent either the por t fo l io w i t h m i n i m u m risk thus a t t rac t ing the risk 
averse investor, or the por t fo l io w i t h m a x i m u m risk thus a t t rac t ing the risk 
prone investor. Where these circumstances are not fu l f i l l ed , then one can 
only deduce that this por t fo l io is selected because either; 
1. For the risk averse investor, the reduction in revenue, brought about 
by part ia l ly investing i n the physical market , is so great that i t cannot 
be made up for by the only marginal reduction in the level of risk, or; 
2. For the risk prone investor, the reduction i n revenue, brought about by 
part ia l ly investing in the physical market , is so great that i t cannot be 
made up for by the only marginal increase in the level of risk. 
I f i t is assumed that this sample trade ( U S G C - J A P ) is representative of 
the handy-sized market, the results const i tute a sad reflection on the state of 
that market . Because of the importance of this trade, as shown in Chapter 
8, this would seem to be a fair assumption. Since the returns on freight 
futures were derived f r o m the assumption of a ' b l i n d ' hedging policy, there 
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is obvious scope for improvement by implement ing some f o r m of strategy 
where futures prof i t becomes an objec t ive rather than a happy coincidence. 
This aspect, together w i t h the results achieved in the analysis, suggest that 
shipowners would be better of f i n the short- term selling their handy-sized 
ships and merely speculating on B I F F E X . 
When inspecting the results for the H R - J A P coal trade, i t is clear that 
apart f r o m the case where m i n i m u m return is the measure of risk employed, 
then the risk prone and risk neut ia l investors prefer to operate under voy-
age charter. I t is entirely logical that the results imp ly that the risk averse 
investor prefers to hedge his investment in the physical market usually by 
investment in freight futures. This aspect suggests that B I F F E X theoreti-
cally succeeds in fu l f i l l i ng its purpose, at least insofar as the results suggest 
that i t provides a worthwhi le hedging mechanism for the risk averse investor 
involved in the Panamax market . This result is especially per t inent given 
that B I F F E X is of ten crit icized as leaning too heavily towards the Panamax 
trades. In al l cases, the portfolios selected by the risk averse investor are 
logical i n that they sacrifice expected return for a reduction in the level of 
risk which they face. In general, however, the results reflect the relatively 
healthy state of the Panamax spot market . 
Where the m i n i m u m level of re turn is used as. a measure of risk, i t is the 
risk prone investor who prefers to invest in a mix of t ime charters and voyage 
charters in order to increase the level of risk which he faces in re turn for a 
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sacrifice in the level of expected return. This sacrifice is undertaken to such 
an extent that he actually prefers to face a negative expected return for the 
small chance of making a large actual return. Given the trend in freight rates 
over the period of study, this result suggests that where the minimum level 
of return is used as the measure of risk, the risk prone shipowner should be 
prepared, to a certain extent, to speculate on a fall in spot charter rates by 
choosing to invest a proportion of his capital in time charters. 
For the BRZ-NVVE iron ore trade, the results almost unanimously suggest 
that shipowners should be playing the spot voyage charter market. This again 
suggests a fairly healthy Cape-sized shipping market. The only exceptions 
are again logical in that for the risk averse investor, where either variance 
or interquartile range is the measure of risk, it is preferable to hedge his 
physical market investments by recourse to the freight futures market. The 
risk averse shipowner thereby reduces the level of his expected return for a 
concurrent reduction in the level of risk which he faces. 
When appraising the results provided by the different measures of risk 
from an overall perspective, several interesting points can be made. On 
those occasions where the methodology recommends a deviation away from 
a 100% commitment to a single market investment, the specification of the 
recommended portfolios differ depending on whether variance or standard de-
viation is used as the measure of risk. According to the assumptions implicit 
in the pure Markowitz Portfolio Theory, standard deviation and variance 
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yield the same optimum portfolio if the returns from the available portfolios 
are normally distributed. The results obtained within this study, therefore, 
point to the fact that returns in shipping are not normally distributed and 
that the consequent use of standard deviation and/or variance as the measure 
of risk is questionable. 
With the notable exception of the risk prone investor in the HR-JAP 
Panamax trade where minimum return is the measure of risk, time charters 
have been virtually ignored in the composition of the subjectively optimal 
portfolios. As Gray (1987) points out, time charters have been regarded in 
the past as the prominent means of hedging voyage charter investments. The 
results contained within this study suggest that freight futures have, or at 
least should have, displaced the time charter in this role. Because of the 
nature of the dry bulk market during the period which forms the basis of the 
analysis, the time charter cannot be totally ignored as a potential contributor 
to a subjectively optimal portfolio. There may well be a place for its inclusion 
in such a portfolio where the underlying nature of the market differs from 
that prevalent during this analysis. However, the time charter can no longer 
be regarded as the most effective means of hedging a voyage charter, [t has 
to stand on its own merits. 
Apa^rt from the conceptual difficulties associated with the use of the mini-
mum level of return as a measure of risk, its inconsistency is illustrated by the 
result that is obtained for the risk prone investor operating in the Panamax 
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market. This result constitutes empirical evidence, to support the theoreti-
cal assertion, that the minimum level of return is an inadequate measure of 
risk. This inadequacy arises primarily from the fact that this measure makes 
no allowance whatsoever for probabilities. Thus, an investment which has a 
one in a million chance of earning zero return, representing the lowest return 
possible, is ranked on a par with an investment which has a one in a million 
chance of not earning zero return. 
I t is obvious that the recommended portfolios, as prescribed by Modern 
Portfolio Theory, are highly dependent on the measure of risk that is em-
ployed in the analysis. It is important, therefore, to ascertain an optimal risk 
measure for the shipping industry. As a consequence of the comments made 
above, the best risk estimate is clearly that provided by the interquartile 
range. The logical consistency of the results obtained under this measure 
suggest that it best copes with the fact that the returns within shipping 
markets are not normally distributed. The subjectively optimal portfolios 
which are selected under this measure of risk point to the fact that, in the 
Panamax and Cape-sized trades, there is potential for the implementation of 
a successful hedging strategy to better fu l f i l the investment criteria of a risk 
averse investor. In the handy-sized market, however, the situation is so bleak 
that all effort should be aimed at maximizing return rather than attempting 
to avert risks. The results of the analysis imply, therefore, that players in 
the handy-sized market currently exist in a *do or die' environment. 
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11.2 A General Perspective on the Method-
ology Adopted and the Implications for 
the Shipping Industry 
The foregoing analysis proves that iModern Portfolio Theory can be ap-
plied to real investment decisions in the dry bulk shipping sector. I t is pos-
sible to determine the necessary inputs to the model, which forms the core 
of the theory, and it is then possible to apply the theory to processing those 
inputs to arrive at logically consistent outputs from the model. Of course, 
this analysis has necessarily been based on a number of generalizations and 
simplifications which inevitably do not apply to the real world of market 
investment in the shipping industry. However, these do not detract from the 
viability of the methodology as a means of portfolio investment selection for 
shipowners: 
The results achieved from the implementation of the Modern Portfolio 
Theory methodology provide the optimal apportioning of a shipowner's mar-
ket investment budget given his attitude towards risk. This apportionment 
between individual investments constitutes a specification of an optimal port-
folio. Because Modern Portfolio Theory is essentially a static model of op-
timal market investment and because the analysis was undertaken on data 
relevant to the end of December 1988, the results achieved relate to the op-
timal decisions that should be taken in January 1989. Thus, at this point in 
time, a risk averse shipowner with a potential contract of carriage for coal 
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between Hampton Roads and Japan should invest 32% of his market invest-
ment budget in voyage charters and 68% in freight futures assuming that the 
interquartile range is the most appropriate measure of risk and that he is 
seeking to employ a Panamax ship on the route. 
This result causes a particular arithmetic problem because of the indi-
visibility of the amounts that can be invested in the physical market. The 
analysis undertaken has modelled the total monthly cost of operating a Pana-
max ship under voyage charter on this route as 8529,613. Consequently, when 
looking at the employment of a single ship on this trade, if the optimal pro-
portional investments are to be maintained it is necessary that this amount 
represents 32% of the total invested. Thus, 31,125.428 needs to be invested 
in freight futures. The cost of freight futures is totally dependent on the price 
of the futures contract which is traded (assumed to be the nearest or spot 
futures contract) and the number of futures contracts involved. Commission 
also needs to be accounted for at a rate of S30 per contract. The problem 
then becomes the determination of the number of futures contracts that need 
to be invested in. This amount can be calculated as follows: 
n X PFF + 71 X S30 = Si, 125,428 
where: 
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n = the number of freight futures contracts to be traded. 
Pff = the price of the relevant freight futures contract. 
At the start of January 1989, the value of the nearest spot futures con-
tract, maturing at the end of January 1989, was 1605 which at SlO per index 
point means that a single contract would cost S 16,050. Using this figure in 
the above equation means that, according to the prescribed optimum port-
folio, the shipowner should trade 70 contracts. As is implied by the use of 
the term 'trade', one flaw with the Modern Portfolio Theory methodology 
lies with the fact that it does not prescribe what form the freight futures 
investment should take. That is, it does not define whether this number of 
contracts should be bought or sold. This decision is beyond the scope of the 
theory, but must necessarily hinge on the shipowner's forward position vis a 
vis future employment. 
This prescribed level of futures investment represents a hedge against 
physical risk exposure which is not 'bl ind' but depends solely on the risk 
attitude of the investing shipowner. Clearly, the indivisibility of the amounts 
invested in physical market contracts means that the total market investment 
budget needs to be greater than a preset amount per ship per trade in order 
to properly apply the methodology. In relation to the example just used, the 
level of this budget can be minimally specified as §1,655,041 per month per 
Panamax ship on this route with this cargo. 
The fact that risk attitude is incorporated in the methodology means 
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that the shipowner does prefer this high level of investment in freight futures 
rather than in the physical market. However, this amount is exaggerated 
since it relates to investment in terms of commitment of resources. The 
fact that BIFFEX investment is highly geared means that the actual cash 
commitment is much smaller than this level of required investment. In fact, 
the level of cash commitment is only S500 per contract so the total cash 
commitment to freight futures implied by a total investment of Si,125,428 is 
only 835,000. 
The indivisibility of the amounts invested in the physical market would 
cause immense problems where the application of the Modern Portfolio The-
ory methodology results in a recommended portfolio involving investment in 
voyage charters and time charters. I t would be extremely difficult, in such 
a case, to apportion the total amount invested in the appropriate balance 
that is recommended by the analysis. The shipowner should then attempt 
to come as close as possible to the recommended balance within the con-
straint of a total market investment budget. The achievement of such an 
aim will still be advantageous in that, although strictly suboptimal, the final 
chosen portfolio is very close to the best available and, therefore, better than 
virtually all other alternatives. 
Where it is not possible to invest at anywhere near the recommended 
portfolio, it might be deduced that the Modern Portfolio Theory can only 
successfully be applied in situations where indivisibility can be overcome. 
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For example, it might be the case that the theory is best applied solely to 
the interaction of voyage charters and freight futures. Fortunately, in the 
analysis undertaken within this work, the vast majority of optimal portfolios 
do not suffer from such an insoluble problem. However, the problem might 
come to the fore should the underlying structure of the market change. 
It could be construed that the optimal portfolio discovered through the 
application of Modern Portfolio Theory represents the balance of investment 
that should pertain for a particular trade throughout the whole of the market. 
Thus, for example, in January 1989 for the HR-JAP 55,000 Dwt., coal trade 
to be operating at the optimal, there should no shipowners operating under 
time charter between Hampton Roads and Japan. All contracts of carriage 
should be voyage charters and, if the interquartile range is the best measure 
of risk, these should represent 32%, of the total market investment i f freight 
futures are also included. However, the optimal portfolio is derived from 
the interaction of a particular utili ty function with the available investment 
opportunities. The utility function that this study has employed is an average 
for the shipping industry. As such, it is merely representative of an individual 
shipowner's specific utili ty function. Consequently, no such inferences may 
be drawn concerning the optimization of a particular trade route. Since a 
number of shipowners within the trade will use the methodology to optimize 
their own utihty function, the overall balance of investment is still optimal 
but may not coincide with the levels prescribed when an industry average 
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utility curve is used. I t is very likely, for example, that the application of the 
methodology to one of the shipowners engaged in the trade may well result 
in an optimal portfolio which does involve time charters. 
Clearly, the degree of risk aversion and risk proneness and the incidence of 
each, will affect the overall optimal portfolio specification. There is thus no 
easy way of predicting this from an analysis based on averages. If, however, 
some optimal balance on a specific trade was deduced, possibly by aggre-
gating the optimal portfolios that should be held by the individual players 
in that market, an important question that is then raised is whether or not 
this optimal portfoho coincides with the actual trade portfolio. The answer 
to this question will determine whether Modern Portfolio Theory is really 
prescriptive with respect to the optimal solutions that it supplies or whether 
i t constitutes merely a behavioural model. This is an important point insofar 
as the answer will determine whether shipowners will or will not make better 
decisions by its conscious implementation. It is usually assumed that the 
theory is prescriptive, but a test of its behavioural features has never really 
been implemented, presumably because of the extreme difficulty in doing so. 
The static nature of Modern Portfolio Theory has already been alluded 
to. The implication is that the methodology has to be implemented on a 
regular basis in order to keep pace with the underlying dynamics of the 
shipping industry. For a number of reasons, as will be seen, this does not 
create any real problems. However, at every point in time that a solution is 
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derived, the shipowner's market investment decision, at least with respect to 
the physical market, is constrained by what is available. The methodology 
may well recommend a certain proportion of a shipowner's portfolio to be 
held in time charters for a specific trade, but those time charters may just 
not be available within the market. Similarly, problems might arise from the 
shipowner being locked into contracts recommended by the application of the 
methodology from the previous time period. Clearly, there is great scope for 
tailoring the dynamic application of Modern Portfolio Theory to the needs 
of the shipowner. 
The second of the problems which have just been raised is extremely 
difficult to surmount and is certainly beyond the scope of this work. However, 
the former can be alleviated by expanding the application of the methodology. 
Rather than applying the methodology to the solution of which contract the 
shipowner should invest in for a particular trade, the universal set of potential 
individual investments could include all trades anif associated contracts that 
the shipowner is considering for the employment of a fleet composed of a 
speciflc ship size. Thus, rather than only looking at the interaction of say, 
voyage charters, time charters and freight futures for a 120,000 Dwt. ship 
employed on BRZ-NVVE, the shipowner could add other available potential 
trades and contracts to the universal set for further consideration and analysis 
via the application of the Modern Portfolio Theory model. 
The application of the principles and mathematical routines of Modern 
393 
Portfolio Theory to this more wide-ranging universal set of potential in-
vestments greatly increases the complexity of the problem. However, the 
increasing prevalence of high technology amongst the business community 
in general and, indeed, among shipowners means that the implementation 
of the investment selection process could be automated to such an extent 
that dealing with large universal sets of individual investments becomes in-
creasingly viable. The increasing influence of computerization means that 
it is feasible that the stage may even be reached where subjective portfolio 
selection does become an almost routine part of the business. 
If such a stage can be reached, it then becomes viable to increase the 
number of individual investments that can be included in a portfolio. Given 
the correct computerized optimal portfolio selection procedure, there is no 
necessity to constrain the proportion of the portfolio that a specific individual 
investment might comprise. This is especially the case where a shipowner has 
decided on a specific measure of risk to use rather than a range of measures 
as was the case in this study. Obviously, in order to arrive at a 'best' measure 
of risk, further research needs to be undertaken, but this work contributes 
to that research effort in the sense that it highlights the importance of the 
distribution of returns in shipping. 
As far as the complete computerization of the methodology is concerned, 
this should be a relatively simple task. The individual components that 
comprise the methodology have already been computerized. For example, 
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programs already exist for the determination of utili ty functions and for the 
derivation of an efficient set of portfolios. It is only necessary to integrate 
each of these individual programs into an overall package aimed at the de-
termination of subjectively optimal portfolios. 
A specific shipowner will be able to apply large parts of the Modern 
Portfolio Theory methodology in a manner which is much more simple than 
that outlined in this study. For example, a shipowner who is already involved 
in certain trades or who is looking to move into certain trades, has no cause 
to model his costs and returns. They are already to hand. The access to such 
privileged information was denied this study, so it was absolutely necessary 
to attempt some form of modelling process for the derivation of even just the 
simple inputs to the ultimate Modern Portfolio Theory model. A shipowner 
has day-to-day access to his own database of information with regard to costs 
and revenues and, through his own contacts in the industry, will have access 
to most, if not all, the additional information that he requires in running the 
methodology. Similarly, the utili ty function that he applies to an efficient set 
of portfolios should be his own. 
This implies that the computerized procedure for portfolio selection should 
also be integrated with a shipowner's operational database since most of the 
information that the optimization procedure requires is already stored there. 
The collection of data, and the subsequent analysis of information, relating 
to a decision maker's utili ty function becomes much simpler within a com-
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puterized environment. This is evidenced in the work of Jones, Bradley & 
Ampt (1987) with respect to the computerized application of state preference 
theory. 
This study has employed historical data as the basis of the calculation 
of expected return. This approach need not necessarily be adopted. A 
shipowner, in applying the methodology in his own right, may have a much 
better insight into the expected return from a particular contract or trade 
than that supplied by the analysis of historical data. Similarly, a shipowner 
in undertaking his own analysis, might want to include forecast values of ex-
pected return and risk. The shipowner is free to select a particular forecast-
ing technique from a whole gamut of possibilities as described by Hampton 
(1986). 
The fact that a shipowner can supply much better input information is 
particularly evident where that shipowner has already instigated a freight 
futures investment strategy. He need not make the assumption that fu-
tures hedging is undertaken on a 'blind' basis with the associated high risks 
and low returns, relative to some alternative strategy, that this implies. A 
shipowner who is already operating a successful futures investment strategy 
can build in these improved results into the model. Where a shipowner's fu-
tures investment strategy is not so successful, the application of the Modern 
Portfolio Theory approach may help to indicate, and subsequently eradicate, 
his errors. 
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One major advantage of the Modern Portfolio Theory approach is that it 
formally recognizes the importance to the investment decision of the values 
and attitudes, especially with regard to risk, of the decision maker. The 
emphasis which the methodology places upon this aspect may well serve to 
reinforce its importance to a decision maker in the real world. If the decision 
maker, when faced with a real decision, knows that his attitude to risk must 
be formalized in order to properly apply the approach, there is much greater 
likelihood of that decision maker more accurately and precisely specifying 
exactly what his attitudes are. Consequently, although values and attitudes, 
especially towards risk, do change in the light of changing circumstances, 
there is a much greater chance that the decision maker will become more 
consistent in the values and attitudes that he adopts and/or exercises. Even 
where this is not the case, there is a greater likelihood of the decision maker 
attempting to consciously explain any extant change in attitude. There is 
considerable benefit, therefore, merely in this formalization process which 
can theoretically progress to a stage whereby corporate attitude is capable 
of specification. 
One further windfall benefit from the application of this methodology, lies 
with the fact that should a shipowner's information database be insufficient 
or inappropriate to its successful application, there is immediate motivation 
for an improvement in the company's information collection and collation 
processes. Obviously, this will prove beneficial to aspects of the shipping 
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operation other than those relating to optimizing market investment. 
Clearly, the Modern Portfolio Theory approach is based on the existence 
of synergistic effects in holding combinations of individual market invest-
ments. This synergy, together with a requirement for the adoption of an 
holistic view of market investment, forms the centraJ core of the methodol-
ogy. The adoption of this approach by shipowners would prove advantageous 
merely i f shipowners came to perceive the benefits to be had from taking an 
integrated view of their general business organization and operation. In other 
words, the adoption of the methodology might reinforce the importance of 
an integrated approach to business. 
In summary, the major result of this study is that Modern Portfolio The-
ory, in the modified form discovered and recommended herein, would consti-
tute a major aid to management in the shipping industry i f it were adopted 
and used. This study has concentrated on shipowners in the dry bulk sector, 
but the recommended modified methodology need not be limited solely to 
this group. Other parts of the industry may benefit equally well. Indeed, 
the approach does not have to be limited to market investment. Perhaps the 
greatest rewards to be reaped from its application lie in the area of general 
strategic management where the subjectively optimal portfolio relates to the 
employment of all a company's assets. 
This study has shown some of the modifications to the pure theory which 
are necessary for a successful application of the model to shipping. Partic-
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ularly important in this respect are the modifications that have been un-
dertaken to facilitate the application of the methodology to the risk prone 
investor. This is especially significant given the comparative prevalence of 
such investors in shipping. These modifications and several other features 
need to be analysed in much greater detail. It is to this area that the next 
section addresses itself. However, it must be emphasized at this point that, 
despite the necessary modifications to the original theory, the underlying fea-
ture of the shipowning industry that makes the application of this technique 
feasible is that the objective of the participants in the industry is clearly not, 
in most cases, one of profit maximization. 
Modern Portfolio Theory does cater for shipow-ners who are only inter-
ested in maximizing their profit, but additionally provides logical recom-
mended portfolio selections where the objective of the company is not profit 
maximization. This study has shown that the majority of shipowners do have 
an attitude to risk. By definition, therefore, they cannot be profit maximizers 
since this attitude afi'ects their decisions. The application of Modern Port-
folio Theory is based on the more broadly defined objective of maximizing 
utility. This makes this methodology much more applicable than the many 
that are based solely on the assumption of profit maximization, especially 
when authorities, such as Marris (1964), have shown that the most prevalent 
corporate objective is for growth. 
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11.3 Avenues for Further Research 
Inevitably, a work such as this raises more questions than it answers. Perhaps 
the most important area for further research lies with an analysis aimed 
at widening the application of Modern Portfolio Theory. This study has 
concentrated on the selection of optimum portfolios of contracts on specific 
routes. As such, the study is macro-industrial. There is grea^ scope for 
the application of the theory to the actual selection of trades as well as the 
contracts under which those trades should operate. Because of the degree 
of detailed information that is required to undertake such an analysis, it is 
probably best implemented within the confines of a single shipping company. 
As a consequence, the whole-hearted cooperation of a company is required 
in order to facilitate such a micro-economic study. 
Clearly, even if the Modern Portfolio Theory methodology does prove, 
theoretically, to be of invaluable assistance to shipping decision makers, this 
is not really of much benefit unless the shipping community accepts it as 
such. A study of shipping companies, such as that undertaken by Pike (1982) 
for the general business community, aimed at determining the investment ap-
praisal techniques that are actively used in the industry would provide a base 
knowledge of the level of decision making sophistication in shipping. This 
could be added to by analysing the degree of acceptance or use of new deci-
sion making techniques by shipowners and then imputing the implications for 
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Modern Portfolio Theory. Obviously, such atti tudinal analysis would involve 
a fair degree of sociological and psychological input. 
Modern Portfolio Theory is essentially an American concept. As Amling 
(I984p591) points out: 
"Several national brokerage firms use MPT concepts, but their 
use is not widespread. The entire industry has been influenced 
by MPT, but its exclusive use and application is limited to about 
10 percent of the investment industry." 
If possible, a comparison of the degree of acceptance achieved by Modern 
Portfolio Theory in the United States shipping sector with that pertaining in 
other countries might provide a useful scale of decision making sophistication. 
Realistically, this is likely to be extremely low in all cases since Modern 
Portfolio Theory has, in the past, been practically applied almost exclusively 
to share investment portfolios. Consequently, its potential acceptance is 
likely to be much more important than its actual acceptance. 
The likehhood of Modern Portfolio Theory gaining greater acceptance 
as a decision making tool would be greatly facilitated if an integrated suite 
of computer programs could be developed for its successful implementation. 
Because of the peculiarities of the shipping industry, it is recommended that 
such a development should be tailored, certainly to the industry as a whole 
but possibly even, to a specific company. To this end, the collaboration of an 
experienced exponent and user of Modern Portfolio Theory with a competent 
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software house is required. 
A great deal of scope remains for the study of appropriate risk measures 
in shipping. This work suggests that the best type of measure is one which 
does not assume a normal distribution of returns. A more detailed and wider-
ranging analysis of the returns in shipping should be undertaken in an effort 
to confirm this characteristic of non-normality. If such a confirmation is 
achieved, an investigation of alternatives other than the interquartile range, 
but within the same family of measures, would prove extremely beneficial to 
the development of the methodology especially with respect to its successful 
implementation in the shipping industry. Examples of such measures which 
could be further investigated are; the semi-interquartile range, the semi-
variance and the various measures of kurtosis and skewness. 
Related to the measurement of risk, a much more sophisticated analysis 
of the application of the Capital Asset Pricing Model to shipping could prove 
extremely worthwhile. This study has shown that the more general simplified 
versions of the model are not applicable to market investment in dry bulk 
shipping. .An analysis of the applicability of more complicated transformed 
versions should be undertaken. The advantage of using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model to measure risk is that the measure it provides relates to the 
inherent risk of an individual investment once it is included in a portfolio. 
As a result, this measure is theoretically consistent through time and across 
portfolios. The successful application of a particular form of the model would 
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thus lead to specific unique risk measures for each individual investment that 
is included in a portfolio. This aspect of further research is particularly im-
portant since the applied use of the Capital Asset Pricing Model is now state 
of the art in the U.S.A. where there is already a massive lead in the appli-
cation of financial economics to real industrial decision making. Also, the 
determination of such a consistent risk measure facilitates the potential ap-
plication of linear programniing techniques to the derivation of a subjectively 
optimal portfolio. . 
The question still remains as to whether Modern Portfolio Theory consti-
tutes a normative or a positive theory with respect to shipping. This aspect 
can only be investigated by undertaking a complete methodological applica-
tion and then comparing prescribed results to actual results. One peculiarity 
of the philosophy underlying the theory is that should any difference between 
these two arise, then in every case, by definition, the actual result will be 
'worse' than the result that leads from the prescribed portfolio of the theory. 
The importance of answering this question lies with the fact that if the the-
ory is behavioural then shipping companies are already utility maximizers 
and, as a consequence, cannot improve their performance by implementing 
the Modern Portfolio Theory decision making technique. 
A vast area of potential research and analysis exists within the sphere of 
futures trading in general and, specifically, with regard to BIFFEX. Although 
scope still exists for the study of futures markets in general, academic and 
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applied literature on the subject is quite extensive. The same cannot be 
said in relation to freight futures. There is a complete dearth of adequate 
and appropriate literature and actual analysis of the market is virtually non-
existent. This study has shown that the level of acceptance of freight futures 
as a market investment, and specifically as a hedging instrument, is minimal 
amongst shipowners. This assertion can be proved or disproved by an in-
depth analysis of the volume of business on BIFFEX, especially with respect 
to levels of open interest and holding periods. 
Most of the literature pertaining to BIFFEX is directed at marketing 
freight futures. It is limited in this respect, in that this study has shown that 
quite a large proportion of shipowners have used other futures markets. This 
would suggest that the concept of futures is not as unfamiliar to shipowners 
as the body of marketing literature would seem to imply and that, therefore, 
the reluctance of shipowners to participate in the market is probably due to 
a healthy distrust of the validity of the market. This can only be reinforced 
by the absence of objective analysis and appraisal. The BIFFEX marketing 
effort can at best, therefore, be regarded as patronizing and inappropriate. 
On reading the available niarketing literature, this author has found several 
instances where the information presented is certainly misleading and on a 
few occasions, actually and grossly erroneous. 
The existence of objective analysis of the freight futures market may well 
lead to an increased acceptance of BIFFEX, especially since its flaws will 
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inevitably be highlighted. Shipowners, and other potential users of freight 
futures, must invariably be wary of any financial opportunity which is por-
trayed in such a good light as BIFFEX is. As this study has shown, freight 
futures do provide a novel and useful means of risk reduction in the dry bulk 
sector. I t is a shame, therefore, that its ful l potential has not been recog-
nized. This can hardly be unexpected, however, when the very people who 
control and market BIFFEX are those that are going to benefit from its in-
creased use. This author would prefer to see the control of BIFFEX taken 
out of the incestuous hands of the shipping community itself, in the guise 
of shipbroking companies, and placed under the control of a more objective 
financial institution with a wider knowledge of futures markets. 
The final recommendation for future work is much more general in na^ 
ture and perhaps, as a consequence, the most important of all. This work has 
focussed on an analysis of a novel methodology for market investment. As 
such, it constitutes just one meagre contribution to a body of literature con-
cerned with corporate decision making and the techniques used therein. I t 
is extremely important that this body of knowledge is disseminated to mem-
bers of the shipping community so that better decision making is facilitated. 
Increasing the level of financial education and awareness should be a matter 
of great priority in shipping circles. I t is only by doing so, that the problems 
met during periods of shipping recession can be alleviated and minimized 
and the benefits to be derived from shipping booms can be fully reaped. The 
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addition of any new technique to the armoury of decision making tools can 
only prove beneficial to the decisions that are made. I f a decision maker is, 
at least, aware of a particular decision making aid or method, it is then at 
his discretion whether he chooses to implement the results that are derived 
from i t . Entrepreneurial spirit need not be quelled by the adoption of such 
techniques since on any particular occasion there is still scope for intuitive 
judgement and adherence to the philosophy embodied in the saying: 
"There are three ways of losing money — horses, women and 
taking the advice of experts. Horses — that is the quickest; 
women — that is the most pleasant: but taking the advice of 
experts — that is the most certain." 
It is the task of management educationalists, and the exponents of the 
various management techniques now available, to subjugate the prevalence of 
such feelings amongst industrial practitioners. The burden of this responsi-
bility is not a light one, but its achievement is absolutely vital to the success 
of business enterprise in general and the continued survival of shipping in 
particular, especially in the high cost traditional maritime nations. 
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Dear S i r , 
Please find enclosed a questionnaire vhicfa I vould be vezy grateful i f ycu 
oould oaiplete and return i n the HIEEPCST envelope supplied. 
I h i s questionnaire fbrm part of a oajor research project currently being . 
undertaJgen at Plymouth Itolytechnic. I t e research i s aixoed a t assessing 
ouxrent investinent behaviour i n the shipping indistry and then attenpting to 
develop an inproved investioent methodology geared towards maxunising the 
returns while minimising the r i s k of an investzoent. 
I t i s sincerely hoped that the fr u i t s of these labours w i l l be of r e a l 
p r a c t i c a l use to the shipping industry and that the application of the 
resultant approach to investsent i n shipping w i l l prove to be a viable 
tool. 
E x p l i c i t i n acy investigaticn of investment behaviour i s the raquireoent to 
assess attitudes towards r i s J c I t i s to this aspect which the questionnaire 
primarily addresses i t s e l f . Ihe questionnaire also asks certain questions 
about your view of BIFFBC which again i s relevant to an analysis of 
investment behaviour i n shipping. 
Rest assured that any responses that ycu make w i l l be treated in the 
s t r i c t e s t confidence. 
However, should you feel i n any way apprehensive about the sensitive nature 
of sane of the questions asJoed, pleas** fieel free to ignore questions 1-4 in 
Section A. 
I would very ouch appreciate your cooperation in this matter and look 
fiorward to receiving your carpleted fiDrm. TSank you w r y auch, in 
anticipation, for your time axxi effort. 
Yours sincerely, 




P o s i t i o n i n Company 
Name of Company 
Address of Company 
Are you f a m i l i a r w i t h the term "BIFFEX" 
( B a l t i c I n t e r n a t i o n a l F r e i g h t F u t u r e s 
Exchange)? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
How w e l l do you understand how BIFFEX works? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Very w e l l 
F a i r l y w e l l 
Only s l i g h t l y 
Not a t a l l 
Has your company e v e r used BIFFEX f o r 
hedging purposes? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Has your company e v e r used BIFFEX f o r 
s p e c u l a t i v e purposes? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
Don't know 
Has your company e v e r made use of o t h e r 
f u t u r e s markets, a p a r t from BIFFEX, f o r 
e i t h e r hedging or s p e c u l a t i v e purposes? 














10. Are you f a m i l i a r w i t h the con c e p t o f an 
o p t i o n s market? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
N.B. I f your answer i s "No", then go to Qu e s t i o n 12 
I f they were a v a i l a b l e , would your company 
t r a d e f r e i g h t o p t i o n s on the BIFFEX market? 




I f "Depends" then p l e a s e s p e c i f y : -
Do you see BIFFEX as a major i n n o v a t i o n i n the 
s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y ? 
FOR O F F I C E 
USE ONLY 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
Don * t know 
Do you t h i n k i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t BIFFEX 
c o n t r a c t s ( i n t h e i r p r e s e n t form) c o u l d be 
used a s s e c u r i t y on a lo a n , i n much the same 
way a s time c h a r t e r c o n t r a c t s have been i n 
the p a s t ? 









G u i d e l i n e s to S e c t i o n B 
I n t h i s s e c t i o n you w i l l be g i v e n a s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s r e g a r d i n g your 
d e c i s i o n s i n s e v e r a l h y p o t h e t i c a l investment c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n s . As f a r 
as p o s s i b l e you should t r e a t each c h o i c e as i f i t were an a c t u a l 
d e c i s i o n t h a t you would have to make as a top e x e c u t i v e of your 
company. Before making your d e c i s i o n s by answering the q u e s t i o n s you 
should note the f o l l o w i n g p o i n t s : 
1. The p r o b a b i l i t i e s provided should be t r e a t e d 
as t o t a l l y o b j e c t i v e , i . e . they s h o u l d be a c c e p t e d 
as g i v e n f a c t s where t h e r e i s no p o s s i b i l i t y o f 
d e v i a t i o n away from the p r o b a b i l i t i e s g i v e n . 
2. The p a y o f f s r e f e r r e d to i n each h y p o t h e t i c a l 
c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n a r e to be regarded a s n e t t 
income f i g u r e s , i . e . i n i t i a l i n v e s t m e n t s have 
a l r e a d y been deducted from the p a y o f f s p r o v i d e d . 
A l s o , t h e s e n e t t f i g u r e s r e p r e s e n t d i s c o u n t e d 
income streams. Thus, they s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d as 
the a c t u a l p o t e n t i a l a d d i t i o n to or d i m i n u t i o n of 
company wealth a s a r e s u l t o f making the d e c i s i o n . 
3. Each of the h y p o t h e t i c a l c h o i c e s i t u a t i o n s s h o u l d 
be t r e a t e d as independent, so t h a t no h y p o t h e t i c a l 
or p e r c e i v e d g a i n or l o s s i n one s i t u a t i o n s h o u l d 
be a l l o w e d to i n f l u e n c e o t h e r c h o i c e s . 
N.B. P l e a s e read through the q u e s t i o n s i n t h i s s e c t i o n before s t a r t i n g 
to answer them. 
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S c e n a r i o 1 
F o r the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e q u e s t i o n s assume t h a t 
y our company has what you r e g a r d a s a s a t i s f a c t o r y 
l i q u i d i t y s i t u a t i o n , i . e . a l o s s o f $3m would not 
p u t your company i n t o any danger o f i n s o l v e n c y . 
1. Your company i s committed t o a c o n t r a c t which 
has a 25% chance o f l o s i n g $3m and a 75% 
chance o f making a p r o f i t o f $30m. An 
o p p o r t u n i t y a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l t h i s 
c o n t r a c t t o some t h i r d p a r t y . What i s the 
minimiun amount t h a t you would ac c e p t f o r 
the c o n t r a c t ? . 
Amount 
Your company i s committed t o a c o n t r a c t which 
has a 50% chance of l o s i n g $3n and a 50% chan c e 
of making a p r o f i t o f 130m. An o p p o r t u n i t y 
a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l t h i s c o n t r a c t to some 
t h i r d p a r t y . What i s the minimum amount t h a t 
you would a c c e p t f o r the c o n t r a c t ? 
Amount 
Your company i s committed t o a c o n t r a c t w hich 
has a 75% chance of l o s i n g $3m and a 25% chan c e 
o f making a p r o f i t o f I30ra. An o p p o r t u n i t y 
a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l t h i s c o n t r a c t to some 
t h i r d p a r t y . What i s the minimum amount t h a t 








S c e n a r i o 2 
F o r the f o l l o w i n g t h r e e q u e s t i o n s assume t h a t 
your company has what you regard as a weak 
l i q u i d i t y p o s i t i o n , i . e . A l o s s of $3m can be 
s u s t a i n e d w i t h o u t running i n t o s e r i o u s problems, 
b u t any subsequent l o s s e s c o u l d pose a s e r i o u s 
t h r e a t to the s o l v e n c y of the company. 
Your company i s committed to a c o n t r a c t 
which has a 25% chance of l o s i n g |3m and a 
75% chance of making a p r o f i t o f $30m. An 
o p p o r t u n i t y a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l 
t h i s c o n t r a c t to some t h i r d p a r t y . What i s 
the minimiim amount t h a t you would a c c e p t f o r 
the c o n t r a c t ? 
Amount 
Your company i s committed to a c o n t r a c t which 
has a 50% chance o f l o s i n g $3m and a 50% chance 
of making a p r o f i t of $30m. An opportunity 
a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l t h i s c o n t r a c t t o 
some t h i r d p a r t y . What i s the minimum amount 
t h a t you would a c c e p t f or the c o n t r a c t ? 
Amount 
Your company i s committed to a c o n t r a c t which 
has a 75% chance of l o s i n g $3m and a 25% chance 
of making a p r o f i t of $30m. An opp o r t u n i t y 
a r i s e s whereby you may s e l l t h i s c o n t r a c t to 
some t h i r d p a r t y . What i s the minimum amount 









What i s the approximate v a l u e of your 




(a) I n v a l u e terms, what i s the main s h i p p i n g 




S h i p o p e r a t i n g 
C h a r t e r i n g 
Shipowning 
S h i p b r o k i n g 
S h i p Agency 
S h i p Management 
Other ( P l e a s e 
s p e c i f y ) 
(b) Approximately what percentage ( i n v a l u e 
terms) of your company's t o t a l o p e r a t i o n 
does the a c t i v i t y t i c k e d i n 2(a) 











I n terms of 





v a l u e , w i t h which p a r t i c u l a r 
s h i p p i n g market does your 
most invo1vemen t ? 
Dry c a r g o 
L i q u i d cargo 
U n i t i s e d cargo 
P a s s e n g e r s 
G e n e r a l cargo 
C a r s 
Other ( P l e a s e 
s p e c i f y ) 
(65) 
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What i s your o p i n i o n of the p r e s e n t 
f i n a n c i a l s t a t e of the s h i p p i n g i n d u s t r y 





E xtremely h e a l t h y 
Very h e a l t h y 
F a i r l y h e a l t h y 
F a i r l y d epressed 
Very d e p r e s s e d 
E x t r e m e l y depressed 
Over t h e 




n e x t two y e a r s , do you t h i n k 
s h i p p i n g markets w i l l 
Improve 
S t a y the same 
Get worse 
Don't know 
How would you d e s c r i b e your company's 









How does t h i s compare to the average 















I n g e n e r a l , how would 
company's a t t i t u d e to 
by the d e c i s i o n s t h a t 
you d e s c r i b e your 
r i s k as e x e m p l i f i e d 




R i s k a v e r s e 
R i s k prone 
R i s k n e u t r a l 
T o t a l l y v a r i a b l e 
(70) 
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I f n e c e s s a r y would you be w i l l i n g to 
p r o v i d e f u r t h e r a s s i s t a n c e on t h i s 
p r o j e c t , i . e . would you be w i l l i n g t o 
answer a follow-up q u e s t i o n n a i r e ? 
PLEASE TICK ONE BOX Yes 
No 
N.B. I F YOU ANSWERED 'YES' TO THIS QUESTION 
PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOU HAVE FILL E D IN 
QUESTIONS 1-4 IN SECTION A 





The Calculation of Voyage 
Charter Returns on 
Investment 
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B . l U S G C - J A P 30,000 D W T . Grain 
M o n t h Cost of Cost of To ta l Other T o t a l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel O i l Oi l Cost Costs Cost 
J A N 1985 327,826 37,697 365,523 63,950 429,473 
F E B 343,436 38,467 381,903 63,950 445,853 
M A R 337,582 37,697 375,280 63,950 439,230 
A P R 312,215 37,390 349,604 63,950 413,554 
M A Y 294,653 36,620 331,273 63,950 395,223 
J U N 259,529 36,312 295,841 63,950 359,791 
J U L 279,042 36,466 315,508 63,950 379,458 
A U G 279,042 36,312 315,355 63,950 379,305 
SEPT 1 286,847 36,466 323,314 63,950 387,264 
O C T 282,945 37,082 320,027 63,950 383,977 
N O V 261,480 37,390 298,870 63,950 362,820 
DEC 286,847 38,313 325,160 63,950 389,110 
J A N 1986 261,480 38,313 299,793 63,950 363,743 
F E B 195,134 29,850 224,984 63,950 238,934 
M A R 193,183 26,157 219,340 63,950 283,290 
A P R ! 152,205 26,157 178,362 63,950 242,312 
M A Y i 119,032 
r 
23,080 142,112 63,950 206,062 
J U N J 138,545 23,080 161,625 63,950 225,575 
J U L i 126,837 22,772 149,610 63,950 213,560 
A U G 1 119,032 20,772 139,804 63,950 203,754 
SEPT 142,448 22,157 164,605 63,950 228,555 
O C T 148,302 22,003 170,305 63,950 234,255 
N O V 150,253 21,541 171,795 63,950 235,745 
DEC 146,351 21,541 167,892 63,950 231,842 
J A N 1987 177,572 23,849 201,422 63,950 265,372 
FEB 202,940 24,926 227,866 64,950 292,816 
M A R 189,280 24,465 213,745 64,950 278,695 
A P R 210,745 24,465 235,210 64,950 300,160 
M A Y 234,161 24,619 258,780 64,950 323,730 
J U N 224,404 25,080 249,485 64,950 314,435 
J U L 224,404 24,619 249,023 64,950 313,973 
A U G 230,259 25,388 255,646 64,950 320,596 
SEPT 206,842 24,619 231,461 64,950 296,411 
O C T 200,988 24,311 225,299 64,950 290,249 
N O V 191,232 24,926 216,158 64,950 281,108 
DEC 175,621 24,926 200,547 64,950 265,497 
J A N 1988 146,351 24,619 170,969 64,950 235,919 
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M o n t h Cost of Cost of To ta l Other T o t a l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oi l O i l Cost Costs Cost 
F E B 154,156 24,926 179,082 64,950 244,032 
M A R 124,886 24,926 149,812 64,950 214,762 
A P R 152,205 24,619 176,823 64,950 241,773 . 
M A Y 158,059 25,080 183,139 64,950 248,089 
J U N 158,059 24,772 182,831 64,950 247,781 
J U L 130,740 24,003 154,743 64,950 219,693 
A U G 148,302 24,157 172,459 64,950 237,409 
SEPT 161,962 23,849 185,811 64,950 250,761 
O C T 122,935 24,003 146,938 64,950 211,888 
N O V 113,178 23,849 137,027 64,950 201,977 
DEC 144,399 24,619 169,018 64,950 233,968 
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M o n t h Gross Commission Net Gross Dai ly Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
J A N 1985 516,000 12,900 503,100 73,627 2,153 
F E B 510,000 12,750 497,250 51,397 1,503 
M A R 519,000 12,975 506,025 66,795 1,954 
A P R 522,000 13,050 508,950 95,396 2,790 
M A Y 504,000 12,600 491,400 96,177 2,813 
J U N 489,000 12,225 476,775 116,984 3,421 
J U L 390,000 9,750 380,250 792 23 
A U G 420,000 10,500 409,500 30,195 883 
SEPT t 450,000 11,250 438,750 51,486 1,506 
O C T 1 450,000 11,250 438,750 54,773 1,602 
N O V I 450.000 11,250 438,750 75,930 2,221 
DEC 450,000 11,250 438,750 49,640 1,452 
J A N 1986 420,000 10,500 409,500 45,757 1,338 
F E B 429,000 10,725 418,275 129,341 • 3,783 
M A R 1 405,000 10,125 394,875 111,585 3,263 
A P R i 330,000 8,250 321,750 79,438 2,323 
M A Y l i 315,000 7,875 307,125 10L063 2,956 
J U N 1 1 315,000 7,875 307,125 81,550 2,385 
J U L i i 270,000 6750 263,250 49,690 1,453 
A U G 282,000 7,050 274,950 71,196 2,082 
SEPT i 411,000 10,275 400,725 172,170 5,035 
O C T j 375,000 9,375 365,625 131,370 3,342 ; 
N O V ; 420,000 10,500 409,500 173,755 5,082 
DEC i 411,000 10,275 400,725 168^883 4,939 \ 
J A N 1987 ' 465,000 11,625 453,375 188,003 5,498 : 
F E B 462,000 11,550 450,450 157,634 4,610 
M A R 510,000 12,750 497,250 218,555 6,392 
A P R 528,000 13,200 514,800 214,640 6,277 
M A Y 585,000 14,625 570,375 246,645 7,213 i 
J U N 480,000 12,000 468,000 153,565 4,491 : 
J U L 555,000 13.875 541,125 227,152 6,643 
A U G 630,000 15,750 614,250 293,654 8,588 
SEPT 615,000 15,375 599,625 303,214 8,868 
O C T 603,000 15,075 587,925 297,676 8,706 ! 
N O V 585,000 14,625 570,375 289,267 8,460 ] 
DEC 660,000 16,500 643,500 378,003 11,055 ; 
J A N 1988 750,000 18,750 731,250 495,331 14,487 I 
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J 
M o n t h Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight V^oyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
F E B 870,000 21,750 848,250 604,218 17,671 
M A R 915,000 22,875 892,125 677,363 19,810 
A P R 750,000 18,750 731,250 489,477 14,315 
M A Y 735,000 18,375 716,625 468,536 13,703 
J U N 645,000 16,125" 628,875 381,094 11,146 
J U L 654,000 16,350 637,650 417,957 12.224 
A U G 675,000 16,875 658,125 420,716 12,304 
SEPT 705,000 17,625 687,375 436,614 12,769 i 
O C T 750,000 18,750 731,250 519,362 15,189 
N O V 795,000 19,875 775,125 573,148 16762 
DEC 1 810,000 20,250 789,750 555,782 16,254 i 
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M o n t h Dai ly Net Re turn on 
Surplus Investment 
J A N 1985 -6,241 -29.26% 
FEB -6,891 -31.60% 
M A R -6,441 -29.79% 
A P R -5,604 -26.85% 
M A Y -5,581 -27.47% 
J U N •4,973 -25.80% 
J U L -8,371 -42.33% 
A U G -7,511 -37.95% 
SEPT -6,888 -34.36% 
O C T -6,792 -34.04% 
N O V -6,174 -31.93% 
DEC -6,942 -34.53% 
J A N 1986 -7,092 -36.60% 
F E B -4,648 -27.03% 
M A R -5,167 -30.37% 
A P R -6J07 -38.75% 
M A Y -5,475 -37.28% 
J U N -6,045 -39.62% 
i J U L -6,977 -46.91% 
i A U G -6,348 -43.49% 
SEPT -3,395 -22.02% 
O C T -4,588 -29.50% 
N O V -3,349 -21.42% 
DEC -3,491 -22.51% 
J A N 1987 -2,968 -17.92% 
FEB -3,856 -22.20% 
M A R -2,075 -12.21% 
A P R -2,189 -12.42% 
M A Y -1,253 -6.82% 
J U N -3,975 -22.07% 
J U L -1,823 -10.10% 
A U G 122 0.66% . 
SEPT 401 2.28% 
O C T 239 1.38% 
N O V -7 -0.04% 
DEC 2,589 15.49% 
J A N 1988 5,984 37.51% 
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M o n t h Dai ly Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
F E B 9,168 56.33% 
M A R 11,308 73.18% 
A P R 5,813 . 36.05% 
M A Y 5.200 31.91% 
J U N 2,643 16.29% 
J U L 3,721 24.15% 
A U G 3,302 23.85% 
SEPT 4,267 26.09% 
O C T 6,687 43.85% 
N O V 8,260 55.10% 
DEC 7,752 48.64% 
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B.2 H R - J A P 55,000 D W T . Coal 
M o n t h Cost of Cost of T o t a l Other To ta l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel O i l O i l Cost Costs Cost 
J A N 1985 230,630 23,079 253,709 93,325 347,034 
F E B 241,613 23,550 265,163 93,325 358,488 
M A R 237,494 23,079 260,573 93,325 353,898 
A P R 219,648 22,891 242,539 93,325 335,864 
M A Y 207,293 22,420 229,712 93,325 323,037 
J U N 182,582 22,231 204,814 93,325 298,139 
J U L 196,310 22,325 218,636 93,325 311,961 
A U G 196,310 22,231 218,542 93,325 311,867 
SEPT 201,802 22,325 224,127 93,325 317,452 
O C T 199,056 22,702 221,758 93,325 315,083 
N O V 183,955 22,891 206,846 93,325 300,171 
DEC 201,802 23,456 225,257 93,325 318,582 
J A N 1986 183,955 23,456 207,411 93,325 300,736 1 
FEB 137,280 18,275 155,555 93,325 248,880 i 
M A R 135,907 16,014 151,921 93,325 245,246 j 
l - A P R 107,078 16,014 123,092 93,325 216,417 
! M A Y 83,741 14,130 97,871 93,325 191,196 1 
! J U N 97,469 14,130 111,599 93,325 204,924 
J U L 89,232 13,942 103,174 93,325 196,499 
A U G 83,741 12,717 96,458 93,325 189,783 ! 
SEPT 100,214 13,565 113,779 93,325 207,104 1 
O C T 104,333 13,471 117,803 93,325 211,128 
N O V 105,706 13,188 118,894 93,325 212,219 I 
DEC 102,960 13,188 116,148 93,325 209,473 i 
J A N 1987 124,925 14,601 139,526 93,325 232,851 
F E B 142,771 15,260 158,032 94,325 252,357 
M A R 133,162 14,978 148,139 94,325 242,464 
A P R 148,262 14,978 163,240 94,325 257,565 
M A Y 164,736 15,072 179,808 94,325 274,133 
J U N 157,872 15,355 173,227 94,325 267,552 
J U L 157,872 15,072 172,944 94,325 267,269 
A U G 161,990 15,543 177,533 94,325 271,858 
SEPT 145,517 15,072 160,589 94,325 254,914 
O C T 141,398 14,884 156,282 94,325 250,607 
N O V 134,534 15,260 149,795 94,325 244,120 
DEC 123,552 15,260 138,812 94,325 233,137 
J A N 1988 102,960 15,072 118,032 94,325 212,357 
440 
M o n t h Cost of Cost of To ta l Other To ta l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel O i l O i l Cost Costs Cost 
F E B 108,451 15,260 123,712 94,325 218,037 
M A R 87,859 15,260 103,120 94,325 197,445 
A P R .107,078 15,072 122,150 94,325 216,475 
M A Y 111,197 15,355 126,551 94,325 220,876 
J U N 111,197 15,166 126,363 94,325 220,688 
J U L 91,978 14,695 106,673 94,325 200,998 
A U G 104,333 14,789 119,122 94,325 213,447 
SEPT 113,942 14.601 128,543 94,325 222,868 
O C T 86,486 14,695 101,182 94,325 195,507 
N O V 79,622 14,601 94,223 94,325 188,548 
DEC 101,587 15,072 116,659 94,325 210,984 
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M o n t h Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
J A N 1985 676,500 16,913 659,588 312,553 9,954 
FEB 709,500 17,738 691,763 333,275 10,614 
M A R 742,500 18,563 723,938 370,039 11,785 
A P R 770,000 19,250 750,750 414,886 13,213 
M A Y 715,000 17,875 697,125 374,088 11,914 
J U N 632,500 15,813 616,688 318,549 10,145 
J U L 577,500 14,438 563,063 251,102 7,997 
A U G 572,000 14,300 557,700 245,833 7,829 ! 
SEPT 577,500 14,438 563,063 245,611 7,822 
O C T . i 605,000 15,125 589,875 274,792 8,751 i 
N O V ! 594,000 14,850 579,150 278,979 8,885 1 
DEC 1 594,000 14,850 579,150 260,568 8,298 
J A N 1986 j 550,000 13,750 536,250 235,514 7,500 
F E B 1 550,000 13,750 536,250 287,370 9,152 
M A R I 467,500 11,688 455,813 210,566 6,706 1 
A P R i 396,000 9,900 386,100 169,683 5.404 
M A Y I ] 385,000 9,625 375,375 184,179 5,866 ; 
J U N '• ' 385,000 9,625 375,375 170,451 •5,423 
J U L •; • 357,500 8,938 348,563 152,064 4,843 
A U G i 352,000 8,800 343,200 153,417 4,886 ; 
SEPT i \ 561,000 14,025 546,975 339,871 10,824 i 
O C T 522,500 13,063 509,438 298,309 9,500 i 
N O V i 511,500 12,788 498,713 286,494 9.124 ! 
DEC 1 478,500 11,963 466,537 257,064 8.187 ; 
J A N 1987 ; 621,500 15.538 605,963 373,112 11,883 i 
FEB 594,000 14,850 579,150 326,793 10,407 1 
M A R 671,000 16,775 654,225 411,761 13,113 j 
A P R 742,500 18,563 723,938 466,372 14,853 
M A Y 836,000 20,900 815,100 540,967 17,228 
J U N 687,500 17,188 670,313 402,761 12,827 1 
J U L i 814,000 20,350 793,650 526,381 16,764 1 
A U G 907,500 22,688 884,813 612,954 19,521 j 
SEPT 869,000 21,725 847,275 592,361 18,865 1 
O C T 913,000 22,825 890,175 639,568 20,368 1 
N O V 869,000 21,725 847,275 603,155 19,209 
DEC 907,500 22,688 884,813 651,675 20,754 
J A N 1988 1,072,500 26,813 1,045,688 833,331 26,539 
442 
M o n t h Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
FEB 1,155,000 28,875 1,126,125 908,088 28,920 
M A R 1,292,500 32,313 1,260,188 1,062,743 33,845 
A P R •1,100,000 27,500 1,072,500 856,025 27,262 
M A Y 1,155,000 28,875 1,126,125 905,249 28,830 
J U N 962,500 24,063 938,438 717,750 22,858 
J U L 935,000 23,375 911,625 710,627 22,631 
A U G 907,500 22,688 884,813 671,365 21,381 
SEPT 946,000 23,650 92'2,350 699,482 22,276 
O C T 990,000 24,750 965,250 769,743 24,514 
N O V 990,000 24,750 965,250 776,702 24,736 
DEC 1,045,000 26,125 1,018,875 807.891 25.729 
443 
M o n t h Dai ly Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
J A N 1985 45 0-21% 
F E B 705 3.22% 
M A R 1,876 8.62% 
A P R 3,304 15.57% 
M A Y 2,005 9.65% 
J U N 236 1.19% 
J U L -1,912 -9.42% 
A U G -2,080 -10.25% 
SEPT I -2,087 -10.19% 
O C T i -1,157 -5.67% 
N O V i -1.024 -5.14% 
DEC i -1,610 -7.85% 
J A N 1986 i -2,389 -12.00% 
F E B 1 -737 -4.04% 
M A R ! -3,183 -17.61% 
A P R -4,485 -26.23% 
M A Y -4,024 -24.71% 
J U N -4,461 -26.68% 
J U L -5,046 -30.71% 
A U G -5,003 -30.86% 
SEPT 935 5.52% 
O C T : -389 -2.28% 
N O V i 1 -765 -4.49% 
DEC \ : -1,702 -10.05% 
J A N 1987 i : 2,013 11.32% 
F E B 1 ' 538 2.93% 
M A R 3,244 17.90% 
A P R 4,983 26.70% 
M A Y 7,359 38.20% 
J U N I 2,957 15.62% 
J U L ' 6,894 36.23% 
A U G 9,651 50.14% 
SEPT 8,996 48.16% 
O C T 10,499 56.51% 
N O V 9,339 50.94% 
DEC 10,885 60.41% 
J A N 1988 16,689 95.55% 
444 
M o n t h Dai ly Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
F E B 19,070 107.66% 
M A R 23,996 139.78% 
A P R 17,412 98.82% 
M A Y 18,980 106.61% 
J U N 13,009 73.73% 
J U L 12,782 75.21% 
A U G 11,531 66.39% 
SEPT 12,427 70.21% 
O C T 14,664 86.96% 
N O V 1 j 14,886 89.45% 
DEC !| 15,879 91.26% 
445 
B.3 B R Z - N W E 120,000 D W T . Iron Ore 
M o n t h Cost of Cost of To ta l Other To ta l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel O i l O i l Cost Costs Cost 
J A N 1985 231,186 23,460 254,647 105,658 360,305 
F E B 239,840 23,460 263,301 105,658 368,959 
M A R 216,351 23,989 240,340 105,658 345,998 
A P R 213,878 23,989 237,867 105,658 343,525 
M A Y 176,790 22,192 198,982 105,658 304,640 
J U N 170,608 22,192 192,800 105,658 298,458 
J U L 170,608 21,664 192,272 105,658 297,930 
A U G 178,026 22,615 200,641 105,658 306,299 
SEPT 182,971 24,094 207,065 105,658 312,723 
O C T 170,608 25,046 195,654 105,658 301,312 
N O V 190,389 25,363 215,751 105,658 321,409 
DEC 182,971 24,517 207,488 105,658 313,146 
J A N 1986 179,262 24,200 203,462 105,658 309,120 
FEB 123,629 18,916 142,545 105,658 248,203 
M A R 124,865 19,233 144,099 105,658 249,757 
A P R 101,376 19,550 120,926 105,658 226,584 
M A Y i 77,886 14,901 
• 
92.787 105,658 198,445 
J U N 70,469 11,942 82,410 105,658 188,068 
J U L 64,287 10,356 74,643 105,658 180,301 
A U G 82,831 12,576 95,407 105,658 201,065 
SEPT 102,612 12,893 115,505 105,658 221,163 
O C T 95,194 11,942 107,136 105,658 212,794 ; 
N O V 93,958 11,836 105,794 105,658 211,452 
DEC 93,958 11,836 105,794 105,658 211,452 
J A N 1987 124,865 15,429 140,294 105,658 245,952 
F E B 111,266 14,795 126,061 135,342 261,403 
M A R 121,156 14,583 135,740 135,342 271,082 
A P R 143,410 14,795 158,205 135,342 293.547 
M A Y 143,410 15,640 159,050 135,342 294,392 
J U N 139,701 15,323 155,024 135,342 290,366 
J U L 139,701 15,535 155,235 135,342 290,577 
A U G 138,465 15,852 154,316 135,342 289,658 
SEPT 121,156 14,795 135,951 135,342 271,293 
O C T 124,865 15,006 139,872 135,342 275,214 
N O V 116,211 15,323 131,535 135,342 266,877 
DEC 108,794 15,640 124,434 135,342 259.776 
J A N 1988 105,085 15,429 120,514 135,342 255,856 
446 
M o n t h Cost of Cost of To ta l Other T o t a l 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oi l O i l Cost Costs Cost 
F E B 95,194 13,738 108,932 147,711 256,643 
M A R 84,068 12,470 96,538 147,711 244,249 
A P R 111,266 15,006 126,272 147,711 273,983 
M A Y 96,431 14,266 110,697 147,711 258,408 
J U N 97,667 13,527 111,194 147,711 258,905 
J U L 89,013 12,681 101,694 147,711 249,405 
A U G 91,485 12,893 104,378 147,711 252,089 
SEPT 87,777 • 11,730 99,507 147,711 247,218 
O C T 65,523 10,356 75,880 147,711 223,591 
N O V 76,650 11,202 87,852 147,711 235,563 
DEC 86,540 13,632 100,173 147,711 247,884 
447 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
JAN 1985 636,000 15,900 620,100 259,795 12,906 
FEB 648,000 16,200 631,800 262,841 13,058 
MAR 684,000 17,100 666,900 320,902 15,942 
APR 744,000 18,600 725,400 381,875 18,971 
M A Y 660,000 16,500 . 643,500 338,860 16,834 
JUN 600,000 15,000 585,000 286,542 14,235 
JUL 480.000 12,000 468,000 170,070 8,449 
AUG 504,000 12.600 491,400 185,101 9,196 
SEPT 552,000 13.800 538,200 225,477 11,202 
OCT 552,000 13.800 538,200 236,888 11,768 
NOV 624,000 15.600 608,400 286,991 14,258 
DEC 624,000 15,600 608,400 295,254 14,668 
JAN 1986 504,000 12.600 491,400 182,280 9,056 
FEB 444,000 11,100 432,900 184,697 9,176 
MAR 468,000 11,700 456,300 206,543 10,261 
APR 444,000 11,100 432,900 206,316 10,250 
M A Y j 408,000 10,200 397,800 199,355 9,904 
JUN 1 360.000 9,000 351,000 162,932 8,094 
JUL I 324.000 8JO0 315,900 135;599 6,736 
AUG 456,000 11,400 444,600 243,535 12,099 
SEPT 444,000 11,100 432,900 211,737 10,519 
OCT 516.000 12,900 503,100 290,306 14.422 
NOV ! 480,000 12,000 468,000 256,548 12,745 
DEC 432,000 10,800 421,200 209,748 10.420 
JAN 1987 j 456,000 11,400 444,600 198,648 9,869 
FEB 324.000 8,100 315,900 54,497 2.707 
MAR 336,000 8,400 327,600 56,518 2,808 
APR 540,000 13.500 526,500 232,953 11,573 
MAY 672,000 16,800 655,200 360,808 17,925 
JUN 564,000 14,100 549,900 259,534 12,894 
JUL 720,000 18,000 702,000 411,423 20,439 
AUG 756.000 18,900 737,100 447,442 22,229 
SEPT 648.000 16,200 631,800 360,507 17,910 
OCT 744,000 18,600 725.400 450,186 22,365 
NOV 864.000 21.600 842,400 575,523 28,592 
DEC 816,000 20,400 795,600 535,824 26.619 
JAN 1988 852,000 21,300 830,700 574,844 28,558 
448 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
FEB 912,000 22,800 889,200 632,557 31,425 
MAR 1,080,000 27,000 1,053,000 808,751 40,178 
APR 744,000 18,600 725,400 451,417 22,426 
M A Y 840,000 21,000 819,000 560,592 27,850 
JUN 660,000 16,500 643,500 384,595 19,107 
JUL 708,000 17,700 . 690,300 440,895 21,903 
AUG 816,000 20,400 795,600 543,511 27,001 
SEPT 768,000 19,200 748,800 501,582 24,918 
OCT 804,000 20,100 783,900 560:309 27,836 
NOV 888,000 22,200 865,800 630,237 31,310 
DEC 1,020,000 25,500 994,500 746,616 37,092 
449 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
JAN 1985 667 2.16% 
FEB 819 2.61% 
MAR 3,703 12.23% 
APR 6,732 22.27% 
M A Y 4,595 16.30% 
JUN 1,996 7.18% 
JUL -3,790 -13.71% 
AUG -3,044 -10.84% 
SEPT -1,038 -3.65% 
OCT -471 -1.69% 
NOV 2,018 6.96% 
DEC 2,429 8.50% 
JAN 1986 -3,184 -11.28% 
FEB -3,064 -12.20% 
MAR -1,978 -7.84% 
APR -1,990 -8.27% 
MAY -2,335 -10.33% 
JUN -4,145 -18.82% 
JUL -5,503 -25.48% 
AUG -141 -0.62% 
SEPT -1,720 -7.23% 
OCT 2,183 9.31% 
NOV 506 2.17% 
DEC -1,819 -7.81% 
JAN 1987 -2,371 -9.47% 
FEB -9,532 -37.19% 
MAR -9,431 -36.10% 
APR -666 -2.42% 
MAY 5,685 20.53% 
JUN 654 2.39% 
JUL 8,200 29.74% 
AUG 9,989 36.24% 
SEPT 5,671 21.38% 
OCT 10,126 37.73% 
NOV 16,352 61.54% 
DEC 14,380 54.97% 
JAN 1988 16,319 62.74% 
450 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
FEB 19,186 73.45% 
MAR 27,939 108.65% 
APR 10,187 38,05% 
MAY 15,611 59-76% 
JUN 6,867 26.49% 
JUL 9,664 37.89% 
AUG 14,762 57.27% 
SEPT 12,679 49.77% 
OCT 15,597 64.06% 
NOV 19,071 76.15% 




The Calculation of Time 




C . l U S G C - J A P 30,000 D W T . Grain 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
J A N 1985 327,826 37,697 365,523 63,950 429,473 
FEB 343,436 38,467 381,903 63,950 445,853 
M A R 337,582 37,697 375,280 63,950 439,230 
APR . 312,215 37,390 349,604 63,950 413,554 
M A Y 294,653 36,620 331,273 63,950 395,223 
JUN 259,529 36,312 295,841 63,950 359,791 
JUL 279,042 36,466 315,508 63,950 379,458 
AUG 279,042 36,312 315,355 63,950 379,305 
SEPT 286,847 36,466 323,314 63,950 387,264 
OCT 282,945 37,082 320,027 63,950 383,977 : 
NOV 261,480 37,390 298,870 63,950 362,820 1 
DEC 286,847 38,313. 325,160 63,950 389,110 ! 
J A N 1986 261,480 38,313 299,793 63.950 363,743 ' 
FEB 195,134 29,850 224,984 63,950 288,934 
MAR 193,183 26,157 219,340 63,950 283,290 
APR 152,205 26:157 178,362 63,950 242,312 
M A Y 119,032 23,080 142,112 63,950 206,062 ' 
JUN 138,545 23,080 161,625 63,950 225.575 ; 
JUL 126,837 22,772 149,610 63,950 213,560 I 
AUG 119,032 20,772 139,804 63,950 203,754 i 
SEPT 142,448 22,157 164,605 63,950 228,555 • 
OCT 148,302 22,003 170,305 63,950 234,255 ; 
NOV 150,253 21,541 171,795 63,950 235,745 
DEC 146,351 21,541 167,892 63,950 231,842 
JAN 1987 177,572 23,849 201,422 63,950 265,372 
FEB 202,940 24,926 227,866 64,950 292,816 
M A R 189,280 24,465 213,745 64,950 278,695 
APR 210,745 24,465 235,210 64,950 300,160 
M A Y 234,161 24,619 258,780 64,950 323,730 
JUN- 224,404 25,080 249,485 64,950 314,435 
JUL 224,404 24,619 249,023 64,950 313,973 
AUG 230,259 25,388 255,646 64,950 320,596 
SEPT 206,842 24,619 231,461 64.950 296,411 
OCT 200,988 24,311 225,299 64,950 290,249 
NOV 191,232 24,926 216,158 64,950 281,108 
DEC 175,621 24,926 200,547 64,950 265,497 
JAN 1988 146,351 24,619 170,969 64,950 235,919 
453 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
FEB 154,156 24,926 179,082 64,950 244,032 
M A R 124,886 24,926 149,812 64,950 214,762 
APR 152,205 24,619 176,823 64,950 241,773 
M A Y 158,059 25,080 183,139 64,950 248,089 
JUN 158,059 24,772 182,831 64,950 247,781 
JUL 130,740 24,003 154,743 64,950 219,693 
AUG 148,302 24,157 172,459 64,950 237,409 • 
SEPT 161,962 23,849 185,811 64,950 250,761 I 
OCT 122,935 24,003 146,938 64,950 211,888 
NOV 113,178 23,849 137,027 64,950 201,977 
DEC 144,399 24,619 169,018 64,950 233,968 
454 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
JAN 1985 555,985 13,900 542,086 112,613 3,293 
FEB 579,204 14,480 564,724 118,871 3,477 
M A R 569,161 14,229 554,932 115,703 3,384 
APR 540,067 13,502 526,565 113,011 3,305 
M A Y 525,155 13,129 512,026 116,803 3,416 
JUN 486,303 12,158 474,146 114,355 3,344 
JUL 492,294 12,307 479,986 100,528 2,940 
AUG 495,559 12,389 483,170 103,866 3,038 
SEPT 496,680 12,417 484,263 96,999 2,837 
OCT 500,231 12,506 487,725 103,749 3,034 
: NOV 492,751 12,319 480,432 117,613 3,440 
DEC 525,880 13,147 512,733 123,623 3,616 
J A N 1986 483,417 12,085 471,331 107,588 3,147. ; 
FEB 405,189 10,130 395,059 106,125 3,104 
MAR 389,287 9,732 379,555 96,265 2,815 : 
APR i 348,309 8,708 339,601 97,289 2,845 
M A Y 305,220 7,631 297,590 91,528 2,677 
JUN 1 324,734 8,118 316,615 91,040 2,663 
JUL 1 312,718 7,818 304,900 91,340 2,671 
AUG i 306,331 7,658 298,673 94,919 2,776 
SEPT I 348,229 8,706 339,523 110,968 3,245 
OCT i 350,510 8,763 341,747 107,492 3,144 
NOV 348,580 8,715 339,866 104,121 3,045 
DEC 341,258 8,531 332,727 100,885 2,950 : 
J A N 1987 385,045 9,626 375,419 110,048 3,218 
FEB 412,490 10,312 402,178 109,362 3,198 
MAR 425,723 10,643 415,080 136,385 3,989 
APR 467,703 11,693 456,011 155,851 4,558 
M A Y 504,950 12,624 492,326 168,597 4,931 
JUN 485,397 12,135 473,262 158,828 4,645 
JUL 491,774 12,294 479,480 165,507 4,840 
AUG 508,655 12,716 495,939 175,343 5,128 
SEPT 484,470 12,112 472,358 175,947 5,146 
OCT 478,308 11,958 466,350 176,101 5,150 
NOV 472,586 11,815 460,772 179,664 5,254 
DEC 480,910 12,023 468,887 203,390 5,948 
J A N 1988 482,106 12,053 470,053 234,134 6,848 
455 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
FEB 497,057 12,426 484,631 240,598 7,037 
M A R 478,045 11,951 466,094 251,331 7,350 
APR 505,056 12,626 492,429 250,656 7,331 
M A Y 504,533 12,613 491,920 243,831 7,131 
JUN 493,968 12,349 481,618 233,837 6,839 
JUL 493,233 12,331 480,903 261,209 7,639 
AUG 504,111 12,603 491,508 254,099 7,431 
SEPT 537,978 13,449 524,529 273,768 8,007 
OCT j 502,524 12,563 489,961 278,073 8,133 
NOV 499,452 12,486 486,966 284,989 8,335 
DEC 1 534,862 13,372 521,491 287,523 8,409 
456 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
J A N 1985 -5,101 -23.88% 
FEB -4,918 -22.50% 
M A R -5,010 -23-14% 
APR -5,089 -24.37% 
M A Y -4,978 -24.48% 
JUN" -5,050 -26.20% 
JUL -5,454 -27.47% 
AUG -5,357 -26.99% 
SEPT -5,557 -27.67% 
OCT -5,360 -26.81% 
NOV -4,955 -25.58% 
DEC -4,779 -23.71% 
JAN 1986 -5,284 -27.21% 
FEB -5,327 -31.01% 
M A R -5.615 -33.03% 
APR -5,585 -35.41% 
M A Y -5,754 -39.19% 
JUN -5,768 -37.78% 
JUL -5,759 -38.64% • 
AUG -5,654 -38.69% 
SEPT -5,185 -33.74% ; 
OCT -5,287 -34.02% ' 
NOV -5,385 -34.57% : 
DEC -5,480 -35.44% \ 
JAN 1987 -5,248 -31.79% 
FEB -5,268 -30.40% 
MAR -4,478 -26.45% 
APR -3,908 -22.22% 
M A Y -3,536 -19.32% 
JUN -3,821 -21.21% 
JUL -3,626 -20.14% 
AUG -3,338 -18.33% 
SEPT -3,321 -18.99% 
OCT -3,316 -19.16% 
NOV -3,212 -18.86% 
DEC -2,518 -15.19% 
JAN 1988 -1,655 -10.51% 
457 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
FEB -1,466 -9.16% 
MAR -1,152 -7.61% 
APR -1,172 -7.35% 
M A Y -1,372 -8.50% 
JUN -1,664 -10-33% 
JUL -863 -5.65% 
AUG -1,071 -6.77% 
SEPT -496 -3.06% 
OCT -370 -2.46% 
NOV -168 -1.14% 
DEC -94 -0.60% ' 
458 
C.2 H R - J A P 55,000 D W T . Coal 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker V^oyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
JAN 1985 230,630 23,079 253,709 93,325 347,034 
FEB 241,613 23,550 265,163 93,325 358,488 
MAR 237,494 23,079 260,573 93,325 353,898 
APR 219,648 22,891 242,539 93,325 335,864 
MAY 207,293 22,420 229,712 93,325 323,037 
JUN 182,582 22,231 204,814 93,325 298,139 
JUL 196,310 22,325 218,636 93,325 311,961 
AUG 196,310 22,231 218,542 93,325 311,867 
SEPT 201,802 22,325 224,127 93,325 317,452 
OCT 199,056 22,702 221,758 93,325 315,083 
NOV 183,955 22,891 206,846 93,325 300,171 
DEC 201,802 •23,456 225,257 93,325 318,582 
JAN 1986 183,955 23,456 207,411 93,325 300,736 
FEB 137,280 18,275 155,555 93,325 248,880 ; 
MAR 135,907 16,014 151,921 93,325 245,246 1 
APR 107,078 16,014 123,092 93,325 216,417 1 
MAY 83,741 14,130 97,871 93,325 191,196 1 
JUN 97,469 14,130 111,599 93,325 204,924 
JUL 89:232 13,942 103,174 93,325 196,499 
AUG 83,741 12,717 96,458 93,325 189,783 
SEPT 100,214 13,565 113,779 93,325 207,104 
OCT 104,333 13,471 117,803 93,325 211,128 
NOV 105,706 13,188 118,894 93,325 212,219 
DEC 102,960 13,188 116,148 93,325 209,473 
JAN 1987 124,925 14,601 139,526 93,325 232,851 
FEB 142,771 15,260 158,032 94,325 252,357 
MAR 133,162 14,978 148,139 94,325 242,464 
APR 148,262 14,978 163,240 94,325 257,565 
MAY 164,736 15,072 179,808 94,325 274,133 
JUN 157,872 
• 
15,355 173,227 94,325 267,552 
JUL 157,872 15,072 172,944 94,325 267,269 
AUG 161,990 15,543 177,533 94,325 271,858 
SEPT 145,517 15,072 160,589 94,325 254,914 
OCT 141,398 14,884 156:282 94,325 250,607 
NOV 134,534 15,260 149,795 94,325 244,120 
DEC 123,552 15,260 138,812 94,325 233,137 
JAN 1988 102,960 15,072 118,032 94,325 212,357 
459 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
FEB 108,451 15,260 123,712 94,325 218,037 
MAR 87,859 15,260 103,120 94,325 197,445 
APR 107,078 15,072 122,150 94,325 216,475 
MAY 111,197 15,355 126,551 94,325 220,876 
JUN 111,197 15,166 126,363 94,325 220,688 
JUL 91,978 14,695 106,673 94,325 200,998 
AUG 104,333 14,789 119,122 94,325 213,447 
SEPT 113,942 14,601 128,543 94,325 222,868 
OCT 86,486 14,695 101,182 94,325 195,507 
NOV 79,622 14,601 94,223 94,325 188,548 
DEC . 101,587 15,072 116,659 94,325 210,984 
460 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
JAN 1985 516,594 12,915 503,680 156,645 4,989 
FEB 524,908 13,123 511,785 153,297 4,882 
M A R 517,178 12,929 504,249 150,351 4,788 
APR 496,004 12,400 483,604 147,740 4,705 • 
M A Y 476,897 11,922 464,975 141,938 4,520 
JUN 448,859 11,221 437,637 139,499 4,443 
JUL 450,121 11,253 438,868 126,907 4,042 
AUG 453,167 11,329 441,837 129,971 4,139 
SEPT 458,752 11,469 447,283 129,831 4,135 
OCT 459,523 11,488 448,035 132,952 4,234 
NOV 1 457.171 
1 • 
11,429 445,742 145,571 4,636 
DEC 1 481,862 12,047 469,816 151,233 4,816 
JAN 1986 442,036 11,051 430.985 130,249 4,148 
FEB 382,330 9,558 372,772 123,892 3,946 
M A R i 378,696 9,467 369,229 123,983 3,948 
APR ; 342,017 8,550 333,467 117,050 3,728 
M A Y ; : 321,506 8,038 313,468 122.272 3,894 
JUN ; i 335,234 8,381 326,853 121,929 3,883 
JUL ^ 318,959 7,974 310,985 114,486 3.646 
AUG 316,953 7,924 309,029 119.246 3,798 
SEPT ! ; 348,404 8,710 339,694 132,590 4,223 
OCT i j 360,278 9,007 351,271 140,143 4,463 
NOV '! 353,519 8,838 344,681 132,462 4.219 
DEC 335,073 8,377 326,696 117,223 3.733 
• 
JAN 1987 i 389,851 9,746 380,105 147,254 4,690 
FEB 409,357 10,234 399,123 146,766 4,674 
MAR 415,164 10,379 404,785 162,321 5,169 
APR 445,965 11,149 434,816 177,251 5,645 
M A Y 493,933 12,348 481,585 207,452 6,607 
JUN 471,652 11,791 459,860 192,309 6,124 
JUL 474,509 • 11,863 462,646 195,377 6.222 
AUG 516,778 12,919 503,859 232,001 7,389 
SEPT 493,554 12,339 481,215 226,301 7,207 
OCT 526,927 13,173 513,754 263,147 8,380 
NOV 526,720 13,168 513,552 269,432 8,581 
DEC "515,737 12,893 502,844 269,707 8,589 
JAN 1988 542,057 13,551 528,506 316,149 10,068 
461 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
FEB 594,837 14,871 579,966 361,929 11,526 
MAR 621,345 15,534 605,811 408,366 13,005 
APR 640,375 16,009 624,366 407,891 12,990 
MAY 613,376 15,334 598,042 377,166 12,012 
JUN 558,238 13,956 544,282 323,594 10,306 
JUL 514,998 12,875 502,123 301,125 9,590 
AUG 583,967 14,599 569,368 355,921 11,335 
SEPT 612,228 15,306 596,923 374,054 11,913 
OCT. i 578,587 14,465 564,122 368,615 11,739 
NOV 581,048 14,526 566,522 377,974 12,037 
DEC 603,484 15,087 588,397 377,413 12,020 
462 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
J A N 1985 -4,920 -23.02% 
FEB -5,027 -23.12% 
M A R -5,121 -23.72% 
APR -5,204 -24.78% 
MAY -5,389 -26.19% 
JUN -5,466 -27.66% 
JUL -5,867 -29.04% 
AUG -5,770 -28.56% 
SEPT -5,774 -28.33% 
OCT 1 -5,675 -27.94% 
NOV -5,273 -26.59% 
DEC -5,092 -24.92% 
JAN 1986 -5,741 -28.97% 
FEB -5,944 -32.80% 
MAR -5,941 -33.00% 
APR i -6.161 -36.13% 
i\LAY 1 -5,995 -36.93% 
JUN i -6,006 -36.00% 
JUL ! ' -6,243 -38.07% 
AUG : -6,091 -37.64% 
SEPT I -5,667 -33.81% 
OCT i -5,426 -32.11% 
NOV -5.671 -33.50% 
DEC ! -6,156 -36.58% 
JAN 1987 -5,180 -29.44% 
FEB i -5,195 -28.50% 
MAR -4,700 -26-22% 
APR -4,224 -22.93% 
MAY -3,263 -17.18% 
JUN -3,745 -19.96% 
JUL -3,647 -19.44% 
AUG -2,481 -13.10% 
SEPT -2,662 -14.48% 
OCT -1.489 -8.15% 
NOV -1,289 -7.13% 
DEC -1,280 -7.23% 
JAN 1988 219 1.28% 
463 
Month Daily Net- Return on 
Surplus Investment 
FEB 1,677 9.71% 
M A R 3,156 18.97% 
APR 3,140 18.20% 
M A Y 2,162 12.44% 
JUN 456 2.63% 
JUL -260 -1.56% 
AUG 1,485 8.68% 
SEPT 2,063 11.83% 
OCT L890 11.43% 
NOV 2.188 13.41% 
DEC 2,170 12.73% 
464 
C.3 B R Z - N W E 120,000 D W T . Iron Ore 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
JAN 1985 231,186 23,460 254,647 105,658 360,305 
FEB 239,840 23,460 263,301 105,658 368,959 
MAR 216,351 23,989 240,340 105,658 345,998 
APR 213,878 23,989 237,867 105,658 343,525 
M A Y ! 176,790 22,192 198,982 105,658 304,640 
JUN 170,608 22,192 192,800 105,658 298,458 
JUL 170,608 21,664 192,272 105,658 297,930 
AUG ! 178,026 22,615 200,641 105,658 306,299 
SEPT j 182,971 24,094 207,065 105,658 312,723 
OCT 1 170,608 25,046 195,654 105,658 301,312 
NOV 190,389 25,363 215,751 105,658 321,409 
DEC 182,971 24,517 207,488 105,658 313,146 
JAN 1986 179,262 24,200 203,462 105,658 309,120 
FEB 1 123.629 18.916 142,545 105,658 248,203 
MAR 1 124,865 19,233 144,099 105^658 249,757 
APR i 101,376 19,550 120,926 105,658 226,584 
MAY j i 77,886 
JUN i l 70,469 
14,901 92,787 105,658 198,445 
11,942 82,410 105,658 188,068 
JUL 1 64,287 10,356 74,643 105,658 180,301 
AUG ! 82,831 12,576 95,407 105,658 201,065 
SEPT 102,612 12,893 115,505 105,658 221,163 
OCT 95,194 11,942 107,136 105,658 212,794 
NOV 93,958 11,836 105,794 105,658 211,452 
DEC 93,958 11,836 105,794 105,658 211,452 
JAN 1987 124,865 15,429 140,294 105,658 245,952 
FEB 111,266 14,795 126,061 135,342 261,403 
MAR 121,156 14,583 135,740 135,342 271,082 
APR 143,410 14,795 158,205 135,342 293,547 
MAY 143,410 15,640 159,050 135,342 294,392 
JUN 139,701 15,323 155,024 135,342 290,366 
JUL i 1 139,701 15,535 155,235 135,342 290,577 
AUG 138,465 15,852 154,316 135,342 289,658 
SEPT 121,156 14,795 135,951 135,342 271,293 
OCT 124,865 15,006 139,872 135,342 275,214 
NOV 116,211 15,323 131,535 135,342 266,877 
DEC 108,794 15,640 124,434 135,342 259,776 
J A N 1988 105,085 15,429 120,514 135,342 255,856 
465 
Month Cost of Cost of Total Other Total 
Heavy Diesel Bunker Voyage Voyage 
Fuel Oil Oil Cost Costs Cost 
FEB 95,194 13,738 108,932 147,711 256,643 
MAR 84,068 12,470 96,538 147,711 244,249 
APR 111,266 15,006 126,272 147,711 273,983 
M A Y 96,431 14,266 110,697 147,711 258,408 
JUN 97,667 13,527 111,194 147,711 258,905 
JUL 89,013 12,681 101,694 147,711 249,405 
AUG i 91,485 12,893 104,378 147,711 252,089 
SEPT i 87,777 11,730 99,507 147,711 247,218 
OCT ; 65,523 10,356 75,880 147,711 223,591 
NOV j 76,650 11,202 87,852 147,711 235,563 
DEC i 1 86,540 13,632 100,173 147,711 247,884 
466 
Month Gross Commission .Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
J A N 1985 519,324 12,983 506,341 146,036 7,255 
FEB 527,978 13,199 514,779 145,820 7,244 
M A R 507,030 12,676 494,354 • 148,357 7,370 
APR 502,544 12,564 489,981 146,456 7,276 
M A Y 455,608 11,390 444,217 139,578 6,934 
JUN 447,413 11,185 436,228 137,770 6,844 
JUL 442,859 11,071 431,787 133,858 6,650 
1 AUG 451,228 11,281 439,947 133,648 6,640 
SEPT 453,627 11,341 442,286 129,563 6,437 = 
I OCT 446,241 11,156 435,085 133,773 6,646 
: NOV 466,338 11,658 454,680 133,271 6,621 
, DEC 458,075 11,452 446.623 133,477 6,631 
! JAN 1986 445,998 11,150 434,848 125,727 6,246 : 
i FEB 381,055 9,526 371,529 123,325 6,127 : 
MAR 1 364,492 9,112 355,380 105:623 5.247 
. APR j 337,294 8,432 328,861 102,277 5,081 
M A Y 309,154 7,729 301,426 102,981 5,116 
JUN j 298,778 7,469 291,308 103,240 5,129 
JUL 291,011 7,275 283,736 103,434 5,139 
AUG 311,775 7,794 303,980 102,915 5,113 
SEPT 352,001 8,800 343,201 122,039 6,063 
OCT 343,633 8,591 335,042 122,248 6,073 
NOV 342,291 8,557 333,733 122,281 6,075 
DEC 342,291 8,557 333,733 122,281 6,075 
JAN 1987 376,791 9,420 367,371 121,419 6,032 
FEB 392,242 9,806 382,436 121,033 6,013 ' 
MAR 411,985 10,300 401,686 130,604 6,488 
APR 444,514 11,113 433,401 139,855 6,948 
M A Y 461,463 11,537 449,926 155,534 7,727 
JUN 449,385 11,235 438,151 147,785 7,342 
JUL 465,700 11,642 454,057 163,480 8,122 i 
AUG 486,923 12,173 474,750 185,091 9,195 
SEPT 468,558 11,714 456,844 185,551 9,218 
OCT 486,568 12,164 474,404 199,191 9,896 
NOV 488,296 12,207 476,088 209,212 10,394 
DEC 541,582 13,540 528,043 268,267 13,327 
JAN 1988 533,636 13,341 520,295 264,440 13,137 
467 
Month Gross Commission Net Gross Daily Gross 
Freight Freight Voyage Voyage 
Revenue Revenue Surplus Surplus 
FEB 540,463 13,512 526,951 270,308 13,429 
MAR 558,262 13,957 544,305 300,056 14,907 
APR 587,996 14,700 573,296 299,313 14,870 
M A Y 550,279 13,757 536,522 278,114 13,817 
JUN 530,647 13,266 517,380 258,476 12,841 
JUL 517,121 12,928 504,193 254,788 12,658 
AUG 529,870 13,247 516,623 264,534 13,142 
SEPT 533,050 13,326 519,724 272,506 13,538 
OCT 525,526 13,138 512,388 288,797 14,347 
NOV 537,498 13,437 524,061 288,498 14,332 
DEC 549,819 13,745 536,074 288,190 14,317 
468 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
J A N 1985 -4,984 -16.19% 
FEB -4,995 -16.00% 
M A R -4,869 -16.20% 
APR -4,963 -16.58% 
M A Y -5,305 -18-99% 
JUN -5,395 -19.53% 
JUL -5,589 -20.26% 
AUG -5,600 -19.99% 
SEPT -5,803 -20.48% 
OCT -5,594 -20.15% 
NOV -5,618 -19.52% 
DEC -5,608 -19.77% 
J A N 1986 -5,993 -21.29% 
FEB -6,113 -24.41% 
M A R -6,992 -27.86 
APR -7.158 -29.93% 
M A Y -7,123 -31.68% 
JUN 1 - ' . . l i o -32.39% 
JUL ! -7,101 -32.94% 
AUG 1 -7,126 -31.51% 
SEPT-- \ -6.176 -26.10% 
OCT -6,166 -26.53% 
NOV -6,164 -26.61% 
DEC -6.164 -26.61% 
J A N 1987 -6,207 -24.90% 
FEB -6,226 -24.22% 
M A R -5,751 -21.94% 
APR -5,291 -19.33% 
M A Y -4,512 -16.45% 
JUN -4,897 -17.99% 
JUL -4,118 -15.11% 
AUG -3,044 -11.18% 
SEPT -3,021 -11.49% 
OCT • -2,344 -8.84% 
NOV -1,846 -7.07% 
DEC 1,088 4.21% 
J A N 1988 898 3.51% 
469 
Month Daily Net Return on 
Surplus Investment 
FEB 1,189 4.64% -
MAR 2,667 10.64% 
APR 2,630 9.90% 
M A Y 1,577 6.12% 
JUN 602 2.34% 
JUL 418 1.66% 
AUG 903 3.55% 
SEPT L299 5.16% 
OCT 2,108 8.78% 
NOV 2,093 8.51% 
DEC i 2,078 8.23% 
470 
Appendix D 
The Calculation of Freight 
Futures Returns on Investment 
471 
D . l U S G C - J A P 30,000 D W T . Grain 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate BFI Price Rate 
01-05-1985 17.5 1062 981 16.17 484,958 
05-06-1985 .17.5 931 882 16.58 497,368 
10-07-1985 17.5 792.5 788.5 17.41 522,350 
31-07-1985 17.5 725.5 725.5 * * * * * **++++ 
01-08-1985 17.5 718.5 770 18.75 562,630 
14-08-1985 17.5 718.5 814 19.83 594,781 
18-09-1985 17.5 765 846 19.35 580,588 
23-10-1985 17.5 898.5 905 17.63 528,798 
31-10-1985 1 17.5 905 903 * * * * * * * * * * * 
01-11-1985 ! 16.4 906.5 910 16.46 493,900 
27-11-1985 I 16.4 900 899 16.38 491,453 
02-01-1986 i 16.4 897.5 893.5 16.33 489,807 
31-01-1986 \ 16.4 831 853 •*+*•• **+*++ 
03-02-1986 \ 16.4 827.5 899.5 17.83 534,308 
05-02-1986 16.4 811.5 874 17.66 529,893 
12-03-1986 il 16.4 742.5 845 18.66 559,919 
16-04-1986 16.4 681 672 16.18 485,498 
30-04-1986 j : 16.4 658.5 661.5 * * * * * 
01-05-1986 j 10.2 658 657.5 10.19 305,767 
21-05-1986 1 10.2 665 646.5 9.92 297,487 
25-06-1986 i 10.2 620.5 593 9.75 292,438 
30-07-1986 j 10.2 556.5 561 10.28 308,474 
31-07-1986 1 10.2 553.5 560.5 + *** * * « t * * * * 
01-08-1986 10.2 556 641 11.76 352,781 
03-09-1986 10.2 700 826 12.04 361,080 
08-10-1986 10.2 795 784 10.06 301,766 
31-10-1986 10.2 786.5 786 * * * * * ++**+* 
01-11-1986 10.2 784 747.5 9.73 29L754 
12-11-1986 14 781 737.5 13.22 396,607 
17-12-1986 13.7 700.5 679.5 13.29 398,679 
21-01-1987 15.5 853.5 840 15.25 457,645 
31-01-1987 15.5 866.5 864.5 * ** * + * 4i * + t * 
02-02-1987 15.4 861.5 762 13.62 408,641 
25-02-1987 15.4 848-5 795.5 14.44 433,142 
01-04-1987 17.6 998 1032 18.20 545,988 
30-04.1987 17.6 1019.5 1015 *** * + * * * * * * 
01-05-1987 19.5 1025 938 17.84 535,346 
472 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate BFI Price Rate 
06-05-1987 19.5 1034 970 18.29 548,791 
10-06-1987 16.2 980.5 870 14.37 431,229 
15-07-1987 16.2 923.5 926 16.24 487,316 
31-07-1987 16.2 976.5 971.5 * + + + * ***+*+ 
03-08-1987 16.2 982.5 1114 18.37 551,047 
19-08-1987 16.2 1129 1180 16.93 507,954 
23-09-1987 16.2 1026.5 1071 16.90 507,069 
28-10-1987 16.2 1158 1157 16.19 485,580 
31-10-1987 16.2 1171.5 1159 • * + * * • + * * 
02-11-1987 16.2 1172.5 1232 17.02 510;663 
02-12-1987 22.0 1213.5 1277 23.15 694,536 
06-01-1988 25.0 1284.5 1348 26.24 787,077 
31-01-1988 25.0 1393 1391 * * * * * * * * * * * 
01-02-1988 29.0 1399.5 1515 • 31.39 941,801 
10-02-1988 29.0 1516 1549 29.63 888,938 • 
16-03-1988 ' 30.5 1596.5 1670 31.90 957,125 
20-04-1988 1 25.0 1475 1418.5 24.04 721,271 
30-04-1988 . 25.0 1358 1380 * * * * * * * * ¥ * * 
01-05-1988 • 24.5 1345 1229.5 22.40 671,883 
25-05-1988 : 1 24.5 1404 1265 22.07 662,233 . 
29-06-1988 1 21.5 1224 1205 21.17 634,988 1 
31-07-1988 i 21.8 1197 1198 * * * * * * * * * * * 
01-08-1988 ! 22.5 1196 1245 23.42 702,655 * 
03-08-1988 22.5 1192 1240 23.41 702,181 j 
31-08-1988 ! 22.5 1267 1261 * * * * * t«* « * * 
01-09-1988 23.5 1272 1375 25.40 762,087 
07-09-1988 23.5 1277 1347 24.79 743,645 
30-09-1988 23.5 1270 1274 * * * * * * * * * * * 
03-10-1988 25.0 1275 1357 26.61 798,235 
12-10-1988 25.0 1305 1357 26.00 779,885 
31-10-1988 25.0 1373 1368 * * * * * * * * * * * 
01-11-1988 26.5 1378 1464 28.15 844,615 
16-11-1988 26.5 1473 1520 27.35 820,367 
30-11-1988 26.5 1501 1510 * * * * * ****** 1 
01-12-1988 27.0 1501 1487 26.75 802,445 
21-12-1988 27.0 1523 1566 27.76 832,869 
30-12-1988 27.0 1543 1590 * * + ** * t *** * 
473 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of Sell Conimission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
01-05-1985 290,975 30 294,300 buy 900 
05-06-1985 298,421 34 299,880 buy 1,020 
10-07-1985 313,410 40 315,400 buy 1,200 
31-07-1985 4= * + * * + 4 + * *+ + * + 
01-08-1985 337,578 44 338,800 buy 1,320 
14-08-1985 356,868 44 358,160 buy 1,320 
' 18-09-1985 348,353 42 355,320 buy 1,260 
23-10-1985 1 317,279 36 325,800 buy 1,080 
31-10-1985 + + * t *+ + * f * f-»• * 
01-11-1985 1 296,340 33 300,300 buy 990 
27-11-1985 1 294,872 33 296,670 buy 990 
02-01-1986 ! 293,884 33 294,855 buy 990 
31-01-1986 - * + 
03-02-1986 1 320,885 36 323,820 buy 1.080 
05-02-1986 ; 317,936 37 323,380 buy 1.110 
12-03-1986 i 335,952 40 338,000 buy 1.200 
16-04-1986 I 291,299 44 295,680 buy 1,320 
30-04-1986 1 f f f * * 
1 
* + 
01-05-1986 i 183,460 28 184,100 buy 840 
21-05-1986 ; 178,492- 28 181,020 buy 840 
25-06-1986 I 175,463 30 177,900 buy 900 
30-07-1986 1 185,085 33 185,130 buy 990 
31-07-1986 1 f + ^ + * ^ f * * * 
01-08-1986 j 211,668 34 217,940 buy 1,020 
03-09-1986 216,648 27 223,020 buy 810 
08-10-1986 181,060 24 188,160 buy 720 
31-10-1986 + • » i t ^ * + 
01-11-1986 175,052 24 179,400 buy 720 
12-11-1986 428,335 59 435,125 buy 1,770 
17-12-1986 430,573 64 434,880 sell 1,920 
21-01-1987 494,257 59 495,600 buy 1,770 
31-01-1987 + + 
02-02-1987 441,332 58 441,960 buy 1,740 
25-02-1987 467,793 59 469,345 buy 1,770 
01-04-1987 589,667 58 598,560 seli 1,740 
30-04-1987 * + *+++*+ * * * * • 
01-05-1987 578,174 62 581,560 sell 1,860 
474 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of Sell Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
06-05-1987 592,694 62 601,400 sell 1,860 
10-06-1987 258,737 30 261,000 sell 900 
15-07-1987 292,389 32 296,320 sell 960 
31-07-1987 ¥¥ ¥ ¥ * ¥ * 
03-08-1987 330,628 30 334,200 sell 900 
19-08-1987 304,772 26 306,800 buy 780 
23-09-1987 304,241 29 310,590 buy 870 
28-10-1987 291,348 26 300,820 buy 780 
31-10-1987 + + + * * ¥ ¥¥•¥ 
02-11-1987 306,398 25 308,000 buy 750 
02-12-1987 750,099 59 753,430 sell 1,770 
06-01-1988 850,043 64 862,720 sell 1,920 
31-01-1988 + * + + * t * + + 
01-02-1988 1,017,145 68 1.030,200 sell 2,040 
10-02-1988 960,053 62 960.380 sell 1,860 
16-03-1988 1,033,695 62 1,035,400 buy 1,860 
20-04-1988 778,973 55 780,175 buy 1,650 
30-04-1988 + - + + + T t + + * ¥¥ ¥f 
01-05-1988 725,634 60 737,700 buy 1,800 
25-05-1988 ! 715,212 57 721,050 buy 1,710 
29-06-1988 685,787 57 686,850 sell 1,710 
31-07-1988 f * ^ * 41 * + f * * ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ 
01-08-1988 758,867 61 759,450 sell 1,830 
03-08-1988 758,356 62 768,800 buy L860 
31-08-1988 - +*++*+ ¥ ¥ r ¥ ¥¥ ¥ 
01-09-1988 823,054 60 825,000 buy 1,800 
07-09-1988 803,137 60 808,200 sell 1,800 
30-09-1988 + * * * + 41 f * + + t( + ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥¥ 
03-10-1988 862,094 64 868,480 sell 1,920 
12-10-1988 842,276 63 854,910 buy 1,890 
31-10-1988 + * ¥ • ¥ ¥ * * *' * * 
01-11-1988 912,185 63 922,320 buy 1,890 
16-11-1988 885,996 59 896,800 buy 1,770 
30-11-1988 + + ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥¥ ¥¥ 
01-12-1988 866,641 59 877,330 buy 1,770 
21-12-1988 899,499 58 908,280 sel'l 1,740 
30-12-1988 • + * * t* ¥ ¥ ¥ * + ** 
475 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Future's 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/Loss Prof/Loss 
01-05-1985 295,200 ^ ***+*++ f t * * * * * 
05-06-1985 300,900 264,600 -29,700 -29,700 -30,600 
10-07-1985 316,600 268,090 -31,790 -31,790 -32,810 
31-07-1985 **•+** + 290,200 -25,200 -25,200 -26,400 
01-08-1985 340,120 * « > + * * * t * * * * * * t * * * * * * 
14-08-1985 359,480 358,160 19,360 19,360 18,040 
18-09-1985 356,580 372,240 14,080 14,080 12,760 
23-10-1985 326,880 380,100 24,780 24,780 23,520 
31-10-1985 325,080 -720 -720 -1,800 
01-11-1985 301,290 t ****** f + f + + + + ******* 1 1 -t t * * * 
27-11-1985 297,660 296,670 -3,630 -3,630 -4,620 
02-01-1986 295,845 294,855 -1,815 -1,815 -2,805 
31-0M986 +***** 281,490 -13,365 -13,365 -14,355 
03-02-1986 324,900 4c t * * * f t * * * * * t * + + + 1 * 
05-02-1986 324,490 314,640 -9,180 -9,180 -10,260 
12-03-1986 339,200 312,650 -10,730 -10,730 -11,840 
16-04-1986 297,000 268,800 -69,200 -69,200 -70,400 
30-04-1986 ****** 291,060 -4,620 -4,620 -5,940 : 
01-05-1986 i 184,940 * + + 1 + + + 4c f # f « * t + t + ,t * + 
21-05-1986 181,860 181,020 -3,080 -3,080 -3,920 
25-06-1986 i 178,800 166,040 -14,980 -14,980 -15,820 
30-07-1986 186,120 168,300 -9,600 -9,600 -10,500 
31-07-1986 ****** 184,965 -165 -165 -1,155 
01-08-1986 218,960 ******* ******* f + + 1 * * * 
03-09-1986 223,830 280,840 62,900 62,900 61,880 
08-10-1986 188,880 211,680 -11,340 -11,340 -12,150 
31-10-1986 ****** 188,640 480 480 -240 
01-11-1986 180,120 f » * * « t * f > t ;^  4i.t * ******* t * * * * * * 
12-11-1986 436,895 177,000 -2,400 -2,400 -3,120 
17-12-1986 436,800 400,905 -34,220 -34,220 -35,990 
21-01-1987 497,370 537,600 102,720 -102,720 -104,640 
31-01-1987 ****** 510,055 14,455 14,455 12,685 
02-02-1987 443,700 ^ ^  # t * * * « « f t * * * 4c t * * * * * t T * * * * * 
25-02-1987 471,115 461,390 19,430 19,430 17,690 
01-04-1987 600,300 608,880 139,535 139,535 137,765 
30-04-1987 ****** 588,700 -9,860 9,860 8,120 
01-05-1987 583,420 ^ * * t * * * f t * * * * * 1 1 * * * * * 
476 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Vadue of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/Loss Prof/Loss 
06-05-1987 603,260 601,400 19,840 -19,840 -21,700 
10-06-1987 261,900 539,400 -62,000 62,000 60,140 
15-07-1987 297,280 277,800 16,800 -16,800 -17,700 
31-07-1987 ****** 310,880 14,560 -14,560 -15,520 
03-08-1987 335,100 ******* ******* ******* ******* 
19-08-1987 307,580 354,000 19,800 -19,800 -20,700 
23-09-1987 311,460 278,460 -28,340 -28,340 -29,120 
28-10-1987 301,600 335,530 24,940 24,940 24,070 
31-10-1987 ****** 301,340 520 520 -260 
02-11-1987 308,750 * * 4< * * * * 4t * * * * * * * * + * + * + f * ** fc r * 
02-12-1987 755,200 319,250 11,250 11,250 10,500 
06-01-1988 864,640 795,320 41,890 -41,890 -43,660 
31-01-1988 ****** 890,240 27,520 -27,520 -29,440 
01-02-1988 1,032,240 ******* ******* ******* * * * * 4c * 4c 
10-02-1988 962,240 1,053,320 23,120 -23^20 -25,160 
16-03-1988 1,037,260 1,035,400 75,020 -75.020 -76,880 ! 
20-04-1988 781,825 879,470 -155:930 -155,930 -157,790 i 
30-04-1988 1 + + + * + + 
1 
759,000 -21,175 -21,175 -22,825 j 
01-05-1988 i 739,500 ****** t * ^ * f * >« f ***** * 
4c .* 4c * * * * i 
25-05-1988 ; 722,760 759,000 21,300 21,300 19,500 1 
29-06-1988 688,560 686,850 -34,200 -34,200 -35,910 
31-07-1988 t * ** * 4r 682,860 -3,990 3,990 2,280 
01-08-1988 761,280 ******* 4c * 4< * ^ * * V * . * * * * * * * * * * * 4 1 
03-08-1988 770,660 756,400 -3,050 3,050 1,220 
31-08-1988 **++*+ 781,820 13,020 13,020 11,160 
01-09-1988 826,800 ******* ^* ** ** * r* ** *** ******* 
07-09-1988 810,000 808,200 -16,800 -16,800 -18,600 
30-09-1988 ****** 764,400 -43,800 43,800 42,000 
03-10-1988 870,400 ******* 4r * * * * * * ***** f* ******* 
12-10-1988 856,800 868,480 0 0 -1,920 
31-10-1988 ** **** 861,840 6,930 6,930 5,040 
01-11-1988 924,210 4c* * * * * * 4c f ** *** ******* ******* 
16-11-1988 898,570 957,600 35,280 35,280 33,390 
30-11-1988 ****** 890,900 -5,900 -5,900 -7,670 
01-12-1988 879,100 ******* ^* **** * ******* ******* 
21-12-1988 910,020 923,940 46,610 46,610 44.840 
30-12-1988 ****** 922,200 13,920 -13,920 -15,660 
477 
Month Monthly Monthly Return on 
Return Costs Investment 
M A Y 1985 -27,103 261,463 -10.37% 
JUN -27,870 257,263 -10.83% 
JUL -34,837 393,974 -8.84% 
AUG 24,602 524,995 4.69% 
SEPT 14.934 307,049 4.86% 
OCT 12,984 551,016 2.36% 
NOV -4,941 335,308 -1.47% 
DEC -2,484 263,642 -0.94% 
JAN 1986 -14,355 295,845 -4.85% 
FEB -19-,055 565,950 -3.37% 
M A R -47,296 296,652 -15.94% 
APR -32,089 422,989 -7.59% 
M A Y -8,892 242,096 -3.67% 
JUN -12,648 155,355 -8.14% 
JUL -9,855 334,269 -2.95% 
AUG 56,420 199,640 28.26% 
SEPT -3,913 191,989 -2.04% 
OCT -3,017 240,041 -1.26% 
NOV -24,714 . 442,257 -5.59% 
DEC -65,221 386,918 -16.86%' : 
JAN 1987 -41,130 722,010 -5.70% 
FEB 37,371 511,002 7.31% 
M A R 118,364 424,513 27.88% 
APR 7,840 579,600 1.35% 
MAY 22,975 1,031,556 2.23% 
JUN 4,845 312,264 1.55% 
JUL -22,600 402,040 -5.62% 
AUG -33,180 466,920 -7.11% 
SEPT -9,763 264,749 -3.69% 
OCT 16,933 524,071 3.23% 
NOV 10,500 308,750 3.40% 
DEC -38,670 668,891 -5.78% 
J A N 1988 -34,430 950,949 -3.62% 
FEB -66,895 1,554,599 -4.30% 
M A R -102,769 884,421 -11.62% 
APR -112,991 1,374,545 -8.22% 
M A Y 10,266 925,353 1.11% 
478 
Month Monthly Monthly Return on 
Return Costs Investment 
JUN -26,372 628,715 -4.19% 
JUL 1,976 596,752 0.33% 
AUG 12,380 1,531,940 0.81% 
SEPT 23,400 1,636,800 1.43% 
OCT 3,120 1,727,200 0.18% 
NOV 25,720 1,822,780 1.41% 
DEC 29,180 1,789,120 1.63% 
479 
D.2 H R - J A P 55,000 D W T . Coal 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate B F I Price Rate 
01-05-1985 13.0 1062 981 12.01 660,466 
02-06-1985 11.5 931 884 10.92 600,569 
04-07-1985 10.5 817.5 820 10.53 579,266 
31-07-1985 10.5 725.5 725.5 * 
01-08-1985 10.4 718.5 770 11.15 612,999 
05-08-1985 10.4 • 716 781 11.34 623,927 
06-09-1985 10.5 735 814 11.63 639,571 
08-10-1985 11.0 883 863.5 10.76 591,639 
31-10-1985 11.0 905 903 + + + + + 
01-11-1985 10.8 906.5 910 10.84 596,293 
09-11-1985 10.8 898.5 868.5 10.44 574,167 
11-12-1985 10.8 916 882 10.40 571,952 
12-01-1986 10.0 917.5 904.5 9.86 542,207 : 
31-01-1986 10.0 831 853 t •* f + f +t 
03-02-1986 10.0 827.5 899-5 10.87 597,355 1 
13-02-1986 10.0 784 883 11.26 619^452 ! 
17-03-1986 ! 8.5 744 820 9.37 515.255 
18-04-1986 : 7.2 685 685 7.20 396,000 ; 
30-04-1986 7.2 658.5 661.5 + f * * 4t f 1 1 ^ * + 1 ! 
01-05-1986 7.0 658 657.5 6.99 384 J 0 7 
20-05-1986 7.0 664.5 643 6.77 372,543 
21-06-1986 7.0 637 606 6.66 366,264 
23-07-1986 6.5 569 565 6.45 354,987 
31-07-1986 6.5 553.5 560.5 
01-08-1986 6.4 556 641 7.38 405,813 
24-08-1986 6.4 636 749 7.54 414,541 
25-09-1986 10.2 789.5 826 10.67 586,936 
27-10-1986 9.5 786 782.5 9.46 520,173 
31-10,1986 9.5 786.5 786 + * * + * 
03-11-1986 9.3 784 747.5 8.87 487,687 
28-11-1986 9.3 737.5 675 8.51 468,153 
30-12-1986 8.7 697 712.5 8.89 489,141 
31-01-1987 11.3 861.5 864.5 
02-02-1987 10.8 866.5 762 10.78 592,629 
04-03-1987 12.2 859.5 857 12.16 669,048 
05-04-1987 13.5 1033 1080 14.11 776,283 
30-04-1987 13.5 1019.5 1015 + * + + * :^  + t * * + 
480 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate B F I Price Rate 
01-05-1987 15.2 1025 938 13.91 765,042 
07-05-1987 15.2 1051.5 999 14.44 794,260 
08-06-1987 12.5 986.5 850 10.77 592,372 
10-07-1987 14.8 923.5 899 14.41 792,405 
31-07-1987 14.8 976.5 971.5 + + + + * * +t + -4<* + 
03-08-1987 16.5 982.5 1114 18.71 1,028,962 
11-08-1987 ! 16.5 1074 1187 18.24 1,002,982 
12-09-1987 1 15.8 1049 1045 15.74 865,686 
14-10-1987 I 16.6 1085.5 1107 16.93 931,083 
30-10-1987 j 16.6 1171.5 1159 * + > t + + + 1 + 
02-11-1987 : 15.8 1172.5 1232 16.60 913,099 
15-11-1987 i 15.8 1155.5 1176 16.08 884,417 
17-12-1987 I 16.5 
j 
1264.5 1245 16.25 893,505 
18-01-1988 i 19.5 1386.5 1419.5 19.96 1,098,027 
29-01-1988 • 19.5 1393 1391 *+ • * + + + + . + 4( + + 
01-02-1988 I 21.0 1399.5 L515 22.73 1,250,322 
' 19-02-1988 . 21.0 1568.5 1561.5 20.91 1,149,845 ! 
: 22-03-1988 * 23.5 1647.5 1734 24.73 1,360,361 
' 23-04-1988 : 20.0 1402.5 1377.5 19.64 1,080..392 1 
29-04-1988 i 20.0 1358 1380 + + * f + 
02-05-1988 i 21.0 1345 1229.5 19.20 1,055,816 
25-05-1988 \ 21.0 1404 1265 18.92 1,040,652 
26-06-1988 ! 17.5 1238.5 1206.5 17.05 937,631 
28-07-1988 1 17.0 1197 1197 17.00 935,000 
29-07-1988 1 17.0 1197 1198 + + * *t ^ 
01-08-1988 16.5 1196 1245 17.18 944,680 
29-08-1988 16.5 1267 1261 16.42 903,202 
30-08-1988 16.5 1267 1261 t 4c f ^  f tc ic 
31-08-1988 17.2 1272 1395 18.86 1,037,476 
30-09-1988 17.2 1270 1274 ¥* ¥ ¥ ¥ 
03-10-1988 18.0 1275 1357 19.16 1,053,671 
31-10-1988 18.0 1373 1368 t+ • ^  t 
01-11-1988 18.0 1378 1464 19-12 1,051,785 
30-11-1988 18.0 1501 1510 + + • * f +++++++ 
01-12-1988 19.0 1501 1487 18.82 1,035,253 
03-12-1988 19.0 1488 1488 19.00 1,045,000 
31-12-1988 19.0 1596.5 1590 
481 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of SeU Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
01-05-1985 785,955 81 794,610 seU 2,430 
02-06-1985 714,677 81 716,040 sell 2,430 
04-07-1985 689,327 85 697,000 buy 2,550 
31-07-1985 • * ******* + ** + + ** * 
01-08-1985 729,469 95 731,500 buy 2,850 
05-08-1985 742,474 96 749,760 buy 2,880 
06-09-1985 761,090 94 765,160 seU 2,820 
08-10-1985 704,051 82 708,070 buy 2,460 
31-10-1985 **** * • * ******* ++* ***** 
01-11-1985 709,589 78 709,800 buy 2,340 
09-11-1985 683,259 79 686,115 sell 2,370 
11-12-1985 ; 680,623 78 687,960 buy 2,340 
12-01-1986 645,226 72 - 651,240 buy 2,160 
31-01-L986 * f ******* *** ***** 
03-02-1986 711,447 80 719,600 buy 2,400 . ! 
13-02-1986 \ 737,147 84 741,720 sell 2,520 ; 
17-03-1986 1 613,154 75 615,000 seU 2,250 ; 
18-04-1986 j 47L240 69 472,650 buy 2,070 ! 
30-04-1986 ' ! * ^ f t ^ 4. * - ******+ ****'* ' 
01-05-1986 i 
1 
! 457,802 70 460,250 buy 2,100 
20-05-1986 1 
1 
443,326 69 443,670 sell 2,070 i 
21-06-1986 ! 435,854 72 436,320 sell 2,160 ; 
23-07-1986 1 422,434 75 423,750 buy 2,250 
31-07-1986 t f f * * * * * t * * * * *** * * * * * j 
01-08-1986 482,917 76 487,160 buy 2,280 i 
24-08-1986 493,304 66 494,340 buy 1,980 j 
25-09-1986 698,454 85 702,100 sell 2,550 j 
27-10-1986 619,006 80 626,000 sell 2,400 ! 
31-10-1986 f fc 4 c * * * 4< * * ****t** *** ***** 
03-11-1986 580,347 78 583,050 sell 2,340 
28-11-1986 557,102 83 560,250 buy 2,490 
30-12-1986 582,078 82 584,250 sell 2,460 . 
31-01-1987 ^ ^ * 4c 4c f * + * * *t**** *+ * ***** j 
1 
02-02-1987 705,228 82 708,890 buy 2,460 
04-03-1987 796,167 93 797,010 buy 2,790 
05-04-1987 923,776 86 928,800 buy 2,580 
30-04-1987 * * * * 4 < ^ f * * ******# •+* ***** 
482 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of Sell Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
01-05-1987 910,400 98 919,240 buy 2,940 
07-05-1987 945,169 95 949,050 buy 2,850 
08-06-1987 704,923 83 705,500 buy 2,490 
10-07-1987 942,962 105 943,950 sell 3,150 
31-07-1987 * 4< * * + * * t + ^ + I f + # + * + * + + + + 
03-08-1987 1,224,465 110 1,225,400 sell 3,300 
11-08-1987 1,193,548 101 1,198,870 seU 3,030 
12-09-1987 1,030,167 99 1,034,550 buy 2,970 
i 14-10-1987 1,107,989 101 1,118,070 selJ 3,030 
^ 30-LO-1987 + * * + + f + * + f + + + * t + * * * + + + + + 
! 02-LI-1987 1,086,587 89 1,096,480 sell 2,670 
L5-11-1987 1,052,456 90 1,058,400 sell 2,700 
17-12-1987 1,063,271 86 1,070,700 buy 2,580 
18-01-L988 1,306,652 93 1,320,135 buy 2,790 
29-01-1988 f + + f * * f * + 1 + + + 
01-02-1988 L487,883 99 1,499,850 buy 2,970 
19-02-1988 1,368,316 88 1,374,120 buy 2,640 
22-03-1988 1,618,830 94 1,629,960 sel"l 2,820 
23-04-1988 1,285,667 94 L294,850 sell 2,820 
29-04-1988 * * 1 1 -t + f * r ¥ ¥ * * > f t 
02-05-1988 1,256,421 103 1,266,385 sell 3,090 
25-05-1988 1,238,376 98 1,239,700 sell 2,940 
26-06-1988 1,115,781 93 1,122,045 buv - 2,790 
28-07-1988 1,112,650 93 1,113,210 sell 2.790 
29-07-1988 t % t + * t * + + + + + + + 
01-08-1988 1,124,169 91 1,132,950 sell 2,730 
29-08-1988 1,074,811 86 1,084,460 buy 2,580 
30-08-1988 t ^ f t +14[ + + + + + 
31-08-1988 1,234,597 89 1,241,550 buy 2,670 
30-09-1988 ^ ^  ^  t * t * + f f f ^  t f f 41 f + * • + + 
03-10-1988 1,253,868 93 1,262,010 buy 2,790 
31-10-1988 f « t * • + + * • t f t f f f f ¥ ¥ ¥ • * + * + 
01-11-1988 1,251,624 86 1,259,040 sell 2,580 
30-11-1988 + + * + + + * + 
01-12-1988 1,231,951 83 1,234,210 sell 2,490 
03-12-1988 1,243,550 84 1,249,920 buy 2,520 
31-12-1988 * ^ t + * t + + + + > f f + f f * + + + + * 
483 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/Loss Prof/Loss 
01-05-1985 797,040 t*** •** ******* ******* ******* 
02-06-1985 718,470 716,040 -78,570 78,570 76,140 
04-07-1985 699,550 664,200 -51,840 51,840 49,410 
31-07-1985 ******* 616,675 -80,325 -80,325 -82,875 
01-08-1985 734,350 * * * 4 c * * * ****** ****** ****** 
05-08-1985 752,640 741,950 10,450 10,450 7,600 
06-09-1985 767,980 781,440 31,680 31,680 28,800 
1 08-10-1985 710,530 811,690 46,530 -46,530 -49,350 
1 31-10-1985 ***t*** 740,460 32,390 32,390 29,930 
! 01-11-1985 712,140 * f t * * * * ++++*+ ****** ****** 
i 09-11-1985 688,485 677,430 -32,370 • -32,370 -34,710 
1 11-12-1985 690,300 696,780 10,665 -10,665 -13,035 
12-01-1986 653,400 705,510 17,550 17,550 15,210 
31-01-1986 ****** :^  614,160 -37,080 -37,080 -39,240 
1 03-02-1986 722,000 ++*+*** ****** ****** ****** 
: 13-02-1986 744,240 706,400 -13,200 -13,200 -15,600 
'. 17-03-1986 617,250 688,800 -52,920 52,920 50,400 
18-04-1986 474,720 513,750 -101,250 101.250 99,000 
30-04-1986 *•**+*+ 456,435 -16,215 -16,215 -18,285 
01-05-1986 462,350 f * f * 4c * * ***** i * * + * * * * * * f • * 
[ 20-05-1986 445,740 450,100 -10,150 -10,150 -12,250 
i 21-06-1986 438,480 418,140 -25,530 25,530 23,460 
: 23-07-1986 426,000 406,800 -29,520 29,520 27,360 
31-07-1986 * ^ f** t * 420,375 -3,375 -3,375 -5,625 
1 01-08-1986 489,440 ******* ****** ****** ****** 
24-08-1986 496,320 569,240 82,080 82,080 79,800 
25-09-1986 704,650 545,160 50,820 50,820 48,840 
27-10-1986 628,400 665,125 -36,975 36,975 34,425 
31-10-1986 t* * **** 628,800 2,800 -2,800 -5,200 
03-11-1986 585,390 ******* ****** ****** ****** 
28-11-1986 562,740 526,500 -56,550 56,550 54,210 
30-12-1986 586,710 591,375 ' 31,125 31,125 ; 28,635 
31-01-1987 **+;^*** 624,840 i 40,590 -40,590 ! -43,050 
02-02-1987 711,350 * * * * * * * 1 ****** ****** ****** 
04-03-1987 799,800 702,740 -6,150 -6,150 -8,610 
05-04-1987 931,380 1,004,400 207,390 207,390 204,600 
30-04-1987 ******* 872,900 -55,900 -55,900 1 -58,480 
484 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/Loss Prof/Loss 
01-05-1987 922,180 ++++++ * * * * * * •*++*+ 
07-05-1987 951,900 979,020 59,780 59,780 56,840 
08-06-1987 707,990 807,500 -141,550 -141,550 -144,400 
10-07-1987 947,100 746,170 40,670 40,670 38,180 
31-07-1987 1,020,075 76,125 -76,125 -79,275 
03-08-1987 1,228,700 4c* + +*+*** * * * * * * 
11-08-1987 1,201,900 1,305,700 80,300 -80,300 -83,600 
12-09-1987 1,037,520 1,055,450 -143,420 143,420 140,390 
14-10-1987 1,121,100 1,095,930 61,380 61,380 • 58,410 
i 30-10-1987 
+ + 1 + + * 1,170,590 52,520 -52,520 -55,550 
02-11-1987 1,099,150 t + + •+1 + * * * * * * 
! 15-11-1987 1,061,100 1,046,640 -49.840 49,840 47,170 
17-12-1987 1,073,280 1,120,500 62,100 -62,100 -64,800 
18-01-1988 1,322,925 1,220,770 150,070 150,070 147,490 
29-01-1988 , + + + + * 1,293,630 -26,505 -26,505 -29,295 
' 01-02-1988 1 1,502,820 4c 4c .-4c * % f * * * * * * ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ ¥ * * * * * * 
\ 19-02-1988 ! 1,376,760 1,545,885 46,035 46,035 
* 
43,065 
1 22-03-1988 1,632,780 1,525,920 151,800 151,300 149,160 
23-04-1988 1,297,670 1,294,850 -335.110 335,110 332.290 • 
29-04-1988 1 f t ^ + r * 4^  
1 
1,297,200 2,350 -2,350 -5,170 
02-05-1988 1,269,475 *+*+*+ * * * * * * * * * * * * 
25-05-1988 1,242,640 1,302,950 36,565 -36,565 -39,655 
' 26-06-1988 1,124,835 1,182,370 -57,330 57,330 54,390 
28-07-1988 1,116,000 1,113,210 -8,835 -8,835 -11,625 
29-07-1988 ¥ + * * ¥ ¥ ¥ 1,114,140 930 -930 -3,720 
01-08-1988 1,135,680 f ***** * * * * * * * * * * * * 
29-08-1988 1,087,040 1,147,510 14,560 -14,560 -17,290 
30-08-1988 1,084,460 0 0 -2,580 
31-08-1988 1,244,220 ¥ ¥ ¥ * ¥ * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
30-09-1988 + 1 * ^ 1,133,860 -107,690 -107,690 -110,360 
03-10-1988 1,264,800 *+++** * * * * * * * * * * * * 
31-10-1988 1,272,240 10,230 10,230 7,440 
01-11-1988 1,261,620 t*+•++ * * * * * * * f * + * * 
30-11-1988 * t :4c 4c t 4< f 1,298,600 39,560 -39,560 -42,140 
01-12-1988 1,236,700 ¥ ^ ¥ i ¥ ¥ ¥ +***++ +*+*+* +*+++* 
03-12-1988 1,252,440 1,235,040 830 -830 -3,320 
31-12-1988 + + * * * t+ 1,335,600 85,680 85,680 83,160 
485 
Month Monthly Monthly Return on 
Return Costs In vestment 
M A Y 1985 73,761 772,133 9.55% 
J U N 47,157 698,473 6.75% 
J U L -78,243 744,454 -10.51% 
A U G 31,900 1,369,390 2.33% 
S E P T -34,055 717,584 -4.75% 
O C T 19,135 878,526 2.18% 
N O V -43,672 1,185,473 -3.68% 
D E C 5,908 668,161 0.88% 
: J A N 1986 -34,012' 890,691 -3.82% 
1 F E B 12,750 1,140,635 1.12% 
M A R 74,644 653,519 11.42% 
A P R 28,121 764,056 3.68% 
M A Y -3,453 629,503 -0.55% 
; J U N 23,213 415,613 5.59% 
J U L 13,185 727,455 1.81% 
A U G 92,010 613,520 15-00% 
S E P T 43,085 504,362 8.54% 
O C T 22,770 1,200,928 1.90% 
N O V 58,684 673,318 8.72% 
D E C 18,780 548,151 3.43% , 
J A N 1987 -37,669 513,371 -7.34% 
F E B -8,036 663,927 -1.21% 
M A R 184,845 772,242 23.94% 
A P R -39,299 1,006,361 -3.91% 
M A Y -55,973 1,665,852 -3.36% 
J U N -4,146 717,096 -0.58% 
J U L -68,537 1,146,222 -5.98% 
A U G 17,305 2,092,566 0.83% 
S E P T 77,816 1.018,907 7.64% 
O C T -35,472 1.477.748 -2.40% 
N O V 12,745 1,662,859 0.77% 
D E C 43,370 1,034,031 4.19% 
J A N 1988 44,450 1,859,565 2.39% 
F E B 89,678 1,933,058 4.64% 
M A R 196,004 1,405,742 13.94% 
A P R 233.663 2,471,231 9.46% 
M A Y -26,058 1,580,135 -1.65% 
486 
Month Monthly Monthly Return on 
Return Costs Investment 
J U N 38,613 1,142,887 3.38% 
J U L -13,165 2,029,928 -0.65% 
A U G -19,870 2,222,720 -0.89% 
S E P T -110,360 1,244,220 -8-87% 
O C T 7,440 1,264,800 0.59% 
N O V -42,140 1,261,620 -3.34% 
D E C 79,840 2,489,140 3.21% 
487 
D.3 B R Z - N W E 120,000 D W T . Iron Ore 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate B F I Price Rate 
01-05-1985 5.5 1062 981 5.08 609,661 
23-05-1985 5.5 974.5- 888 5.01 601,416 
12-06-1985 5.0 919 890 4.84 581,066 
03-07-1985 4.0 838 830 3.96 475,418 
24-07-1985 1 4.0 754.5 753 3-99 479,046 
31-07-1985 j 4.0 725.5 725-5 ^+ * * * * + + 1 + + * 
01-08-1985 i 4.2 718.5 770 4.50 540,125 
; 14-08-1985 i 718.5 814 4.76 570,990 
i 04-09-1985 ! 4.6 739.5 807 5.02 602,385 
25-09-1985 1 4.6 839.5 937 5.13 616,110 
; 16-10-1985 ! '-^ 888.5 914 • 4.73 567,842 
31-10-1985 \ 4.6 905 903 4 * t * .4^  * + 
^ 01-11-1985 1 5.2 906.5 9L0 • 5.22 626,409 
; 06-11-1985 ! 5.2 914.5 885 5.03 603,871 
' 27-11-1985 ! 5.2 900 899 5.19 623,307-
' 18-12-1985 i 5.2 897 881.5 5.11 613,217 
; 08-01-1986 ! ^-2 905.5 910 4.22 506,505-
29-01-1986 \ 4.2 846 857.5 4.26 510;851 
31-01-1986 4.2 831 853 ^ ^ t f t i'* 
03-02-1986 3.7 827.5 899-5 4.02 482,632 
19-02-1986 3.7 761 854 4.15 498,260 
12-03-1986 ! 3.9 742.5 845 4.44 532,606 
02-04-1986 3.7 731.5 756 3.82 458,871 
23-04-1986 3.7 676 671.5 3.68 441,044 
30-04-1986 3.7 658-5 661.5 ^ * t + + * t 
01-05-1986 3.4 658 657.5 3.40 407,690 
14-05-1986 3.4 661 699 3.60 431,455 
04-06-1986 3.0 661-5 636-5 2.89 346,395 
25-06-1986 3.0 620.5 593 2.87 344,045 
16-07-1986 2.7 572.5 560.5 2.64 317,209 
31-07-1986 2.7 553-5 560.5 i t t * 4^  + 
01-08-1986 3.8 556 641 4.38 525,712 
06-08-1986 3.8 554.5 669 4.58 550,161 
27-08-1986 3.8 644.5 756 4.46 534,889 
17-09-1986 3.7 756 801 3.92 470,429 
08-10-1986 4.3 795 784 4.24 508,860 
29-10-1986 4.3 786-5 782 4.28 513,048 
488 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate B F I Price Rate 
31-10-1986 4.3 786.5 786 + # + * + f f f t** * 
03-11-1986 4.0 784 747.5 3.81 457,653 
19-11-1986 4.0 774.5 724 3.74 448,702 
10-12-1986 3.6 708 685 3.48 417,966 
31-12-1986 3.6 699 712 3.67 440,034 
21-0M987 3.8 853.5 840 3.74 448,787 
31-01-1987 3.8 866.5 864.5 ***** 
02-02-1987 2.7 861.5 762 2.39 286,579 
11-02-1987 3.3 853.5 775.5 3.00 359,810 
04-03-1987 3.3 859.5 872 3.35 401,759 
25-03-1987 3.3 980 1029.5 3.47 416,002 i 
15-04-1987 3.3 1001 995.5 3.28 393,824 ^ 
30-04-1987 3.3 1019.5 1015 ***** f ^ f t ^ t * j 
01-05-1987 3.3 1025 938 3.02 362,388 
06-05-1987 3.3 1035 970 3.09 371,130 
27-05-1987 3.3 1075 1027 3.15 378,318 
17-06-1987 : 3.3 960.5 851 2.92 350,855 : 
08-07-1987 \ I 3.3 919.5 887 3.18 382,003 ' 
29-07-1987 i ' 3.3 965 965 3.30 396,000 : 
31-07-1987 : 3.3 976.5 971.5 m k i :k ^ f ^ 4> * « * * 
03-08-1987 3.3 982.5 1114 3.74 449,002 ; 
19-08-1987 i 6.3 1129 1180 6.58 790,151 I 
09-09-1987 ! 5.4 1061.5 1090 5.54 665,398 
30-09-1987 5.4 1045 1100.5 5.69 682,415 i 
21-10-1987 6.2 1123.5 1138 6.28 753,602 
31-10-1987 6.2 1171.5 1159 ***** f f # r f * V j 
02-11-1987 7.2 1172.5 1232 7.57 907,845 1 
11-11-1987 7.2 1172.5 1231 7.56 907,108 
02-12-1987 6.8 1213.5 1277 • 7.16 858,700 ! 
23-12-1987 6.8 1262 1282 6.91 828,932 
13-01-1988 7.1 1369 1418 7.35 • 882,495 1 
31-01-1988 7.1 1393 1391 ***** ^^^^ M¥* 1 
1 
01-02-1988 7.6 1399.5 1515 8.23 987,267 1 
03-02-1988 7.6 1427 1540 8.20 984,219 1 
24-02-1988 7.6 1562 1583 7.70 924,261 
16-03-1988 9.0 1596.5 1670* 9.41 1,129,721 
06-04-1988 6.2 1596.5 1612 6.26 751,223 
489 
Date Current Level Spot Implied Expected 
of Freight of Futures Freight Revenue 
Trade Rate B F I Price Rate 
27-04-1988 6.2 1377.5 1380 6.21 745,350 
30-04-1988 6.2 1358 1380 ***** ******* 
03-05-1988 7.0. 1345 1229.5 6.40 767,866 
18-05-1988 7.0 1455.5 1435 6.90 828,169 
08-06-1988 5.5 1287 1287 5.50 660,000 
29-06-1988 5.5 1224 1205 5.41 649,755 
20-07-1988 5.9 1199 1227 6.04 724,534 
31-07-1988 5.9 1197 1198 ***** ******* 
01-08-1988 6.8 1196 1245 7.08 849,431 
10-08-1988 6.8 1191 1243 7.10 851,627 
31-08-1988 6.8 1267 1261 ***** ******* 
01-09-1988 6.4 1272 1375 6.92 830,189 
21-09-1988 6.4 1285 1304 6.49 779,356 
30-09-1988 6.4 1270 1274 ***** ******* 
03-10-1988 6.7 1275 1357 7.13 855,708 
12-10-1988 6.7 1305 1357 6.97 836,037 
31-10-1988 6.7 1373 1368 ***** ******* 
01-11-1988 7.4 1378 1464 7.86 943,419 
02-11-1988 7.4 1390 1455 7.75 929,525 
23-11-1988 7.4 1517 1532 7.47 896,780 
30-11-1988 7.4 1501 1510 ***** * * * T * * 
01-12-1988 8.5 1501 1487 8.42 1,010,486 
14-12-1988 8.5 1522 1532 8.56 1,026,702 
31-12-1988 8.5 1543 1590 ***** ******* 
490 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of Sell Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
01-05-1985 658,434 68 667,080 buy 2,040 
23-05-1985 649,529 74 657,120 buy 2,220 
12-06-1985 627,552 71 631,900 buy 2,130 
03-07-1985 513,451 62 514,600 buy 1,860 
24-07-1985 517,369 69 519,570 sell 2,070 
31-07-1985 * * * * * * * + * * * * * * * * + + * * * * * * 
01-08-1985 583,335 76 585,200 sell 2,280 
14-08-1985 616,669 76 618,640 buy 2,280 
04-09-1985 650,576 81 653,670 buy 2,430 
25-09-1985 665,398 72 674,640 buy 2,160 
16-10-1985 613,270 68 621,520 buy 2,040 
31-10-1985 * * * * * * * * * * , * * * * * *** * * * * * 
01-11-1985 676,522 75 682,500 buy 2,250 
06-11-1985 652,181 74 654,900 buy 2,220 
27-11-1985 673,171 75 674,250 buy 2,250 
18-12-1985 662,275 76 669,940 sell 2,280 
08-01-1986 547,025 61 555,100 sell 1,830 
29-01-1986 I 551719 65 557,375 sell 1,950 : 
31-01-1986 * * * * * * * f «*r *** *+ * * * * f * 
03-02-1986 521,243 53 521,710 sell 1,740 
19-02-1986 538,121 64 546,560 sell 1,920 : 
12-03-1986 575.215 69 583,050 buy 2,070 ; 
02-04-1986 495,580 66 498,960 sell 1,980 1 
23-04-1986 476,328 71 476,765 buy 2,130 ; 
30-04-1986 * * * * * * 4c 
. * * * * * * * * + * * * * * * ' 
01-05-1986 440,305 67 440,525 buy 2,010 i 
14-05-1986 465,972 67 468,330 sell 2,010 i 
04-06-1986 374,106 59 375,535 buy 1,770 
25-06-1986 371,569 63 373,590 buy 1,890 
16-07-1986 342,585 62 347,510 buy 1,860 ! 
31-07-1986 * * * * * * * V * ****++•* * + + * * * * • 
01-08-1986 567,769 89 570,490 buy 2,670 ; 
06-08-1986 594,173 89 595,410 sell 2,670 
27-08-1986 577,680 77 582,120 buy 2,310 i 
17-09-1986 508,063 64 512,640 buy 1,920 \ 
08-10-1986 549,569 71 556,640 sell 2,130 ! 
29-10-1986 554,091 71 555,220 seU 2,130 ' 
491 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of SeU Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
31-10-1986 f 1 1 f +^ ^ + + + + + + + + + + + + + • + + f 
03-11-1986 494,265 . 67 500,825 sell 2,010 
19-11-1986 484,599 67 485,080 seU 2,010 
10-12-1986 451,403 66 452,100 sell 1,980 
31-12-1986 475,237 67 477,040 buy 2,010 
21-01-1987 484,690 58 487,200 sell 1,740 
31-01-1987 4c :4c 4c 4< * *-f # + + + * t + 
02-02-1987 309,506 41 312,420 seU 1,230 
11-02-1987 233,877 31 240,405 sell 930 
04-03-1987 261,143 30 261,600 sell 900 
25-03-1987 270,401 27 277,965 sell 810 
15-04-1987 255,986 26 258,830 sell 780 
30-04-1987 fc* i ^ + K t t + *t t + + t A ¥* * + * + + * 
01-05-1987 235,552 26 243,880 sell 780 
06-05-1987 241,235 25 242,500 buy 750 
27-05-1987 245,907 24 246,480 buy 720 
17-06-1987 228,056 27 229,770 buy 810 
08-07-1987 1 248,302 28 248,360 buy 840 
29-07-1987 257,400 27 260,550 buv 810 
31-07-1987 \ fc f * 4c * + * + + + + f + + + ¥ ¥ ¥ ^ ^ 
03-08-1987 291,851 27 300,780 buy 810 
19-08-1987 853,363 73 861,400 sell 2,190 
09-09-1987 718,630 66 719,400 buy 1,980 
30-09-1987 737,009 67 737,335 buy 2,010 
21-10-1987 813,890 72 819,360 sell 2,160 ! 
31-10-1987 * * * + 1 + * t * + ¥¥ ¥^* 
02-11-1987 980,472 80 985,600 sell 2,400 
11-11-1987 979,677 80 984,800 buy 2,400 
02-12-1987 927,396 73 932,210 buy 2,190 
23-12-1987 895;246 70 897,400 sell 2,100 ! 
13-01-1988 953,095 68 964,240 buy 2,040 1 
31-01-1988 4c4i f 4c + * * t * + :4c :t t * • + + 
01-02-1988 1,066,248 71 1,075,650 buy 2,130 
03-02-1988 1,062,956 70 1,078,000 buy 2,100 
24-02-1988 998,202 64 1,013,120 sell 1,920 
16-03-1988 1,220,099 74 1,235,800 sell 2,220 
06-04-1988 811,321 51 822,120 buy 1,530 
492 
Date Level Number Futures Buy or Broker's 
of of Risk of Cost of SeU Commission 
Trade Exposure Contracts Investment Decision 
27-04-1988 804,978 59 814,200 seU 1,770 
30-04-1988 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *+* * * * * * 
03-05-1988 829,295 68 836,060 seU 2,040 
18-05-1988 894,423 63 904,050 buy 1,890 
08-06-1988 712,800 56 720,720 sell 1,680 
29-06-1988 701,735 59 710,950 sell 1,770 
20-07-1988 782,496 64 785,280 sell 1,920 
31-07-1988 * * * * * * * * * *+*++** *** * * * * * 
01-08-1988 917,386 74 921,300 sell 2,220 
10-08-1988 919,757 74 919,820 buy 2,220 
31-08-1988 * * * * * * * ** *+++*** *** * * * * * 
01-09-1988 896,604 66 907,500 buy 1,980 
21-09-1988 841,704 65 847,600 buy 1,950 
30-09-1988 * * * * * * * * * + **+ *** ** * * * * * * 
03-10-1988 924,165 69 936,330 buy 2,070 
12-10-1988 902,920 67 909,190 buy 2,010 
31-10-1988 * * * * * * * + * * * * * * * * *+ * * * * * * 
01-11-1988 1,018,393 70 1,024,800 buy 2,100 
02-11-1988 1,003,337 69 1,003,950 sell 2,070 
23-11-1983 968,523 64 980,480 sell 1,920 
30-11-1988 * * * * * * * + + * * * * * * * + * * * * * * * 
01-12-1988 1,091,325 74 1,100,380 sell 2,220 
14-12-1988 1,108,838 73 1,118,360 sell 2,190 
31-12-1988 * * T + • * * * + * * * * * * * *** * * * * * 
493 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/ Loss Prof/ Loss 
01-05-1985 669,120 t * *•-*** * * f f * * * **++*+* 
23-05-1985 659,340 603,840 -63,240 -63,240 -65.280 
12-06-1985 634,030 658,600 1,480 1,480 -740 
03-07-1985 516,460 589,300 -42,600 -42,600 -44,730 
24-07-1985 521,640 466,860 -47,740 -47,740 -49.600 
31-07-1985 +^ ^ t*** 500,595 -18,975 18,975 16.905 
01-08-1985 ! 587,480 > t * * * * t * * * * * * * * * * * *+*+** 
14-08-1985 j 620,920 618,640 33,440 -33,440 -35,720 
04-09-1985 1 656,100 613,320 -5,320 -5,320 -7.600 
25-09-1985 i 676,800 758,970 105,300 105,300 102,870 
16-10-1985 ! 623,560 658,080 -16,560 -16,560 -18,720 
31-10-1985 i ft * ** ** 614,040 -7,480 -7,480 -9,520 
01-11-1985 1 684,750 .t * + % * * * *++**+ * * * * * * * * * * * * 
06-11-1985 ! 657,120 663,750 -18,750 -18,750 -21,000 
27-11-1985 !• 676,500 665,260 10,360 10,360 8,140 
18-12-1985 672.220 661,125 -13,125 -13,125 -15,375 
08-01-1986 \ 556,930 691,600 21,660 -21,660 -23,940 
29-01-1986 559,325 523,075 -32,025 32,025 30,195 
31-01-1986 ^ f ^  4< * * ¥ 554,450 -2,925 2,925 975 
03-02-1986 523,450 ++*++* V * ^ « f * * * * * * 
19-02-1986 ' 548,480 495,320 -26:390 26.390 24,650 
12-03-1986 ij 585,120 540,800 -5,760 5,760 3,840 : 
02-04-1986 ' 500,940 521,640 -61,410 -61,410 -63,480 ! 
23-04-1986 478,895 443,190 -55,770 55,770 53,790 i 
30-04-1986 * t * 4< * * * 469,665 -7,100 -7,100 -9,230 i 
01-05-1986 1 442,535 **+**** * * * * * * * * * * * * t * * * ** 
14-05-1986 470,340 468,330 27,805 27,805 25,795 
04-06-1986 377,305 426,455 -41,875 41,875 39,865 i 
25-06-1986 i 375,480 349,870 -25,665 -25,665 -27,435 
16-07-1986 349,370 353,115 -20,475 -20,475 -22,365 j 
31-07-1986 1 * * * * * 
i 
347,510 0 0 -1,860 1 
01-08-1986 573,160 t * t f t * * * * * * * * * * * * * *+*f+t ! 
1 
06-08-1986 598,080 595,410 24.920 24,920 22,250 1 
27-08-1986 584,430 672,840 77,430 -77,430 -80,100 
17-09-1986 514,560 616,770 34,650 34,650 32,340 
08-10-1986 558,770 501,760 -10,880 -10.880 -12,800 
29-10-1986 557,350 555,220 -1,420 1,420 -710 
494 
Date Total Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof/Loss Prof/ Loss 
31-10-1986 ******* 558,060 2,840 -2,840 -4,970 
03-11-1986 502,835 ******* ++++** ****** * * * * * * 
19-11-1986 487,090 485,080 -15,745 15,745 13,735 
10-12-1986 454,080 458,950 -26,130 26,130 24,120 
31-12-1986 479,050 469,920 17,820 -17,820 -19,800 
21-01-1987 488,940 562,800 85,760 85,760 83,750 
31-01-1987 ******* 501,410 14,210 -14,210 -15,950 
02-02-1987 313,650 ******* ****** ****** ****** 
11-02-1987 241,335 317,955 5,535 -5,535 -6,765 
04-03-1987 262,500 270,320 29,915 -29,915 -30,845 
25-03-1987 278,775 308,850 47,250 -47,250 -48,150 
.15-04-1987 259,610 268,785 -9,180 9,180 8,370 
30-04-1987 ******* 263,900 5,070 -5,070 -5,850 
01-05-1987 244,660 ******* ****** ** **** ****** 
06-05-1987 243,250 252,200 3,320 -8,320 -9,100 
27-05-1987 247,200 256,750 14.250 • 14,250 13,500 
17-06-1987 230,580 204,240 -42.240 -42,240 -42,960 
08-07-1987 249,200 239,490 9,720 9,720 8,910 
29-07-1987 ! 261,360 270,200 21.840 21.840 21.000 
31-07-1987 * * * * * * * 262,305 1,755 1 — l . f D O 945 
03-08-1987 301,590 ******* ****** ****** ****** 
19-08-1987 863,590 318,600 17.820 • 17,820 17,010 
09-09-1987 721,380 795,700 -65.700 
• 
65,700 63,510 . 
30-09-1987 739,345 726,330 6,930 6,930 4,950 
21-10-1987 821,520 762,460 25,125 25,125 23,115 
31-10-1987 ******* 834,480 15,120 -15,120 -17,280 
02-11-1987 988,000 **** *** ****** ***+++ +***** 
11-11-1987 987,200 984,800 -800 800 -1,600 ' 
02-12-1987 934,400 1,021,600 36,800 36,800 34,400 : 
23-12-1987 899,500 935,860 3,650 3,650 1,460 
13-01-1988 966,280 992,600 95,200 -95,200 -97,300 ' 
31-01-1988 ******* 945,880 -18,360 -18,360 -20,400 ; 
01-02-1988 1,077,780 ******* ****** ****** ****** 
03-02-1988 1,080,100 1,093,400 17,750 17,750 15,620 • 
24-02-1988 1,015,040 1,108,100 30,100 30,100 28,000 
16-03-1988 1,238,020 1,068,800 55,680 -55,680 -57,600 ! 
06-04-1988 823,650 1,192,880 -42,920 42,920 40,700 
495 
Date To ta l Final Futures Gross Net 
of Cost of Value of Price Futures Futures 
Trade Investment Futures Difference Prof /Loss Prof /Loss 
27-04-1988 815,970 703,800 -118,320 -118,320 -119,850 
30-04-1988 814,200 0 0 -1,770 
03-05-1988 838,100 ***#:*t* ++*+*+ * **t ** *++•** + 
18-05-1988 905,940 975,800 139,740 -139,740 -141,780 
08-06-1988 722,400 810,810 -93,240 -93,240 -95,130 
29-06-1988 712,720 674,800 -45,920 45,920 44,240 
20-07-1988 787,200 723,930 12,980 -12.980 -14,750 
31-07-1988 766,720 -18,560 18,560 16,640 
01-08-1988 ! 
1 
923,520 * * * ^ * ++***+ + + + + f+ 
10-08-1988 1 922,040 919,820 -1,480 1,480 -740 
31-08-1988 * 933,140 13,320 13,320 11,100 
01-09-1988 1 909,480 ***:**.>:* +*++++ ++*+** 
21-09-1988 849,550 860,640 -46,860 . -46,860 -48,840 
30-09-1988 828,100 -19,500 -19,500 -21,450 
03-10-1988 938,400 * + * * * + • + + + f * * * * * * * 
12-10-1988 \ 911,200 936,330 0 13 -2.070 
31-10-1988 \ i f f i «c t * t 916,560 7.370 7,370 5,360 
01-11-1988 \ [ L026,900 ** * t *:** :*****:* + -* + + * + * * f * * 
02-11-1988 ' ; 1,006,020 1,018,500 -6.300 -6,300 -8:400 
23-11-1988 i '• 982,400 1,057,080 53,130 -53.130 -55,200 
30-11-1988 , 1 * * * * * * * 966,400 -14,080 14,080 12,160 
01-12-1988 i 1 1,102,600 * * * * * * * f * +1 * + f + + * * f 
14-12-1988 ! 1,120,550 1,133,680 33,300 -33,300 -35,520 
31-12-1988 1 ******* 1,160J00 42,340 -42,340 -44,530 
496 
M o n t h Mon th ly M o n t h l y Return on 
Return Costs Investment 
M A Y 1985 -65,632 983,091 -6.68% 
J U N -40.858 919,015 -4.45% 
J U L -36,955 1.098,484 -3.36% 
A U G -42,234 1.119,697 -3.77% 
SEPT 96,436 938,174 10.28% 
O C T -22,891 1,106,989 -2.07% 
N O V -15,789 1,470,727 -1.07% 
D E C -28,406 995,790 -2.85% 
J A N 1986 i 23,190 1,340,328 1.73% 
FEB ! 26,844 836,867 3.21% 
M A R ! -59,273 844,037 -7.02% 
A P R i 41,999 955,981 4.39% 
M A Y 59,965 845,684 7.09% 
J U N -28,130 551,776 -5.10% 
J U L i -17,835 617,570 -2.89% 
A U G ' -50,150 1,310,390 -3.83% 
SEPT 16,107 788,320 2.04% 
O C T 1 -9,947 1.287,640 -0.77% 
N O V 29,815 827,562 3.60% 
DEC i 204 684,879 0.03% 
J A N 1987 \ 55,836 899,554 6.2 IS-
F E B i -34,672 532,001 -6.52% 
M A R -47,899 391,684 -12.23% 
A P R I -669 432,185 -0.15% 
M A Y -5,829 546,767 -1.07% 
J U N ! -26,791 342,063 -7.83% 
J U L J 24,915 587,420 4.24% 
A U G 62,374 918,440 6.79% 
SEPT 26,398 1,073,741 2.46% 
O C T 1 2,533 1,455.244 0.17% 
N O V 1 32,800 1,975,200 1.66% 
DEC -44,873 1,362,733 -3.29% 
J A N 1988 -71,367 1,437,447 -4.96% 
F E B 29,906 2.399,556 1.25% 
M A R -14,814 1.657,664 -0.89% 
A P R -109,991 1,993,340 -5.52% 
M A Y -214,260 1.528,340 -14.02% 
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Month M o n t h l y M o n t h l y Re tu rn on 
Return Costs Investment 
J U N 18,780 1,073,856 1.75% 
J U L 4,700 1.364,164 0.34% 
A U G 10,360 1,845,560 0.56% 
SEPT -70,290 1,759,030 -4.00% 
O C T 3,290 1,849,600 0.18% 
N O V -51,440 3,015,320 -1 .71% 
DEC -80,050 2,223,150 -3.60% 
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Appendix E 
Monthly Voyage Charter 
Freight Rates ($/Ton of 
Cargo) for the 'Sample' Trades 
(1985-1988) 
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M o n t h USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 
30,000Dwt. 55,000Dwt. r 2 0 , 0 0 0 D w t . 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
J A N 1985 17.2 12.3 5.3 
F E B 17 12.9 5.4 
M A R 17.3 13.5 5.7 
A P R 17.4 14 6.2 
M A Y 16.8 13 5.5 
J U N 16.3 11.5 5 
J U L i 13 10-5 4 
A U G ! 1^ L0 .4 4.2 
SEPT 1 15 10.5 4.6 
O C T 1 11 4.6 
N O V ! 15 10.8 5.2 
DEC ! 15 10.8 5.2 
J A N 1986 1 14 10 4.2 
F E B i 14.3 10 3.7 
M A R ^ 13.5 8.5 3.9 
A P R 11 7.2 3.7 
M A Y 10.5 7 3.4 
J U N 10.5 7 3 ; 
J U L 9 6.5 2.7 i 
i A U G 9.4 6.4 3.8 
' SEPT 13.7 10.2 3.7 
O C T ; 12.5 9.5 4.3 
N O V 14 9.3 4 
DEC 1 13.7 8.7 3.6 
J A N 1987 15.5 11.3 3.8 
F E B 1 15.4 10.8 2.7 
M A R i 12.2 2.8 
A P R 1 17.6 13.5 4.5 
M A Y 19.5 15.2 5.6 
J U N ! 16 12.5- 4.7 
J U L 18.5 14.8 6 
A U G 21 16.5 6.3 
SEPT 20.5 15.8 5.4 
O C T 20.1 16.6 6.2 
N O V 19.5 15.8 7.2 
DEC 22 16.5 6.8 
J A N 1988 25 19.5 7.1 
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M o n t h USGC-JAP H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
30,000Dwt. 55,000Dwt. 120,0OODwt. 
Gra in Coal I ron Ore 
F E B 29 21 7.6 
M A R 30.5 23.5 9 
A P R 25 20 6.2 
M A Y 24.5 21 7 
J U N 21.5 17.5 5.5 
J U L 21.8 ^7 5.9 
A U G 22.5 16.5 6.8 
SEPT 23.5 17.2 6.4 
O C T 25 18 6.7 
N O V ! 26.5 18 7.4 
• DEC ! 27 19 8.5 
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Appendix F 
Monthly Time Charter Freight 
Rates ($/day) for the 'Sample' 
Trades (1985-1988) 
5 0 2 
M o n t h USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 
30,000Dwt. 55,000Dwt. 120,000Dwt. 
Grain Coal I ron Ore 
J A N 1985 3700 5400 7900 
FEB 3900 5300 7900 
M A R 3800 5200 8000 
A P R 3700 5100 7900 
M A Y 3800 4900 7500 
J U N 3700 4800 7400 
J U L 3300 4400 7200 ! 
A U G I 3400 4500 7200 i 
SEPT ; 3200 4500 7000 i 
O C T ; 3400 4600 7200 ; 
N O V ' i 3800 5000 7200 ; 
DEC ;! 4000 5200 7200 
J A N 1986 i i 3500 4500 6800 1 
FEB j 3400 4250 6600 : 
M A R : ; 3100 4250 5700 ' 
A P R ; 3100 4000 5500 
M A Y 2900 4150 5500 
J U N ! 2900 < 4150 5500 
J U L 2900 3900 5500 
A U G 3000 4050 5500 
SEPT ; 3500 4500 6500 
O C T • 3400 4750 6500 ; 
N O V ! 3300 4500 6500 \ 
DEC 1 3200 4000 6500 ; 
J A N 1987 '• i 3500 5000 6500 ' 
FEB 3500 5000 6500 i 
1 M A R 4300 5500. 7000 ! 
A P R 4900 6000 7500 I 
M A Y 5300 7000 8300 
J U N 5000 6500 7900 ! 
J U L 5200 6600 8700 ; 
A U G 5500 7800 9800 1 
SEPT 5500 7600 9800 
O C T 5500 8800 10500 i 
N O V 5600 9000 11000 
DEC 6300 9000 14000. 
J A N 1988 7200 10500 13800 
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1 
M o n t h USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 
30,000Dwt. 55,000Dwt. r20 ,000Dwt. 
Grain Coal I ron Ore 
F E B 7400 12000 14100 
M A R 7700 13500 15600 
A P R 7700 13500 15600 
M A Y 7500 12500 14500 
J U N 7200 10750 13500 
J U L 8000 10000 13300 
A U G 7800 11800 13800 
SEPT 1 8400 12400 14200 
O C T 8500 12200 15000 
N O V 1 8700 12500 15000 
DEC ! 8800 12500 15000 
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Appendix G 
Monthly Voyage Equivalent 
Time Charter Freight Rates 
($/Ton of Cargo) for the 
'Sample' Trades (1985-1988) 
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M o n t h U S G C - J A F H R - J A P B R Z - N W E 
30,000Dwt. 55,000Dwt. 120,000Dwt. 
Grain Coal I ron Ore 
J A N 1985 18.5 9.4 4.3 
F E B 19.3 9.5 4.4 
M A R 19.0 9.4 4.2 
A P R 18.0 9.0 4.2 
M A Y 17.5 8.7 3.8 
J U N 16.2 8.2 3.7 
J U L 16.4 8.2 3.7 
A U G 16.5 8.2 3.8 
SEPT 16.6 8.3 3.8 • 
O C T 16.7 8.4 3.7 
N O V 16.4 8.3 3-9 
DEC 17.5 8.8 3.8 ! 
J A N 1986 16.1 8.0 3.7 1 
FEB 13.5 7.0 3.2 i 
M A R ' 13.0 6.9 3.0 ! 
A P R 11.6 6.2 2.8 
M A Y ' 1 10.2 5.8 2.6 
J U N . : 10.8 6.1 2.5 ! 
J U L 10.4 5.8 2.4 ' 
A U G 10.2 5.3 2.6 
SEPT i 11.6 6.3 2.9 ' 
O C T : 11.7 6.6 2.9 i 
N O V i 11.6 6.4 . 2.9 : 
DEC 1 11.4 6.1 2.9 ! 
J A N 1987 1 12.8 7.1 3.1 \ 
FEB 13.7 7.4 3.3 i 
M A R 14.2 7.5 3.4 1 
A P R 15.6 8.1 3.7 ! 
M A Y 16.8 9.0 3.8 j 
J U N 16.2 8.6 3.7 ! 
J U L 16.4 8.6 3.9 
A U G 17.0 9.4 4.1 
SEPT 16.1 9.0 3.9 j 
O C T 15.9 9.6 4.1 i 
N O V 15.8 9.6 4.1 
DEC 16.0 9.4 4.5 
J A N 1988 16.1 9.9 4.4 
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M o n t h USGC-JAP H R - J A P BRZ-NVVE 
30,000Dwt. 55,OO0D\vt. 12O,000Dwt. 
Grain Coal I ron Ore 
F E B 16.6 10.8 4.5 
M A R 15.9 11.3 4.7 
A P R 16.8 11.6 4.9 
M A Y 16.8 11.2 4.6 
J U N 16.5 10.1 4.4 
J U L 16.4 9.4 4.3 
A U G 16.8 10.6 4.4 
SEPT j 17.9 11.1 4.4 
O C T : 16.8 10.5 4.4 
N O V ! 16.6 10.6 4.5 
DEC 1 17.8 11.0 4.6 
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Appendix H 
Monthly Prices ($/Tonne) of 
Heavy Fuel Oil (1985-1988) 
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M o n t h USGC Rot terdam 
J A N 1985 168 L87 
F E B 176 194 
M A R L73 175 
A P R 160 173 
M A Y 151 143 
J U N 133 138 
J U L 143 138 
A U G 143 144 
SEPT 147 148 
1 O C T 145 138 
i N O V 134 154 
: DEC 147 148 
, J A N 1986 134 145 
F E B 100 100 
M A R 99 101 
A P R j 78 82 
; M A Y 1 61 63 
J U N 71 57 
J U L , 65 52 
A U G • 61 67 
SEPT 73 83 
O C T 
1 
77 
N O V ! 77 76 
DEC ! 75 76 
J A N 1987 ! 91 101 
FEB 104 90 
M A R 97 98 
A P R 108 116 
M A Y 120 116 
J U N 115 113 
J U L 115 113 
A U G 118 112 
SEPT 106 98 
O C T 103- 101 
N O V 98 94 
DEC 90 88 
J A N 1988 75 85 
5 0 9 
M o n t h u s e e Rot te rdam 
F E B 79 77 
M A R 64 68 
A P R 78 90 
M A Y 81 78 
J U N 81 79 
J U L 67 72 
A U G 76 74 
SEPT 83 71 
; O C T 63 53 
1 N O V 58 62 
! DEC 74 70 
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Appendix I 
Monthly Prices ($/Tonne) of 
Diesel Oil (1985-1988) 
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Month USGC Rotterdam 
JAN 1985 245 222 
FEB 250 222 
MAR 245 227 
APR 243 227 
M A Y 238 210 
JUN 236 210 
JUL 237 205 
AUG 236 214 
SEPT 237 228 
OCT i 241 237 
NOV i 243 240 
DEC [ 249 232 
JAN 1986 i i 249 229 
FEB ! i 194 179 
MAR i 1 170 182 
APR 1 170 185 
MAY i 150 141 
JUN ! 150 
i 
113 
JUL ; 148 98 
AUG ' 135 119 
SEPT 144 122 
OCT . 143 113 
NOV ! 140 112 
DEC i i 140 112 
JAN 1987 ; 155 146 
FEB ' 162 140 
MAR I 159 138 
APR 159 140 
M A Y 160 148 
JUN 163 145 
JUL 160 147 
AUG j 165 150 
SEPT i 160 140 
OCT 1 158 142 
NOV 162 145 
DEC ! 162 
1 
148 
JAN 1988 1 160 146 
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Month USGC Rotterdam 
FEB 162 130 
MAR 162 118 
APR 160 142 
M A Y 163 135 
JUN 161 128 
JUL 156 120 
AUG 157 122 
SEPT • 155 H i 
OCT 156 98 
NOV 155 106 
DEC 160 129 
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Appendix J 
A Program for Calculating the 
Expected Return, Variance 
and Standard Deviation of 
Each Portfolio Possibility 
514 
T h i s program c a l c u l a t e s the means, standard d e v i a t i o n s and 
variances of the r e t u r n s of d i f f e r e n t p o r t f o l i o holdings of 
three a s s e t s : voyage c h a r t e r s , time c h a r t e r s and BIFFEX f u t u r e s . 
I t does so by a n a l y s i n g a l l p o s s i b l e mixes of the three a s s e t s 
given a p r e s c r i b e d base u n i t eg. 1*/,, 5*/, or 10'/, chunks. T h i s 
'steplength' i s set as an input v a r i a b l e . Other necessstry inputs 
are the mean, standard d e v i a t i o n and p a i r w i s e c o r r e l a t i o n 
c o e f f i c i e n t s of the three i n d i v i d u a l a s s e t s as i f they were 
held on a 100'/, b a s i s . 
program p o r t f o l i o 
• C O L L E C T I N G T H E D A T A -
character f i l e * 1 6 
p r i n t s 
print=^ , ' what filename ' 
p r i n t * 
read ( * , ' ( l a l 6 ) ' ) f i l e 
open ( f i l e = f i l e , u n i t = 5 , s t a t u s = ' n e w ' ) 
p r i n t * 
print*,*What i s the deadweight tonnage of the ship you are i n t e r e s 
+ted i n . ' 
p r i n t * 
read*,dwt 
p r i n t * 
print*,*what i s the mean of the voyage c h a r t e r r e t u r n s f o r t h i s sh 
+ i p . ' 
p r i n t * 
read*,xvc 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the standard d e v i a t i o n of the voyage c h a r t e r r e t u r 
+s f or t h i s s h i p . ' 
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p r i n t * 
read*,svc 
p r i n t * 
print*,*what i s the mean of the time c h a r t e r r e t u r n s f o r t h i s ship 
+. ' 
p r i n t * 
read*.xtc 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the standard d e v i a t i o n of the time c h a r t e r r e t u r n s 
+ f or t h i s ship.' 
p r i n t * 
r e a d * , s t c 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the mean of the BIFFEX r e t u r n s f o r t h i s s h i p . ' 
p r i n t * 
read*,xbfi 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the standard d e v i a t i o n of the BIFFEX ret u r n s f o r t 
+his ship.' 
p r i n t * 
r e a d * , s b f i 
p r i n t * 
print*.'what i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between voyage and time c h a r t e r re 
+turns.' 
p r i n t * 
read*,pvctc 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between voyage cind BIFFEX r e t u r n s , 









p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the c o r r e l a t i o n between time c h a r t e r and BIFFEX r e 
+turns.' 
p r i n t * 
r e a d * . p t c b f i 
p r i n t * 
print*,'what i s the re q u i r e d percentage steplength.' 















i f ( i . l t . l O ) g o t o 3 
i f ( i . g t . 2 0 ) g o t o 3 
i f ( j . l t . 8 0 ) g o t o 3 
i f ( j . g t . 9 0 ) g o t o 3 
i f ( k . g t . S ) g o t o 3 
i f ( i . e q . O ) t h e n 
propi=0 
e l s e 
p r o p i = r e a l ( i ) / l 0 0 . 0 
end i f 
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i f ( j .eq.Othen 
propj=0 
e l s e 
p r o p j = r e a l ( j ) / 1 0 0 . 0 
end i f 
i f (k.eq.Othen 
propk=0 
e l s e 
propk=real(k)/lOO .0 
end i f 
av=propi*xvc+propj^xtc+propk*xbfi 
var=propi**2*vvc+propj **2*vt c+propk**2*vbf i+2'^ (propi'^prop j *covl 
++propi*propk''cov2+propj*propk*cov3) 
std = s q r t ( v a r ) 
Hrite(5.10) i . j . k . a v , s t d , v a r 









Expected Return, Variance 
and Standard Deviation 
Results for Portfolios with a 
10% Chunk-size 
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K . l U S G C - J A P 30,000 Dwt. Grain 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Variance Standard 
Charters Charters Futures Return Deviation 
0% 0% 100% -1.60% 71.70 8.47 
0% 10% 90% -3.63% 59.47 7.71 
0% 20% 80% -5-66% 51.33 7.16 
0% 30% 70% -7.69% 47.28 6.88 
0% 40% 60% -9.72% 47.31 6.88 
0% 50% 50% -11.74% 51.44 7.17 
0% 60% 40% -13.77% 59.64 7.72 
0% 70% 30% -15.80% 71.94 8.48 
0% 80% 20% -17.83% 88.32 9.40 
0% 90% 10% -19.85% 108.79 10.43 
0% 100% 0% -21.88% 133.35 11.55 
10% 0% 90% -2.07% 65.67 8.10 
10% 10% 80% -4.10% 61.95 7.87 
10% 20% 70% -6.12% 62.33 7.89 
10% 30% 60% -8.15% 66.79 8.17 
10% 40% 50% -10.18% 75.33 8.68 
10% 50% 40% -12.21% 87.97 9.38 
10% 60% 30% -14.24% 104.69 10.23 
10% 70% 20% -16.26% 125.50 11.20 
10% 80% 10% -18.29% 150.39 12.26 
10% 90% 0% -20.32% 179.38 13.39 
20% 0% 80% -2.53% 82.66 9.09 
20% 10% 70% -4.56% 87.45 9.35 
20% 20% 60% -6.59% 96.34 9.82 
20% 30% 50% -8.62% 109.31 10.46 
20% 40% 40% -10.64% 126.37 11.24 
20% 50% 30% -12.67% 147.52 12.15 
20% 60% 20% -14.70% 172.75 13.14 
20% 70% 10% -16.73% 202.08 14.22 
20% 80% 0% -18.76% 235.48 15.35 
30% 0% 70% -3.00% 122.66 11.08 
30% 10% 60% -5.02% 135.97 11.66 
30% 20% 50% -7.05% 153.37 12.38 
30% 30% 40% -9.08% 174.86 13.22 
30% 40% 30% -LI .11% 200.43 14.16 
30% 50% 20% -13.14% 230.09 15.17 
30% 60% 10% -15.16% 263.83 16.24 
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K.2 H R - J A P 55,000 Dwt. Coal 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Variance Standard 
Charters Charters Futures Return Deviation 
0% 0% 100% 2.15% 43.65 6.61 
0% 10% 90% 0-27% 37.16 6.10 
0% 20% 80% -1.60% 38.68 6.22 
0% 30% 70% -3.47% 48.20 6.94 
0% 40% • 60% -5.34% 65.72 8.11 
0% 50% 50% -7.21% 91.24 9.55 
0% 60% 40% -9.08% 124.77 11.17 
0% 70% .30% -10.95%. 166.31 12.90 
0% 80% 20% -12.82% 215.84 14.69 
0% 90% 10% -14.69% 273.38 16.53 
0% 100% 0% -16.56% 338.92 18.41 
10% 0% 90% 4.87% 56.35 7.51 
10% 10% 80% 3.00% • 67.27 8.20 
10% 20% 70% 1.13% 86.19 9.28 
10% 30% 60% -0.74% 113.11 10.64 
10% 40% 50% -2.61% 148.04 12.17 
10% 50% 40% -4.48% 190.98 13.82 
10% 60% 30% -6.35% 241.91 15.55 
10% 70% 20% -8.22% 300.85 17.35 
10% 80% 10%. -10.09% 367.79 19.18 
10% 90% 0% -11-96% 442.74 21.04 
20% 0% 80% 7.60% 112.34 10.60 
20% 10% 70% 5.73% 140.66 11.86 ' 
20% 20% 60% 3.86% 176.99 13.30 ; 
20% 30% 50% 1.99% 221.32 14.88 
20% 40% 40% 0.12% 273.66 16.54 
20% 50% 30% -1.75% 334.00 18.28 
20% 60% 20% -3.62% 402.34 20.06 ' 
20% 70% 10% -5.49% 478.69 21.88 1 
20% 80% 0% -7.36% 563.03 23.73 ' 
30% 0% 70% 10.33% 211.62 14.55 
30% 10% 60% 8.46% 257.35 16.04 [ 
30% 20% 50% 6.59% 311.09 17.64 ' 
30% 30% 40% 4.72% 372.83 19.31 i 
30% 40% 30% 2.85% 442.57 21.04 
30% 50% 20% 0.98% 520.31 22.81 
30% 60% 10% -0.89% 606.06 24.62 
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Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Variance Standard 
Charters Charters Futures Return Deviation 
30% 70% 0% -2.77% 699.81 26.45 
40% 0% 60% 13-06% 354.20 18.92 
40% 10% 50% 11.19% 417.33 20.43 
40% 20% 40% 9.32% 488.48 22.10 
40% 30% 30% 7.45% 567.62 23.82 
40% 40% 20% 5.58% 654.77 25-59 
40% 50% 10% 3.70% 749.92 27.38 
40% 60% 0% 1.83% 853.07 29.21 
50% 0% 50% 15.79% 540.06 23.24 
50% 10% 40% 13.92% 620.61 24.91 
50% 20% 30% 12.05% 709.16 26.63 
• 
50% 30% 20% 10.17% 805.71 28.38 
50% . 40% 10% 8.30% 910.26 30.17 
50% 50% 0% 6.43% 1022.82 31.98 
60% 0% 40% 18.52% 769.22 27.73 : 
60% 10% 30% 16.64% 367.17 29.45 ' 
60% 20% 20% 14.77% 973.13 31.19 
60% 30% 10% 12.90% 1087.08 32.97 1 
60% 40% 0% 11.03% 1209.04 34.77 
70% 0% 30% 21.24% 1041.67 32.27 • 
70% 10% 20% 19.37% 1157.03 24.02 i 
70% 20% 10% 17.50% 1280.39 35.78 i 
70% 30% 0% 15.63% 1411.75 37.57 
80% 0% 20% 23.97% 1357.42 36.84 
80% 10% 10% 22.10% 1490.18 38.60 
80% 20% 0% 20.23% 1630.94 40.38 
90% 0% 10% 26.70% 1716.45 41.43 
90% 10% 0% 24.83% 1866.62 43.20 
100% 0% 0% 29.43% 2118.77 46.03 
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K.3 B R Z - N W E 120,000 Dwt. Iron Ore 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Variance Standard 
Charters Charters Futures Return Deviation 
0% 0% 100% -1.1.7% 23.57 4.85 
0% 10% 90% -2.42% 19.23 4.39 
0% 20% 80% -3.66% 19.73 4.44 
0% 30% 70% -4.90% 25.06 5.01 
0% 40% 60% -6.14% 35.25 5.94 
0% 50% 50% -7.38% 50.27 7.09 
0% 60% 40% -8.62% 70.13 8.37 
0% 70% 30% -9-86% 94.84 9.74 
0% 80% 20% -11.10% 124.39 11.15 
0% 90% 10% -12.35% 158.77 12.60 
0% 100% 0% -13.59% 198.01 14.07 
10% 0% 90% 0-85% 31.22 5.59 
10% 10% 80% -0.39% 36.51 6.04 
10% 20% 70% -1.63% 46.64 6.83 ! 
10% 30% 60% -2.87% 61.61 7.85 
10% 40% 50% -4.11% 81.42 9.02 . 
10% 50% 40% -5.35% 106.08 10.30 f 
10% 60%. 30% -6.59% 135.57 11.64 
10% 70% 20% -7.84% 169.91 13.03 i 
10% 80% 10% -9.08% 209.09 14.46 
10% 90% 0% -10.32% 253.11 15.91 
20% 0% 80% 2.88% 64.42 8.03 J 
20% 10% 70% 1.64% 79.34 8.91 
20% 20% 60% 0.40% 99.10 9.95 
20% 30% 50% -0.84% 123.70 11.12 
20% 40% 40% -2.08% 153.15 12.38 
20% 50% 30% -3.33% 187.43 13.69 
20% 60% 20% -4-57% 226.56 15.05 
20% 70% 10% -5.81% 270.53 16.45 
20% 80% 0% -7.05% 319.34 17.87 
30% 0% . 70% 4.91% 123-17 11.10 
30% 10% 60% 3.67% 147.72 12.15 
30% 20% 50% 2-43% 177.11 13.31 
30% 30% 40% 1.19% 211.34 14.54 
30% 40% 30% -0.06% 250-42 15.82 
30% 50% 20% -1-30% 294-33 17.16 
30% 60% 10% -2.54%) 343-09 18.52 
524 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Variance Standard 
Charters Charters Futures Return Deviation 
30% 70% 0% -3.78% 396.69 19.92 
40% 0% 60% 6.94% 207.46 14.40 
40% 10% 50% 5.70% 241.64 15.54 
40% 20% 40% 4.45% 280.66 16.75 
40% 30% 30% 3.21% 324.53 18.01 
40% 40% 20% 1.97% 373.23 19.32 
40% 50% 10% 0.73% 426.78 20.66 
40% 60% 0% -0.51% 485.17 22.03 
50% 0% 50% 8.96% 317.30 17.81 
50% 10% 40% 7.72% 36L.IL 19.00 
50% 20% 30% 6.48% 409.76 20.24 
50% 30% 20% 5.24% 463.26 21.52 
50% 40% 10% 4.00% 521.60 22.84 
50% 50% 0% 2.76% 584.78 24.18 
60% 0% 40% 10.99% 452.68 21.28 
60% 10% 30%. 9-75% 506-13 22.50 
60% 20% 20% 8.51% 564.41 23.76 
60% 30% 10% 7.27% 627.54 25.05 
60% 40% 0% 6.03% 695.51 26.37 
70% 0% 30% 13.02% 613.61 24.77 
70% 10% 20% 11.78% 676.69 26.01 
70% 20% 10% 10.54% 744.61 27.29 
70% 30% 0% 9.30% 817.37 28.59 
80% 0% 20% 15.05% 800.09 28.29 
80% 10% 10% 13.81% 872.80 29.54 
80% 20% 0% 12.36% 950.35 30.83 
90% 0% 10% 17.08% 1012.12 31.81 
90% 10%. 0% 15.83% L094.46 33.08 
100% 0% 0% 19.10% 1249.69 35.35 
525 
Appendix L 
Expected Return, Interquartile 
Range and Minimum Return 




L . l U S G C - J A P 30,000 Dwt. Grain 
Portfolio Holdings i 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimum j 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range Return 1 
0% 0% 100% -16.86% . 7.28 -16.86 1 
0% 10% 90% -18.72% 8.34 -18-72 j 
0% 20% 80% -20.58% 9.50 -20.58 
0% 30% 70% -22.43% 9.44 -22.43 1 
0% 40% 60% -24.29% • 9.83 -24.29 : 
0% 50% 50% -26.15% 10.72 -26.15 
0% 60% 40% -28.01% 12.26 -28.01 i 
0% 70% 30% -29.87% 13.94 -29.87 ; 
0% 80% 20% -32.09% 16.33 -32.09 
0% 90% 10% -35.64% 19.21 -35.64 ; 
0% 100% 0% -39.19% 21.22 -39.19 : 
10% 0% 90% -17.43% 9.96 -17.43 
10% 10% 80% -19.28% 10.76 -19.28 • 
10% 20% 70% -21.14% 11.40 -21.14 
10% 30% 60% -23.00% 13.09 -23.00 
10% 40% 50% -24.86% 14.76 -24.86 • 
10% 50% 40% -26.72% 16.64 -26.72 
10% 60% 30% -29.07% 18.32 -29.07 
10% 70% 20% -32.34% 20.36 -32.34 
10% 80% 10% -35.90% 22.30 -35.90 
10% 90% 0% -39.47% 24.36 -39.47 
20% 0% 80% -18.83% 13.57 -18.83 
20% 10% 70% -20.54% 15-81 -20.54 ' 
20% 20% 60% -22.24% 16.94 -22.24 ; 
20% 30% 50% -23.95% 19.40 -23.95 ' 
20% 40% 40% -26.29% 20.11 -26.29 : 
20% 50% 30% -29.59% 21.92 -29.59 , 
20% . 60% 20% -33.16% 24.37 -33.16 : 
20% 70% 10% -36.73% 26.77 -36.73 ! 
20% 80% 0% -40.29% 28.46 -40.29 ' 
30% 0% 70% -20.27% 18.20 -20.27 
30% 10% 60% -21.98% 19.73 -21.98 
30% 20% 50% -23.69% 21.42 -23.69 ; 
30% 30% 40% -26-85% 23.45 -26.85 ' 
30% 40% 30% -30.41% 24.90 -30.41 j 
30% 50% 20% -33.98% 27.36 -33.98 i 
30% 60% 10% -37.55% 29.52 -37.55 i 
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Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimun; 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range Return 
30% 70% 0% -41.12% 31.49 -41.12 
40% 0% 60% -22.24% 23.97 -22.24 
40% 10% 50% -24.10% 25.06 -24.10 
40% 20% 40% -27.67% 26.14 -27.67 
40% 30% 30% -31-24% 27.79 -31.24 
40% 40% 20% -34.81% 30.38 -34.81 
40% 50% 10% -38.38% 32.84 -38.38 
40% 60% 0% -41.95% 34.52 -41.95 
50% 0% 50% -25.59% 28.62 -25.59 
50% 10% 40% -28.50% 29.88 -28.50 
50% 20% 30% -32.07% 31.20 -32.07 
50% 30% 20% -35.64% 33.64 -35.64 
50% 40% 10% -39.21% 35.57 -39.21 
50% 50% 0% -42.78% 38.02 -42.78 
60% 0% 40% -29.33% 33.13 -29.33 
60% 10% 30% -32.90% 34.42 -32.90 
60% 20% 20% -36.46% 36.84 -36.46 
• 
60% 30% 10% -40.03% 39.01 -40.03 ' 
60% 40% 0% -43.60% 41.38 -43.60 
70% 0% 30% -33.72% 37.98 -33-72 
70% 10% 20% -37.29% 40.51 -37.29 i 
70% 20% 10% -40.86% 42.79 -40.86 i 
70% 30% 0% -44.43% 44.33 -44.43 1 
80% 0% 20% -38.19% 44.18 -38.19 
80% 10% 10% -41.69% 46.32 -41.69 
80% 20% 0% -42.26% 48.04 -42.26 
90% 0% 10% -42.51% 49.75 -42.51 
90% 10% 0% -46.08% 51.81 -46.08 
100% 0% 0% -46.91% 55.47 -46.91 
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L.2 H R - J A P 55,000 Dwt. Coal 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimum 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range Return 
0% 0% 100% 2.15% 7.57 -10.51 
0% ;o% 90% 0.27% 7.65 12.36 
0% 20% 80% -1.60% 8.35 -14.22 
0% 30% 70% -3.47% 10.45 -16.07 
0% 40% 60% -5.34% 13.38 -17.92 
. 0% 50% 50% -7.21% 15.96 -19.78 
0% 60% 40% -9.08% 19.27 -22.38 
0% 70% 30% -10.95% 22.27 -26.11 
0% 80% 20% -12.82% 25.83 -30.09 
0% 90% 10% -14.69% 28.91 -34.08 
0% 100% 0% -16.56% 32.01 -38.07 : 
10% 0% 90% 4.87% 10.08 -10-40 
10% 10% 80% 3.00% 11.19 -12.25 
i 10% 20% 70% 1.13% 13.65 -14.11 
1 10% 30% 60% -0.74% 17.30 -15.96 '. 
! 10% 40% 50% -2.61% 19.88 -17.81 ; 
: 10% 50% 40% -4.48% . 24.47 -21.38 '• 
10% 60% 30% -6.35% 27.95 -25.37 
i 10% 70% 20% -8.22%. 31.21 -29.36 ; 
i 10% 80% 10% -10.09% 34.45 -33.35 
10% 90% 0% -11.96% 37.49 -37.33 
20% 0% 80% 7.60% 15.71 -10.29 i 
20% 10% 70% 5.73% 17.70 -12.15 \ 
20% 20% 60% 3.86% 20.65 -14.00 
20% 30% 50% 1.99% 24.04 -16.66 
20% 40% 40% 0.12% 27.95 -20.65 
20% 50% 30% -1.75% 32.75 -24.63 
20% 60% 20% -3.62% 36.07 -28.62 
20% 70% 10% -5.49% 39.14 -32.61 i 
20% 80% 0% -7.36% 41.94 -36.60 1 
30% 0% 70% 10.33% 23.08 -10.18 1 
30% 10% 60% 8.46% 24.41 -12.04 
30% 20% 50% 6.59% 28.17 -15.92 
30% 30% 40% 4.72% 32.33 -19.91 
30% 40% 30% 2.85% 36.73 -23.90 
30% 50% 20% 0.98% 40.73 -27.89 
30% 60% 10% -0.89% 43.98 -31.87 
529 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimum 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range Return 
30% 70% 0% -2.77% 46.50 -35.86 
40% 0% 60% 13.06% 28.96 -11.20 
40% 10% 50% 11.19% 32.26 -15.19 
40% 20% 40% 9.32% 36.55 -19.17 
40% 30% 30% 7.45% 40.71 -23.16 
40% 40% 20% 5.58% 44.64 -27.15 
40% 50% 10% 3.70% 48.50 -31.14 
40% 60% 0% 1.83% 51.82 -35.13 
50% 0% 50% 15.79% 36.08 -14.45 
50% 10% 40% 13.92% 40.43 -18.44 
50% 20% 30% 12.05% 44.62 -22.43 
50% 30% 20% 10.17%) 49.40 -26.41 
50% 40% 10% 8.30% 52.82 -30.40 
50% 50% 0% 6.43% 56.53 -34.39 
60% 0% 40% 18.52% 43.88 -17.70 
60% 10% 30% 16.64% 48.55 -21.69 
60% 20% 20% 14.77% 53.32 -25.68 
60% 30% L0% 12.90% 57.93 -29.67 
60% 40% 0% 11.03% 61.17 -33.65 
70% 0% 30% 21.24% 52.23 -20.95 
70% 10% 20% 19.37% 57.34 -24.94 
70% 20% 10% 17.50% 62.09 -28.93 
70% 30% 0% 15.63% 66.18 -32.92 
80% 0% 20% 23.97% 61.07 -24.21 
80% 10% 10% 22.10% 66.11 -28.19 
80% 20% 0% 20.23% 70.43 -32.22 
90% 0% 10% 26.70% 69.91 -27.46 
90% 10% 0% 24.83% 74.36 -31.54 
100% 0% 0% 29.43% 78.28 -30.86 
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L.3 B R Z - N W E 120,000 Dwt. Iron Ore 
Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimum 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range Return 
0% 100% -1.17% 5.70 -14.02 
0% 10% 90% -2.42% 6.15 -13.20 
0% 20% 80% -3.66% 6.92 -14.17 
0% 30% 70% -4.90% 7.57 -15.14 
0% 40% 60% -6.14% 10.07 -16.11 
0% 50% 50% -7.38% 1 12.81 -18.75 
i 0% 60% 40% -8.62% ' 15.64 -21.47 
j 0% 70%* 30% -9.86% 18.82 -24.20 
i 0% 80% 20% -11.10% 22.37 -26.93 
! 0% 90% 10% -12.35% 24.85 -29.94 
0% 100% 0% -13.59% 28.00 -32.94 
1 10% 0% 90% 0.85% 8.63 -14.62 
1 10% 10% 80% -0.39% 9.02 -15.59 
1 10% 20% 70% -1.63% 10.15 -16.56 
10% 30% 60% -2.87% 12.36 -17.53 ; 
10% 40% 50% -4.11% 15.07 -18.50 : 
10% 50% 40% -5.35% 17.49 -20.17 ' 
' 10% 60% 30% -6.59% 20.44 -23.18 
10% 70% 20% -7.84% 24.62 -26.18 
: 10% 80% 10% -9.08% 28.33 -29.19 
I 10% 90% 0% -10.32% 31.37 -32.19 
20% 0% 80% 2.88% 10.29 -17.00 
! 20% 10% 70% 1.64% 11.66 -17.98 
20% 20% 60% 0.40% 14.05 -18.95 
' 20% 30% 50% -0.84% 16.53 -19.92 
20% 40% 40% -2.08% 20.74 -20.89 
20% 50% 30% -3.33% 24.25 -22.43 
20% 60% 20% -4.57% 27.58 -25.44 
• 20% 70% 10% -5.81% 31.15 -28.44 
20% 80% 0% -7.05% 34.72 -31.45 
30% 0% 70% 4.91% 14.19 -19.39 
30% 10% 60% 3.67% 17.12 -20.36 
30% 20% 50% 2.43% 18.90 -21.33 
30% 30% 40% 1.19% 23.26 -22.30 
30% 40% 30% -0.06% 27.72 -23.28 
30% 50% 20% -1.30% 30.15 -24.69 
30% 60% 10% -2.54% 33.71 -27.70 
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Portfolio Holdings 
Voyage Time Freight Expected Interquartile Minimum 
Charters Charters Futures Return Range . Return 
30% 70% 0% -3.78% 37.54 -30.70 
40% 0% 60% 6.94% 19.85 -21.78 
40% 10% 50% 5.70% 22.50 -22.75 
40% 20% 40% 4.45% 26.38 -23.72 
40% 30% 30% 3.21% 30.27 -24.69 
40% 40% 20% 1.97% 33.89 -25.87 
40% 50% 10% 0.73% 36.74 -27.64 
40% 60% 0% -0.51% 39.64 -29.96 
50% 0% 50% 8.96% 25.22 -24.17 i 
50% 10% 40% 7.72% 28.26 -25.14 • 
50% 20% 30% 6.48% 32.49 -26.11 : 
50% 30% 20% 5.24% 36.28 -27.17 • 
50% 40% 10% 4.00% 39.57 -28-94 1 
50% 50% 0% 2.76% 43.33 -30.71 ! 
60% 0% 40% 10.99% 30.79 -26.55 
60% 10% 30% 9.75% 34.72 -27.52 . 
60% 20% 20% 8.51% 38.55 -28.49 
60% 30% 10% 7.27% 42-40 -30.23 
60% 40% 0% 6.03% 45.96 -32.00 
70% 0% 30% 13.02% 37.10 -23.94 
70% 10% 20% 11.78% 40.68 -29.91 : 
70% 20% 10% 10.54% 44.87 -31.53 
70% 30% 0% 9.30% 48.47 -33.30 . 
80% 0% 20% 15.05% 43.17 -31.33 ; 
80% 10% 10% 13.81% 47.05 -32.83 
80% 20% 0% 12.36% 51.12 -34.60 ; 
90% 0% 10% 17.08% 49.41 -34.12 j 
90% 10% 0% 15.83% 53.08 ! -35.89 : 
100% 0% 0% 19.10% 55.00 -37.19 ; 
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Appendix M 
A Program for Determining 
the Roots of Polynomials 
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A 
I T h i s i s a program f o r d e r i v i n g the roots of a polynomial using 
I Newton's Divided D i f f e r e n c e algorithm. To r\in the program, i t i s 
Inecessary to input an i n i t i a l guess at a root. T h i s guess should 
I r e l a t e to an i n t e r v a l of i n t e r e s t . I t i s a l s o necessary to 
I a d j u s t the f ( x ) and f d ( x ) v a x i a b l e s i n l i n e with the form of the • 
I polynomial cu id i t s d e r i v a t i v e . 
i m p l i c i t real*8(a-h,o-2) 
f (x) = .0000335241*x«*3+.00383043^x«=*^2+. 1158109=^x-90.842647 
fd(x)=3*.0000335241*x**2+2*.00383043*x+.1158109 
print*.'what i s your i n i t i a l approximation' 
read*,xO 
print*,'what i s the required accuracy' 
r e a d * , t o l 




i f ( a b s ( ( x l - x O ) / x l ) . I t . t o l . a n d . a b s ( f ( x l ) ) . I t . t o l ) then 
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p r i n t * . ' t h e root i s x l t o o k i i t e r a t i o n s ' 
stop 
end i f 
p r i n t * , ' i t e r a t i o n ' , i , ' a p p r o x i m a t i o n ' . x l 
xO=xl 
1 continue 
p r i n t * , ' s o r r y have not converged' 
stop 
end 
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